Control of belief and intention
Control of belief and intention
This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of belief and that of intention. I do not defend this Symmetry View in detail, but rather try to adjudicate between different versions of it: what I call Evaluative, Normative and Teleological versions. I argue that the central motivation for the Symmetry View in fact supports only a specific Teleological version of the view.
aim of belief, epistemic normativity, intention, control, transparency
337-346
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
December 2012
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
Abstract
This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of belief and that of intention. I do not defend this Symmetry View in detail, but rather try to adjudicate between different versions of it: what I call Evaluative, Normative and Teleological versions. I argue that the central motivation for the Symmetry View in fact supports only a specific Teleological version of the view.
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Published date: December 2012
Keywords:
aim of belief, epistemic normativity, intention, control, transparency
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 354338
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/354338
PURE UUID: c5b53450-6a90-4141-8a44-543c4d80f41f
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Date deposited: 09 Jul 2013 10:29
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 14:17
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