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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES
School of Management

Funding higher education in Uruguay: a policy question

by

Panambi Abadie

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration

July 2009

“The tension between properly supporting what exists while also responding to the demands of expansion is endemic. It can only be addressed as a policy question.”

Darling et al, 1989 (p. 582)

Abstract
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
Doctor of Business Administration
FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION IN URUGUAY: A POLICY QUESTION
By Panambi Abadie

For years the dominant theme of higher education in Uruguay has been financial distress. However the literature relating to higher education has not addressed the question of how higher education institutions receive their funding. The aim of this study was to provide an analytical view of the current model of financing higher education in this country and predictions about its possible evolution or change according to the views of different stakeholders.

This study used a qualitative approach and multi-modal tools -documents, literature, semi structured interviews, a Focus Group and speeches at Parliamentary sessions- were chosen to address several questions from different perspectives.

Findings in this research suggest that the traditional historical funding model used until the 1990s has evolved into a historical/ incremental model. In this case, increases, or new funds that are allocated to the system, are tied to certain specific purposes determined in the Budget laws. In this way, funding relies on: (a) historical allocations, actually the biggest part of the allocations, which are always the same and are expected to be the same; and (b) new allocations (increases) focused on certain projects which are specified in the Budget Laws by the Parliament. In this way, Uruguay mirrors the regional pattern in which very little strategic planning occurs in the financing process.

This study suggests, too, a particular approach to accountability in Uruguayan higher education. Resources are allocated to the system by the Parliament on a decentralised basis and institutions keep broad decision-making powers. The Ministry of Education and Culture is not involved in the process of allocating resources to higher education. The Government applies no control on institutional performance or efficiency. University autonomy is considered the *raison d´etre* of this approach; information gathered for this study suggests that Governmental agencies hold very little concern about the use of public funds. Internal use of public appropriations has bureaucratic controls and is only monitored through the conventional accounting audits prescribed by law.

This research shows that a new left wing state-wide administration headed by the Frente Amplio Party will devote more funds to the finance of public higher education, primarily concerned with the insufficient amount of funds devoted historically to the sector. A considerable increase is expected as political leaders and Government officers have announced that the educational sector will receive added funding in the future Budget Law. However, there is also a view that, although the system will receive further funding, the funding model will remain the same. Moreover, whilst there is concern about the insufficient amount of funds devoted to the sector, the majority of stakeholders are not paying attention to the merits or problems of the current model of funding the sector.

This study also suggests that : a) in the future the funding authorities may expand the mechanism of allocating funds oriented to special programmes and, in this way, introduce some kind of strategic orientations; b) further funding for public institutions may be originated in the collection of the graduate tax and that its utility could be improved in ways to introduce more funding to the system; c) it is unlikely that a future model will consider the use of formulae or quality considerations; and d) the introduction of a tuition-fee scheme is very improbable in the short term because the availability of further funding will reduce the pressures to introduce alternative funds to complement public revenues. Further, the ideological and political predominance of the Frente Amplio party in the Parliament (historically placed against tuition-fees) will certainly abort discussions about cost-recovery in the public University.

Author´s declaration

I Panambi Abadie declare that the thesis entitled Funding higher education in Uruguay: a policy question and the work presented in this thesis is of my own. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for the research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the works of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- ✓ none of this work has been published before submission.

Panambi Abadie

30 July, 2009

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List of abbreviations

ANEP	Administracion Nacional Enseñanza Publica National Administration of Public Education
ANUIES	Asociacion Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educacion Superior National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions, Mexico
CEPAL	Comision Economica para America Latina Economic Commission for Latin America
CEPRE	Programa de Reforma del Estado Programme of Reform of the State
CIPFA	The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, United Kingdom
CUC	Consejo Directivo Central Central University Council, University of the Republic
IDB	Inter-american Development Bank
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
FOMEC	Fondo para la mejora de la calidad de la Educacion Superior. Improvement of Higher Education Quality Fund, Argentina
FEUU	Federacion de Estudiantes Universitarios. Student Union (UdelaR)
FUM	Federación Uruguaya del Magisterio Association of Basic School Teachers

IESALC	Instituto de Educacion Superior para America Latina y el Caribe Institute of Higher Education for Latin America and the Caribbean
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comun del Sur. Trade Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile and Bolivia are associates but not members.
MP	Member of Parliament
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ORT	Universidad ORT
TOCAF	Texto Ordenado de Administracion Financiera Laws and decrees about financial management and accounting in public agencies of Uruguay
UCUDAL	Universidad Católica de Uruguay
UdelaR	Universidad de la Republica
UE	Universidad de la Empresa
UM	Universidad de Montevideo
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Fund for Infancy
THEC	Tennessee Higher Education Commission
WB	The World Bank

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.0. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe the reasons for undertaking this study and its overall importance to the field of education. The main aims of the research study will be explained and the research questions developed in order to investigate them will be identified.

1.1. The research problem. Background.

For many years, the dominant theme of higher education in Uruguay has been financial distress. Public higher education -mainly represented by the University of the Republic - has absorbed the rapid growth of student demand since the restoration of democracy in 1985 through a policy of open admissions and cost-free education. A tremendous increase in the number of students has occurred; at the same time public funding has not been able to maintain the expenditure per student in the country´s only public University. The results are severely overcrowded classes, inadequate library and laboratory conditions, and poor student services.

However, in spite of the catastrophic outcome caused, *prime facie*, by scarcity of funds, there is little research literature about higher education funding in the country. This is not unexpected, because the development of analytical studies requires information about the sector. Such information is not available, is missing or is invisible.

In addition, Uruguay is placed in a unique position in the continent. In general, the funding models used in the higher education systems of all Latin American

countries have already been described and analysed by researchers or by analysts working for funding agencies such as International Development Bank or the World Bank. This is the case of José Joaquin Brunner (1990; 1994; 1997) in Chile; Carlos Marquis (2002; 2002) in Argentina, and Simon Schwartzman (1991; 1992; 1993ª; 1993b; 1993c; 1994; 1996; 1999; 2001) in Brazil, each of whom has developed complete reports as consultants for those agencies. All of them are scholars from countries with big higher education systems, a fact that has favoured a circulation of ideas about - and within- the field.

Based on the knowledge provided by these and other authors, it is usual to say that there is a "Brazilian" model or an "Argentinean" model of funding higher education. For instance, Brazil, the biggest country in the continent, is of interest due to the changes and experiments in its models of funding during the 1990s, evolving from a historical, block funding model towards a more rational model using some formulae and contracts. Argentina has also experimented and has created an interesting, "smooth" evolution from a historical model to a system which combines historical allocations and some portions based on formulae or strategic programmes. However, it is clear that Chile shows the most significant experience in the continent and has deserved most attention since the 1980s, due to the country´s particular approach to deregulation in the sector and a significant stimulus to private provision (World Bank, 1994; Johnstone, 2000).

This background to this research is not the same in the case of Uruguay. Technical analysis about higher education in this country is scarce. Existing literature in the field comes from institutions, especially from the public University, and is intended to inform the general public rather than to provide scientific knowledge.

A distinguishing feature of the Uruguayan case helps to explain this situation: the higher education system has always been small and, in particular, the public University was monopolistic until the 1980s. However, during the 1990s and 2000s, higher education has faced a significantly different political context. For example:

- A series of private Universities was created and some public institutions launched degree programmes, demanding their own positions in the arena of higher education and changing the landscape of education in the country.

- The public University was authorised by law to charge tuition, but the institution decided to remain with policies of no tuition.

- A graduate tax was introduced with the specific purpose of providing new funds for the public University. The introduction of this tax implies that, for the first time, a user charge - by a form of deferred payment- was introduced for the service of public education in Uruguay.

All these moves, after years and years of "quietness", have probably determined the emergence of some critical mass and of incipient technical analysis in relation to the field. Recent studies authored by Martínez Sandres (1999), Bentancur (2002), Martínez Larrechea (2003) and Oddone and Perera (2004) introduced a

scientific approach to the analysis of higher education in Uruguay for the first time.

These studies provide an initial scope of the system and supply basic institutional information in relation to its history, affiliations, enrolments, governance and staff. Some of them do mention aspects related to institutional budgets, but none - excepting Oddone and Perera´s - concentrates on financial concepts. Oddone and Perera concentrate their analysis on three related aspects: (a) the funding sources in the University system; (b) the newest source at the public University funding: the graduate tax; and (c) the calculation of economic gains in individual wages associated with increasing levels of higher education attainment. However, their study does not provide an overall analysis of the funding model for higher education. A significant gap, therefore, remains in the research literature that this study aims to fill.

Furthermore, the information that is available makes it impossible to develop a conceptualisation of the funding model in use in the country. Most data is related to the public University which covers a high percentage of total enrolments in the sector. However, the system as a whole cannot be described ignoring the rest of the institutions that have emerged in recent years and that are clearly growing very fast. To consider the whole system as a monolith would be a considerable over-simplification.

Even consideration of the public University shows that the available data from the institution is insufficient or presents problems. Almost all its management information comes from analysis and elaboration made on an *ad hoc* basis and the methodology and criteria used for its collection are not certain (UdelaR, 2001 p.101; Abadie and Pereira, 2001, p. 9).

Funding arrangements in use in the rest of the system are completely ignored. Only some general aspects are known. For instance, it is recognised that private Universities are supported by tuition (Martínez Larrechea, 2003, p. 98 and Oddone and Perera, 2004, pp: 26-27) and that other public institutions of higher education receive appropriations from their “mother” institutions (Brunner and Becerra, 1999, p.13). However, nothing has been written about the precise funding models of these institutions.

It is clear that information is scarce and that Uruguay is in need of formal studies about the funding of higher education. This is not just an academic concern. A systematic investigation on the field may help, as well, in the design of relevant and needed policies and thereby make an important contribution to the future development of higher education in the country.

