Why are married men working so much? An aggregate analysis of intra-household bargaining and labor supply
Why are married men working so much? An aggregate analysis of intra-household bargaining and labor supply
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? This paper argues that models of intra-household allocation could be useful for understanding aggregate labor supply trends in the US since the 1970s. A simple calculation suggests that the standard model without bargaining predicts a 19% decline in married-male labor supply in response to the narrowing of the gender gap in wages since the 1970s. However married-men's paid labor remained stationary over the period from the mid 1970s to the recession of 2001. This paper develops and calibrates to US time-use survey data a model of marital bargaining in which time allocations are determined jointly with equilibrium marriage and divorce rates. The results suggest that bargaining effects raised married men's labor supply by about 2.1 weekly hours over the period, and reduced that of married women by 2.7 hours. Bargaining therefore has a relatively small impact on aggregate labor supply, but is critical for trends in female labor supply. Also, the narrowing of the gender wage gap is found to account for a weekly 1.5 hour increase in aggregate labor supply.
general aggregative models: neoclassical, time allocation and labor supply, economics of gender, marriage, marital dissolution
1055-1085
Knowles, John
0c41d933-fc6d-4a91-9e0f-0b07e5db84ac
3 July 2013
Knowles, John
0c41d933-fc6d-4a91-9e0f-0b07e5db84ac
Knowles, John
(2013)
Why are married men working so much? An aggregate analysis of intra-household bargaining and labor supply.
The Review of Economic Studies, 80 (3), .
(doi:10.1093/restud/rds043).
Abstract
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? This paper argues that models of intra-household allocation could be useful for understanding aggregate labor supply trends in the US since the 1970s. A simple calculation suggests that the standard model without bargaining predicts a 19% decline in married-male labor supply in response to the narrowing of the gender gap in wages since the 1970s. However married-men's paid labor remained stationary over the period from the mid 1970s to the recession of 2001. This paper develops and calibrates to US time-use survey data a model of marital bargaining in which time allocations are determined jointly with equilibrium marriage and divorce rates. The results suggest that bargaining effects raised married men's labor supply by about 2.1 weekly hours over the period, and reduced that of married women by 2.7 hours. Bargaining therefore has a relatively small impact on aggregate labor supply, but is critical for trends in female labor supply. Also, the narrowing of the gender wage gap is found to account for a weekly 1.5 hour increase in aggregate labor supply.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 4 December 2012
Published date: 3 July 2013
Keywords:
general aggregative models: neoclassical, time allocation and labor supply, economics of gender, marriage, marital dissolution
Organisations:
Economics
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Local EPrints ID: 193509
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/193509
ISSN: 0034-6527
PURE UUID: d9db43b6-2e17-449f-b6ee-22aa4fd248bf
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Date deposited: 15 Jul 2011 08:12
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 03:55
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John Knowles
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