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Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning

Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning
Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning
Many philosophers accept that a naturalistic reduction of meaning is in principle impossible, since behavioural regularities or dispositions are consistent with any number of semantic descriptions. One response is to view meaning as primitive. In this paper, I explore Brandom’s alternative, which is to specify behaviour in non-semantic but normative terms. Against Brandom, I argue that a norm specified in non-semantic terms might correspond to any number of semantic norms. Thus, his theory of meaning suffers from the very same kind of problem as its naturalistic competitors. It is not sufficient, I contend, merely that some norms be introduced into one’s account but that they be specified using intensional, semantic notions on a par with that of meaning. In closing, I counter Brandom’s reasons for resisting such a position, the most significant of which is that it leaves philosophers with nothing constructive to say about meaning.
brandom, inferentialism, pragmatism, semantics, naturalism, primitivism, quietism
0353-5150
3-22
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Whiting, Daniel (2006) Between primitivism and naturalism: Brandom’s theory of meaning. Acta Analytica, 21 (3), 3-22. (doi:10.1007/s12136-006-1007-9).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many philosophers accept that a naturalistic reduction of meaning is in principle impossible, since behavioural regularities or dispositions are consistent with any number of semantic descriptions. One response is to view meaning as primitive. In this paper, I explore Brandom’s alternative, which is to specify behaviour in non-semantic but normative terms. Against Brandom, I argue that a norm specified in non-semantic terms might correspond to any number of semantic norms. Thus, his theory of meaning suffers from the very same kind of problem as its naturalistic competitors. It is not sufficient, I contend, merely that some norms be introduced into one’s account but that they be specified using intensional, semantic notions on a par with that of meaning. In closing, I counter Brandom’s reasons for resisting such a position, the most significant of which is that it leaves philosophers with nothing constructive to say about meaning.

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Published date: 2006
Keywords: brandom, inferentialism, pragmatism, semantics, naturalism, primitivism, quietism
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 195821
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/195821
ISSN: 0353-5150
PURE UUID: f3106be3-8988-4bdd-a931-f58502a298e0

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Date deposited: 30 Aug 2011 09:22
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:06

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