1.2. Statement of the problem

The aims of this study, therefore, are to provide an analytical view of the current model of financing higher education in Uruguay; to understand more about how the financing of higher education is perceived by different stakeholders; and to provide predictions about its possible evolution or change according to the views of different stakeholders.

This study tries to find out the necessary information that will enable us to establish a full picture of the current model of funding in the sector and to construct some theory of how this model will evolve or change.

In addition, this research may lead to some policy building about funding of higher education. Change will only occur if the appropriate individuals feel the need for change. Policy-makers and other stakeholders might be motivated for change if there is information and analysis that provide persuasive evidence that shows that there is a need of that change. At least, they will probably be more motivated to devote some thinking to the matter.

The study is intended to answer the following questions:

RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in reference to the following elements:

ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations?
ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?
ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability?
ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource allocation?
ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded University?

RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to change in the future?
ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources of revenue in public higher education?

The thesis will analyse and characterise funding arrangements according to international classifications in reference to the following elements:

ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?

The first element is related to the funding methodologies in use, considering whether the appropriations are received as a block grant, whether there is a separation between research and teaching funds, and whether there is in use some formula to "follow" students or teachers (or both), as described by Albrecht and Ziderman (1992, pp: 45-47).

Koelman (1998, p .129) describes block grant funding as a mechanism in which "*the subsidy is an amount paid in advance for a set period of time. The institution is free to decide in what way this amount will be spent".* In typical block-budgeting, "*what happens is essentially this: a central funding authority engages in negotiations with each operating unit about its operation, and funding and a mutually agreed plan is agreed upon and a block allocation is made*" (Massy and Hulfactor, 1993, p.30).

In general, public Universities consider the Government block grants as *"the base of revenue pyramid"* (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997 p.71). In addition, the block allocation is critical due to their (relatively) unconditional nature, which contributes to institutional independence.

However, on the other side, block allocation systems have negative effects, because they lack good processes for evaluating plans and performance and re-inforce the idea that operating units “own” their funding, taking Government block grants as a given.
In an analysis of the funding mechanisms in place across OECD states, Jongbloed (2001) reported that Governments in a number of countries have attempted to separate their support for teaching and research by providing *block* (i.e. lump sum) funding for each activity, covering the day-to-day running costs.

For instance, in the UK, public funds are provided for teaching and research under a dual support system, both with a block grant from the Funding Councils. Institutions are free to allocate their block grants according to their own priorities within broad guidelines (Jongbloed, 2001, p.11).

ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations?

This element relates to the funding criteria used by the authorities when providing the allocations. In this case, the focus is placed on the elements that are considered by the authorities in order to "base" the funding. In particular, it will consider whether:

(a) the basis is the former budget, for instance: historical allocations;
(b) the basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the institution;
(c) the allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae;
(d) there are orientations or guidelines, and allocations are linked to these specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments;

(e) the outcome is the subject of a formal contract between Government and institutions.

ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?

This element relates to the degree of decentralisation that exists between the institution and the funding authority. This element will also consider the frame of control that is in use. Knowledge about the degree of decentralisation will enable us to analyse, for instance, if there is some control over the use of funds, or over the achievement of indicated goals, and whether control is loose or tight.

The concept of centralisation refers to the relationship between a centre and divisional units within an organisation, with particular emphasis on variable characteristics like control (by the centre) and autonomy to take decisions and to be responsible (by the divisional unit). The variation between the control and decisional/ responsibility elements determines the degrees of centralisation that exist within an organisation or a system. Within this frame, decentralisation is defined as "*a transfer of tasks from a centre to lower levels*" (Otten 1996, p. 75).

“Centralisation” and “decentralisation” are concepts commonly used in dealing with the relationship between the corporate centre and the organisational division. The guiding philosophy of decentralisation is that the divisional unit is able to take better decisions because it is placed closer to the point of action or delivery. In the case of a University, this means closer to the point of contact with students or with other stakeholders

The degree of centralisation may vary according to environmental conditions. As shown by Sizer (1982, p. 20), under conditions of contraction or decline, institutions of higher education may need to apply more centralised methods of planning and resource allocation. In the same way, Sizer finds that periods of expansion allow the use of decentralised models. Jarzabkowski (2002, p. 6, citing Khandwalla), shows that competitive environments may increase centralisation in order to improve co-ordination, reduce costs or monitor quality.

ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability?

This element refers to the requirements of accountability to the funding body, or other bodies, and to the procedures or methods that are used to report how funds have been used (for instance: the use of performance indicators or types of auditing procedures).

Trow (1996, p.2) describes accountability as the obligation to report to others, to explain, to justify, and to answer questions about how resources have been used and to what effect. Accountability, he explains, is closely linked to trust because

> *"it implies that society provides support without the requirements that the institutions either provide specific goods and services in return for that support or account specifically and in detail for the use of those funds. Trust, indeed, is the basis of the very large measure of autonomy of colleges and Universities at everywhere"* (Trow, 1996, p.2).

Trow makes a distinction between "academic accountability" and "legal/ financial accountability". The first is *"the obligation to tell others what has been done within the institutions to further learning, teaching and public service and to what effect".*

Legal and financial accountability is described as "*the obligation to report how resources are used : is the institution doing what it is supposed to be doing by law and are its resources being used for the purposes for which they are given?"* (Trow, 1996, p 7). Trow defines academic accountability as "*the obligation to tell others, both inside and outside the institution, what has been done with those resources to further teaching, learning and public service and to what effect "*(p.8).

The forms of accountability vary with circumstances. In many European countries, funded largely by the State which maintains control over expenditures, accountability is discharged chiefly through financial and (increasingly) academic audits, rather than through direct assessments of the work of the institutions linked to funding (Trow, 1996, pp: 6-7).

Hendel et al (2004, pp: 5-6) examine how interconnected is the concept of accountability to the concept of autonomy in higher education. The authors explain that, in the past, Universities in the United States have had a relatively autonomous existence from State and Federal Governments because these bodies were confident that academia held high standards of quality and excellence. As a pattern, they explain, the federal Government also had minimal involvement in higher education. Today, a very different situation exists. Institutions of higher education are facing external demands from State and Federal Governments, as well as from the general public and State level agencies, and these demands are often manifested in an increase of governmental involvement in academic matters (Zumeta, 2000, pp: 59-61). Public institutions, in particular, are now expected to be accountable and to report on their operations and performance (Layzell, 1998).

Furthermore, in the United States a relatively recent series of accountability initiatives, published in the three national reports- "*Measuring Up 2000: The State-by-State Report Card," "Measuring Up 2002: The State-by-State Report Card", and "Measuring Up 2004: The State-by-State Report Card"*- has *revisited* the notion of accountability (Hendel et al, 2004 p. 16). These reports, authored by an independent policy research organisation –The National Centre for Public Policy and Higher Education- rely on the concept that the most important evidence of quality in higher education is performance, especially the achievement of student learning outcomes. These have led to a series of biennial, State-by-State report cards that identify a broad range of performance indicators or measures, including access, productivity and efficiency, student learning, degree completion, and economic returns from postsecondary education. They are designed to give State leaders and policy-makers a tool for evaluating and comparing State performance in higher education on a variety of key results-oriented measures in five categories: preparation, participation, affordability, completion, and benefits. The States are graded by comparing their performance against the top-performing States in each category (Idaho Board of Education, 2005).

The way in which Universities react to pressures towards accountability also differs. Many institutions of higher education have mandates and performance indicators that are forced on them by State legislatures and co-ordinating boards (Hendel et al, 2004, p.11). Conversely, some institutions have taken a more proactive role in developing their own reports in an effort to dissuade policy makers from imposing their own designs (Moloney and Grotevant, 1997).

ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource allocation?

The purpose of this sub-question is to identify the political and historical factors that have inter-acted to shape the model of funding which is currently in use. Although there may be many factors influencing policies, I will try to highlight those factors that emerge as most significant according to the collected data, and as illustrated by Parliamentary debates.

ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded University?

Resource Dependency Theory, a theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), has been used to explain how organisations function in a context of scarcity of funds.

According to Pfeffer and Salancik "...*organisations are inescapably bounded up with the conditions of their environment*" (1978, p.1). Therefore, to understand the behaviour of an organisation, one must understand the context of that behaviour.

The central themes of Resource Dependency Theory are: a) the importance of the environmental or social context of organisations for understanding what decisions are to be made; b) that organisations are embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships which constrain their situations and environments; and c) that there are opportunities to do things, such as co-opting sources of constraint, to obtain, at least temporarily, more autonomy and the ability to pursue organisational interests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. xii).

According to this theory, if an organisation is dependent on the environment for its survival (for instance through the provision of funding), it may become dependent on the continued success of the other organisation and build "behavioural dependencies" with it.

Slaughter and Leslie (1997) consider that, in the case of Universities, those who provide resources to the institutions have the capability of exercising power over those organisations (p. 68). Furthermore, following Pfeffer and Salancik concepts (the relative magnitude of the exchange), they pre-suppose that organisations that receive funding from only one source will be heavily dependent on that supplier which may exercise great power over that organisation should it desire to do so. Slaughter and Leslie describe the situation as follows:

> *"Historically, public Universities in most Western democracies, have been heavily dependent financially upon their Governments, which usually have allowed Universities cosiderable operating autonomy. The principal mechanism that has enabled this autonomy has been the unstipulated or block grant mode of funding general institutional aid "* (p.68).

Within the framework of resource dependency theory, I will analyse whether the Uruguayan Government is utilising resource allocation strategically and making an active choice to manage the resource dependencies that may exist with the public University arising from the fact that its funding relies heavily on Government allocated public subsidies.

RQ 2 Is the current model likely to change, according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

Description and analysis undertaken in the initial stage of the study will move to investigation within a contextual analysis of how the system may evolve based on the views of those who take decisions about higher education funding. In other words, how do they observe the impact of the application of the current model and what are their perspectives for change?

