Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio, Calvo-Armengol, Antonio and Zenou, Yves (2010) Delinquent networks. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, (1), 34-61. (doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x).
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Description/Abstract
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 1542-4766 (print) 1542-4774 (electronic) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HM Sociology H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences |
| Item ID: | 339641 |
| Date Deposited: | 29 May 2012 08:39 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2012 10:53 |
| Contributors: | Ballester, Coralio (Author) Calvo-Armengol, Antonio (Author) Zenou, Yves (Author) |
| Date: | January 2010 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339641 |
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