New Perspectives on Yugoslavia

Key Issues and Controversies

Edited by
Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First edition published 2011
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Typeset in Garamond by Taylor and Francis Books
Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 13: 978-0-415-49919-4 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-49920-0 (pbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-203-84601-8 (ebk)

Contents

2 The Great War and the Yugoslav Grassroots

Popular mobilization in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914–18

Mark Cornwall

On 3 December 1917 in Vienna, some ferocious language was employed in a debate in the Austrian parliament (the *Reichsrat*). On behalf of the club of South Slav deputies, Vjekoslav Spinčić, a Croat from Istria, lambasted the monarchy's wartime regime: 'How we have been treated during the war exceeds anything that has occurred in the history of humanity. Never, nowhere, have governments dealt so badly, so terribly, so cruelly, so criminally with their own citizens, as our governments with us Croats, Serbs and Slovenes during this ever lasting war'. In short, it had been a veritable 'reign of terror'. It was a genocidal image, conjured up again a few months later when a Serb deputy described the wartime 'reign of terror' as comparable only to the Spanish Inquisition or the atrocity of St Bartholomew's Night. Yet out of this nightmare, he claimed, the final victor would be the idea of freedom for all peoples and, in particular, an independent southern Slav state.[1]

This exaggerated rhetoric fell at a time when the so-called 'declaration movement' was in full swing in the southern regions of the Austro-Hungarian empire, a Yugoslav agitation that challenged individuals to question the monarchy's legitimacy in its then form. Historians of the Yugoslav space have been very slow to examine critically this grassroots phenomenon, usually paying more attention to Serbia's wartime mission or the broader international context for creating Yugoslavia in 1918.[2] Yet adopting a cultural approach, notably probing mentalities in the South Slav regions of Austria-Hungary, is crucial if we are to understand why the new state could emerge and, most importantly, why Slovene and Croatian expectations might chafe so roughly against the stance of the victorious Serbian leadership. In the scope of recent Habsburg historiography on the war, Czech scholars have begun to question stereotypes about Czech wartime loyalties. For Vienna, too, Maureen Healy has set out an imaginative framework for studying how inhabitants in the imperial capital might interpret the concepts of sacrifice and allegiance.[3] In the same way, we now require an integrated study of the monarchy's wartime 'South', particularly exploring the diversity of public opinion as well as the meshing of mentalities, even if the sources for this are not easy to access.[4] Not only will it illuminate the fluidity and complexity of 'Yugoslav' loyalties (where they existed at all), it will probably underline persistent levels

of Habsburg allegiance that defied the stark rhetoric emitted by many South Slav politicians.

The launch-pad for domestic Yugoslav agitation in the final phase of the war was the 'May declaration' of 30 May 1917 by the 33 South Slav politicians who composed the Yugoslav club in the *Reichsrat*. Since parliament in Austria (Cisleithania) had not met since March 1914, and wartime censorship was tight, there had been few outlets for political expression. Exploiting the new emperor Karl's desire for constitutional government and his reconvening of the *Reichsrat*, the non-German deputies proceeded to coordinate their attacks on the 'pernicious' Austro-Hungarian structure of the empire. In its statement of 30 May, the Yugoslav club (following soundings since late 1916 with religious and political leaders in Croatia) demanded unification of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in a special democratic state entity under the Habsburg dynasty. The claim was made on the basis of the 'national principle' but also of 'Croatian state right'. Despite this clear nod to Croatian historical arguments, the movement that took off from the summer, permeating southwards into Dalmatia, Croatia and Bosnia, received its dynamism especially from Slovene initiatives in the hands of the clerical leader Anton Korošec. On that basis, some observers quickly surmised that radical Slovenes ('the culturally most advanced nation of the South Slavs') would take the lead in any future Yugoslav state.[5] Certainly, it was the case that the 'declaration' agitation was most vibrant in the Slovene lands. Characterized by a mass-signing of petitions and enormous rallies, it was there especially that a campaign of popular participation seemed to be taking place, reinforcing the idea that many Slovenes consciously desired to enter some Yugoslav unit.

Yet if there were loud echoes in both Istria and Dalmatia (Austrian provinces), the reception in Croatia or in Bosnia was more equivocal. As we will see, the political stance in Croatia was complicated by conflicting interpretations of Croatia's own national mission and what meaning was ascribed to the May declaration; in Bosnia, the chance for any popular mobilization was restricted by the military regime of General Stjepan Sarkotić. In contrast, for the Southern Slavs of Cisleithania there was not only greater freedom of association permitted, but their leaders in the Slovene and coastal lands were increasingly alarmed from 1917 by a two-fold nationalist threat: a perceived German nationalist course at home, and an Italian imperialist menace from abroad. In the face of these it was easy to exploit local national insecurities, especially if they were matched by acute economic insecurities which the Habsburg regime seemed powerless to resolve. Some form of Yugoslav unity, however conceived (and there were numerous interpretations), could offer many a panacea for basic threats to their everyday existence.

The economic insecurities

Indeed, the monarchy's economic catastrophe after 1916 was fundamental in exacerbating national or regional grievances which, for some, had manifested

themselves early in the war due to the heavy-handed tactics of the political and military authorities. Here we should note immediately the diversity of wartime economic experience across the southern Slav region. While the Austrian half of the empire suffered a major calamity (especially as the 'bread-basket' in Galicia was under Russian occupation until August 1917), the Hungarian half – which included Croatia-Slavonia – remained largely self-sufficient and always looked to its own needs first. With no empire-wide systemization of rationing and no attempts made to equalize prices until mid-1918, the monarchy from early in the war had ceased to act as an economic unit.[6]

Of the South Slav lands, only Croatia really held its head above water. In May 1917, General Ottokar Landwehr, newly appointed as coordinator of the empire's food supplies, travelled by train to Zagreb. He passed only women and children working in the fields, but noted good bread at the stations. He found the Croatian governor (*ban*) unwilling to tighten regional rationing, let alone send food reserves to starving Bosnia.[7] A year later when Landwehr returned to Zagreb he could still observe that 'everything swims in fat and the black-market blossoms'; it might be forbidden now to sell bread in public places, but much of Croatia was still suffering less than elsewhere, as evidenced by the migrant beggars from Istria or Bosnia who loitered around the railway stations. By this time the new *ban*, Antun Mihalovich, was more receptive to Landwehr's request for sharp requisitioning, promising to supply 40 wagons of macaroni, potatoes and fat in order to alleviate famine in Istria, Dalmatia and Bosnia.[8] Indeed, Mihalovich's concern for these 'Croat lands' reflected his own 'Yugoslav sympathies'. When appointed as *ban* in June 1917 he had assured the *Sabor* (assembly) in a stirring speech that his regime would be 'democratic and Croat', defending the interests of all Croats. By early summer, Landwehr for one felt there was a fast-accelerating Yugoslav band-wagon in Croatia, onto which the *ban* himself had already climbed with a largely pan-Croatian agenda.[9]

