Imitation and experimentation in changing contests
Imitation and experimentation in changing contests
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in miscoordination for a positive fraction of time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83, D84.
376-404
Squintani, Francesco
c2a948f1-2809-4eb4-95a2-53a5a7609615
Valimaki, Juuso
6cb468e1-96a7-4632-8db2-906714498ce2
2002
Squintani, Francesco
c2a948f1-2809-4eb4-95a2-53a5a7609615
Valimaki, Juuso
6cb468e1-96a7-4632-8db2-906714498ce2
Squintani, Francesco and Valimaki, Juuso
(2002)
Imitation and experimentation in changing contests.
Journal of Economic Theory, 104 (2), .
(doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2889).
Abstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in miscoordination for a positive fraction of time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83, D84.
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Published date: 2002
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Local EPrints ID: 33054
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33054
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 59d88d5f-5dfe-464b-ab54-38b6e1f9e007
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Date deposited: 15 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:41
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Author:
Francesco Squintani
Author:
Juuso Valimaki
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