The people who take decisions about higher education are not only the representatives from Universities themselves (either academics or administrators), but also members of the Parliament, various officials of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and educational or financial advisors at the legislature. Therefore, the research will refer to people that come from both the internal context and the external context of higher education.

Each of them will offer views that are only a part of reality. Certainly they represent different goals and visions about the sector. However, all are members of a policy network that, as described by Van Vught (1997, p.395), is in the position of developing patterns of communication and inter-action in order to build policies about the sector.

ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to change in the future?

In October 31st, 2004 a left-wing party candidate won the Uruguayan presidency for the first time in the nation´s history. When Mr Tabare Vazquez took office in March 2005, his coalition party – The *Frente Amplio*- joined the ranks of leftist Governments currently in place in several Latin American countries, including the neighbours Brazil and Argentina and the politically powerful Chile and Venezuela.

The victory of Tabaré Vázquez brought to an end an era of 170 years of political power shared by the rural elite in the Blanco Party and the urban elite in the Colorado Party. Vazquez's win was widely seen as recognition of the newly established credibility that the left would solve the growing problems of poverty, inequality, and corruption.

However, as the Uruguayan left arrives to power, we may wonder how this party will face the central dilemma of dealing with multiple, antagonistic political, social and economic pressures that are represented, on the one side, by its own historical leftist programme, and, on the other side, by the economic elites and the international credit agencies. It is important to recall that, less than one year after becoming President of Brazil, Luiz Ignacio *Lula* da Silva declared, in December 2003, that the experience of governing the country had made him abandon some of the early dreams of his militant past.

Despite it all, when we compare the current situation with the one that predominated before 2004, the changes are evident. Everything indicates that a new phase has been initiated. Governing has changed with a national Government that declares that it will try to respond to the demands, aspirations and expectations of the most vulnerable social sectors (Frente Amplio, 2004).

Therefore, through this question, I will analyse how the current administration, represented in the Executive Branch and especially in the Ministry of Education and Culture, and by the majority of the Congress MPs, will attempt to change the current model of financing public higher education.

ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources of revenue in public higher education?

In the past quarter century, most developed and developing countries around the world have moved towards a system of financing higher education that is based at least in part on the principle of cost-recovery.

While there is extensive evidence of a major shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne by Governments to being shared by students (Johnstone, 1986, 1993, 1997), in some developing countries (including most Latin American countries), there is strong opposition to any expansion of tuition or fees as a source of additional funding, based largely on political and equity grounds (Lewis and Dundar, 2002; Garcia Guadilla, 2005). Public institutions, unions and politicians commonly argue that non tuition-fees systems provide greater equality of educational opportunity and greater access to disadvantaged groups.

However, as enrolments in most of the public Universities have risen while financial resources per student have fallen dramatically, some voices claim that the political authorities cannot provide sufficient public revenue to higher education and that the institutions must seek funding from other sources, including tuition and other means (Moura Castro and Levy, 2000).
In Uruguay, in 1990, under the influence of the conservative Blanco Party Government, the Parliament passed a law which authorised the public University (UdelaR) to charge tuition-fees to students who could afford them. However, UdelaR has refused to implement this authorisation. This study will analyse if a tuition-fee scheme is likely to be introduced in UdelaR in the future or whether

other funds could be available in order to increase the current scheme based, almost only, on public subsidies.

1.3. Reasons to develop the study

The reasons that have moved me to choose this research topic were the following:

- **It was original.** As mentioned above, there was no technical literature in the country with a focus in this topic. This means that the research would fill a gap in the field. In the meantime, it was clear that this topic covered a broader field, including policies of education, and other aspects related to finances in general, public financing and educational finances. All these issues were considered in the study.

- **It would develop new information and knowledge**. This work was relevant from two perspectives: (a) the academic one, which was in the need of a scientific approach to the matter, providing a characterisation of the funding model for Uruguay like those developed for almost all countries in the world, and (b) the policy-building one, where information about the sector and about the current model was needed in order to build policies about the sector. Martinez Larrechea (2003), Martinez Sandres (1999, p.75) or Bentancur (2002, p.40) reported that, until now, Uruguay has failed to identify and establish public policies about higher education in general, and about its funding in particular.

- **It was a realistic project for me.** I was placed in a position in which the study could be developed without ethical concerns as I was not working in

financial matters while the study was developed. Also, I had an appropriate background to understand the topic very well because I had worked on budgeting issues for many years. Last, but not the least, I could cover the costs of conducting the research within my own funds.

- **It covers an attractive topic.** It means that, although the topic has not been addressed until now, it would catch the attention of many people, principally from higher education stakeholders.

1.4. Significance of the study

The research reported in this thesis is important for the following reasons:

First, the study is important for decision-makers concerned with higher education in Uruguay who are in need of information about the sector and about the current model in order to build future policies about the sector.

Second, the study adds to the literature by providing a characterisation of the country model like those developed for almost all countries in the world.

1.5. Organisation of the study

This study has seven chapters in which the rationale for undertaking the research, its context, the methodology used and the findings are presented, analysed and discussed.

Chapter 2 explains the existing models of funding higher education and the

rationale involved in the use of each of them.

Chapter 3 provides information about the context of Latin America and Uruguay with reference to higher education systems and shows some of the key aspects of the Uruguayan case.

Chapter 4 reviews the literature and examines many of the current policy documents and theoretical analyses for details of the processes that may be at work and considered in this analysis. Gaps in the literature are identified and the contribution to be made by this study is outlined.

Chapter 5 describes details of the approach taken, the implementation strategy for the study and the evolution of the theoretical framework as it proceeded.

Chapter 6 presents the data gathered from the sources selected: documentation, interviews, focus groups and parliamentary discourses and sets out how the data were used to answer the research questions in the context of the literature.

Chapter 7 provides analysis and recommendations about the results of this study.

Chapter summary

This chapter described the reasons for undertaking the research, and its overall importance to the field of education. The main aims of the study were explained and the research questions to investigate them were identified.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

What is there to study about resource allocation? Can´t informed people who know the academic disciplines and their institutional strenghts and weaknesses, simply decide what programmes need funding the most and give them the money?

Massy, 2004, p.3

Aim of the chapter

The aim of this chapter is to explain the changes that have occurred in the funding of higher education systems during recent decades and the meaning and rationale which underpin each of the most notable funding models in use.

Finally, I will identify some of the principles that might underpin an effective funding model, according to some experts in the field.

2.0. Introduction

Higher education is an expensive enterprise that is predominantly funded by Governments (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992; Hauptmann, 1998). However, as noted by Psacharoupoulus (1990) and Blaug (1982), today no country can provide through the State as much funding and support as is wanted by its society. In addition, the landscape of higher education finance has been complicated by several issues in recent years, including competition for resources with other sectors (Booth, 1982), concerns about efficiency and effectiveness in the use of funds (Thomas, 2001), and the convergence of several economic and demographic forces (Coombs and Hallak, 1972; Blaug, 1982; Montserrat, 1997; Eicher, 2000).

These factors have placed constraints on Government funding to higher education throughout the world and have strengthened resistance to increasing tax burdens (Johnstone, 1993). At the same time, they have given impetus to a series of innovative dimensions of financing and budgeting in the sector and various alternative models have been developed to allocate resources in response to different views and approaches (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992). Indeed, it is

important to emphasise this last aspect because the emergence of new concepts that refer to different types of allocations - such as: "resource allocation methodologies", "strategic orientations" and "contract driven allocations" - are not merely simple changes in methodology; their emergence responds to an important long-term ideological re-orientation (Neave, 1998).

2.1. The rationale of allocating funds to higher education

Hauptman (1991) explains that the way in which Governments allocate taxpayer funds to institutions is the principal public policy vehicle for higher education around the world. This concept relies on the assumption that an organisation may use a model of funding as an instrument to implement strategies and to translate policies into activities. In the application of this concept to University funding, and considering that in most countries Governments are the dominant source of higher education finance, Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) show how each model of allocating funds to the sector has effects in how these funds are used.

Probably most of the behavioural consequences that are studied in the literature can be analysed under the scope of the Resource Dependence Theory. This is a well known theory in social sciences to explain organisation-environment relations and relies on a particular view of inter- and intra-organisational interactions. In general, it focuses on the dependency relations between organisations and the environment, power positions of different organisations, and strategic alternatives for those in organisational leadership.

This theory, developed by Pfeffer and Salanick (1978), suggests that control over resource allocation is an important power source in organisations. The core of this

theory is that organisations will respond to demands made by external organisations upon whose resources they are heavily dependent. Anytime there is dependence asymmetry between organisations (or individuals), there is a power difference (pp: 39-64).

Pfeffer and Salanick identified three factors that are critical in determining the dependence of one organisation on another:

(1) the importance of the resource and the extent to which the organisation requires it for continued operation and survival;
(2) the extent of discretion over the allocation and use of a resource possessed by the other organisation; and
(3) the extent to which there are few alternatives or concentration of resource control (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p.45).

Within this frame, the power of an organisation is understood as a measure of the extent to which it can control responses and reduce its dependencies on others for resources. Scott (1998) explains that:

> *"The need to acquire resources creates dependencies between organisations and external units, which ultimately can cause political problems that require political solutions. In this perspective, organisations have choice over their own fate"* (p. 114).

Why is it relevant to recall and explain Resource Dependency theory while talking about resource allocation in higher education? Because, as higher education in most countries is either Governmentally-owned and operated, or, at least, publicly funded (or both), it may be expected that the Governments are in the position of

exerting influence through the allocation of resources and therefore to be the most powerful agent in the sector.

For instance, Slaughter and Leslie (1997, p. 69) suggest that changes in national higher education policies have resulted in alterations in resource dependence that are driving changes within western Universities rather than self induced change led by the academy. According to these authors, Resource Dependency theory helps us to understand these changes, as it contends that those who provide resources to an organisation have the capability to exert power over that organisation (p. 68).

