ABSTRACT   This paper focuses on the process of Europeanization and the extent to which it regulates the policies and practices of actors. The literature distinguishes between three phases of Europeanization. The first phase deals with Europeanization among the EU member states and the constant ‘uploading’ of policies and norms at the EU level and their ‘downloading’ at the national level. The second phase of Europeanization relates to the impact of the accession process on states of Central and Eastern Europe. The third phase turns our attention to the neighbouring states of the EU. It is this final stage that is the central focus of the paper. The aim is to achieve a better understanding of how the process of Europeanization might regulate the policies and practices of states that do not have the incentive of future membership. Through a case study of Euro-Mediterranean relations on energy and climate change policies (i.e. renewable energy) the paper offers insights into the mechanisms, obstacles and implementation opportunities for cross-national regulation of policy between members and non-members.

1. Introduction

The concept of Europeanization has become a widespread phenomenon since 1990s. Despite mounting academic interest in the concept, Europeanization remains a contested concept with researchers offering different interpretations. In general, it has mostly been used to describe the EU’s impact on EU Member States and, to a lesser extent, candidate countries. Diffusion of EU norms, rules and policies at the domestic level captures the interest of Europeanization studies from early 1990s till the present (Ladrech, 1994; Börzel, 1999; Risse et al., 2001; Héritier, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Negotiation and consensus-building of EU policy processes at the EU level added another dimension to studies of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2000; 2003; Börzel, 2001a; 2001b). Only recently did research start to focus on the impact of the new members at the EU level (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Sedelmeier,
2008; Jahn and Kuitto, 2011). As the EU keeps enlarging its borders, influence over national governments and authority to embrace new EU states, new questions arise about how these dynamics are unfolding, which mechanisms advance negotiation and consensus-building and how different policy tools and strategies are enacted through various mediating factors to produce diverse outcomes.

EU membership plays a significant role in the analysis of this puzzle. EU membership generates compliance with EU norms (EU Member States), while at the same time membership conditionality secures adoption of the whole EU acquis in candidate European countries when membership perspective is credible. The absence of EU membership is not expected to generate compliance nor adoption of the whole EU acquis in non-European countries, since there is a lack of enforcement link in comparison with the case of the first two waves.

This paper attempts to shed light on Europeanization literature and understand the main lessons learnt from the first two waves. Although there is empirical data on Europeanization inside Europe, there is a lack of empirical data on Europeanization ‘beyond Europe’ in general and specifically on EU climate policies. Europeanization inside Europe mainly focuses on how EU norms and policies are negotiated at the EU level and, then, diffused and institutionalized at the domestic level. Instead, Europeanization beyond Europe focuses on norm and policy diffusion at the domestic level of non-European countries without taking into consideration potential contestation of EU norms from non-European countries. Moreover, both EU ‘external governance’ and ‘normative power Europe’ perspectives tend to be speculative without providing empirical evidence from third countries. Euro-Mediterranean climate governance can provide useful insights in the third wave of Europeanization, although currently empirical evidence of the mechanisms, obstacles and implementation opportunities is lacking.

2. Conceptualising Europeanization

Early studies on Europeanization till late 1990s and early 2000s provide useful insights on the domestic impact of Europeanization, in several EU Member States and on certain EU policies (Ladrech, 1994; Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Later studies focused on the ‘cause of effect’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009) viewing Europeanization as a ‘two-way process’ (Radaelli, 2000; 2003; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Börzel, 2001; Jordan et al., 2004) and introducing the idea of ‘up-loading’ (Börzel, 2001, Radaelli, 2000; 2003). Research on candidate European states for EU membership and non-European countries captured the interest of Europeanization studies at a later stage (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lavenex, 2004; 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009).

Moving Europeanization studies forward, Radaelli captured Europeanization as a ‘reciprocal’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 3) policy process including both up-loading and down-loading of norms, rules, policies and ‘ways of doing things’. Börzel’s study (2001b) on ‘pace-setters’ and ‘foot-draggers’ introduces several elements that characterise EU Member
States when they negotiate and implement policy processes. Moreover, in her study on CEEs, Grabbe (2001; 2003) introduces several policy tools and strategies – i.e. legislative compliance, financial and technical assistance etc. – that characterise the top-down process of EU policy channels.

Coercion, socialisation and mimesis constitute the main mechanisms that drive the process of Europeanization. Coercion is connected with the enforcement of policy processes from one agent to another leading to compliance. The degree of compliance to an EU policy process is secured via Commission’s sanctions, ECJ ruling and the use of conditionality. According to Checkel (2001: 3), conditionality is a ‘mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy action, in support of which an international institution will provide specific amounts of assistance – usually financial or technical’. A second mechanism of Europeanization is socialisation through social learning and persuasion. For Johnston (2001: 494), ‘socialization is aimed at creating membership in a society where inter-subjective understandings of the society become taken for granted’. Finally, a third mechanism of Europeanization is mimesis. States act mimetically in order to transpose successful policies towards other states. Lesson-drawing, emulation and copying form constituent parts of mimesis.

