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Globalization, Lobbying and International Environmental Governance

Globalization, Lobbying and International Environmental Governance
Globalization, Lobbying and International Environmental Governance
Globalization may require supranational coordination of environmental policies to prevent strategic policy competition weakening environmental standards. This raises concerns about a democratic deficit at the supranational level, and the possibility of capture by special interest groups. The authors develop a model in which environmental policy can be set at the national or supranational level. Governments at each level act in the interests of the group they represent, and interest groups lobby to influence the probability of getting their type of government elected.
Using asymmetries in lobbying costs, the authors analyze the effects of a democratic deficit and differential access to influence by different interest groups on the welfare of groups and nations. The paper shows: (i) asymmetries may have unexpected effects; (ii) asymmetries have greater effect when policy is set at the national rather than supranational level; and (iii) despite asymmetries groups and nations are better off when policy is coordinated at the supranational level.
0965-7576
387-403
Johal, Surjinder
149fcba2-9742-42f2-8571-3ee24282173a
Ulph, Alistair
82a2f3b8-ac72-4d0e-85cc-2760eb99b117
Johal, Surjinder
149fcba2-9742-42f2-8571-3ee24282173a
Ulph, Alistair
82a2f3b8-ac72-4d0e-85cc-2760eb99b117

Johal, Surjinder and Ulph, Alistair (2002) Globalization, Lobbying and International Environmental Governance. Review of International Economics, 10 (3), 387-403.

Record type: Article

Abstract

Globalization may require supranational coordination of environmental policies to prevent strategic policy competition weakening environmental standards. This raises concerns about a democratic deficit at the supranational level, and the possibility of capture by special interest groups. The authors develop a model in which environmental policy can be set at the national or supranational level. Governments at each level act in the interests of the group they represent, and interest groups lobby to influence the probability of getting their type of government elected.
Using asymmetries in lobbying costs, the authors analyze the effects of a democratic deficit and differential access to influence by different interest groups on the welfare of groups and nations. The paper shows: (i) asymmetries may have unexpected effects; (ii) asymmetries have greater effect when policy is set at the national rather than supranational level; and (iii) despite asymmetries groups and nations are better off when policy is coordinated at the supranational level.

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More information

Published date: 2002

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33457
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33457
ISSN: 0965-7576
PURE UUID: 3762f7b1-a3a8-484d-9e75-3d742370a48d

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Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 22 Jul 2022 20:41

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Contributors

Author: Surjinder Johal
Author: Alistair Ulph

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