A stochastic multiple leader Stackelberg model: analysis, computation, and application
DeMiguel, Victor and Xu, Huifu (2009) A stochastic multiple leader Stackelberg model: analysis, computation, and application. Operations Research, 57, (5), 1220-1235. (doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0686).
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We study an oligopoly consisting of M leaders and N followers that supply a homogeneous product (or service) noncooperatively. Leaders choose their supply levels first, knowing the demand function only in distribution. Followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply levels and the realized demand function. We term the resulting equilibrium a stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SMS) equilibrium. We show the existence and uniqueness of SMS equilibrium under mild assumptions. We also propose a computational approach to find the equilibrium based on the sample average approximation method and analyze its rate of convergence. Finally, we apply this framework to model competition in the telecommunication industry.
|Keywords:||programming, noncooperative games-group decisions, Stackelberg game, equilibrium existence, uniqueness, sample average approximation|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Mathematics > Operational Research
|Date Deposited:||17 Mar 2010|
|Last Modified:||01 Jun 2011 12:38|
|Contributors:||DeMiguel, Victor (Author)
Xu, Huifu (Author)
|Contact Email Address:||email@example.com|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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