Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers
Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
1-10
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Sgroi, Daniel
56178598-890e-4fe1-8b83-e518f03345c9
December 2004
Gill, David
2319117f-b14e-48c6-8a33-34f5c9d4e2ea
Sgroi, Daniel
56178598-890e-4fe1-8b83-e518f03345c9
Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel
(2004)
Sequential decision-making and asymmetric equilibria: an application to takeovers.
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 4 (1), .
Abstract
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
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Published date: December 2004
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Local EPrints ID: 47661
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/47661
ISSN: 1935-1704
PURE UUID: b8509216-2c0d-40f3-882d-c4634e25f1fb
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Date deposited: 07 Aug 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 09:35
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Author:
David Gill
Author:
Daniel Sgroi
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