In contrast, the inhabitants of the southern Austria crownlands and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been living from hand to mouth for years, their poverty exacerbated by the Habsburg regime's inefficiencies in transport and coordination. Thus in June 1917, maps produced by the Viennese postal censors revealed famine in most towns in southern Styria, Istria, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands. The maps also correctly predicted bad harvests in these regions for the summer.[10] A few months later, in detailing a drop in the harvest for some crops by up to 60 per cent from the previous year, Korošec predicted for Austria a food catastrophe.[11] In stormy *Reichsrat* debates the Yugoslav club was regularly protesting about the chronic lack of food supplies to the south. On the one hand they blamed Hungary's selfish attitude. According to a Slovene deputy, Karel Verstovšek, 'our Slovene nation has always had only the feeblest impression of the Magyars. We have long wished for all Slavs to be separated from those hunnish people'. Irrespective of nationality, all Austrians, he claimed, now hated the Magyars

most because of their economic exploitation of others: at the grassroots there was a bitterness worse than any hatred of the enemy.[12]

On the other hand, in the deputies' views the regional economic crisis was compounded by inefficiency or corruption on the spot. Korošec, after visiting Bosnia on a fact-finding mission in the summer of 1917, made repeated attacks on the regime there, including Sarkotić's own ignorance of economics. Certainly, Bosnia could not survive on its own resources even in peacetime and now needed a constant bail-out by Hungary; its economy suffered from a feeble workforce, a series of bad harvests, and villagers who vehemently opposed requisitioning to aid cities like Sarajevo or Mostar.[13] It was a situation very similar to Austria where, through strict requisitioning, the countryside of Carinthia or Istria was constantly exploited to feed the urban conglomerations of Ljubljana or Trieste; for Istria and Dalmatia, many rural supply centres or supply routes (served by steamers in the Adriatic for instance) had ceased to function. On top of this was an inequality of prices which stimulated smuggling and the black market. Stories were rife of intrepid Istrian women who walked miles to Trieste to barter their local produce in return for bread, or tried to smuggle more attractive goods back across the border from Croatia.[14]

This Austrian crisis slowly worsened in the final year of the war. If in 1917 economic issues were certainly to the fore in censored material from the South Slav regions, by mid-1918, 90 per cent of letters handled by the central Austrian censor offices complained about food.[15] The grassroots misery is clear in correspondence from Pazin, high up in the centre of Istria. In late May 1918 the Pazin censor told of 47 deaths from starvation: 'the plight is so great that people are forced to live on wild plants, water and some milk without bread; this, coupled with terribly high prices for even the most basic foodstuffs, steadily increases the population's exasperation'. A month later the same source noted that food provisioning in central Istria has broken down completely, producing famine and some suicides; local inhabitants while placing all hope on the next harvest were cutting even half-ripe grain to make flour and 'preparing for their meals not only nettles but all kinds of edible and inedible grasses'.[16] According to one letter-writer, a chemist's wife from coastal Rovinj, 'the land looks as if the enemy had destroyed everything, dried up and contaminated ... People wander around like ghosts, dead from hunger ... [but] one minister has said "the people down there should get used to starving and dying"'.[17] Not surprisingly, the Istrian peninsula by this time was one of the most fertile areas where popular Yugoslav agitation could take root; it seems to have flourished wherever civilians felt most insecure about the war and the future.

Allegiances to empire and homeland, 1914–16

This underlying socio-economic insecurity from 1916 was intertwined, at least for many, with uncertainty about the fate of their region or nation if it stayed part of the Habsburg empire. In analyzing the slippery concept of

allegiance to the wartime regime, we must be cautious in accepting at face value the nationalist rhetoric about Austro-Hungarian repression. According to one post-war Western account, 'in practice there was brutal and savage repression in all Yugo-slav areas both within and without Austria-Hungary by Austrian and Hungarian officials and military commanders'.[18] In fact, as in the Czech lands, and notwithstanding the severe disruption to civilian life-styles, the early years of hostilities seem to have witnessed sustained loyalty to the Habsburg war from large sections of the South Slav population. In the Slovene regions a lead was given by the prominent Catholic conservative politician, Ivan Šušteršič, who pledged full support to the emperor. Recent research has shown how this was matched generally by the Slovene clergy's loyal stance and the degree of influence that they wielded in local communities. Essentially, the Slovene Catholic establishment propagated the notion of a just Habsburg war (Catholic and anti-Orthodox), out of which sacrifice the empire would emerge rejuvenated. This combined spiritual-imperial mission could gain added national bite when in May 1915 Italy entered the war; for not only could the new enemy be portrayed as a liberal menace but it was one threatening to invade and destroy the Slovene national homeland.[19] The call for allegiance to both a Slovene and Austrian fatherland, backed by a powerful redemptive message, probably resonated with thousands of Slovene soldiers and civilians. But a shift would occur when war-weariness set in and the clergy themselves began to outline a new priority for Slovene allegiances.

In Croatia similarly, despite the years of Habsburg absolutist rule, the war from the start had some very vociferous adherents (evident in the anti-Serb riots in Zagreb after Archduke Franz Ferdinand's murder, and in celebrations in the streets when Habsburg troops captured Belgrade in December 1914). In early 1915 the military commander of Zagreb still felt that 'the present generation of Croats may be described as unconditionally loyal and faithful to the dynasty'.[20] This was deceptive. For all the thousands who followed military orders, many were fluid in their allegiance depending on how they interpreted the framework for the Croatian national mission. Some, like bishop Antun Mahnić and the activist Catholic Movement, saw the defeat of liberalism as one essential crusade, but also advocated Slovene-Croatian unity in their Rijeka memorandum of March 1915; it was an ideological precursor of the May declaration.[21] For supporters of Josip Frank's party (Pure Party of Right) or Stjepan Radić's small Peasant Party, creating a greater Croatia within the monarchy was the priority. For the Croat-Serb Coalition, which had a majority in the *Sabor*, the future choices for any Yugoslav unity depended on how the Habsburg regime behaved. However, when the *Sabor* reopened in June 1915, the conditional stance was clear: the majority asserted their dynastic loyalty but also demanded greater Croatian unity (with Dalmatia and Bosnia) in a post-war restructured monarchy.[22]

