Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values

Kwiek, Maksymilian (2010) Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values , Southampton, GB University of Southampton 21pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1012).


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This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of price, then the model has a unique equilibrium payoff profile. If this uncertainty is only on one side, then the player who is known to be normal lowers her demand in order to stop the auction immediately at the reserve price. Hence, her possibly committed opponent buys all the units she demands at the lowest possible price. If the reputation is on both sides, then a War of Attrition emerges.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
ISSNs: 0966-4246 (electronic)
Keywords: multi-unit auction, uniform price, ascending auction, reputation, aggressive bidding
ePrint ID: 161635
Date :
Date Event
July 2010Published
Date Deposited: 03 Aug 2010 09:23
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 03:47
Further Information:Google Scholar

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