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The explanatory value of some post-connectionist models

The explanatory value of some post-connectionist models
The explanatory value of some post-connectionist models
Thought displays a systematicity that cannot be explained by the connections between simple neuron-like units. This is the gist of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (F & P) challenge to connectionism. Furthermore, they assume thought to be representational and there is no available method to detect representations among the mere relations between neurons and the like. In this talk we would like to question the fairness of the challenge and the correctness of the assumption, but also the need for connectionism to accept the challenge at face value. F & P seem to force us to choose between representationalism and some form of eliminativism with respect to systematicity. However, we will argue that this is a false dilemma. An explanatory pluralism grounded on the idea that thought is a property of the relation between an agent and its environment (and peers, if any) is sufficient to decline F & P’s invitation to answer the challenge by embracing connectionist explanatory fascism. This idea follows a long tradition in theoretical biology. The possibility of such a pluralism will be explored by means of recent examples from artificial life. We will finish by wondering whether, once that we abandon representationalism, it makes sense to distinguish between explanatory and ontological pluralism.
Noble, Jason
440f07ba-dbb8-4d66-b969-36cde4e3b764
Silverman, Eric
641120a2-6584-46a6-a33b-4ea9133463af
de Pinedo, Manuel
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Noble, Jason
440f07ba-dbb8-4d66-b969-36cde4e3b764
Silverman, Eric
641120a2-6584-46a6-a33b-4ea9133463af
de Pinedo, Manuel
7a9d3eb0-6ee4-4207-964c-08f77c940676

Noble, Jason, Silverman, Eric and de Pinedo, Manuel (2011) The explanatory value of some post-connectionist models. Systematicity and the Post-Connectionist Era: Taking Stock of the Architecture of Cognition, San Jose, Andalucia, Spain. 19 - 21 May 2011.

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Other)

Abstract

Thought displays a systematicity that cannot be explained by the connections between simple neuron-like units. This is the gist of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (F & P) challenge to connectionism. Furthermore, they assume thought to be representational and there is no available method to detect representations among the mere relations between neurons and the like. In this talk we would like to question the fairness of the challenge and the correctness of the assumption, but also the need for connectionism to accept the challenge at face value. F & P seem to force us to choose between representationalism and some form of eliminativism with respect to systematicity. However, we will argue that this is a false dilemma. An explanatory pluralism grounded on the idea that thought is a property of the relation between an agent and its environment (and peers, if any) is sufficient to decline F & P’s invitation to answer the challenge by embracing connectionist explanatory fascism. This idea follows a long tradition in theoretical biology. The possibility of such a pluralism will be explored by means of recent examples from artificial life. We will finish by wondering whether, once that we abandon representationalism, it makes sense to distinguish between explanatory and ontological pluralism.

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More information

Published date: 2011
Additional Information: Event Dates: 19-21 May, 2011
Venue - Dates: Systematicity and the Post-Connectionist Era: Taking Stock of the Architecture of Cognition, San Jose, Andalucia, Spain, 2011-05-19 - 2011-05-21
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 272314
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272314
PURE UUID: 4eb40bb6-5ca6-46c0-a257-3286d5118409

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 22 May 2011 00:43
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:58

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Contributors

Author: Jason Noble
Author: Eric Silverman
Author: Manuel de Pinedo

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