Similarly, studies conducted by Otten (1996) and Thomas (2000) show that the way budgets are allocated depend largely on the relationship between central authorities and lower organisational levels. Thomas (1998) suggests that the evidence from the United Kingdom is that the way in which funds are allocated to institutions can affect the way in which institutions allocate those funds to their constituent parts. He explains that an increased transparency in national funding methodologies has increased pressures on managers to create income and expenditure accounts for each academic unit and to use those accounts as a basis for internal allocations. He explains:

> *"This development has taken place alongside a decline in Government funding with consequential pressure for increased efficiency and effectiveness in the management of resources and a need to encourage academic departments to earn more non-Government income. There has, therefore, been a move in some United Kingdom institutions towards greater devolution of budgetary responsibility to a departmental, faculty or school level"* (p. 3).

Finally, the analysis of the Resource Dependency Theory suggests that some of its consequences are that

(a) organisational behaviour is a consequence of influences; and
(b) organisations who are dependent on the continued success of another organisation may build behavioural dependencies with them.

Therefore, it can be understood that (a) the more dependent an organisation is on external resources the less powerful it is, and that (b) a reduction of dependency is a key element to reduce environmental pressures. This interpretation becomes relevant when talking about higher education funding because it implies that, for example, a publicly funded University, facing decreasing Government funding, may look to new opportunities to diversify its funding base in order to reduce Government dependency. However, at the same time, it may enter into new dependency relationships with other funding sources.

2. 2. The concept of resource allocation

CIPFA (1997 p. 8) defines resource allocation as a planning and management tool which provides a means of providing resources on a methodological basis to various activities in an organisation. Resource allocation methods can be utilised either as instruments for implementing strategies (Jarzabkowski, 2002) or as frameworks for accountability (Otten, 1996).

Otten (1996) notes that, when talking about funding models, explanations can refer to one of the following:

- the relationship between national or state Governments and Universities or a University system;
- the relationship between central University administration and faculties; or

- the relationship between faculty administration and departments.

He explains that these three levels co-exist inside the system and, in each of them, different methods and mechanisms of resource allocation may be found due to different logics or orientations (pp: 75-76).

2.3. Mechanisms of allocating funds

Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) show that the mechanism through which funds are transferred from the centre to divisional units influences the ways how these funds are used. This notion is critical to convert a resource allocation mechanism into a strategic tool.

Research by Williams (cited by Otten, 1996. p.71) showed that Governments influenced higher education systems by altering the terms in which financial resources were made available. Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) found that Governments have used different criteria to induce certain behaviours in systems of higher education. They found that, throughout Europe and North America, while Governments have allowed for greater autonomy, they also have provided the means to limit funding to the cost of activities and therefore secure accountability from institutions (p.40).

Neuson (quoted by Zinberg, 1996) explains that

> *" It is only recently that policy-makers have begun to understand the critical link between expenditure patterns, cost, efficiency in higher education and the mechanisms by which institutions receive funds. Increasingly, Governments now see financial incentives as a more effective way of influencing the pattern of activities in higher education institutions than administrative intervention".* (p. 285)

Higher education policies implemented through the State are increasingly significant. According to Thomas (1998; 2000), in the United Kingdom, the adoption of formulaic approaches at institutional and sub-institutional levels was pressured by the methodologies used by the Funding Councils. Thomas explains that, in the United Kingdom " *the greater transparency at national level impacted on internal allocation procedures. Some Universities have adopted a formulaic approach in determining allocations to academic departments and incentive schemes began to be incorporated into resource allocation methods"* (1998, pp: 99-100). This suggests that methodologies in resource allocation at national levels affect institutional mechanisms and is consistent with the World Bank (1994, p. 50) which recommends the use of procedures to *"create incentives for institutions to use scarce funds efficiently. The mechanisms in which transfers are made strongly influence the way in which public funds are used".* Similarly, Vossensteyn (2004, p. 43) states that the way how Governments encourage the higher education sector to become more efficient and productive is by integrating performance criteria into the basis for funding higher education institutions and students.

2.4. Models of allocating funds

Today, the most notable models of allocating funds to higher education systems or institutions are:

- historical ;
- formula-based;
- performance-based funding;
- a combination of the above

2.4.1. Historical models

Historical models imply the repetition of the former allocations. Most Governments using this approach do not transfer funds using mechanisms that use criteria of internal working or the achievement of certain goals or other forms of objective criteria. In this model, the University will receive *"automatically"* the same amount of money every year.

Literature denominates this model in different ways: **historical, incremental** (Brunner et al, 1995; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992 ; Layzell 1994); **bureaucratic** (Schwartzman, 1995**); negotiated** (Massy and Hulfactor, 1993; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992) and **automatic** (Brunner et al, 1995). All these denominations describe forms of mechanisms that involve institutions receiving a flat increment on a historic share basis, without relation to institutional characteristics, enrolments or staffing patterns or cost changes (Pratt 1987).

According to Brunner et al (1995, p 42), this is the predominant model in Latin America, a model that provides to institutions the security that they will be able to pay some expenses, such as salaries for instance. In some countries, the use of this model is a consequence of Government paralysis, a phenomenon that, according to this author, tends *"to avoid the adoption of decisions for change in the system*" (p. 21). Brunner et al conclude that this mechanism can be called "*the automatic model"* (1995, p. 43).

Incremental budgeting is described by Layzell (1998, p. 106) as one of the predominant models of Government budgeting in the United States. He explains:

> *"It starts with an institution's prior year base budget and allocates increases (or decreases) to that base according to a set of established decision rules or budget guidelines, such as inflationary increases or new programmes* (p. 106).

In this way the previous year´s budget (usually adjusted by inflation) is incremented or decreased by sums associated with particular line items of expenditure and the attention is focused on additions or deductions. Massy (2004) asserts: *"The base budget is too hard to analyse. After a period of time, operating units tend to assert ownership of base funding levels and come to view most of their cost as fixed"* (p.39).

The consideration of budget increments provides a number of benefits to decision-makers. First, they only have to consider a small number of alternative budgets. Second, consideration of increments prevents re-visiting past political struggles. By considering only incremental changes, past fights may be avoided.

For an institution, incrementalism implies predictability because one of the best predictors of its budget in a given year is that same budget for the year before plus or minus a small increment representing the rate of growth or shrinkage of total Government revenues (Marks and Caruthers, 1999, p. 10).

However, incremental funding leads institutions to several problems:

- To the extent that past values are an important explanation for future outputs, there are no real incentives for change.
- Old unfairness and errors are built in and compounded.
- It is difficult for the system to cope with real changes in cost base

Negotiated funding is described by Massy and Hulfactor (1993, p.30) as a procedure in which the central funding authority engages in negotiations with the operating units over the activities to be undertaken; mutual agreement is reached and a block allocation is made. "*The money goes as a block to the unit and can be spent for whatever it deems necessary*" (p.30). Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) explain that negotiated funding has been the predominant form of funding Universities in the developing world.

Schwartzman (1993a, p.2) names this model as "*bureaucratic funding"* because, he explains, allocations are determined by bureaucratic authorities. Schwartzman considers, that in this model, the Governments (bureaucratic authorities) decide in centralised ways what will be the allocations for the Universities. He explains: *"The last decision about the global amount will be taken by a Ministry or the Parliament while the Universities and other stakeholders will try to exert influence on that decision"* (p. 1).

Interestingly, many public systems still rely on these kinds of mechanisms. A review of 35 countries developed in the 1990s by Albrecht and Ziderman (1992) reported that, in most cases, Government allocations were based on those of the previous year augmented by across-the-board incremental increases. In Latin America, for instance, historical-incremental budgeting has been common in University finance. Brunner et al (1995) observe that Latin American Governments have used this method to avoid confrontation with University constituencies (p.21), while Albrecht and Ziderman suggest that, according to their studies, this model has not served higher education well because it has been utilised as a deliberate way to reduce real spending in higher education by allowing inflation to erode University budgets (1992, p. 21).

2.4.2. A mixed model: Categorical funding

As one of the variations of the traditional type of budgeting, Jongbloed (2004 p.4-6) describes an approach, in which the funding authorities (i.e. the ministry, or funding council) supplement the basic budget by the addition of some extra funding for specific initiatives, such as increasing the participation of certain target groups, targeting specific skills areas, post-graduate training, or specific strategic research in 'areas of excellence'.

In the United States, during the 1990s, certain States distributed funds to public Universities through allocations with two distinct parts – the "**foundation"** (or base) and "**categorical"** funding. In these cases, the foundation amount designed to cover the "**maintenance costs",** while categorical funding programmes financed specific tasks, such as improvement of academic programmes, faculty development or student services (Serban, 1998, p.19-20). One of the States which experimented with categorical funding was Ohio, through an initiative called the *"Ohio´s academic challenge grant"* which provided funds to high quality programmes.

The use of categorical funding implies that institutions receive funds to carry out certain activities. The model has been considered as "acceptable" by institutions (Serban, 1998, p 21), especially when they provide funds for activities or programmes that are institutional priorities. However, as the allocation is activity-oriented and not awarded to achieve particular outcomes, categorical funding fails to provide for accountability.

2.4.3. Formulaic models

There is a clear move to other models in recent years. Darling et al (1989) and Layzell (1994), report that, since the early 1950s, Canadian and American jurisdictions have used formulae to allocate public funds among Universities and Colleges. Formulae were originally envisaged as a means of distributing public funds for higher education in a rational and equitable manner, but have evolved over time into mechanisms with multiple purposes and outcomes (Layzell, 1994, p.107).

