Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism.
European Journal of Philosophy, 19, . (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00403.x).
According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:
(DS) It is true that p if and only if p
According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like).On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.
||deflationism, truth, contextualism, semantics, language, assertion, facts, travis, strawson, dummett
||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Humanities > Philosophy
||27 Aug 2009
||08 Jun 2012 12:30
||Whiting, Daniel (Author)
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