Keep things in perspective: reasons, rationality, and the a priori
Keep things in perspective: reasons, rationality, and the a priori
Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this point, I offer a novel account of subjective reasons which avoids the problem.
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
2014
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2014)
Keep things in perspective: reasons, rationality, and the a priori.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 8.
Abstract
Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this point, I offer a novel account of subjective reasons which avoids the problem.
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KeepThingsinPerspective_JESP_FINAL_DJW.pdf
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Accepted/In Press date: 3 March 2014
Published date: 2014
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 361692
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/361692
ISSN: 1559-3061
PURE UUID: 784d59c2-c058-4147-b3fb-7cdb51bef468
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Date deposited: 30 Jan 2014 12:00
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 15:55
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