According to Darling et al (1989), the introduction of formula funding arises for various reasons: (1) they are a sign of the times: as public funding for Post-Secondary education becomes more scarce, there are greater demands for visibly equitable means of allocating those scarce funds; (2) there is a need for predictable bases for planning and budgeting; (3) there is an interest in funding formulae as devices for holding institutions accountable (pp: 559- 560). Interestingly, these are all characteristics of New Public Management, a set of key managerial ideas and beliefs which spread through the world in the 1980s and 1990s and entailed a substantial shift in the governance and management of the state sector in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, Scandinavia and North America (Barzelay, 2001, pp: 2-3).

Formula funding also attempts to reduce the political elements in decisions about appropriations by front-loading the inevitable political discussion and reducing the lobbying by institutions (Darling et al, 1989, p.560).

Formulaic approaches are mathematical models that consider institutional characteristics, such as workloads, unit costs, ratios or head-counts, to calculate

the amount of resource to allocate. Darling et al (1989) define a funding formula as

> *"...a formally defined procedure, based on data that can vary and be manipulated according to definite and predetermined factors, which can be used to determine funding requirements for a system of Universities or to allocate funding to individual institutions within a system, or both..."* (p.559).

Formulae may be based either on input or output elements. **Input methods** have been called "*the cost of higher education"* (Albrecht and Ziderman 1992, p 9). This method employs formulae usually based on multiplying enrolment by parameters of unit cost (p. 9).

According to Jongbloed (2001, p.15), the use of an input method implies that since *"an individual University's grant depends on the number of students that have chosen to enrol for its courses, it is actually the students voting with their feet that determine the University's resources. In other words: money follows the student".*

Output-driven funding systems are "*systems in which payments made to service-delivery agencies by Governments are an explicit function of quantities of outputs delivered by those agencies"* (Robinson, 2002, p.1). The defining characteristic of a pure output-driven funding system is that in such a system the aim is to base the output *"price"* upon what might be called the *" efficient cost of production"* (Robinson, 2002, p.4). In output methods, funding is allocated on the basis of the estimates of costs for educational outputs. It rewards institutions according to their performance in producing graduates, post-graduates and research.

The most common approach in formulae is to multiply enrolments by a parameter of unit cost, usually called *"unit of resource"* (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992, p.9).

However, in the formulaic approach called "incentive or performance formulae", there is also a consideration of incentive elements. Darling et al (1989) explain that these formulae are usually combined with other types of formulae which are used to allocate most of the funds; a portion is withheld and allocated on the basis of performance. In these cases, performance is measured in a number of ways, such as programmes accredited, performance of graduates on standardised tests, the evaluation of programmes and services, peer evaluation, and success in attracting competitive research grants and contracts. Incentive funding or performance funding formulae are the most policy oriented of funding formulae (pp: 559-561).

Many countries have been using formulaic models since the 1990s. For instance, in some Latin American countries like Argentina (Republica Argentina, 2001; García de Fanelli, 2000), Brazil (The World Bank, 2000; Brunner et al, 1995; Schwartzman, 2002), and Chile (Bernasconi and Rojas, 2004), the Governments have introduced formulaic funding mechanisms in order to bring about some efficiency and transparent elements in public higher education funding.

More recent studies by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000), Jongbloed (2001) and Jongbloed (2004), show that, in European countries, one of the main trends of the 1990s and the 2000s is a move away from negotiated line item funding towards formula-based mechanisms. In a report by Kaiser et al (2001), there is a description of their use in various European countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, for instance, the funding mechanism has made use of performance indicators in the funding formulae for teaching and research since the early 1990s. Sweden utilises a formulaic approach, too, including input and output indicators for calculating the Universities' allocations for teaching (pp: 119-124). Finally, the last example is the United

Kingdom. In this case the teaching grant is determined by projected numbers of full-time students. The student numbers are adjusted for subject-related factors (there are four broad groups of subjects), student-related factors (i.e. different forms of enrolment), and institution-related factors (i.e. institutional scale, location, age of buildings). Total weighted (FTE) student numbers are multiplied by a base price, which leads to the University's standard resource. If the difference between the standard resource and the institution's actual resource (i.e. the previous year's resource adjusted for various factors such as inflation) is no more than 5 %, then the Funding Council will carry forward the grant from one year to the next (Kaiser et al, 2001, pp: 151-162).

The major advantage of funding formulae is that, because they use objective criteria, they provide a clear insight in the distribution of funds among higher education institutions and they facilitate comparisons between institutions (Jongbloed, 2001).

It may be argued that formula based funding mechanisms reflect several other positive aspects. First, they allow a more rational (and non-political) distribution of funds among higher education institutions and between disciplines. Second: they enable correction of major inefficiencies in the system and help in improving innovation and reducing costs. (Johnstone et al, 1998, p. 4)

However, the use of formulae has critics too. For instance, Layzell (1994) and Lang (1998) identify a trend for formulae to become increasingly complex. In similar ways, Darling et al (1989, p.581) point out other problems when they describe that formulae in place in Canadian provinces are based on averages which means that all programmes within a given category are assumed to have the same costs.

Lang (1988, p. 4) reports other disadvantages: (a) as a funding formula becomes more predictable -an advantage - it may become more complex, which might be seen as a disadvantage; (b) funding formulae create entitlements. For example, if a funding formula arithmetically “promises" a certain amount per student in a certain discipline and the enrolment in this discipline unexpectedly increases, the public treasury must provide the resulting amount, whether or not it had been budgeted for. Other negative factors identified by Michael (2004) include: formula rigidity, over-reliance on quantifiable factors and maintenance of historical inequity.

Furthermore, Massy considers that formulae tend to lock budgeting to unit costs making productivity improvement exceedingly difficult and drawing attention away from institutional goals (Massy, 2004, p. 44).

Lastly, some may also contend that a formulae approach, especially if applied in an excessively mechanical way, represents an “opting out” of the responsibility of leaders and managers to reach considered judgements.

2.4.4. Performance based models

The use of funding formulae is considered the first step in developing a system of performance-based funding (Jongbloed , 2001, p.4).

In the 1990s, many States in the USA began to link part of higher education budget allocations to performance with related accountability measures. This practice was called *"incentive or performance funding"* (Zumeta, 2000, p. 61). Public institutions were expected to be accountable for and to report on their operations and performance;

since simple reports of numbers or inputs did not satisfy numerous stakeholders in higher education, institutions were expected to measure both their efficiency and productivity (Layzell, 1998; Zumeta, 2000).

According to Layzell (1998), the evolution from incremental and formula budgeting to performance-funding categories was intended to monitor the performance of public funded institutions through the use of accountability mechanisms; for instance, allocating resources to institutions according to their achievement of previously established goals, objectives or outcomes (p. 101).

The phenomenon is described by Zumeta for institutions of higher education in the United States as follows:

> *"The States traditionally depended on the good judgement of citizen trustees and higher education boards to monitor institutional actions in the public interest. Accountability often took the form of "report cards" that provided information about institutional operations and results. But policymakers became convinced that reporting alone did not often enough improve performance on the reported indicators. Accountability now means a focus on both "objective" information and explicit financial incentives to complement the judgement of citizen oversight bodies"* (2001, p. 61).

Burke (2001b) considers that this development entails a shift in the notion of accountability. According to his view, the *"old accountability"* asked the accounting question of how public campuses expended state resources. The *"new accountability"* asks the management question of what are their results (p. 419).

Performance-based funding is a model in which a formula is used to link the provision of funds with institutions that are successful in certain elements of their

performance. It may be, for instance, students passing exams or a weighted number of passed courses (Jongbloed, 2001, p.3). Resources flow to the institutions after the recipient of funds can demonstrate that the specified outcome has been produced. Funding is tied to the 'products' of teaching and research activities of higher education institutions, e.g. the number of credits accumulated by students, the number of degrees awarded, the number of research publications, or the patents and licenses issued (Jongbloed, 2001, p.3). Therefore, the allocation of resources is linked to achievement rather than to promised results. Unlike historical or formulae models, the performance-based model is a merit-based system rather than a needs-based system and is often heavily based on the evaluation and self-evaluation of institutional academic programmes.

Burke and Minnasians (2002) and Shin and Milton (2004) explain that performance-based funding models have been used in the United States in two models: **performance budgeting and performance funding.** Both are based on the underlying concept that higher education institutions are motivated to improve their performance when performance is linked to budget allocation.

Although these modes are different in focus, both create a link between budget allocation and institutional performance. Burke and Minnassians (2002) describe both categories as follows:

> *" Performance funding ties specified state funding directly and tightly to the performance of public campuses on individual indicators. Performance funding focuses on the distribution phase of the budget process. Performance budgeting allows governors, legislators, and co-ordinating or system boards to consider campus achievement on performance indicators as one factor in determining allocations for public campuses. Performance budgeting concentrates on budget preparation and*

presentation, and often neglects, or even ignores, the distribution phase of budgeting. In performance funding, the relationship between funding and performance is tight, automatic, and formulaic." (p. 3)

A third category called "**Performance Reporting" does** not entail the allocation of resources but the provision of periodic reports regarding University performance on key performance indicators. The reports are usually sent to legislators, the governor, campuses and, in some cases, the media. The idea behind performance reporting is that institutions will focus on those indicators the legislature finds important because they will be measured and individual institution's performance published (Burke, 2001b, p. 419).

Burke explains that Performance reporting sets the stage for the move to performance budgeting as "*progressing from reporting to funding seemed a short step to State officials"* (Burke, 2001b, p. 419).

The State of Tennessee (United States) has been using the performance-based model since the 1970s and is widely recognised as the pioneer in developing an incentive-based funding scheme oriented to reward public higher education institutions for exemplary institutional performance. Tennessee uses four performance standards, comprising in total ten performance indicators. Students and faculty are the most important elements under consideration because improvement of student outcomes resulting from the highest quality is at the heart of the system. Interestingly, this scheme was developed in consultation with academic constituencies.

