Impartial reasons, moral demands
Impartial reasons, moral demands
Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.
consequentialism, utilitarianism, demandingness, irrationality, impartiality, moral obligation
457-466
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
2011
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
Abstract
Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.
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Published date: 2011
Keywords:
consequentialism, utilitarianism, demandingness, irrationality, impartiality, moral obligation
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 397381
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/397381
ISSN: 1386-2820
PURE UUID: e34f24d3-95d0-4dbf-afa6-63637e3de3c8
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Date deposited: 11 Aug 2016 11:21
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 01:13
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