The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces
In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders' market selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge to the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factors that affect such migration.
857-864
Shi, Bing
293fdf16-4597-4ae9-94fd-4415b9b1dc8f
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Vytelingum, Perukrishnen
51f06fc5-024c-450d-bff2-e19c943aa87e
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Shi, Bing
293fdf16-4597-4ae9-94fd-4415b9b1dc8f
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Vytelingum, Perukrishnen
51f06fc5-024c-450d-bff2-e19c943aa87e
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Shi, Bing, Gerding, Enrico H., Vytelingum, Perukrishnen and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2010) A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces. 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS2010), Toronto, Canada. 14 - 18 May 2010. pp. 857-864 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders' market selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge to the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factors that affect such migration.

Text
aamas.pdf - Version of Record
Download (1MB)

More information

Published date: 2010
Additional Information: Event Dates: 14th-18th May
Venue - Dates: 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS2010), Toronto, Canada, 2010-05-14 - 2010-05-18
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 268467
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/268467
PURE UUID: dd61e289-db19-4b28-b049-43e1761b7ab4
ORCID for Enrico H. Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 04 Feb 2010 13:51
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23

Export record

Contributors

Author: Bing Shi
Author: Enrico H. Gerding ORCID iD
Author: Perukrishnen Vytelingum
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×