For all those who professed allegiance and backed the war, the repercussions of disloyalty against the 'Habsburg establishment' (whether in Austria or Hungary) were clear. From the start of hostilities against Serbia, the military's

paranoia about 'Yugoslav' or pro-Serb sympathies had led to mass arrests; radical German or Hungarian language was aimed not just at Serbs but at Slovenes and Croats who seemed insufficiently patriotic. By 1915, hundreds of community leaders in Dalmatia and the Slovene lands had been interned, including politicians like the Croat Ante Tresić-Pavičić. In Croatia, while many politicians survived by toeing ostensibly a pro-Hungarian line, Yugoslav papers like the Catholic Movement's *Riječke novine* (*Rijeka Newspapers*) were simply closed down. The tightest grip however was maintained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There in the heart-land of 'Serb treachery' and next to the war zone, it was not surprising that the Croat Sarkotić maintained strict vigilance. Far from being lulled by the semblance of calm in 1915, he scribbled in his diary that he was 'sitting on a volcano' and hoped 'with God's help to prevent any outbreak of lava'. His solution was to ban all political activity, closing the Bosnian *Sabor* and the Sarajevo city council and targeting the Bosnian Serb population. National or confessional equality, he argued, could not apply to Serbs because of the war; their professed loyalty was simply a mask. Their confessional schools were put under state control, their cultural societies closed down and even the cyrillic alphabet was banned. The climax came in early 1916, in the wake of Austria's conquest of Serbia, when 156 Serbs were put on trial in Banja Luka for connivance with the enemy and 16 were given the death penalty.[23]

The declaration movement and the Slovenes

The regime's vigilance on the home-front, however understandable, would begin to back-fire by 1917 when, under emperor Karl's 'constitutional' regime, the military-political shackles began to be loosened in some regions of the empire. Expressing discontent was most likely and possible in Austria's South Slav regions where the economic crisis was worst and the re-convened *Reichsrat* suddenly offered a political forum for grievances. In the wake of its May declaration, the Yugoslav club had at first been optimistic, especially when an imperial amnesty freed some of their number like Tresić-Pavičić. But any goodwill from the emperor was offset by the backing he gave to Ernst von Seidler's Germanophile Austrian government. Veering increasingly upon a 'German course' for Austria, Seidler's only concession was to suggest some extra autonomy for the Slovenes but certainly no restructuring of the dualist system to allow fuller Slovene-Croat unity. By August 1917 while the club went into opposition in parliament, the public, war-weary and famished, seemed also to be inclining in private towards the panacea of the southern Slav message.[24]

The real impetus to a mass-movement however came only with the open statement of support from bishop Anton Jeglič of Ljubljana. In the face of a German radical agenda, Jeglič in the course of 1917 had come to question Šušteršič's persistent German-Austrian allegiance and moved slowly towards the alternative clerical position, a 'Yugoslav' agenda as espoused by Janez

Krek and Anton Korošec. His statement in the radical Slovene press on 15 September expressed solidarity with the Pope's peace initiative but also with the Yugoslav club's stance. It is clear that Jeglič, like Korošec and most club members, interpreted the May declaration as prioritizing Slovene-Croat unity within the empire, less so any unification with Serbia, and even less the prospect of an independent South Slav state. Looking back in July 1920, Jeglič insisted that he had always been a 'loyal Austrian', disgusted at those working against the monarchy, but equally he had always hoped for some kind of Yugoslav unity. He therefore perceived the declaration as an opportunity that had to be seized both to protect his flock internally (against German domestic dominance) and strengthen the monarchy's strategic position in the south against Italy:

> I felt that all would be lost and we would be powerless if at this propitious moment we did not rise up. I acted so that all parties would sign. My signature was authoritative and started the movement that made Yugoslavia possible. Thank God that He guided everything in such a way that my steps at the end of the war were completely legalised.[25]

Korošec too would later marvel at the push that Jeglič's backing gave towards South Slav unity. From October 1917, parish councils in Carniola, the only pure Slovene crownland, began to announce adherence to the May declaration and a machinery of mass signature-gathering ground into action. The climax of this was to be the winter of 1917–18, for from March the movement changed tactics, developing into a series of mass rallies.

Some historians have viewed the declaration as increasingly a legal cloak beneath which a more radical agitation was fermenting in 1918. In other words, much of the movement was paying lip-service to a statement loyal to the dynasty while actually working towards an independent Yugoslav state outside the Empire.[26] A more recent analysis by Vlasta Stavbar suggests however a complex series of motives inspiring those who signed or supported petitions for the declaration.[27] She concludes, on the basis of hundreds of statements in the Maribor archives, that many Slovenes signatories continued to feel strong allegiance to the Habsburg dynasty as well as to some concept of Yugoslav unity. Some signed with a more radical political design in mind, some were certainly jumping on a band-wagon whose wheels were greased by war-weariness, social hardship and food grievances. Others may well have experienced Jeglič's crisis of conscience – torn between loyalty to Catholic Austria and the security of a South Slav entity.

On Stavbar's evidence, the main grassroots movement started first in Carniola, stimulated directly by the local bishop's adherence. In one village the inhabitants added a personal postscript to the basic declaration: 'we love the Habsburg monarchy, and for that reason we demand for her peoples their own statehood and for us Yugoslavs our own independent state within her, for only thus can the monarchy continue'. Most Carniolan petitions,

encompassing 30,500 signatures, were sent to the Yugoslav club primarily by parish councils; over half the councils of Carniola finally backed the declaration. Their number seems to have been weakened firstly because parts of the crownland were in the war zone and subject to military vigilance. But secondly, Šušteršič's continued influence may have played a role; although he had supported the initial May declaration, he saw its framework as confined to Cisleithania (excluding Croatia) and by late 1917 had broken with the rest of the radical Yugoslav club.[28] In doing so he increasingly identified himself with the sinking Habsburg ship.