Europeanization mechanisms are expressed through certain policy tools and strategies. These policy tools and strategies vary from financial compensations, package deals and transition periods to contractual relations, legislative and regulatory approximation, twinning and advice, monitoring, benchmarking and gate-keeping (Grabbe, 2003; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Falkner et al., 2005; Knill and Liefferink, 2007). Various mediating factors can both influence the final shape of EU policy processes during consensus-building and explore policy tools and strategies during the course of diffusion and institutionalisation. There are cases where they can inhibit the whole process as ‘veto points’ (Tsebelis, 1995); there are also other cases where they can facilitate, restrain or generate change during the formation, consolidation and then transposition and implementation of EU policy processes (Cowles et al., 2001; Jordan, 2002; Haverland, 2003).

The outcome of these interactions determines the extent to which Europeanization has an impact at the domestic level. Jordan et al. (2004) refers to policy content, policy structure and policy style in order to assess the level of ‘effect’ Europeanization produces in national environmental policies. In the pre-accession period, the role of credibility of rewards (i.e. EU membership) as an incentive focuses on the benefits domestic actors and structures can reap in order to comply with EU norms (Sedelmeier, 2011: 31). The short post-accession period and the ‘scarce systematic comparisons of policy outcome performance’ (Jahn and Kuitto, 2010: 719) impede the potential of this research to provide additional explanations on Europeanization in the enlarged EU in terms of the pace of change.

However, Europeanization studies mainly focus on the diffusion and institutionalization of EU policy processes without providing information on the dynamics of interaction. The number of studies that focus on the outcome of Europeanization is also limited to EU Member States and candidate and new EU Members. The lack of an academic consensus
reduces the impact of Europeanization literature in addressing the initial stages of establishing EU policy processes and to what extent it affects domestic structures. Focusing on Euro-Mediterranean climate governance, a new conceptualisation of Europeanization is attempted focusing mainly on the contestation of Euro-Mediterranean climate policy processes and the role of Europeanization mechanisms in the negotiation, diffusion and institutionalization of EU policy processes.

3. Europeanization inside Europe: EU Member States and candidate European countries for EU membership

3.1 The first wave of Europeanization: EU Member States

In the first wave of Europeanization among EU Member States, the negotiation of policy channels has attracted minimum attention (Börzel, 2001a; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Jordan et al., 2011). EU membership carries several rights and obligations for all EU Member States to maintain the sustainability of EU internal market. Pace-setting and foot-dragging EU Member States (Börzel (2001b)) have the right to influence the negotiation of EU policy processes through contestation, coalition-building and lobbying at the European Commission. The preventive stance from pace-setters minimises several domestic costs, contributes to a comparative advantage toward other EU Member States and accommodates to a certain extent national interests and domestic actors’ preferences (Börzel, 2001a; 2001b; Jordan, 2002; Jordan et al., 2004; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). On the other hand, foot-draggers face serious problems of forming and ‘up-loading’ national preferences at the EU level because of the lack of effective administration and cohesive representation of national preferences at the EU level. In EU climate policy, foot-draggers such as Spain, Greece and Portugal negotiate with pace-setters (Germany, the Netherlands) their consent asking for financial and time compensation i.e. financial assistance and transition periods (Börzel, 2001b; Jordan et al., 2004).

EU membership requires transposition and implementation of EU policy processes at the domestic level and effective action to cope with the increasing number and high quality of EU policy processes. There are different levels of transposition and implementation for various countries. The first wave of Europeanization mainly focuses on policy sectors such as environmental policy, road haulage, telecommunications, foreign policy and social matters (Börzel, 2001b; Jordan, 2002; Thatcher, 2004; Héritier, 2001; Smith, 2000; Falkner et al., 2005). The theory focuses on the ‘adaptational pressures’ exerted on domestic structures and the role of ‘fit’ and ‘misfit’ (Risse et al., 2001). Domestic actors, state culture, veto points, policy networks and policy entrepreneurs constitute the main actors that are involved in the effective transposition of EU policy processes.

Coercion, socialization and mimesis are the main mechanisms of Europeanization among EU Member States. Coercion is exerted by all EU members, EU institutions and domestic actors, since pace-setters push for an increased level of regulation that could better accommodate national interests in the policy process through the ‘first move advantage’
(Knill and Liefferink, 2007). For foot-draggers, coercion refers to a compensatory nature, since their consent – not blocking – has to be followed by financial or time compensation. Socialisation through persuasion and social influence promotes coalition-building and interest accommodation among EU Member States. EU Member States promote their ideas and interests through argumentative persuasion and communicative interaction to convince other Member States. Coalitions enhance the role of these entrepreneurs, since they can form either blocking or consensus-building groups. Mimesis is combined with socialisation, since ‘actors borrow ideas in order to improve their performance in comparison to others’ (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 12). But, as Börzel and Risse argue (2009: 12), lesson-drawing, emulation and copying mechanisms are the least understood with regard to the EU.

Change induced by Europeanization at the domestic level differs in relation to policies and countries. In EU environmental policy, Jordan et al. argue (2004: 138-9) that EU membership puts pressure on all EU Member States to develop new coordination structures and institutional procedures in order to understand how EU environmental policy operates. According to Falkner et al. (2005), in the long run all member states seem to comply with EU requirements, but with various responses and at different levels. However, only a few studies fully assess the level of change produced by Europeanization (Héritier, 2001; Jordan et al., 2004). Moreover, the analysis of the bottom-up policy process of Europeanization is not integrated in the analysis, while at the same time there is an inconsistency in Europeanization studies to examine in the long run whether and to what extent Europeanization influences – or not – domestic structures and the EU as a whole.

3.2 The second wave of Europeanization: the case of Central and Eastern European countries

The second wave of Europeanization refers to the expansion of EU policy processes beyond EU Member States with EU membership as an incentive. The main difference between the first and the second wave refers to the ‘external projection of internal solutions’ of the EU to candidate European countries (CEEs) (Lavenex, 2004: 695). The literature of Europeanization to the CEEs is concerned with analysing the extent to which EU policy processes are transferred to these countries. As in the first ‘wave’ of Europeanization, there is a lack of adequate studies in explaining the negotiation of policy processes between the EU with candidate European countries.

In this wave, EU membership generates different incentives and obligations for European countries that aspire to become members of the regional trading bloc. The main and most important incentive for the CEEs is EU membership. Other incentives are participation in the internal market, common rules and participation in decision-making, funding, political stability as part of a coalition of states and international credibility as EU members. In order to gain access into the EU, candidate European countries are required to transpose all EU acquis into their domestic legislation. If a candidate European country does not transpose EU acquis and membership obligations at the domestic level, membership cannot be attributed to the candidate. If a candidate European country transposes part of the EU acquis, access to
specific policies, funding and technical assistance is offered but without voting rights (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).

The literature of Europeanization toward candidate European countries pays little attention and holds an ambiguous stance to the bargaining position of CEEs and their interests. In some studies, certain CEEs (i.e. Poland) had a say in the negotiations of the various patterns of relationship with the EU mainly due to their geo-strategic position, but without offering much explanations on that issue (Grabbe, 2001; on textiles and coal Mayhew, 1998). There are other studies (Papadimitriou, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2008) which argue that ‘the candidates had no say in the creation of the rules, and thus cooperation lacked “ownership”’ (Sedelmeier, 2008: 811).

The literature mainly focuses on the ‘selective and patchy’ implementation of EU policy processes at the domestic level of the CEEs in the pre-accession association period before credible EU membership perspective is given to the CEEs (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Grabbe, 1999; Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Diffusion depends on whether the EU sets certain policy processes as necessary conditions (e.g. EU environmental policy) and on the consistency and persistence of such requirements (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004).

In the first pre-accession association period (1991-1996), EU membership was not a credible option for the CEEs. Moreover, EU financial and technical aid, visa facilitation and preferential trade were not significant and conditional on good governance terms (Schimmelfennig, 2001). The size of adoption costs was significantly high for the CEEs, due to the lack of a democratic past in these countries (Mayhew, 1998; Grabbe, 2003; Sedelmeier, 2008). There was the perception in CEEs that the impact of the EU was low in comparison with other international institutions until 1997 (Grabbe, 2001).

With the introduction of Opinions in May 1997, the European Commission produced annual reports assessing each candidate’s progress in conforming to Europe Agreements and to Copenhagen criteria\(^1\). Although in Europeanization among EU Member States each Member State reports annually to the Commission based on its own estimates, in this wave it is the Commission that estimates, assesses and reports on the progress of each CEE. EU conditionality over each CEE was reinforced through a revision of its funding programme; EU aid was conditional on EU acquis implementation, while at the same time twinning contributed to deliver capacity-building (Bailey and de Propris, 2004).

The application of stricter conditionality over the CEEs in the second pre-accession period (1997-2002) is related to the asymmetrical bargaining position between the EU with each CEE (Grabbe, 2001). Stricter EU conditionality combined with credible EU rewards (EU

---

\(^1\) a) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, b) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union and c) the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
membership) produced increased levels of diffusion of EU policy processes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The more CEEs were getting closer to full membership, the more domestic opposition was increasing and EU conditionality had to be applied in order to surpass domestic opposition (Grabbe, 2003). Socialisation was mostly influential in persuasion and social influence of CEE elites (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11). Strict and highly centralised monitoring and sanctioning with a potential ‘suspension’ of EU membership put an added value to the strict conditionality attributed to the CEEs. In the first wave, there are no clear benchmarks which can measure the implementation of an EU policy process. In the case of CEEs, Opinions set out the main priorities ‘jumping from description to prescription without a detailed analysis of the problems and how to overcome them’ (Grabbe, 2001: 1022). In the post-accession period, several studies focus on the compliance rate of EU policy processes at the CEEs’ domestic level and others on the role of communist legacies in the institutionalisation of these norms (Sedelmeier, 2008; Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010: 434; Steneunberg and Toshkov, 2009). The lack of a bottom-up analysis cannot provide secure conclusions about the impact of CEEs’ preferences at the EU policy processes.

4. Taking stock of Europeanization inside Europe: the third wave of Europeanization

The expansion of EU policy processes takes place not only to candidate European countries, but also outside Europe to countries without EU membership as an incentive. With the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, the external borders of the EU acquired neighbouring countries to its eastern and southern borders. South Mediterranean countries (SMCs) cannot apply for EU membership, since, according to Copenhagen criteria, they are not European states (1993: 13).

