Private enforcement - is Article 82 EC special?
Private enforcement - is Article 82 EC special?
Hedvig Schmidt identifies a lack of guidance from the Commission on how to establish a causal link between the abuse and the harm caused to the claimant in a private action. Under the present case-law, it is sufficient for the Commission to prove a likelihood of harm to competition. This standard of proof gives private claimants not enough to found their own case in a follow-on action. The move to a more rigorous economic analysis, Schmidt argues, would benefit these claimants but would, at the same time, raise the benchmark for those bringing an independent action in national courts.
european union, abuse of dominant position, article 82 EC, unilateral rest, competition law, antitrust law, industrial economics, private enforcement
978-3-540-69958-3
137-164
Schmidt, Hedvig
79ee57ca-7da9-43ea-93bc-2c3ad29e714a
19 August 2008
Schmidt, Hedvig
79ee57ca-7da9-43ea-93bc-2c3ad29e714a
Schmidt, Hedvig
(2008)
Private enforcement - is Article 82 EC special?
In,
Mackenrodt, Mark-Oliver, Gallego, Beatriz Conde and Enchelmaier, Stefan
(eds.)
Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?
Dordrecht, NL.
Springer, .
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
Hedvig Schmidt identifies a lack of guidance from the Commission on how to establish a causal link between the abuse and the harm caused to the claimant in a private action. Under the present case-law, it is sufficient for the Commission to prove a likelihood of harm to competition. This standard of proof gives private claimants not enough to found their own case in a follow-on action. The move to a more rigorous economic analysis, Schmidt argues, would benefit these claimants but would, at the same time, raise the benchmark for those bringing an independent action in national courts.
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Published date: 19 August 2008
Keywords:
european union, abuse of dominant position, article 82 EC, unilateral rest, competition law, antitrust law, industrial economics, private enforcement
Organisations:
Law
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 148879
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/148879
ISBN: 978-3-540-69958-3
PURE UUID: 5a14a974-47df-413e-8a75-2ab692e19a69
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Date deposited: 29 Apr 2010 09:20
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 02:51
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Contributors
Editor:
Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt
Editor:
Beatriz Conde Gallego
Editor:
Stefan Enchelmaier
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