Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers


Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel (2004) Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4, (1), 1-10.

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Description/Abstract

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 1935-1704 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences
ePrint ID: 47661
Date Deposited: 07 Aug 2007
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:31
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/47661

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