A common element between Europeanization within and beyond Europe is the existence of several incentives that run through the whole spectrum of Europeanization. Trade opportunities offered by the EU’s Internal Market can be seen as an incentive both for insiders and outsiders to consider harmonization with EU norms. Financial assistance is another common element. In the first wave, side payments are offered to the foot-draggers in order not to block certain EU policy processes from pace-setting EU Member States. In the second and third waves, candidate European and non-European countries are offered financial assistance via bilateral contractual relations so that they can deal with capacity-building issues and harmonization with the EU acquis.

Moreover, in the first wave and in certain cases in the second wave (i.e. before a credible membership perspective), the role of domestic actors and veto points facilitate, impede or delay the implementation of an EU norm at the domestic level. Formal institutions play a significant role in the implementation of an EU Directive or the EU acquis. Also, although ‘foot-dragging’ EU Member States are equal members in the EU and have an equal footing in the decision-making process, but they are unable to ‘up-load’ their preferences at the EU level. Candidate European countries had also limited chances to influence the dynamics of interaction with the EU. However, these dynamics may differ in the case of SMCs, since
several SMCs are significant exporters of energy resources to the EU and potential exporters of electricity through renewable energy. Low level of public administration, low specialization and the need of capacity-building (Blue Plan, 2008) are common characteristics with ‘foot-dragging’ EU Member States and the CEEs.

Another common element in all three waves is benchmarking, setting goals and monitoring the process of implementation. While in the first wave EU Member States send out national data to the Commission, in the second and third wave it is the Commission that is responsible for collecting data and reporting on the implementation of EU norms and/or the reform rate of each country. Moreover, enforcement through ECJ decisions can lead to financial sanctions for non-compliant EU Member States. For candidate European countries, strict conditionality can produce enforcement, since non-credible membership perspective lead to ‘patchy and selective’ implementation of several EU policy processes (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010). In the third wave, Casier’s study (2011) on phytosanitary issues in Israel and Jordan’s public finance management shows a ‘partial, uneven and selective’ rule transfer to ENP countries.

Mechanisms hold a different role in all three waves of Europeanization. Coercion is mainly used when financial and time concessions are required between EU Members and when further implementation of the EU acquis is required for candidate countries. It also takes place at all levels of EU policy processes at the first wave, whereas at the second it is exerted to domestic structures. Socialisation is common element in all three waves, since dialogue and argumentative interaction is mainly used at various bilateral and multilateral co-operation frameworks. In the third wave, multilateralism (EMP, UfM) runs in parallel with ‘differentiated bilateralism’ on a one-by-one basis between the EU with each SMC through ENP Action Plans (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). Mimesis is less easy to be traced, but it is combined with socialisation or even with coercion as in the case of CEEs (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig, 2005).

There are two theoretical perspectives that attempt to capture the impact of the EU outside Europe without EU membership as an incentive. Several researchers focus on the theoretical perspective of EU’s ‘external governance’ (Lavenex, 2004; 2008; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Lavenex and Winchmann, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex, 2011). The focus is mostly on top-down policy processes without mentioning the negotiation of EU norms with non-European countries. It also shows that EU policy processes are given fact for countries outside Europe. EU external governance literature focuses on policies like energy, environment and justice and home affairs. In general terms, the EU external governance perspective tries to understand how and why EU policy processes are transferred outside EU territory (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 795). EU external governance focuses on rule transfer (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004; Casier, 2011) and how other means such as network governance can explain how the obstacle of the lack of EU membership as a final objective for these countries can be overcome.

Lavenex and Uçarer’s study on asylum and immigration policy (2004) argue that less coercive and more voluntary means of influence are for the case for neighbouring countries.
Lavenex and Winchmann (2009) argue that socialisation through horizontal network governance rather than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality can be applied to non-European countries. Network governance through regulatory agencies and structures between the EU with ENP countries could emerge as new form of political interaction, bypassing the hierarchical mode of strict conditionality (Lavenex, 2008). Later studies on EU’s external governance identify the importance of sectoral governance in the expansion of EU internal policies (Schimmelfennig, 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009) and they argue that the EU could offer regulatory membership in certain EU policies following the example of European Free Trade Area countries (EFTA EEA)² (Lavenex, 2011). However, they do not provide any empirical data on how enforcement has been or could be achieved in non-European countries. In the case of EFTA EEA countries, judiciary monitoring is offered by a Court that acts as a settlement of disputes mechanisms in trade and other related issues between the EU and these countries. Could this be extended to non-European countries by including integrated judiciary monitoring or EFTA-like Court in order to promote enhanced enforcement?

Another theoretical perspective focuses on the normative impact of the EU outside Europe. The main representative of this theoretical framework is Ian Manners (2002) with his study *Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?*. This perspective focuses on the use of soft power based on persuasion and routinization of practices on the basis of ‘core’ (democracy, rule of etc.) and ‘minor’ (social rights, sustainable development etc.) norms. Promoting these norms at the international level, the EU attempts to frame the ‘language of international society’ which stems from its own security experience in peaceful co-operation and integration (Carwell, 2011; Manners, 2002; Smith, 2000). These norms are promoted not only at the international level but also through EU’s bilateral and regional relations. Drawing on the theoretical perspective of normative power Europe, Federica Bicchi (2006: 287) agrees with Manners’ ‘universalism of EU norms’ and argues that EU foreign policy, although intentional, can be characterised as an ‘unreflexive attempt to promote its model. In relation to EMP and the South Mediterranean, Bicchi also refers to ‘standardisation of practices’ and the repetitive pattern of ‘routine-based behaviour’, since by ‘talking the talk’ and ‘practicing the practices’, the repetition of social communication leads to change in actors’ reciprocal disposition. However, although Manners focuses on the abolition of death penalty in his case study, the lack of empirical data provides room only for speculation.

