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Corporate governance and tunneling: empirical evidence from China

Corporate governance and tunneling: empirical evidence from China
Corporate governance and tunneling: empirical evidence from China
We analyze asset appropriation by principal shareholders in China and uncover the following relationships: (1) outsiders in the board of directors, audit without non-clean opinion, and dispersed ownership prevent operational tunneling; (2) belonging to a business group and issuing B or H share exacerbate asset appropriation. Institutional ownership does not prevent the embezzlement of assets and is endogenous, as investors select companies with good governance. Besides governance mechanisms, stock characteristics matter in that larger firms exhibit less tunneling, whereas highly leveraged firms experience the opposite. We find a decline of tunneling in 2001, which might be due to economic reforms
corporate governance, china, operational tunneling
0927-538X
591-605
Kling, Gerhard
feea1f9e-c49a-4d9c-b688-ec839cef9624
Gao, Lei
885f6f80-3796-4bdb-b75d-7c8905b6b5de
Kling, Gerhard
feea1f9e-c49a-4d9c-b688-ec839cef9624
Gao, Lei
885f6f80-3796-4bdb-b75d-7c8905b6b5de

Kling, Gerhard and Gao, Lei (2008) Corporate governance and tunneling: empirical evidence from China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16 (5), 591-605. (doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2007.09.001).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We analyze asset appropriation by principal shareholders in China and uncover the following relationships: (1) outsiders in the board of directors, audit without non-clean opinion, and dispersed ownership prevent operational tunneling; (2) belonging to a business group and issuing B or H share exacerbate asset appropriation. Institutional ownership does not prevent the embezzlement of assets and is endogenous, as investors select companies with good governance. Besides governance mechanisms, stock characteristics matter in that larger firms exhibit less tunneling, whereas highly leveraged firms experience the opposite. We find a decline of tunneling in 2001, which might be due to economic reforms

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Published date: November 2008
Keywords: corporate governance, china, operational tunneling

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Local EPrints ID: 165713
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/165713
ISSN: 0927-538X
PURE UUID: 01594c88-8b5c-4477-b98f-dd9bf0c959c0

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Date deposited: 19 Oct 2010 14:35
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 02:11

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Author: Gerhard Kling
Author: Lei Gao

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