In southern Styria, Korošec's home base, the movement was livelier than in Carniola but also cautious since the German language border was close. The declaration was backed by 70 per cent of parish councils as well as some societies and banks, and over 70,000 signatures were collected, mostly women and children. While some petitions emerged after political meetings, many hint at a strong degree of local initiative since (compared to Carniola) they were handwritten rather than duplicated texts. Many contained a special Habsburg clause such as 'Long live Yugoslavia, Long live our Emperor Karl!', or 'Long live the beloved Habsburg dynasty and lucky Yugoslavia under its glorious sceptre!' Mass meetings from spring 1918 also seemed at first to be spontaneously loyal. At one in March, when Korošec spoke about the wonderful Yugoslav future, the mass cry went up, 'We want to be free in a great Habsburg Yugoslavia'. At another on 21 April the resolution mentioned for the last time an allegiance to the Habsburg dynasty. These rallies and petitions were also permeated by the sense of a growing German threat; indeed Slovene signatories in the Ptuj district seem to have suffered ethnic intimidation. On the face of it there is interesting evidence of grassroots defence. One petition dispatched in January to Korošec by 558 women from near Maribor was strident:

> Concerning the audacious plan of our religious and national opponents who wish, with the help of the German School Association (*Südmark*) to seize by force our beautiful Slovene lands, owned by the Slovene people for centuries, we are inspired by the idea of unification of all the Yugoslav regions of Austria-Hungary [under the Habsburg sceptre].[29]

It was in Carinthia however that a German menace to Slovene existence was portrayed as especially dangerous. Janko Pleterski has suggested that there in particular a German-Austrian persecution from early in the war was turned into a 'crucial mass political experience', making numerous Slovenes alert to some peril to their national existence should Austria win the war and implement a 'German course'.[30] Even if we should be cautious about generalizing an image of Slovene national suffering, it was the case that even after May 1917 the regional governor of Carinthia, Count Lodron (a German nationalist speaking no Slovene), was determined to suppress the declaration movement; already in 1916 he had clamped down hard on any Slovene dissent, arresting

the only Slovene MP while the only newspaper was very strictly censored. In 1917–18 he banned almost all Slovene national rallies and only ten parish councils ventured to announce support for the May declaration. Yet over 19,000 signatures were collected, representing over 20 per cent of the Slovene population. Lodron dismissed these, claiming that most Slovenes had little idea about what they were signing. Certainly, there may well have been some abuses, with villagers simply signing what their local priest advised. Against this must be set Pleterski's own analysis of the Carinthian petitions preserved in the Ljubljana archives, for they suggest that individual grievances against German aggressiveness and the war were now widespread among Slovene-speakers.[31]

The declaration movement therefore had snowballed in the particular circumstances of winter 1917–18. While it was stimulated from above by the clerical lead and by Yugoslav club rhetoric about self-determination, it was nourished at the grassroots by hopes of peace in the East, as the monarchy started talks with Russia's Bolshevik regime, and by a gathering belief that it was publicly acceptable to challenge the miserable war conditions (exemplified by the empire-wide food and labour protests of January 1918). In the south, agitation for the declaration provided a positive focal point for negative frustrations. Thus, one postal censor report in April noted how ordinary people who 'normally ignored such things' had been indoctrinated; it was obvious from letters sent by the lower classes and even working women who were 'not tired of asserting that everyone fights for "Yugoslavia", admonishing their relatives and friends in neutral countries to remain true to the Slovene cause in heart and mind'.[32] The gendarmerie commander in Celje concurred that the movement was unstoppable: 'it includes all people without distinction of party bias ... the agitation has been skilfully organized and skilfully executed. People who lived in peace up to now have been shaken to the core'. In the face of this the Habsburg authorities in most areas remained relatively powerless. Already in February 1918 the regional governor of Carniola, Count Attems, warned the ministry of interior about a phenomenon that seemed to be spreading into all South Slav regions and all layers of the population. Yet not only was the Yugoslav club protected by parliamentary immunity. A legal ruling of February announced that the agitation because of the 'Habsburg clause' was still within the law. Lodron's arbitrary behaviour was therefore exceptional, pre-empting the minister of interior who only on 12 May forbade further declaration rallies or propaganda.[33]

The ban was prompted by events in Ljubljana where the agitation was beginning to infect the armed forces. On 22–24 April spontaneous food demonstrations had occurred in the city. Many displayed their Yugoslav sympathies, directing their frustration against Šušteršič and against German property. According to Attems whose office was invaded by 200 Slovene women:

> Through systematic agitation in the press and in meetings dealing with the Yugoslav question, a great mass of inflammable material has been

> gathered together. It has now blazed up, on the one hand targeting the head of the provincial diet [Šušteršič], on the other against Germans.[34]

More alarming was the fact that Slovene troops had refused to move against the rioters, 'clear evidence' that Yugoslav propaganda was starting to infect the army. A military investigation revealed that, a few evenings before the disturbances, two officers of the local regiment had been heard shouting Yugoslav and treasonable slogans in the streets. The local military commanders were clear that the 'Korošec party' was to blame:

> Many men, even the companies who departed in April, wore national (tricolour) ribbons and cockades on their march to the railway station ... Everybody agrees on one point: that the agitation originates with a section of the Slovene clergy, incited and backed by the bishop [Jeglič]. Whereas those in the countryside are roused only with difficulty and reluctance, the urban population, especially sections of the educated classes and the younger generation, follows more willingly.[35]

Reports such as this led the Austrian defence minister to warn the government on 1 May about the 'unbridled agitation of the Korošec party' and its impact on army morale. The military authorities were usually inclined to make mountains out of any nationalist mole-hills. Nevertheless, when six military revolts occurred in the hinterland a few weeks later, while the core grievances were war-weariness and inadequate food as well as some Bolshevik 'infection', a nationalist ingredient was also present. The three rebellions in Styria involving Slovene soldiers all seemed to have some links to the agitation at home (not least through the local radical press), and were a hint that morale in the hinterland and at the front could be closely connected.[36]

That of course was the military's real fear. As yet, the cases of open Slovene or Croat insubordination in the front-line seem to have been small, especially on the Italian front where Habsburg officers could tell their troops that Italy had rapacious designs on the Slovene-Croatian homelands. There had however already been some notorious cases of 'treachery', most notably that of Ljudevit Pivko, a remarkable Slovene officer who in September 1917 had deserted to Italy and tried to organize propaganda troops there to subvert the empire (he found that recruiting Slovenes or Croats for his cause was very difficult). In May 1918 the desertion to Italy of a handful of Croat officers from the 42nd *honvéd* division was further evidence that a minority of soldiers, depressed by the material catastrophe, were listening to the Yugoslav message emanating from Zagreb. They, like the Slovene military rebels in the hinterland, were finally prepared to make a clear leap away from their Habsburg allegiance.[37]

The military duly used these incidents to put pressure on what they saw as lax rule at home, and in part the government responded. On 12 May the declaration movement was officially banned, and at the same time both the

emperor and prime minister Seidler publicly refuted the idea that Slovene regions would be allowed to join in any South Slav union or even to form a Slovene entity within Austria. Yet these pronouncements were no longer enforceable. Seidler's stance in particular confirmed for Slovene politicians and their constituencies that, with momentum for a 'German course' picking up, they could expect no help from Vienna for their national security. As the empire's fate in the war looked ever more precarious and the prospect of an Italian invasion loomed, they were pushed to think of more radical Yugoslav options.