Europeanization beyond Europe constitutes a new area of understanding in Europeanization literature which intends to examine the level of contestation of EU policy processes outside Europe with countries that do not aspire and are not able to have EU membership as an incentive. Unlike in the case of the first two waves, Europeanization beyond Europe provides incentives of compliance to EU policy processes (a stake in the Internal Market, visa facilitations, financial and technical assistance, multilateral co-operation, legitimacy etc.) which were characterized as intermediate incentives in the case of CEEs. Moreover, unlike in the case of the first wave, there is no judicial monitoring under European Commission and

---

² Norway, Lichtenstein, Iceland (Switzerland is only part of EFTA Agreement)
ECJ ruling, but instead political monitoring at bilateral and multilateral level and via EC’s annual reports as in the case of CEEs. This research intends to examine the bargaining role of SMCs in each model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance. The focus on climate policy and governance will shed light on whether and to what extent EU is a normative power (Manners, 2002) towards non-European neighbouring countries. By exploring these questions, this paper will examine whether EU’s bargaining position as a regional economic hegemon can influence domestic actors in SMCs. The absence of membership incentive and enforcement, the lack of membership conditionality, the promotion of ‘shared values’ through joint ownership and the idea of equal partnership promote various interpretations for Europeanization beyond Europe. In the following two sections, the third wave of Europeanization will be examined through the prism of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance.

5. Europeanization beyond Europe? Governing climate change in Euro-Mediterranean relations

The Mediterranean is particularly vulnerable to climate change (IPCC, 2007). Euro-Mediterranean climate relations are governed around dense, contradictory and complex structures of ‘overlapping’ (Cardwell, 2011) institutional frameworks. Despite the lack of explicit climate governance structures in Euro-Mediterranean relations, climate change forms an integral part in this system of multilateral, bilateral and project-based cooperation. Many SMCs have significant energy resources and all have significant potential for harnessing green energy thus contributing to the reduction both of their own carbon footprint in CO2 emissions and of other countries.

There are two main actors in the region that attempt to institutionalise climate governance: UNEP and the EU. Established in 1975, the Mediterranean Action Programme of UNEP provides a stable institutionalised framework of multilateral co-operation through meetings among all coastal countries and the EU under the Barcelona Convention and its various Protocols. The institutional framework of the Barcelona Convention is based on biennial ministerial meetings of the Contracting Parties, which monitor its process of ratification and implementation. Financial and technical assistance is provided via regional donors (i.e. France, Spain, EU) and through loans from international or regional funding institutions (EIB, WB). Despite regional political tensions such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue, UNEP’s role as a broker of various interests brought together various perspectives for intensive co-operation, whereas increasing interest is expressed by the EU. Since 2005 the European Commission attempts to enhance its co-operation with the UNEP MAP Secretariat aiming at a more stable environmental and climate relationship.

On the other hand, the EU constitutes the regional hegemon that can offer various incentives for climate co-operation to the SMCs focusing on multilateral and bilateral relations (EMP Association Agreement) followed by regional and bilateral projects. Initiated in 1995, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a multilateral attempt to raise issues like
political, economic, and cultural issues including environmental co-operation under the second pillar of economic co-operation. It combines institutionalised multilateral Euro-Med meetings, bilateral contractual relations (EMP Association Agreements) between the EU with each SMC – which outline EMP’s commitments based on each SMC’s needs – and regional and bilateral projects.

Launched in 2004, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is based on bilateral relations and projects between the EU with each SMC. Each SMC signs an Action Plan with the EU for a certain period up to five years, which then can be either renewed or upgraded leading to an ‘advanced status’ partnership and further access to EU rewards. The main EU rewards for ENP countries are a stake in the Internal Market, financial and technical assistance, visa facilitations, twinning, access to specific EU policies without voting rights and joint position in global issues. ENP Action Plans specify certain priorities based on the EMP Association Agreements. Unlike EMP, ENP focuses mainly on the approximation of SMCs’ legislation to the EU based on several incentives offered by the EU (Weber et al., 2007).

In 2008, after President Sarkozy’s initiative, the EU launched an updated version of EMP, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). It aims to build on and reinforce the successful elements of the EMP by substituting it providing more concrete and visible projects to the citizens. Flagship regional projects are the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the de-pollution of the Mediterranean.

In developing our understanding of climate governance in the region, we can distinguish between three forms of Euro-Mediterranean climate co-operation: a) multilateral governance, b) EU-SMC bilateral relations, and c) project-based cooperation. Each form of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance provides different opportunities and challenges for each SMC to promote its own interests and increase leverage during negotiations.

