Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
Gill, David and Lipsmeyer, Christine S. (2005) Soft money and hard choices: why political parties might legislate against soft money donations. Public Choice, 123, (3-4), 411-438. (doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y).
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In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States)
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||29 May 2008|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:41|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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