After Tennessee, many other States in the USA have adopted this approach or are considering some kind of performance category (Layzell, 1998). A series of surveys by Burke and his associates at the Rockefeller Institute of Government since the mid-1990s, showed that performance funding grew rapidly from 1979 to 2001, at which time it was in place in some form in 19 states. The *Fiscal Survey of the States* in the late 1990s called performance budgeting "*the most significant trend in State budgeting"* and *"the budgeting phenomenon of the decade"* (Burke, 2001b, p. 417). However, between 2001 and 2003, various States discontinued this practice due to several reasons: campus opposition and changes in legislative leadership (Colorado), changing governors and campus resistance (Kentucky) or lack of understanding between legislators and University system officials (South Carolina) (Burke, 2001b, pp: 427-428).

Kaiser et al (2001) have reported the use of this model in other countries. In Europe, the funding of teaching is performance-based in three countries, for example: Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. The Swedish model is interesting because its performance-based model of funding has adopted the form of an agreed contract between the institutions and the funding body. In this category, the institution agrees to undertake a range of activities and, in return, it receives a specified level of resource. The Swedish Ministry of Education and each individual institution agree a contract that covers education and research. Institutions of higher education receive an *educational assignment* for each new three-year period. The allocation of resources depends on results measured in terms of students (FTE) and study achievements (Kaiser et al, 2001, pp: 119-124).

Other interesting case reported by Kaiser et al (2001, pp: 35-43) is Australia. In this country, a uniform national system of performance indicators was replaced by a

system that allows each institution to select and declare its own performance indicators in periodic performance agreement negotiations with the Government.

In the USA, as many States adopted the model and later decided to abandon it, performance based funding is associated with *"volatility"* (Burke, 2001b, p.9), partly related to its novelty. Certainly, its newness seems to increase both attractiveness and volatility.

2.5. Principles underpinning effective funding models

Looking beyond the characteristics of the existing models that are utilised to fund higher education, Serban (1998, p.16), Burke (1998, p.12) and Marks and Caruthers (1999, pp: 4-6) have identified a series of principles that, as they see it, should underpin an effective funding method. They identify some of those principles as follows:

- ✓ **Should be strategy-based**

A funding model should incorporate and reinforce the goals expressed through approved national or sectoral plans (Burke, 1998, p.12 and Marks and Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6).

- ✓ **Should provide adequate funding**

A funding model should focus on determining how much funding each institution needs to fulfil its approved mission (Serban, 1998 p.16 and Marks and Caruthers 1999, pp: 4-6).

- ✓ **Should provide incentives for or reward performance**

A funding model should provide incentives for institutional effectiveness and efficiency (Burke, 1998, p. 12 and Marks and Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6).

- ✓ **Should be equitable**

The model should recognise institutional differences and missions. Examples of such differences may include, i.e., institutions with medical schools, agricultural colleges, research centres and University hospitals. In addition, different institutional missions might require different per-student funding or different rates of funding attributed to differences in degree levels, programme offerings and geographic location (Burke, 1998, p. 12; Serban 1998, p.16; and Marks and Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6).

- ✓ **Should be simple and transparent**

A funding model should be simple and easy to understand from a Government, institution and student perspective. Besides it should be easy to administer from a Government and institutional perspective (Burke, 1998, p.12 and Marks and Caruthers, 1999, pp: 4-6).

- ✓ **Should be flexible**

The model should enable institutions to be responsive to changes in technology and changes in demand from students and industry, in external conditions or in the costs encountered by institutions (Burke, 1998, p. 12 and Marks and Caruthers (1999, pp: 4-6).

- **Should be predictable and sustainable**

The model must provide reasonably stable funding and a reasonable level of predictability in order to enable the development of plans at institutional levels (Serban, 1998, p.16 and Marks and Caruthers 1999, pp: 4-6).

Chapter summary

This chapter has explained the changes that occurred in the funding of higher education systems during the last decades, outlining the most notable models in use and what is the rationale underpinning each of them. It has also provided a description of the use of the models in different countries and indicated a series of characteristics that, according to the literature, should underpin the “ideal” model. This project will aim to examine to what extent the model in existence in Uruguay meets these characteristics.

CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT

Aim of the chapter

This chapter is intended to provide an outline of the context of Latin America and Uruguay; in particular, higher education systems will be examined and some key aspects of the Uruguayan case will be highlighted.

This chapter comprises seven sections. The first presents a brief historical background of the development of Universities in Latin America, with a brief analysis of the key features of the higher education system. The second section provides information about Uruguay and an overview of the most distinctive aspects of its economic, social and political situation. The following sections are intended to provide information about the system of higher education in Uruguay **(section 4),** including analysis about UdelaR **(section 4),** the other public institutions **(section 5),** the private institutions **(section 6)** and the Ministry of Education and Culture **(section 7).**

SECTION 1: LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT

3.1. 1. Historical background.

3.1.1. 1. The installation of the colonial Universities

The first Universities in Latin America were established by the Spanish Crown in alliance with the Catholic Church after the conquest, to provide education and certification to the colonial administrators (Steger, 1974; Reyes Abadie and Perez Santarcieri, 1992).

In the 16th century Spain was a federation of kingdoms. Each of the kingdoms had a University very closely linked with the crown. Following this model, Spain created several Universities in the New World soon after the conquest. Only 100 years after the arrival of Christopher Columbus in to new territories, three Universities were founded in the Americas: in Peru, Santo Domingo and Mexico (Reyes Abadie and Perez Santarcieri, 1992). Osborn (1976) shows that, in the 16th century, when Harvard, Yale, Princeton and Columbia were installed in North America, in Latin America there were already five Universities (pp: 6-11).

Spanish authorities considered the Universities as “tools” of the crown, needed to train military officers, priests and lawyers who could manage the colonies of the New World (Steger, 1974). Interestingly, other colonial powers, like Portugal, preferred to keep their higher education institutions for themselves, and did not allow many opportunities for local populations to educate themselves (Steger, 1974; Niesker, 1992). The differences reflected contrasting approaches to the

overall pattern of the colonial enterprise. The Portuguese empire considered that the colonies were mostly places for economic exploitation, to be ruled from the metropolis. As a result, the young Brazilians wishing to embark on higher studies had to travel to the *Universidade de Coimbra* in Portugal (Niesker, 1992; Schwartzman, 1992). Only in the 19th century were the first higher education institutions established in Brazil and its first University, the *Universidade do Rio de Janeiro*, was inaugurated in 1920 (Schwartzman, 1992, p. 4).

The Spanish conquerors were very effective in the destruction of the political and economic structure of the pre-Columbus aboriginal empires and in the establishment of a caste-like system where the lower class would be Indian and the upper class would be the Spanish and the "*Criollos"*, the Spanish born in America (Osborn, 1976, p. 5). In the meantime, the colonisers created a complex system of tax-collection and the bureaucracy, which was established for this purpose, was progressively enlarged to give jobs to European newcomers. Within this context, the creation of Universities responded to the need to train cadres to serve both the colonial administration and the Church. As a consequence, the new University institutions were run by the Catholic Church as part of the Spanish colonising process (Steger, 1973).

3.1.1.2. The Universities in the independence days

In the 19th century, the colonial model crumbled with the emergence of the movements of independence. The young nations admired and copied the French opposition to all forms of corporatist arrangements and privileges, including those of the Church and of the traditional Universities (Scwhartzmann, 1991; 1992). Once free from the colonial rule, the new model introduced to the young Republics

was the Napoleonic model, with a centralised State and bureaucratically controlled institutions. This model also brought with it conflict between the State and the Church, as the latter was taken away from most of its roles in *élite* education (Schwartzman, 1992). Throughout Latin America, from the early 19th century until well into the 20th century, French science and French higher education symbolised the victory of modern science and rationality against the traditional, religious and aristocratic colonisers and their local allies.

As Schwartzman (2002, p. 30) describes:

> *"...the adoption of the "Napoleonic Model", means, in essence, that higher education institutions are considered public entities entitled to provide their students with legal rights to practice their professions, and to enjoy all the rights and benefits derived from their higher education degree. The basic unit of this system is the "Faculty", an organised teaching unit responsible for providing a specific degree. The system did not require Universities, and the first Universities were organised as an aggregation of formerly existing Faculties."*

Latin American higher education, as it exists today, was organised in the period of independence. However, Schwartzman (1992, p. 3) explains that

> *"political independence did not mean much in terms of social and economic transformations. Latin American enlightened élites spoke French, travelled to Europe and handled French concepts, including their democratic and rationalist ideals; still, their societies remained restricted to the limits of their economies, based on a few export products, large pockets of traditional or decadent settlements"*

The Universities contributed to the replacement of the colonial authorities by the republican oligarchies and, as a consequence, they dispensed education to

economic, political and religious *élites.* They were a synonym of "*education for the professions*" (Schwartzman, 1993b, p. 9; Albornoz, 1993, p.71).

In contrast to what happened in Germany, for instance, Latin American Universities were extremely slow in creating space for empirical research. A dominant feature of the South American model is the weight of the professional schools in law, medicine and engineering (Schwartzman, 1993b, pp:9-10), a feature that remains today.

3.1.1.3. The transformation of the Universities in the 20th century

In the 20th century, Latin American countries followed the continental tradition of all-powerful States, enabling the transformation of the Universities placed in the capitals of the former colonial vice-royalties (Mexico, Lima and Buenos Aires) into National Universities (Didriksson, 2002). Those cities were the scene of massive European immigration at the turn of the century, only comparable with the United States.

European migration meant the beginnings of a modern middle class in Latin American cities, with all its social and economic attachments: a growing service sector, small industries and demands of professionalisation and education (Schwartzman, 1993b, p.10).