At the multilateral level of Euro-Mediterranean climate relations, EU initiatives can be characterized as mainly focusing on ad hoc attempts of dialogue, interaction and information-exchanging fora. Under EMP, although in its early stages the discourse of Euro-Med ministerial ministers referred to climate-related issues such as renewable energy, energy efficiency and desertification, only in 2007 was climate change introduced in the agenda (Euro-Med foreign affairs meeting in Lisbon, 2007). At a sectoral level, meetings under EMP environmental ministerial meetings are highly fragmented with a lack of routine-based structure. After the third meeting in 2006, no other sectoral Euro-Mediterranean environmental ministerial meeting took place in relation to environmental and climate issues (the first was in 1997 and the second in 2002). Moreover, after the launch of UfM, progress in multilateral political, climate and environmental issues has stalled mainly due to the stalemate of UfM, the continuous Arab-Israeli instability and the latest developments due to the Arab Spring (Gillespie, 2011).

On the other hand, UNEP MAP meetings show a sustainable institutionalised and routine-based framework of interaction between North and South Mediterranean environmental ministers along with EU Institutions through socialisation and social learning, whereby most
of its members, NGOs and epistemic communities show increasing interest to co-operate among each other. Although the introduction of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Protocol introduces climate change as an integral part of the discussion under UNEP MAP structure and its institutionalisation in the co-operation, its entry into force in March 2011 has yet to show any results in the region. The introduction of the Compliance Committee in 2009 under UNEP MAP provides an interesting development in the region. It provides technical assistance, interpretation of the legal texts and recommendations to the Contracting Party that fails to comply with UNEP MAP rules. It could be argued that this Compliance Committee introduces for the first time a mechanism which mainly focuses on the effects of socialisation and social learning, although more empirical evidence is required. Technical assistance goes in hand with the initial idea of Med Plan, but now it becomes integral part of the co-operation. Moreover, this compliance committee attempts to explore the process of environmental protection rules beyond the prescriptions of soft law. Upcoming field research will examine which countries promoted this committee and will also explore its potential as an institutionalised advisory body on Mediterranean environmental and climate regulations.

In order to establish closer connections with that sustainable conventional multilateral framework, the EU promotes enhanced co-operation with UNEP MAP via the 2005 Joint Work Programme followed by a progress report in 2008. It is stated (UNEP MAP, 2006: 2) that ‘particular attention will be given to strengthen the environmental dimension of public policy, to promote sustainable development policies and to support European Commission activities in the implementation of relevant EU environmental policies and the ENP […]’. Moreover, the inclusion of regional flagship projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the de-pollution of the Mediterranean under the UfM indicate that the EU intends to influence regional climate relations through the legitimised framework of UNEP MAP and combine it with concrete regional projects that may have an impact in the region. By aligning with the Secretariats of UNEP MAP and UfM, the EU attempts to regulate indirectly regional climate policies through transgovernmental networking (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). However, the lack of empirical data and scientific studies in the region leave space only for speculation at this stage. Field research intends to cover this empirical gap.

An initial understanding from the multilateral aspect of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance is that the Europeanization mechanism of coercion cannot be an option at this stage. Although the EU and its Member States contribute mostly in the UNEP MAP’s Budget and via technical assistance, it seems that UNEP MAP membership signifies regional co-operation through interaction and socialisation upon common norms of environmental protection, technological transfer and know-how and sustainable development through loose monitoring. On the other hand, although Euro-Mediterranean environmental co-operation under EMP and UfM offers more opportunities for the EU to expand its regulation to the SMCs, the stalemate in regional Euro-Mediterranean relations limits the scope of any kind of coercion, socialisation or even mimesis. The incapacity of the EU to provide viable solutions at the regional level impedes any efforts for legitimised solution under EMP or UfM (Bicchi, 2011). Moreover, bilateral benefits are more easily negotiated with the EU rather than among
22 actors under UNEP MAP, 27 actors under former EMP, not to mention 43 actors under UfM. Therefore, socialisation through social persuasion and leading by ‘example’ under UNEP MAP can offer the chance to the EU to influence its neighbours. However, the lack of literature limits the scope of this research for any further conclusions on the contestation from rich SMCs in energy resources and with significant potential in harnessing renewable energy.

At the bilateral model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance, bilateral relations between the EU and the SMCs appear to determine the progress of climate governance in the region. EMP Association Agreements introduced the issue of renewable energies in the agenda of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean climate relations. The temporally uneven entry into force of EMP AAs (ranging from 1997 to 2005), the low interest on climate issues under EMP and the lack of concerted financial assistance by the EU produced limited outcomes in the region (Ugur and Tovias, 2005). Instead, ENP provides the opportunity for each SMC to develop its own specific framework of cooperation with the EU. Bilateral EU and SMCs’ priorities in the climate sector are affected neither by the unstable regional political climate nor by the lack of regional dialogue at an EMP or UfM level. ENP Action Plans have introduced climate change and renewable energies as integral parts in the cooperation between EU with each SMC. APs set out certain priorities, whereby each SMC has to undertake in order to approximate to EU’s legislation. Regulatory approximation to the EU has to be followed by compliance with international commitments in the area of climate change such as UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Cancún Agreement etc. Approximation to EU legislation is combined with financial and technical assistance by the EU through FDI, low interest loans and twinning as part of the broader finality of participating in the long run in the EU’s Internal Market and in other EU policy sectors.

