The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
Bardsley, Nicholas and Moffatt, Peter G. (2007) The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions. Theory and Decision, 62, (2), 161-193. (doi:10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3).
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In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.
|Keywords:||altruism, finite mixture models, reciprocity, tobit, trembles, voluntary contributions|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences
|Date Deposited:||02 Feb 2007|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:35|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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