Campaign contributions as a commitment device

Maniadis, Zacharias (2009) Campaign contributions as a commitment device. Public Choice, 139, (3-4), 301-315. (doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9394-2).


[img] PDF - Version of Record
Restricted to System admin

Download (292Kb) | Request a copy


We explore the idea that the influence of interest groups in elections may have positive economic effects. Since the investment decisions of firms determine economic growth and employment, voters have a common interest in making their governments commit to policies that encourage private investments. However, governments may renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies. Campaign contributions by firms tend to restrain the scope for such opportunism and provide a commitment device. This is achieved if firms, after the policy is chosen, contribute to the governing party or to its rivals.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9394-2
ISSNs: 0048-5829 (print)
1573-7101 (electronic)
Keywords: campaign contributions, probabilistic voting, policy commitment
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions : Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 341896
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
June 2009Published
16 January 2009Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 06 Aug 2012 16:15
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:32

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics