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Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers

Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic communication including sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism and message clustering. Surprisingly, the strategic receiver may respond to more aggressive claims with more moderate actions. In the limit as the probabilities of the non-strategic players approach zero, (i) the limit equilibrium corresponds to a most-informative equilibrium of the limit (Crawford–Sobel) game; (ii) only the top messages are sent.
communication, honest senders, naive receivers, sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism, clustering of messages, non-monotone receiver reaction, finite message space, existence
0022-0531
401-424
Chen, Ying
338aa31f-c129-49c9-b5b7-b583836a8cc1
Chen, Ying
338aa31f-c129-49c9-b5b7-b583836a8cc1

Chen, Ying (2011) Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers. Journal of Economic Theory, 146 (2), 401-424. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.001).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic communication including sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism and message clustering. Surprisingly, the strategic receiver may respond to more aggressive claims with more moderate actions. In the limit as the probabilities of the non-strategic players approach zero, (i) the limit equilibrium corresponds to a most-informative equilibrium of the limit (Crawford–Sobel) game; (ii) only the top messages are sent.

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e-pub ahead of print date: 22 September 2010
Published date: March 2011
Keywords: communication, honest senders, naive receivers, sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism, clustering of messages, non-monotone receiver reaction, finite message space, existence
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 353791
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/353791
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 2900a2c4-0dfa-44a1-b57a-e64edf01db7b

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Date deposited: 18 Jun 2013 09:22
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 14:09

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Author: Ying Chen

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