Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers
Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel (2004) Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4, (1), 1-10.
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Description/Abstract
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 1935-1704 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences |
| Item ID: | 47661 |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Aug 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Jun 2012 12:17 |
| Contributors: | Gill, David (Author) Sgroi, Daniel (Author) |
| Date: | December 2004 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/47661 |
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