Particular and general: Wittgenstein, linguistic rules and context
Whiting, Daniel (2010) Particular and general: Wittgenstein, linguistic rules and context. In, Whiting, Daniel (eds.) The Later Wittgenstein on Language. London, UK, Palgrave, 114-132. (Philosophers in Depth).
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Wittgenstein held two views which appear to be - and have been taken by many to be - incompatible. First, the meaning of an expression is determined by a general rule governing its employment. Second, what is expressed in the utterance of an expression is determined by the particular circumstances on that occasion. In this paper, I attempt to vindicate Wittgenstein's apparent willingness to maintain both positions by arguing that they are not in tension and by rejecting arguments designed to show otherwise.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||In this paper, I use the standard abbreviations for Wittgenstein's texts.|
|Keywords:||wittgenstein, language, linguistic, rule, context, contextualism, meaning|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
P Language and Literature > P Philology. Linguistics
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Humanities > Philosophy
|Date Deposited:||24 Mar 2010|
|Last Modified:||31 Mar 2016 13:16|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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