Particularly general and generally particular: language, rules and meaning

Description/Abstract

Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or
principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning,
and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in
philosophical accounts of language. Elsewhere, I have argued that the particularist’s
case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she
makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the
considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position.1 In a recent
article,2 and in part in response to my work, Anna Bergqvist tries to strengthen the
cases against generalism and for particularism. While there is much that I admire in
Bergqvist’s careful and considered discussion—and while I share Bergqvist’s sense
that the gap between particularism and generalism, though real and important, is not large—I am ultimately not convinced by her arguments. In this paper, I shall explain
why and, in doing so, take the opportunity to clarify further what the generalist is, or
should be, committed to