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Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources
We define a new class of games---congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.
congestion games, load-dependent resource failures, pure strategy nash equilibrium, algorithms
0899-8256
156-173
Penn, Michal
4b303716-075a-4f19-8889-a45120885942
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e
Penn, Michal
4b303716-075a-4f19-8889-a45120885942
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, Moshe
59ece0e5-2a43-411c-a491-3994bd42063e

Penn, Michal, Polukarov, Maria and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2009) Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources. [in special issue: Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior Dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce] Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (1), 156-173. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.004).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We define a new class of games---congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.

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Published date: September 2009
Keywords: congestion games, load-dependent resource failures, pure strategy nash equilibrium, algorithms
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 267882
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/267882
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: a3b371d5-7622-46a7-86ab-23c4e7c403e1

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Date deposited: 16 Sep 2009 19:59
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:01

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Contributors

Author: Michal Penn
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Moshe Tennenholtz

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