The *"Reforma"*

The early 20th century was also a period of University autonomy. The turning point was a student rebellion at the University of Cordoba (in Northern Argentina) in

1918 that launched a movement that would have vast consequences for the entire continent. The student movement, called the *"Reforma de Cordoba"*, advocated the secularisation and democratisation of the elitist, traditional Universities that were considered as "schools of castes". The *Reforma* proposed to organise a self-governing, autonomous University, led by the establishment of a joint academic governance by faculty, students and alumni, named *"co-Government"* .

According to Schugurenski (2002) the most important features of the Cordoba Reform can be summarised as follows:

> *"a) institutionalisation of student participation in University councils, joining professors and alumni in a three-party system known as co-governance.*
> *b) a linkage between student politics and national politics in order to mobilize the University toward the solution of economic, social and political problems.*
> *c) an emphasis on University extension, particularly courses for workers that would lead to the development of fraternal bonds with the proletariat.*
> *d) tuition-free education and open admission to all academically qualified applicants, in order to replace the elitist and archaic 19th century University with a democratic, modern and mass University."* (p.2)

The Cordoba movement soon spread its word throughout the continent and inspired similar movements, most notably in Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, Colombia and Guatemala. One of the consequences of the Cordoba Reform was the politicising of the student body for elections within the Universities. In this activity, students were normally connected with, and supported by, national political parties. This is certainly a key feature to be recalled when considering the proposals coming or supported by the student unions in the continent: political activism on the part of student unions is considered a normal aspect of the University experience

and is accepted as a customary means of political socialisation, especially rooted and supported in the ideas and the structures of the political left.

On analysing the history of the Uruguayan students union -called *"FEUU"* - Van Aken (1990) comments:

> *"Most (...) are persuaded that the current structure and procedures inside FEUU provide a place to the (ideas of the) left (…)...the University is even more politicised than ever... these is not due to the political parties, but it is due to the student (union). Those students who claimed for the academic freedom as a right to face political influences have introduced the leftist activities and ideologies (to the University). Most students have no idea about the high degree of influence of the leftist politicla parties in academic affaires "* (pp: 253-254)

Other consequences of the *Reforma*

It is important to emphasise two other aspects of the Cordoba Reform which relate to the creation of concepts that remain deeply rooted in most of the public Universities in Latin America: the **co-Government** system and the **tuition-free model.**

The first concept, the **co-Government system**, means that the University council and the Faculty bodies are tripartite bodies integrated by representatives of professors, students and alumni. Most public Universities include in the co-Government frame this representation, not only at the central level or in Faculty councils, but in committees and ad-hoc commissions as well. This system means that University authorities (often made up of co-Government members) adopt decisions based upon the co-Government advice, rather than on independent,

technical or professional advice. According to tradition this *modus operandi* assures full representation of the co-Government members in all University affairs.

The co-Government system has some critics. For instance, Van Aken considers that "*The co-Government system has opened the door to the political left by the back door of the University...*"(p 253).

In similar ways, while talking about the University of Buenos Aires (called the UBA), Garcia de Fanelli says: *"In the tradition of the 1918 Cordoba Reform…according to the UBA statute, the president is elected by the University assembly, which is composed of the deans and academic bodies of the 13 faculties and the University council. One characteristic of these representatives, as well as those from student unions, has been their ties with major political parties. Consequently, there has been an element of partisanship concerning the way votes from the constituencies have been cast."(*2005, p.3)

As a result, some critics consider that co-Government does not assure full participation because *"... the majority of the student population and the faculty are not motivated to become involved in University elections and academic politics"* (Garcia de Fanelli, 2005, p.3)

The other aspect is **tuition-free education**. The *Reforma* model implies that public higher education institutions in Latin America are to be predominantly tax-financed and tuition-free based. In most cases, this aspect has been enshrined within the countries´ National Constitutions or by National education Laws.

This is, clearly, a key aspect of Latin American public higher education, because it has shaped a system in which the public institutions are reluctant to charge tuition-fees. Only in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, do the public

Universities charge tuition-fees, and in Peru, Bolivia and Mexico they charge symbolic fees (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 7)

The main economic and equity arguments of the Cordoba Reform about tuition-free education were based on the following concept: any tuition-fee would place an intolerable burden on students of modest means and therefore reduce access.

Today, the main student unions remain as strong critics of tuition, even of a modest tuition, and add other elements to their arguments: "... *the introduction of tuition is an extension of a World Bank neo-liberal agenda and a promotion of the power of the market over academic considerations and state responsibility* (Levy and Arenas, 1999).

As a consequence, reforms to introduce or increase tuition-fees are often not politically viable and, in many cases, meet with major resistance. Garcia Guadilla considers that *"...the payment of tuition-fees is a dilemma, because it has immense political and socio-cultural consequences. That is why, few (Latin American) countries have been successful in its introduction"* (2005, p.24).

For instance, in 1999, a move to raise tuition levels at Mexico's largest University, *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM) had to be abandoned following a student strike that closed down the University for nearly an entire year.

Interestingly, the UNAM strike shows that, despite the lack of motivation commented above, students retain the power to disrupt and to block certain reforms.

However, the *Reforma* movement, which was incendiary in its rhetoric against the

University establishment, was also conservative in its accomplishments. Whilst the Universities became less subject to daily interferences from central Governments, they did not incorporate new social groups or improve the quality of teaching (Schwartzman, 1991). The Latin American reformed Universities became the places where the children of the traditional *élites* expressed their frustrations against the decadence of their elders (Schwartzman, 1991). Albornoz (1993) comments that Latin American Universities became

> *"...academic entities in non intellectual societies which train people in societies where such a life is quite remote from the daily life of the society. As such, the Universities have not become instruments to nourish the process of modernisation; rather they are still institutions that reproduce and perpetuate a given social order"* (1993, pp: 855-857).

3.1.1.4. Universities as non research institutions

The idea of the University as a research centre arrived late to the Latin American continent and, only in the 1920s, did science evolve into an integral part of the education provided in the Universities of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and, shortly thereafter, Brazil (Cetto and Vessuri, 1998, p.1; Schwartzman, 1993b, p.9).

Nevertheless, although most Latin American Universities are concentrated in professional fields in Faculties with scarce research activities, the Universities, especially the public ones, have had a significant *rôle* in the creation of knowledge in the region (Arocena and Sutz, 2000; 2001; Cetto and Vessuri, 1999) and have remained the main vehicles for scientific research. 85 % of scientific research is undertaken by Universities, in particular by public Universities (IESALC, 2005, p.

199). In Brazil, for example, 41 % of all research groups are concentrated in five institutions: three Universities of Sao Paulo State and two of the more traditional federal Universities (CINDA, 2007, p. 177). The University of Sao Paulo (USP) is the recipient of around 60 % of all thematic projects launched in that State through a mode of financing established by the Sao Paulo State Promotion Agency in 1991 (CINDA, 2007, p. 183). In Mexico, UNAM remains the most prominent centre for scientific research, with specialised research institutes within the Schools and Faculties (Ríos y Herrero, 2005, pp: 50-52).

FIGURE 1 below shows that there is a high concentration of scientific researchers working in higher education institutions and, at the same time, there is a notorious difference in the regional numbers with those of selected countries of other world regions (FIGURE 2).

FIGURE 1. Distribution of researchers in the employment sector in selected countries (in %) in 1999

	Government	Higher education	private sector	other sectors
ARGENTINA	7,9	64,7	25,7	2,1
BRAZIL	37,3	49,3	11,3	0,7
URUGUAY	13,4	85,7	1,0	
AUSTRALIA	11,0	28,2	58,3	2,6
CANADA	6,9	51,8	31,0	0,2

Source: Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología e Innovación Productiva (SECYT) and Red iberoamericana de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología (RICYT) (2001).

Further, in Latin America, the number of individuals working in scientific activities is low if we compare it with the numbers of some industrialised countries.

FIGURE 2. Number of Human Resources in Science and Technology activities in selected countries (per million inhabitants) in 1999.

ARGENTINA	720
BRAZIL	120
MEXICO	268
URUGUAY	366
AUSTRALIA	3670
GREAT BRITAIN	2706

Source: Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología e Innovación Productiva (SeCyT) and Red Iberoamericana de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología (RICYT) (2001).

3.1.1.5. University expansion

After the 1950s, the process of expansion of the University system was extremely rapid (Schwartzman, 1993b). Expansion was due to irresistible sociological trends: secondary education was gradually expanding; middle-class women went to work and continued to study; and evening courses opened everywhere for working lower-middle class sectors (Schwartzman, 1999).

From 1980 to 1994, enrolment in Latin American higher education increased by over 2.5 million at an annual rate of 4.5 % (IESALC, 2005, p. 198). Although average per capita income in the region increased, absolute levels of poverty rose and disparities in income worsened. In 1994, the number of students enrolled at higher educational institutions totalled nearly 8 million and the teaching staff over 700,000 (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.7)

Some countries kept open the gates of their public institutions, leading to “mega Universities” like Buenos Aires (316.050 students) or Mexico (170.018 students) (Schwartzman, 1993b). Its most immediate consequence was that higher education became very expensive to maintain, not just because of the increased number of students, but mostly because of the growing number of academic and administrative staff.

The evolution of some Universities to enormous institutions

Most of the public Universities placed in the capital cities of the Latin American countries that descend from the Spanish colonial period or from the Independence days evolved into very large institutions. Today, many of the largest Universities of the region have an enrolment of 70.000 students or more.

There is probably no other region in the world with this experience of higher education institutions of such magnitude and political importance. In other parts of the world, the appearance and organisation of “mega Universities” has occurred in a radically different ways; for instance, under schemes of distance or open education (i.e. the Open University in the UK or the Spanish UNED (*Universidad de Educacion a distancia*); as multi-campus systems (for example that of the State of California or SUNY, in USA); or under a scheme of national Universities, like in Japan (covering about 500 thousand students in the whole country). However, in these cases the size of institutions never comes near that of the Latin American *macro-Universities* (Didriksson 2003). This is, certainly, unparalleled in the international experience.