In the Slovene lands ordinary people encountered these ideas through the press or through continuing mass rallies. On 2 July for instance, at a huge, officially-prohibited gathering in Vrhinka, Korošec was able to address the crowds from a hotel balcony while the masses handicapped the local gendarmes. Later Korošec attributed the rally's triumph to the government's wisdom in banning it, for that had simply increased curiosity as well as confirming the need for a constitutional state.[38] Although the authorities were suitably alarmed, Korošec himself was quite free to operate in Austria or further afield, inspiring many Slovene women to wear his portrait in a locket upon their breast; at the same time, most Catholic clergy since a meeting in February were backing 'reform' and preaching it from their pulpits.[39] The agitation in the Slovene lands was to climax in mid-August in the 'Slav days' in Ljubljana where, in defiance of the authorities, a National Council of Austria's South Slavs was proclaimed as part of a future national council working towards 'Yugoslav unity'. Korošec read out a letter from Jeglič urging his flock to continue fighting for the May declaration. But one police report stressed how the concept of 'unity' was now interpreted. The monarchy was not mentioned, nor the birthday of the emperor; it appeared that 17 August had deliberately been chosen to highlight a shift of allegiance.[40]

Dissemination in Dalmatia and Croatia

That the declaration movement could spread so successfully in Slovene regions from late 1917 owed much to a mesh of circumstances. In the face of Vienna's obstinate 'German course' (both domestically in Austria and in a tighter alliance with Germany) the Slovene clerical leadership had launched a campaign that fed off war-weariness and abundant misery in local communities: a growing sense that the Habsburg regime would not provide national security while some South Slav entity could. Not surprisingly, in the starving crownlands further south, *Reichsrat* deputies could stir a similarly explosive concoction with the same arguments. Croat politicians and community leaders there took note not only of the Yugoslav club's tactics but also the signs across the border in Croatia, particularly the support that the Starčević party had given to the May declaration. In Istria, Croat deputies like Spinčić and Matko Laginja (both Starčević party members) took the lead with propaganda. In May, the provincial gendarmerie commander suggested that their campaign had failed to

win over the locals, but this was just one perspective. In fact, at least 15,000 people (perhaps 10 per cent of the Slavs of Istria) signed up with petitions in early 1918.[41] Open support was also suggested in censored correspondence. On northern islands like Krk where the pro-Yugoslav bishop Mahnić held sway, 2,000 signatures were collected. And among the starving inhabitants of Pazin, the censor concluded in June:

> There is very lively interest in the South Slav declaration. In the correspondence of intelligent people there are more detailed statements about it, while in that of the less educated one can read short allusions like the greeting 'Long Live Yugoslavia'.[42]

By September the censor was noting an ever stronger fervour in central Istria, and joy at news of the National Council founded in Ljubljana:

> The people are convinced that [the declaration] will be realized and therefore expect a better future. They have full confidence in the *Reichsrat* deputies and are pleased that they have finally chosen the radical path. ... The national struggle between Croats, Slovenes and Italians has ceased – all hatred is directed against the Germans and Magyars.[43]

In Dalmatia in 1918 the declaration echoes were perhaps even stronger. According to the regional governor in Zadar, already in the spring the Slovene leadership enjoyed such a reputation in Dalmatia that educated people had decided for Yugoslav unity within the empire. The number of signatures gathered was over 16,000 with petitions dispatched, for instance, from the Catholic women's movement in Zadar and the Croat reading-room in the Serb bastion of Knin.[44] In April Korošec himself visited Split, having received a petition and invitation from 7,000 of its inhabitants. A few days later the amnestied deputy Tresić-Pavičić, who had been publicly scathing about Habsburg 'atrocities', arrived and was given a tumultuous welcome; a crowd of several thousand cried 'Long live Croatia in a united Yugoslav state' while students unfurled the Yugoslav tricolour. Such open propaganda regularly irked Sarkotić in Sarajevo but he could do little to curb the freedom of assembly allowed in Dalmatia or the rather lax censorship law.[45] Thus on 2 July, Croat and Serb delegates from all parts of Dalmatia were able to assemble in Split, announce their goal of a completely independent Yugoslav state and form a committee to agitate in that direction.

It might be assumed that Croatia-Slavonia too would be at the forefront of south Slav mobilization after 1916 in view of its pre-war history and a majority in the *Sabor* that had expressly rejected the Austro-Hungarian state structure. In fact, while some concept of Yugoslav unity was probably more entrenched than in neighbouring 'Slovenia', a similar public agitation did not develop or at least its percolation into the communities was more subtle. There were a number of reasons. Firstly, the politicians were both

opportunistic and mindful of Croatia's own historic priorities. The Croat-Serb Coalition until the end of the war waited on events and declined to embrace the May declaration; the Frank and Radić parties gave priority to Croatian state right, a 'Yugoslav' unity that focused on the Croats of Bosnia and Dalmatia. Instead therefore it was the small Starčević party that picked up the *Reichsrat*'s torch, its leader Ante Pavelić welcoming the declaration and announcing in June 1917 that it would mobilize national forces.[46] This then was a key axis for interaction with Korošec and the agitators in Dalmatia or Istria, while the main political force, the Coalition, gave no lead.[47] When the Starčević party met Yugoslav club deputies in Zagreb in early March 1918, the Slovene leaders saw little point in proclaiming 'unity' because it was self-evidently absent in Croatia. By the summer there had been some shifts. Not only were some Coalition deputies defecting to the Starčević grouping, but Radić in April had 'crossed the Rubicon of his political career', abandoning the Frankists and adhering to the declaration. Nevertheless, it was the Slovenes who felt most urgency. Korošec in the summer did not wait for a joint initiative with Zagreb before announcing a National Council. As one radical Zagreb journal noted, the Slovenes 'who have the longest and most threatened national border cannot wait for conditions in the *banovina* [Croatia-Slavonia] to clear up completely'.[48]

