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What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms

What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms
What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.
double auction, mechanism design, trading agent competition
1387-2532
172-203
Niu, Jinzhong
f2a9ebdc-629b-4a9a-a01d-8fd1c9279895
Cai, Kai
95ea0dad-7fa4-4a1c-bedf-6d22a4a831a2
Parsons, Simon
979d203f-915a-42f6-a6d7-3a5edaf834c6
McBurney, Peter
dc60c2e9-5ea9-46cf-915f-05d1e39826f9
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Niu, Jinzhong
f2a9ebdc-629b-4a9a-a01d-8fd1c9279895
Cai, Kai
95ea0dad-7fa4-4a1c-bedf-6d22a4a831a2
Parsons, Simon
979d203f-915a-42f6-a6d7-3a5edaf834c6
McBurney, Peter
dc60c2e9-5ea9-46cf-915f-05d1e39826f9
Gerding, Enrico H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362

Niu, Jinzhong, Cai, Kai, Parsons, Simon, McBurney, Peter and Gerding, Enrico H. (2010) What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 21 (2), 172-203. (doi:10.1007/s10458-009-9110-0).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

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More information

Published date: 1 September 2010
Keywords: double auction, mechanism design, trading agent competition
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 268531
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/268531
ISSN: 1387-2532
PURE UUID: eb01aa4b-1fd3-4f18-98c7-b8a5e430c805
ORCID for Enrico H. Gerding: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-7200-552X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 21 Feb 2010 17:52
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23

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Contributors

Author: Jinzhong Niu
Author: Kai Cai
Author: Simon Parsons
Author: Peter McBurney
Author: Enrico H. Gerding ORCID iD

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