Delinquent networks
Delinquent networks
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.
34-61
Ballester, Coralio
dd829919-fae2-4fbc-9a8c-ca9a095d48bf
Calvo-Armengol, Antonio
9a02ce82-b9b7-4371-a7d9-2c78afbdc569
Zenou, Yves
38bf0c72-462b-4c08-8fd1-ce365b0296dc
January 2010
Ballester, Coralio
dd829919-fae2-4fbc-9a8c-ca9a095d48bf
Calvo-Armengol, Antonio
9a02ce82-b9b7-4371-a7d9-2c78afbdc569
Zenou, Yves
38bf0c72-462b-4c08-8fd1-ce365b0296dc
Abstract
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.
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Published date: January 2010
Organisations:
Social Sciences
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 339641
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339641
ISSN: 1542-4766
PURE UUID: a412008c-f2b7-4f82-ad31-d740ca55a062
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Date deposited: 29 May 2012 08:39
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:43
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Author:
Coralio Ballester
Author:
Antonio Calvo-Armengol
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