Ballester, Coralio, Calvo-Armengol, Antonio and Zenou, Yves (2010) Delinquent networks. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, (1), 34-61. (doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x).
- Publishers print
Restricted to internal admin
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences
|Date Deposited:||29 May 2012 08:39|
|Last Modified:||04 Nov 2013 08:58|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
Actions (login required)