Although at the initial stages of ENP (2004-5) climate change constituted a less intensive collaboration sector, by the entry into force of most ENP Action Plans (mostly between 2005-07) the cooperation in this sector focuses on preparing projects, enhancing regulatory convergence and technical assistance and promoting co-operation and accession to international and regional climate frameworks. During the later stages of implementation of ENP, climate change mitigation increased its importance and complemented the implementation of UfM Mediterranean Solar Plan. Moreover, bilateral EU-SMC Association Councils discuss also the issues of climate change and renewable energies. Moreover, annual reports from the European Commission monitor the evolution of reforms under ENP APs and the rate of compliance in adopting EU-SMC commitments and delivering projects.

Unlike with the case of CEEs, only those countries that are willing to reform are those that promote progressive enhancement or even gradual approximation to the EU norms. In several cases, the national targets for renewable energies are identical or even emulated with those of the EU. Israel is in the final phase of developing a low emissions carbon energy master plan for the period up to 2050, while Morocco is in process of developing a low-emissions plan for the period up to 2030 (EC, 2010b; 2010c). This shows that the fact that climate change and energy policies form significant part of the EU agenda, this triggered these countries to implement long-term objectives as these EU rules are ‘legalised and legitimised’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 802). Mitigation to climate change (i.e. renewables, energy
efficiency) and the general framework of combating climate change seem to put forward climate co-operation between the EU with each ENP. They also coincide with the EU’s commitments under Kyoto Protocol and the promotion of renewable energy under EMP.

Although the EU intends to expand its policy processes to countries beyond Europe, conditionality in the area of climate and energy policies is quite absent at the moment. Instead, the EU intends to trigger implementation of reforms to these countries through soft mechanisms of shaming and praising via political and report monitoring. Bilateral Association Councils between the EU with each SMC clarify implementation problems and discuss the issues of climate change and renewable energies every year. In the Association Councils, SMCs can also contest EU’s perspectives or even suggest other forms of co-operation. In 2006, given its opposition to proceed to further contractual relations with the EU in ENP, Algeria ‘proposed to the EU that a strategic energy partnership be considered as a policy response to both parties’ aspirations in this sector’ (Darbouche, 2008: 382) and as a response to alternative aspect of increased sectoral co-operation. Its opposition to an ENP AP led Algeria to suggest an Algerian version of an ‘ENP-like’ Action Plan which set out the implementation of the Algerian EMP Association Agreement (Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). Given the EU’s vulnerability at the given time in 2006 due to Russian energy disruptions, Algeria asked for visa facilitations and support to the WTO application procedure. Being the biggest SMC exporter of energy resources to the EU, its bargaining position increased during the third EU-Algerian Association Council with the inclusion of renewable energy in the proposed ‘energy partnership’ (Darbouche, 2008: 382-384).

Differentiated bilateralism (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005) via socialization and elite learning constitute the framework of co-operation between the EU and the SMCs. It could also be argued that the selective adoption of EU policy processes by the SMCs (Casier, 2011) holds common characteristics with the CEE pre-accession period, whereby non-credible EU membership perspective was attributed to these countries. In the case of SMCs, the lack of EU membership and other credible ‘intermediate’ incentives reinforce this selectivity of EU rules. Even being the most enthusiastic SMC with the EU, Morocco expects a clearer political vision for the ENP for further enhancing its alignment with EU rules, while at the same time it is eager to promote more bilateral rather than regional relations (Kelley, 2006; Gillespie, 2008). However, the absence of studies in the diffusion, institutionalisation and the final reaction from domestic actors restricts our understanding in Europeanization beyond Europe, whereas at the same time it does not provide enough understanding on the causal links between European norms and SMCs’ adoption and final compliance with EU policy processes.

The project-based model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance is based upon multilateral and bilateral commitments. Moreover, the UfM Solar Plan focuses on the regional dimension of cooperation on mitigation to climate change (Darbouche, 2011). Though, an agreement for common Euro-Mediterranean renewable energy rules that will regulate all relevant aspects of this Solar energy market has yet to be agreed (Escribano, 2010). Moreover, after the Arab Spring, SMCs are in transition in their political systems contributing to a further slowdown of these regional projects.
On the other hand, climate projects at a bilateral level seem to advance at a better pace than at regional level. Although Arab-Israeli relations were deteriorating from 2009 onwards, bilateral projects continue at a significant pace, as the European Commission progress reports mention (ENP progress report, 2010). Moreover, there is a tendency of establishing bilateral projects under ENP which are under the branding of MSP at a bilateral level (i.e. wind farm in Egypt, solar power plant in Jordan). Moreover, EU funding opportunities provide more secure environment for those SMCs wishing to produce more approximation and regulatory convergence to EU’s climate and energy legislation. Increased funding through ENPI and low interest loans through FEMIP and Neighbourhood Investment Facility are shown as important incentives that can promote even further the potential of project-based cooperation in Euro-Med climate governance.

Moreover, annual progress reports give the chance to the EU to monitor the extent of reforms undertaken in each country, promote greater visibility and institutionalise the implementation of EU-SMCs’ contractual commitments at a bilateral and at international level the progressive implementation – or not – of their contractual commitments at a bilateral level but at international organisations. Monitoring of establishment of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, ratification – or not – of a Protocol under the Barcelona Convention or association with UNFCCC, Cancun Agreement, Copenhagen Accord are introduced in the annual reports provided by the Commission.