At the Croatian grassroots a Yugoslav message seems particularly to have spread via a radical press and, as in Austria, via the clergy's direction. New papers were appearing from early 1918 such as *Jug* (*South*) in Osijek and *Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba* (*The Voice of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs*) in Zagreb. Others like the Catholic non-party organ *Novine* (*Newspaper*) of Archbishop Bauer of Zagreb, which since 1914 had been a new base for the pro-Yugoslav Catholic Movement, began to be more strident. In late 1917, 52 clerics in Zagreb supported a *Novine* statement advocating a Croat-Serb-Slovene nation. In January the paper commented that the Yugoslav problem was a 'Gordian knot' that awaited its own Alexander (a clear reference to Regent Alexander of Serbia).[49] This was a stance by the Catholic Movement and its hierarchy, notably bishops Mahnić and Bauer, that seemed to exceed the May declaration and undoubtedly it had a major impact, not least among Catholic students. Yet, as in the Austrian crownlands, the Croat Catholic position was by no means clear-cut. Its reference points were not only the declaration movement, but also those clergy in Slavonia (the 'Djakovo circle') who still wished to prioritize spiritual matters, and Archbishop Stadler of Sarajevo who on 16 November had publicly opposed the declaration and insisted on Croatian state interests. While Stadler remained adamant, the hierarchy in Croatia-Slavonia went their own way in league with their Slovene neighbours. Bishop Mahnić for example was converted to a fully independent Yugoslav state by May 1918. He could still interpret this chiefly as Croatia's Catholic mission by which Slovenes but also Serbs would be protected from the evils of German Protestantism; in other words, the spiritual and national crusade were intertwined.[50]

Where and how far this message penetrated into local communities requires far more research. In Croatia-Slavonia there seem to have been no mass petitions for the May declaration, although some signature-gathering spilled over from Austria (for example in the western-most Modrus-Rijeka komitat where the authorities observed 'only Yugoslavs left').[51] What is striking is also the gulf between the educated urban sector, receptive to the South Slav message, and a rural peasantry antagonized by requisitioning of their food supplies. The dangers were summed up by one politician, Živko Bertić, who addressed the *Sabor* in July 1918. Although he felt from his own experience that many Croat soldiers were inclining towards the idea of Yugoslav unity, he warned his colleagues that the movement in Croatia was 'young and green': 'great swathes of our people still act more according to their dark instincts than under the influence of this great idea'.[52] These 'dark instincts', reacting to social and material grievances, would come to the fore at the war's end. While the educated sectors were busy discussing Yugoslav unity or cheering the collapse of the monarchy, many peasants in league with thousands of deserters (the so-called 'green cadres' hiding in the countryside) vented their anger upon the symbols of authority, pillaging towns and estates.[53] The social explosion mirrored that in Hungary proper. It was also a contrast to the relative stability in Slovene society where over the previous two years the shifts in allegiance had been managed quite successfully.

The view from Bosnia-Herzegovina

Late in the war, the Habsburg elite's general perception was that the main sources for the Yugoslav poison were either the 'Korošec movement' or unspecified enemy centres abroad. In the same way, Sarkotić in Bosnia always portrayed the agitation as largely external to his domain.[54] Nevertheless, as in Croatia, there was much fertile soil in Bosnia. In the wake of the May declaration, Sarajevo's Serb and Croat politicians were in contact with the Yugoslav club, and in September 1917 Korošec made a well-publicized visit to drum up support. From Vienna, Count Burián, the minister with special responsibility for Bosnia, observed that Korošec could indeed do great damage, that the authorities were trying to confine his peregrinations, but that the journey to Bosnia was legal and could not be prevented.[55] The visit indeed seems to have moved most Bosnian parties in a Yugoslav direction. Although the privileged Moslem leaders were largely hostile to the declaration until the end of the war, fearing submersion in a Yugoslav entity, Korošec found some sympathizers, and by 1918 an alarming number of Moslem women were backing the pro-Yugoslav Social Democratic party. Many Croats were divided between Stadler and his supporters who advocated 'Greater Croatia' and those like Jozo Sunarić and the Franciscan clergy who backed Korošec; but in both camps this was still a message for some kind of South Slav unity that challenged the existing state structure. As for the Bosnian Serbs, their 'Yugoslav' credentials were taken as read by Sarkotić, but their leaders like their

supporters naturally had special reason to remain cautious. Vojislav Šola and Danilo Dimović were quietly developing their links to Vienna and Zagreb but they had to keep their grassroots base even more secret.

In the early summer of 1918, Sarkotić read the report of a lawyer, Milan Katičić, who had travelled across the South Slav region and who painted a dismal picture. Everywhere he felt the Habsburg idea was losing ground; even in Bosnia most politicians were in the enemy camp and the climate was ripe for revolution. Sarkotić did not agree. He continued to view Dalmatia, Carniola and Croatia as the chief sources for Yugoslav propaganda.[56] The lack of security in Dalmatia (where there was no state police) was particularly alarming as it undermined military discipline and allowed deserters to roam free. The dangers from elsewhere had been vividly brought home to him, personified in bishops Jeglič and Bauer who in June had visited Sarajevo to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Stadler's consecration; it was an encounter with clergy whom he felt were 'swimming in the South Slav declaration'. It made Sarkotić question how far the national calm in Bosnia was skin deep and only ensured by his strict regime. As he warned Burián:

> Foreign and domestic propaganda is working in a Yugoslav – in other words a Serbian – direction, and the danger exists that this propaganda will overwhelm not only the [Bosnian] Serbs but also the Moslems. For it is clear that those who have a positive goal like the Yugoslavs, who steer unswervingly towards that goal and spare neither toil or effort, have a real chance of success. To view this propaganda with folded arms, in other words not to pursue our own goals with the same determination can really only bring disappointments upon us.[57]

In fact, the Habsburg leaders in Vienna and Budapest could never agree on a solution for the South Slav problem and were still bickering over it as the empire disintegrated around them.

