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Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism

Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism
Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism
According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:
(DS) It is true that p if and only if p
According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like).On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.
deflationism, truth, contextualism, semantics, language, assertion, facts, travis, strawson, dummett
0966-8373
607-624
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Whiting, Daniel (2011) Leave truth alone: on deflationism and contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy, 19, 607-624. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00403.x).

Record type: Article

Abstract

According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:
(DS) It is true that p if and only if p
According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like).On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.

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More information

Published date: December 2011
Keywords: deflationism, truth, contextualism, semantics, language, assertion, facts, travis, strawson, dummett

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 67583
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/67583
ISSN: 0966-8373
PURE UUID: dbef2dcd-486d-499b-86c6-102fffa2cddf

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Date deposited: 27 Aug 2009
Last modified: 13 Mar 2024 18:54

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