Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model—the public project problem. In this scenario, the VCG mechanism collects in payments up to n-1 /n of the total value of the agents. This collected revenue represents a loss of social welfare. Given this, we study how to redistribute most of the VCG revenue back to the agents. Our first result is a bound on the best possible efficiency ratio, which we conjecture to be tight based on numerical simulations. Furthermore, the upper bound is confirmed on the case with 3 agents, for which we derive an optimal redistribution function. For more than 3 agents, we turn to heuristic solutions and propose a new approach to designing redistribution mechanisms.
978-3-642-35310-9
323-336
Naroditskiy, Victor
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Guo, Mingyu
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Dufton, Lachlan
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Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
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Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
2012
Naroditskiy, Victor
8881263c-ee85-49f2-b658-99c31b490e1d
Guo, Mingyu
f5665ce2-6a3b-474d-b3ad-17973ed1e43f
Dufton, Lachlan
07c06fcf-cdb8-4410-87f5-0c2ca1a2749d
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Naroditskiy, Victor, Guo, Mingyu, Dufton, Lachlan, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R.
(2012)
Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems.
Goldberg, Paul W.
(ed.)
Internet and Network Economics: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, United Kingdom.
10 - 12 Dec 2012.
.
(doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_24).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model—the public project problem. In this scenario, the VCG mechanism collects in payments up to n-1 /n of the total value of the agents. This collected revenue represents a loss of social welfare. Given this, we study how to redistribute most of the VCG revenue back to the agents. Our first result is a bound on the best possible efficiency ratio, which we conjecture to be tight based on numerical simulations. Furthermore, the upper bound is confirmed on the case with 3 agents, for which we derive an optimal redistribution function. For more than 3 agents, we turn to heuristic solutions and propose a new approach to designing redistribution mechanisms.
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Published date: 2012
Venue - Dates:
Internet and Network Economics: Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, United Kingdom, 2012-12-10 - 2012-12-12
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
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Local EPrints ID: 343343
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/343343
ISBN: 978-3-642-35310-9
PURE UUID: 02b9e3c5-0a5d-47c2-a90c-7b33f33e0d3e
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Date deposited: 01 Oct 2012 14:30
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 12:02
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Contributors
Author:
Victor Naroditskiy
Author:
Mingyu Guo
Author:
Lachlan Dufton
Author:
Maria Polukarov
Author:
Nicholas R. Jennings
Editor:
Paul W. Goldberg
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