Conclusion

The 'secondary mobilization' that took off in the south of the Habsburg monarchy after 1916 was, unlike the patriotic mobilization of 1914, out of the hands of the authorities and largely at a tangent to Habsburg interests.[58] As we have seen, it was not uniform across the southern Slav region, but where it succeeded it acted as something of a plebiscite for the Yugoslav future. Its main fulcrum was in the western Balkans, in Slovene communities and in the southern Austrian crownlands, where a short-term convergence of material hardships, war-weariness and mounting anxiety about German or Italian encroachment gave the Yugoslav Club ample scope to pursue a crusade for Slovene-Croat solidarity. The degree to which this cause penetrated to the grassroots does much to explain the fresh legitimacy accorded to Cisleithanian Slovene and Croat politicians and the simultaneous shift in popular loyalties,

away from an empire that seemed unable to satisfy basic concerns about security. The leadership of these territories could enter the new Yugoslav state with some kind of popular mandate.

In contrast, the much more confused picture in Croatia and Bosnia in 1917–18, in terms of competing concepts of South Slav unity and social-ethnic diversity, helps us understand the future traumas in interwar Yugoslavia. Despite the radical lead of the Catholic church in Croatia from late 1917, and the interaction of Croat-Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia with the declaration initiative, there remained a host of competing Yugoslav agendas in both regions and both entered the new Yugoslavia with the myriad allegiances unresolved. Most notably, for a large educated strata of Croats the 'Yugoslav' idea meant a Greater Croatia, while for many Bosnian Muslims the priority was to shore up Muslim autonomy and preserve their influence; both groupings, even in 1918, felt their goals might still be achieved within the Habsburg monarchy rather than in any new state entity. At the same time, the peasantry in Croatia was largely divorced from the national discourse, or the latter was hooked up too late to peasant material anxieties. In short, most Croatian and Bosnian politicians could not claim popular mandates except in the towns, while the countryside remained a force to be harnessed in the future (for instance by populist leaders like Stjepan Radić).

Across the South Slav region any imperial legitimacy had substantially weakened as the empire suffered an economic and then a military catastrophe. But if as a viable alternative many 'Habsburg' Serbs naturally welcomed the union with Serbia, and many Slovenes entered into it to secure their existence, it was the Croatian outlook that was most conditional and most equivocal. As a result, in terms of a Habsburg legacy to Yugoslavia, it was the thorny Croatian question that would most bedevil the new state's stability.

Notes

1 *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Österreichischen Reichsrates*, XXII Session, vol. III, Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1918, 47th sitting, 3 December 1917, p. 2484, speech by Vjekoslav Spinčić; and 58th sitting, 6 February 1918, pp. 3058–59, speech by Vukotić.

2 The best general surveys remain (all from the Slovene perspective): J. Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje Slovenaca za Jugoslaviju* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976); L. Ude, 'Declaracijsko gibanje na Slovenskem', in V. Čubrilović, F. Čulinović and M. Kostrenčić (eds), *Naučni skup u povodu 50-godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske Monarhije i stvaranje Jugoslavenske države* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija, 1969); Ude, 'Declaracijsko gibanje pri Slovencih', *Zgodovinski časopis*, Volume 24, 1970. In English there is little. The subject receives no mention in I. Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and is weakly treated in J. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a useful overview see Pleterski, 'The Southern Slav Question', in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth Century Europe* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2002), and for Serbia's role: A. Mitrović, *Serbia's Great War 1914–1918* (London: Hurst, 2008). The best political-diplomatic analysis remains D. Šepić, *Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914–1918* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970).

3 I. Šedivý, *Češi, české země a velká válka 1914–1918* (Prague: Lidové noviny, 2001); M. Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire. Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

4 For some recent work see W. Lukan, 'Die politische Meinung der slowenischen Bevölkerung 1917/18 im Speigel der Zensurberichte des Gemeinsamen Zentralnachweisbureaus für Kriegsgefangene in Wien', in J. Pokorny et al. (eds), *Nacionalismus, společnost a kultura ve střední Evropě 19. a 20 století* (Prague: Karolinum, 2007).

5 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Vienna, Kriegsarchiv [KA], Evidenzbüro 1918 [EvB], nr 3442, Militäranwalt des Milkmdo in Vienna to EvB, 31 January 1918.

6 There is no thorough analysis of the Habsburg Empire's economy in wartime, but useful introductions are G. Gratz and R. Schüller, *Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Österreich-Ungarns. Die Tragödie der Erschopfung* (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1930); and E. März, *Austrian Banking and Financial Policy. Creditanstalt at a Turning Point 1913–1923* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984).

7 O. Landwehr, *Hunger. Die Erschöpfungsjahre der Mittelmächte 1917/18* (Zurich, Leipzig and Vienna: Amalthea, 1931), p. 56.

8 KA, Militärkanzlei seiner Majestät [MKSM] 1918, 93–2/35, Landwehr to MKSM, 5 May 1918; J. Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, 2 vols (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990), II, pp. 22, 42.

9 B. Krizman, *Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski politički odnosi* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), p. 113; Landwehr, *Hunger*, pp. 182, 235, 239.

10 KA, EvB 1917, nr 11609, Zensurstelle Vienna to EvB, 7 July 1917.

11 *Stenographische Protokolle*: 41st sitting, 21 November 1917, pp. 2184ff.

12 Ibid., 48th sitting, 4 December 1917, pp. 2558–60.

13 Ibid., p.2186. See also H. Kapidžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1962), pp. 214–16; Landwehr, *Hunger*, pp. 58–59 for the Bosnian situation in mid-1917.

14 See *Stenographische Protokolle*: pp. 2186, 2809 (Korošec speeches), 2410–11 (Spadaro), 2857 (Jarc), 3010ff (Laginja).

15 KA, EvB 1918, nrs 23324, 23412.

16 KA, EvB 1918, Intelligence centre [NaStelle] Udine reports: EvB nr 15188, 21 May; nr 17812, 15 June; nr 21616, 16 July 1918.

17 KA, EvB 1918, nr 28731, Zensurstelle Udine to Feldmarschall von Boroević, 5 September 1918.

18 R.D. Laffan, 'The Liberation of the New Nationalities. Part I The Yugoslavs', in H.W.V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference in Paris*, 6 volumes (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), vol. IV, pp. 178–79.

19 See P. Bobič, *War and Faith: The Catholic Church in Slovenia 1914–1918* (DPhil thesis, Oxford, 2009). Chapter 4 suggests the mediating role of the clergy between front and home-front. See also J. Pleterski, *Dr Ivan Šušteršič 1863–1925. Pot prvaka slovenskega političnega katolicizma* (Ljubljana: Založba, 1998); and, for a local perspective, E. Škulj (ed.), 'Jerebova kronika župnije Škocjan pri Turjaku', *Acta Ecclesiastica Sloveniae*, XXIX (Ljubljana, 2007).

