Piracy and the zero incentive approach
Piracy and the zero incentive approach
With all the information available on Somali piracy and the sheer number of captures in and around the Gulf of Aden, it seems unthinkable that shipowners would send out a vessel without appropriate counter-measures, or indeed a properly trained crew. However, a brief look at recent decisions and contractual limitations suggests that there is little incentive to implement what the UN et al recommend as ‘best practice’ whilst sailing through the transit corridor.
1-3
Caldwell, Graham
ddfe6c43-a384-4ad4-a3cb-a27de0dfaf6f
April 2012
Caldwell, Graham
ddfe6c43-a384-4ad4-a3cb-a27de0dfaf6f
Caldwell, Graham
(2012)
Piracy and the zero incentive approach.
Shipping & Trade Law, 12 (3), .
Abstract
With all the information available on Somali piracy and the sheer number of captures in and around the Gulf of Aden, it seems unthinkable that shipowners would send out a vessel without appropriate counter-measures, or indeed a properly trained crew. However, a brief look at recent decisions and contractual limitations suggests that there is little incentive to implement what the UN et al recommend as ‘best practice’ whilst sailing through the transit corridor.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: April 2012
Organisations:
Southampton Law School
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 341805
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/341805
ISSN: 1471-9614
PURE UUID: ee8eecfe-ae07-4cc3-b418-4875cd413242
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 06 Aug 2012 13:49
Last modified: 11 Dec 2021 00:47
Export record
Contributors
Author:
Graham Caldwell
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics