The principles of nuclear control: volumes 1-2

Ozga, Deborah Ann (2001) The principles of nuclear control: volumes 1-2. University of Southampton, School of Social Sciences, Doctoral Thesis , 426pp.


[img] PDF
Restricted to System admin

Download (31Mb)


This thesis develops the principles of nuclear control which are derived from control models
initially developed in the 1940s, namely, The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and the Baruch
Plan. Authors of these works aspired to create a grand disarmament scheme establishing
an international authority to manage nuclear energy and to prevent states from diverting
nuclear energy production to nuclear weapon development. They identified principles,
which they believed needed to be incorporated in any nuclear control plan, if the plan was
to be effective in promoting international security and stability.
The thesis then examines control models that were actually established and explores how
they diverged from the suggested principles identified previously. In protecting states'
economic and political sovereignty, a series of compromises were made on meeting
principles of control. Political realities forced states to settle on a national inspection
system (the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System) which sought to
detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. This
type system was initially considered by analysts of the Baruch era but was emphatically
rejected as having weaknesses that would undermine the system's effectiveness.
Although decision makers were aware of the damage that compromises on the principles
could have on the control system's effectiveness, they believed some imperfect control
system was better than none at all.
The thesis shows that departures of the established model from the earlier model
weakened control system effectiveness as predicted by Baruch era analysts. This less
rigourous adopted approach achieved broad international acceptability, but could not
provide sufficient assurances to all parties. As a consequence, some governments took
unilateral action to enhance their security in the face of inadequate controls and/or
engaged in efforts to strengthen the system. The mechanisms they created incorporated
some of the basic nuclear control principles originally identified a half-century earlier but
were rejected on political grounds.
The thesis sheds light on the difficulties in implementing control and the relevance of
these implementation problems for disarmament. It highlights the struggle between
states' desires for more credible systems requiring greater sacrifices on national
sovereignty and a need for broad adherence to international control demanding less
intrusiveness and wider benefits. The thesis reveals a long-term trend that states appear
more willing to accept international control measures as globalisation occurs and concludes
that the control system is evolving towards incorporating the principles identified in the
1940s that were not included in the established system.

Item Type: Thesis (Doctoral)
Additional Information: Digitized via the E-THOS exercise.
Subjects: T Technology > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering
J Political Science > JZ International relations
U Military Science > U Military Science (General)
Divisions : University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Politics and International Relations
ePrint ID: 43760
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
May 2001Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 02 Feb 2007
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:28

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics