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Auditory hindsight bias: fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction

Auditory hindsight bias: fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction
Auditory hindsight bias: fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction
We report 4 experiments investigating auditory hindsight bias – the tendency to overestimate the intelligibility of distorted auditory stimuli after learning their identity. An associative priming manipulation was used to vary the amount of processing fluency independently of prior target knowledge. For hypothetical designs, in which hindsight judgments are made for peers in foresight, we predicted that judgments would be based on processing fluency and that hindsight bias would be greater in the unrelated- compared to related-prime context (differential-fluency hypothesis). Conversely, for memory designs, in which foresight judgments are remembered in hindsight, we predicted that judgments would be based on memory reconstruction and that there would be independent effects of prime relatedness and prior target knowledge (recollection hypothesis). These predictions were confirmed. Specifically, we found support for the differential-fluency hypothesis when a hypothetical design was used in Experiments 1 and 2 (hypothetical group). Conversely, when a memory design was used in Experiments 2 (memory group), 3A and 3B, we found support for the recollection hypothesis. Together, the results suggest that qualitatively different mechanisms create hindsight bias in the two designs. The results are discussed in terms of fluency misattributions, memory reconstruction, anchoring-and-adjustment, sense making, and a multi-component model of hindsight bias.
0096-1523
1144–1159
Higham, P.A.
4093b28f-7d58-4d18-89d4-021792e418e7
Neil, G.J.
85453750-0611-48d9-a83e-da95cd4e80b3
Bernstein, D.M.
5e23e1a0-02a5-47c2-b6b9-7a66911dd193
Higham, P.A.
4093b28f-7d58-4d18-89d4-021792e418e7
Neil, G.J.
85453750-0611-48d9-a83e-da95cd4e80b3
Bernstein, D.M.
5e23e1a0-02a5-47c2-b6b9-7a66911dd193

Higham, P.A., Neil, G.J. and Bernstein, D.M. (2017) Auditory hindsight bias: fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction. Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance, 43 (6), 1144–1159. (doi:10.1037/xhp0000405).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We report 4 experiments investigating auditory hindsight bias – the tendency to overestimate the intelligibility of distorted auditory stimuli after learning their identity. An associative priming manipulation was used to vary the amount of processing fluency independently of prior target knowledge. For hypothetical designs, in which hindsight judgments are made for peers in foresight, we predicted that judgments would be based on processing fluency and that hindsight bias would be greater in the unrelated- compared to related-prime context (differential-fluency hypothesis). Conversely, for memory designs, in which foresight judgments are remembered in hindsight, we predicted that judgments would be based on memory reconstruction and that there would be independent effects of prime relatedness and prior target knowledge (recollection hypothesis). These predictions were confirmed. Specifically, we found support for the differential-fluency hypothesis when a hypothetical design was used in Experiments 1 and 2 (hypothetical group). Conversely, when a memory design was used in Experiments 2 (memory group), 3A and 3B, we found support for the recollection hypothesis. Together, the results suggest that qualitatively different mechanisms create hindsight bias in the two designs. The results are discussed in terms of fluency misattributions, memory reconstruction, anchoring-and-adjustment, sense making, and a multi-component model of hindsight bias.

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Higham et al_Auditory Hindsight Bias.pdf - Accepted Manuscript
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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 27 January 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 1 June 2017
Published date: 1 June 2017

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 405607
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/405607
ISSN: 0096-1523
PURE UUID: db191183-2a10-44d7-b2a3-b0da27611467
ORCID for P.A. Higham: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-6087-7224

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Date deposited: 08 Feb 2017 15:48
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 03:18

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Contributors

Author: P.A. Higham ORCID iD
Author: G.J. Neil
Author: D.M. Bernstein

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