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The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games

The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games
We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of each coalition is determined by the safety level payoff it derives in the original---non-cooperative---game. We thus capture several key features of agents' behavior: (i) the possible monetary transfer among the coalition members; (ii) the solidarity of the outsiders against the collaborators; (iii) the need for the coalition to optimize its actions against the worst possible behavior of those outside the coalition. We examine the concept of safety level cooperation in congestion games, and focus on computing the value of coalitions, the core and the Shapley value in the resulting safety level cooperative games. We provide tractable algorithms for anonymous cooperative games and for safety level cooperative games that correspond to symmetric congestion games with singleton strategies. However, we show hardness of several problems such as computing values in games with multi-resource strategies or asymmetric strategy spaces.
432-443
Bachrach, Yoram
3d653f31-34b5-45a6-aae0-4a47e658d9c2
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Bachrach, Yoram
3d653f31-34b5-45a6-aae0-4a47e658d9c2
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nick
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Bachrach, Yoram, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nick (2010) The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games. Proc. 6th Int Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-2010), Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States. 13 - 17 Dec 2010. pp. 432-443 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of each coalition is determined by the safety level payoff it derives in the original---non-cooperative---game. We thus capture several key features of agents' behavior: (i) the possible monetary transfer among the coalition members; (ii) the solidarity of the outsiders against the collaborators; (iii) the need for the coalition to optimize its actions against the worst possible behavior of those outside the coalition. We examine the concept of safety level cooperation in congestion games, and focus on computing the value of coalitions, the core and the Shapley value in the resulting safety level cooperative games. We provide tractable algorithms for anonymous cooperative games and for safety level cooperative games that correspond to symmetric congestion games with singleton strategies. However, we show hardness of several problems such as computing values in games with multi-resource strategies or asymmetric strategy spaces.

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More information

Published date: December 2010
Additional Information: Event Dates: December 13-17, 2010
Venue - Dates: Proc. 6th Int Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-2010), Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States, 2010-12-13 - 2010-12-17
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 271641
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/271641
PURE UUID: 0403780b-0bbd-44eb-9fa7-21a9043dce06

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Date deposited: 19 Oct 2010 13:30
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:36

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Contributors

Author: Yoram Bachrach
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Nick Jennings

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