Why do women wait? Matching, wage inequality and incentives for fertility delay
Caucutt, E.M., Guner, N. and Knowles, J. (2002) Why do women wait? Matching, wage inequality and incentives for fertility delay. Review of Economic Dynamics, 5, (4), 815-855. (doi:10.1006/redy.2002.0190).
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This paper explores the interaction between wage inequality and the marriage and fertility decisions of young women. We develop an equilibrium search model of marriage, divorce, and investment in children that allows for differential timing of fertility. We show how patterns of fertility timing in U.S. data can be explained by the incentives for fertility delay implied by marriage and labor markets. We find that these incentives help explain both the cross-sectional relationship between women's wages and fertility timing and the changes over the past 40 years in married women's fertility timing and labor supply.
|Keywords:||marriage, fertility, returns to experience|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||31 Jul 2008|
|Last Modified:||01 Jun 2011 12:11|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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