20 F. Barac (ed.), *Croats and Slovenes: Friends of the Entente in the World War* (Paris: Lang, Blanchong, 1919), p. 36.

21 Z. Matijević, 'Croatian Catholic Movement and the Creation of the Yugoslav State (1912–18)', *Review of Croatian History*, Volume 1, Number 1, 2005, pp. 165–67. The bishop's name is usually spelled in Slovene sources as Anton Mahnič.

22 Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, I, pp. 333–34; and M. Biondich, *Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904–1928* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 122.

23 Sarkotić diary, 1 January 1915: quoted in S. Klein, *Freiherr Sarkotić von Lovćen. Die Zeit seiner Verwaltung in Bosnien-Herzegovina von 1914 bis 1919* (PhD thesis, Vienna, 1969), p. 38. Also Kapidžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina*, pp. 205–13.

24 KA, EvB 1917, nr 9336/III, Zensurstelle Feldkirch report on southern Slav movement (monthly report for August 1917); Lukan, 'Die politische Meinung', p. 233.
25 J. Pleterski, 'Zapis ob razpravi o izjavah za majniško deklaracijo', *Zgodovinski časopis*, vol. 47/4, 1993, p. 572. See also Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje*, pp.197ff; and Bobič, *War and Faith*, pp. 216–20.
26 Ude, 'Declaracijsko gibanje na Slovenskem', p. 144.
27 V. Stavbar, 'Izjave v podporo Majniško Deklaracije', *Zgodovinski časopis*, 1992–93, vols. 46/3, pp. 357–81; 46/4, pp. 497–507; 47/1, pp. 99–106.
28 Ibid., pp. 497–507. Three-quarters of the petitions from the Ljubljana judicial district mentioned the 'Habsburg clause'. For Šušteršič's behaviour: Pleterski, *Dr Ivan Šušteršič*, pp. 408–14.
29 Ibid., pp. 358–81. In view of this mass 'national defence', we might seriously question a recent claim that during the war 'nationalist feeling counted little when survival was at stake': P. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation. Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 227.
30 J. Pleterski, 'Koroški Slovenci med prvo svetovno vojno', in J. Pleterski, L. Ude and T. Zorn (eds), *Koroški plebiscit. Razprave in članki* (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1970), p. 85.
31 Ibid., pp.104ff. Stavbar in contrast found few Carinthian petitions in the Maribor archives.
32 KA, Zensurstelle Feldkirch files, Fasz.5952, monthly report (Beilage 29: South Slav movement), 29 April 1918.
33 Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje*, pp. 246–48, 255, 260 (Celje report).
34 Ibid., pp. 321–23.
35 Barac (ed.), *Croats and Slovenes*, pp. 68–69.
36 See the detailed study of military revolt on the home-front: R. Plaschka, H. Haselsteiner and A. Suppan, *Innere Front. Militärassistenz, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918*, 2 vols, (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1974), I, pp. 324ff.
37 For the cases of Pivko and the Croat desertions see M. Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 131–49, 231–39, 287–99.
38 Ude, 'Declaracijsko gibanje pri Slovencih', pp. 201–2; and for a full review of the Slovene mass-rallies, pp. 198ff.
39 KA, Feindespropaganda-Abwehrstelle 1918, res.185, report to army high command, 19 June 1918. For the compromise that led to most clergy taking Jeglič's line: Bobič, *War and Faith*, pp. 239ff.
40 Ude, Declaracijsko gibanje na Slovenskem', p. 156. The event was also celebrated in Allied propaganda leaflets that were showered over the Italian front in September: Cornwall, *Undermining*, p. 352.
41 Stavbar, 'Izjave v podporo', pp. 102–4; Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje*, p. 262.
42 For Pazin: KA, EvB 1918, nr 17812, NaStelle Udine to EvB, 15 June. (Over 800 women and girls had signed a petition in January). For the islands: KA, EvB 1918, nr 11932, Zensurstelle Udine, 18 April 1918.
43 KA, EvB 1918, nr 28731, Zensurstelle Udine, 5 September 1918.
44 Stavbar, 'Izjave v podporo', p. 105.
45 KA, EvB 1918, nr 15181/18, Sarkotić report to army high command [AOK], 18 May; KA, AOK Op.Abteilung 1918, nr 110077, Sarkotić report, 26 July 1918.
46 Not to be confused with the *ustaša* leader of the same name.
47 Krizman, *Hrvatska*, pp. 109, 114; Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, II, p.32. See also Z. Matijević, 'Reakcije frankovačkih pravaša na "Svibanjsku deklaraciju"', in F. Hoško (ed.), *Prošlost obvezuje: povijesni korijeni Gospićko-senjske biskupije* (Rijeka: Teologija u Rijeci, 2004), pp. 439–74.
48 *Glas Slovenaca Hrvata i Srba*, quoted in Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje*, p. 337. For Radić: Biondich, *Stjepan Radić*, pp. 131–33; Horvat, *Politička povijest*, II, p. 38 ('crossed the Rubicon').
49 Ibid., p. 34; and see the comments on pro-Serbian propaganda circulating in Osijek: Barac, *Croats and Slovenes*, pp. 60–61.

50 J. Krišto, *Hrvatski katolički pokret (1903–1945)* (Zagreb: Glas koncila, 2004), pp. 108–16; Matijević, 'Croatian Catholic Movement', pp. 172–73.
51 KA, EvB 1918, nr 13508, NaStelle Udine report, 5 May 1918.
52 Horvat, *Politička povijest*, II, pp. 56–58. See also Barac, *Croats and Slovenes*, p. 67: 'The Yugoslav movement ... is the exclusive common property of the more educated, politically active classes'.
53 For the mass phenomenon of deserters in Croatia, see Plaschka, Haselsteiner, Suppan, *Innere Front*, II, pp. 70–89. In September 1918 it was estimated at 25,000 (p. 78).
54 Cornwall, *The Undermining*, pp. 264–65.
55 Kapidžić, *Bosna i Hercegovina*, pp. 221ff. Burián until the end felt that Korošec's agitation represented the South Slav danger in its 'most intensive form': Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years*, p. 198.
56 Klein, *Freiherr Sarkotić von Lovćen*, pp. 190–91.
57 Hrvatski državni arhiv (Croatian State Archives), Zagreb, Sarkotić MSS, Sarkotić to Burián, 16 June 1918; and ibid., the entries in Sarkotić's diary for this period.
58 For more general analysis of this theme see the essays in J. Horne (ed.), *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).