However, the lack of studies in the field cannot provide further information about the role of domestic actors in response to these projects and the administrative difficulties in the implementation of such commitments. Moreover, field research in the following months will explore potential trade-offs that take place during the annual EU-SMC Association Councils and whether regional and/or bilateral projects attract more attention from SMCs to develop their institutional capacity in response to climate change and, finally, adopt and comply with EU policy processes.

7. Concluding remarks

The different Euro-Mediterranean climate governance models embody different levels of negotiation and contestation between the EU with the SMCs at a regional, bilateral and project-based level. Coercion, socialisation and mimesis are identified as the main mechanisms for Europeanization in the first two waves. The absence of membership incentive and enforcement, the lack of membership conditionality, the promotion of ‘shared values’ through joint ownership and the idea of equal partnership under ENP promote a different normative understanding of the EU beyond Europe. Also, the EU external governance perspective can be seen as speculative on the diffusion of EU policy processes to countries outside Europe. It also provides no understanding on the dynamics of interaction of EU policy processes with third countries.

At the multilateral model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance, socialisation through social influence and persuasion can be seen as the most viable mechanism for the EU to
trigger compliance from the SMCs. The institutionalised framework of UNEP MAP offers opportunities for structured dialogue, potential influence and certain regional benefits for climate governance, but it limits the scope of trade-offs for resource abundant SMCs in natural gas and/or with significant potential for developing renewable energy. In this framework, the EU attempts to bring together its power as a regional climate actor and significant donor with the legitimacy of UNEP structures and with other regional actors such as the UfM Secretariat via transnational networking (Lavenex, 2011). Such an attempt may increase the level of trade-offs that take place at the regional level, since the EU is willing to have increased leverage in regional political issues.

The research so far shows that regional political issues i.e. Israeli-Palestinian conflict along with other issues such the Arab Spring and the stalemate in UfM Summits reduce the scope of leverage for the EU. SMCs’ limited interest in multilateral climate governance under EU initiatives is justified both by the EU’s unwillingness to play a significant and concerted role as an actor in regional political issues and by the continuous EU initiatives that do not show a clear commitment to multilateralism in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Bicchi, 2011). Moreover, Euro-Mediterranean membership in regional structures includes a significant number of actors from 43 countries. This impedes any regional effort in climate issues. Although UfM objective was to bring clear outcomes and benefits to the region via specific projects, its politicization restricts its effectiveness and limits any future regionalisation of climate relations (Gillespie, 2011).

Instead, flexibility, differentiation and co-ownership are key elements that promote the bilateral model of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance. Although EU incentives are less intriguing than in the case of CEEs, intermediate incentives such as visa facilitation, financial and technical assistance, twinning and the ultimate goal of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market provide better and more secure framework of co-operation. Moreover, each SMC is in a better position to influence policy processes and ask for more concessions as in the case of foot-dragging EU Member States. Although SMCs are not EU members and not even aspire to become EU members, interdependence between the EU and the SMCs can be considered as significant, since the EU is dependent both on geographically close, diversified and secure energy supplies in order to reduce its energy insecurity and its carbon footprint (Adelle et al., 2009). Also, SMCs are in need of exporting energy to the EU in order to develop their economies and contribute to economic growth and limited unemployment, especially after the Arab Spring. Rich SMCs in energy and with potential to produce and export ‘green’ energy to the EU are found in a position to influence policy processes at a negotiation with the EU and ‘up-load’ their own preferences (i.e. Algeria).

Bilateral climate relations under ENP can offer significant leverage for each party. Annual political monitoring via EU-SMC Association Councils and EC’s reports on the progress of SMCs in approximating to EU rules are instruments to control political co-operation. Under this stable framework, climate change issues are integrated into the broader framework of EU norms of respect of human rights, good governance, rule of law, market economy and sustainable development. Approximation to these norms gives access to those willing and committed SMCs to demand further stake in the EU’s Internal Market and to other incentives.
The more SMCs align with these pre-agreed commitments, the more they can claim more access to the intermediate EU rewards. However, future field research will explore who set those pre-agreed commitments, what trade-offs were agreed and whether other mechanisms were utilised by each party.

Finally, regional projects follow the path of political instability that impedes any further development of enhanced relations in climate change mitigation projects such as the UfM MSP. Instead, bilateral projects under ENP show a more legitimate route for the implementation of the commitments between the contracting parties. Moreover, projects can provide a means for SMCs to claim more trade-offs in the climate and energy sector, if their implementation is successful and self-sustained. Projects constitute a test for domestic actors and structures to comply with international and bilateral commitments. Monitoring offered by the European Commission and via the Association Council can exert socialisation pressures to SMCs to incorporate EU rules, but also SMC’s willingness for better trade-offs in areas of strategic importance for the EU.

Upcoming field research will shed light on the role of SMCs’ and domestic actors in the establishment of the bilateral and project climate relations with the EU and the extent to which EU is a normative power. It will also examine whether other aspects of Europeanization mechanisms are used in the ‘extraterritorialisation’ of EU norms to non-members (Lavenex, 2004) and what is the role of SMCs in the contestation of all three models of Euro-Mediterranean climate governance.
References


Slim, H. and T. Scovazzi (2009) *Study of the current status of ratification, implementation and compliance with maritime agreements and conventions applicable to the Mediterranean Sea Basin – With a specific focus on the ENPI South Partner Countries*, FWC Beneficiaries – LOT No 6, December.


