Blackmailing the Mayor: using semi-formal state-based game theory methods to inform a security situation
Powell, J.H. (2001) Blackmailing the Mayor: using semi-formal state-based game theory methods to inform a security situation. European Journal of Operational Research, 134, (2), 330-345. (doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00251-4).
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Description/Abstract
Security situations, with their combination of personal threat, difficulties of observation of that threat and apparent unpredictability present particular difficulties for decision support. Candidate decision support approaches deriving from behavioural analysis (security studies) or economic game theory are either too specific to be easily transferred or too general to provide appropriate action and sensemaking plans for security advisers. An application of a business strategy tool for conflict analysis between companies (Powergraph) is made to a real-life security situation, that of the blackmail of a regional politician in Southern Europe. The method can be seen to provide a promising basis for real-time support in such situations.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 0377-2217 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Keywords: | security, game theory, conflict resolution |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Management |
| Item ID: | 36729 |
| Date Deposited: | 24 May 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2011 02:17 |
| Contributors: | Powell, J.H. (Author) |
| Date: | 2001 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/36729 |
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