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Perspectivism and the argument from guidance

Perspectivism and the argument from guidance
Perspectivism and the argument from guidance
Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to phi only if you are able to phi for the reasons which determine that you ought to phi. We show that this premise can be understood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance.
1386-2820
1-14
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel (2016) Perspectivism and the argument from guidance. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice, 1-14. (doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9775-9).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to phi only if you are able to phi for the reasons which determine that you ought to phi. We show that this premise can be understood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 8 December 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: 27 December 2016
Published date: 27 December 2016
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 403804
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/403804
ISSN: 1386-2820
PURE UUID: 98069b2b-48b8-4556-8906-1f9141f58358

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Date deposited: 13 Dec 2016 09:21
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 06:08

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