Also, elsewhere in the world, the challenges of increasing enrolments in higher education were undertaken by the re-constitution of higher education systems leading to further institutional differentiation. This has not been the case in most Latin American countries which in all cases lack the overall strategic planning related to student participation and access (Didriksson, 2003). For example, while only 1.9 % of individuals between 20 and 24 years old studied in higher education in the region in 1950, this figure jumped to 20.7% on average in 1994 (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.6) and the region fully entered into the global model of massification of higher education. In the same year, the total student registration in higher education in Latin America was more than 7 million, of which almost 68,5% was located in public Universities (IESALC, 2005, p 197).

Even though tertiary enrolments grew significantly in virtually all countries (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.9) these was not accompanied with national policies oriented to re-craft the higher education systems, based on careful planning, priorities or, at least, some kind of visionary thinking. Enrolment expansion was, mostly, absorbed by the existing National Universities, based in the capital cities, that already had estates, classrooms and equipment, and, not the least, promoted open-access and associated tuition-free institutional policies. In addition, these institutions, under the inspiration of the *Reforma*, had the willingness to receive more and more students in order to assure the democratisation of knowledge.

A Latin American crafted category: the so called "*macro-Universities*"

Based on enrolment numbers, Rama (2002, p. 1) and Didriksson (2002, p. 4) group a series of Universities in a category that they term *"macro-Universities",* trying to expose a phenomenon that, according to their view, offers great originality.

In this category, they include the Uruguayan public University, UdelaR, and three Argentinean Universities: Buenos Aires, with close to 300.000 students enrolled, Cordoba with more than 110.000 students enrolled and La Plata with more than 90.000 students enrolled (Didriksson, 2005).

What are the specific features and common characteristics that categorise an institution as a *macro-University"?* Didriksson (2002, pp: 10-20) describes the key features of the *"macro-Universities"* as follows:

- **Size:** These Universities have more than 60.000 students enrolled.

- **Complexity:** Teaching activities in this institutions cover all disciplines and embrace the whole set of the areas of knowledge. This means that such institutions require a complex organization.

- **Research activities:** These institutions represent an important gathering of researchers and post-graduate programmes and form, by far, the highest percentage of national and regional scientific research.

- **Funding patterns:** All are public institutions and all are funded by public subsidies. In addition, they absorb the most significant percentage of the national budget for the higher

education system and their main financing source comes from Government funds.

■ ***Rôle* in the protection of the cultural and historical heritage of their nations.** They are responsible for the protection of a notable physical and ideological legacy and often a unique historical, cultural and natural patrimony.

FIGURE 3 "Macro-Universities" in selected countries Year 2004

	Institution	Number of students
ARGENTINA	Universidad de Buenos Aires	316.050
ARGENTINA	Universidad de Cordoba	116.627
ARGENTINA	Universidad de La Plata	94.283
BRAZIL	Universidad de Sao Paulo	70.354
COLOMBIA	Universidad Nacional de Colombia	84.052
HONDURAS	Universidad Nacional de Honduras	79.346
MEXICO	Universidad Autonoma de Mexico	170.018
SANTO DOMINGO	Universidad Autonoma de Sto Domingo	161.200
URUGUAY	Universidad de la Republica	70.156

Source: Didriksson (2002)

3. 1.2. Current issues in Latin American higher education.

Some authors show concern about considering a single pattern for all Latin American institutions. For instance, Schwartzman (1994) comments:

> *"There must be room to question this concept. What is in common between the School of Medicine in San Paulo, the Universidad de San Marcos and a small technological*

institute in Valparaiso? Resources, objectives, clientele, graduates, cultures, all are so different that very few things can be said that could embrace them all" (p.1).

However, other authors identify some distinguishing features of the Latin American higher education systems: Garcia Guadilla (2005), Brovetto (2002), Yarzabal (2001), Rama (2002) and Rodrigues Dias (1996).

These authors identify the following patterns:

3.1.2.1. Massification

As already expressed by Trow (1973, p.1) "*in every advanced society the problems of higher education are problems associated with growth*". In Latin America, as higher education became a mass phenomenon, expansion has substantially transformed the higher education scene in the region.

By the end of the 20th century, the number of university students in the region has increased from 270.000 in the 1950s to more than 7 million in the mid 1990s and to 12 million in the mid 2000s (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.6). Castañeda (1993) pictures this increase as follows:

> *"Student population increased fifteen fold in Mexico and Brazil.(For instance) Peru´s student population also grew more that fifteenfold: from 16.000 on 1950 to 246.000 in 1980".* (p.191)

As noted above, this enrolment expansion was primarily absorbed by the public Universities, some of which grew to unmanageable proportions (Kent 1998, p.3)

and now suffer a consequent over-saturation in the number of students per classroom.

As elsewhere, mass higher education in Latin America developed since the 1960s in a phenomenon called “massification”, a consequence of a combination of forces that resulted in an enormous increase in demand for higher education. Trow (1973, p1-2) explains that the transition from *elite* to mass higher education poses a variety of problems for the educational systems that experience it and for societies that support them, such as: a) the rate of growth associated to the number of students; b) the absolute growth of both the systems and individual institutions; and c) the changes in the proportion of the relevant age grade enrolled in institutions of higher education.

However, it can be argued that, in the Latin American region, this phenomenon resulted, not as purposeful planned projects of Governments and University administrators, but as a consequence of large-scale social, economic, and cultural changes beyond anyone’s control (Schwartzman, 1996).

The increase in higher education enrolment in Latin American during the last four decades is remarkable. In 2004, an average of 27% of the relevant age cohort in the region was enrolled in a higher education institution (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 9). This constitutes an annual growth rate of 4.4% since 1985. Argentina and Chile are among the regional leaders with enrolment rates well above 30% (**FIGURE 4**). However this rate remains lower than those of industrialised countries, North America and Europe, where equivalent figures may exceed 70%.

FIGURE 4: Higher education enrolment index in selected Latin American countries (2002)

	index
ARGENTINA	51
BRAZIL	20.4
COLOMBIA	20.8
CHILE	48.1
PARAGUAY	15.5
MÉXICO	22.9
URUGUAY	35.8
VENEZUELA	34.4

Source: Garcia Guadilla (2005, p.9)

3.1.2.2. Diversification in institutional structures

Under the heading of "diversification" it is possible to identify two aspects: (a) the growth in the number of the non-university higher education institutions and (b) the significant growth of the enrolment of students in private higher education.

3.1.2.3. The growth of the non University sector

In the past 20 years, the number of non-university institutions has increased. In the mid 1990s, there were about 800 Universities as well as roughly 5400 non-university education institutions (54% of them private) (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 8). In the mid 2000s, the number of non-university higher education institutions has increased to more than 6300. In Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil, for example, the

non-university system accounts for 28, 30 and 32% of total tertiary enrolment, respectively (Garcìa Guadilla, 2005, p. 10).

Examples of such institutions are technical schools and teacher colleges. In Mexico, for instance, several new institutions, called *"Technological Universities*" were created, offering two year postsecondary training linked to regional job markets and in close coordination with local business leaders. The experiences of the French *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* and the community colleges of the United States seem to have partially inspired policymakers in this case (IESALC, 2005, pp: 198-199).

3.1.2.4. Growth of the enrolment in private higher education.

In the early 1960s, only Brazil, Colombia and Chile had an important private higher education sector. In 2002, about 47,5% of higher education enrolments in Latin America were in private institutions (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.5). In Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Chile, the majority of students are now enrolled in private, rather than public, institutions (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p.32)(FIGURE 5).

There is an exception in this institutional character in Cuba, because there are not private institutions in this country. All Cuban higher education institutions, including the Universities, are public.

FIGURE 5: Percentage of private enrolment in 1995 and 2002

Year	75-40%	40-30%	30-20%	20-10%	Less than 10%
1985	BRAZIL COLOMBIA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	CHILE EL SALVADOR PERU	ARGENTINA GUATEMALA PARAGUAY	COSTA RICA ECUADOR HONDURAS MÉXICO NICARAGUA VENEZUELA	BOLIVIA CUBA PANAMA URUGUAY
2002	BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA PARAGUAY PERU	VENEZUELA	ARGENTINA COSTA RICA ECUADOR GUATEMALA MÉXICO	HONDURAS	BOLIVIA CUBA PANAMA URUGUAY

Source: Garcia Guadilla (2005, p. 7)

3.1.2.5. Problems of access

Access to higher education is still insufficient and reveals inequities between regions, within regions and between countries. As mentioned above (p.92), in the mid 2000s participation of 18-30 year olds in higher education, dropped to 20% in Brazil, to 15% in Paraguay and 20% in Colombia while in Argentina it dropped to 51%, and to 48% in Chile (Garcia Guadilla, 2005, p. 9).

While the middle class represents 15% of the population in the region, 45% of students enrolled in higher education institutions belong to this sector (Rama, 2002). However, this position is even more worrying when certain groups are considered: Rama has examined some countries in which the aboriginal groups represent a high percentage of the total population, for instance 50% in Bolivia, 48% in Guatemala, 38% in Peru and 25% in Ecuador. In all these cases, the access to higher education of these groups is extremely low (Rama, 2002). As Albornoz (1993, p. 141) points out:

> *"access to the University is restricted according to the peculiar social division in each society. No "cholo" – native Peruvian- would be found in any of the elite Universities in Lima and no "negro" would be found in the same kind of University in Caracas".*

IDB (1997) considers that this situation is largely caused by the current public financing patterns used in the region, which favours the middle class. Most public students come from a middle class, ranging from substantial privilege to modest backgrounds, where the very rich and the very poor are only a minority. This has been confirmed by studies developed by UdelaR (2000) and Torello (2004) in Uruguay, and by Gonzalez Rosada and Menendez (2001) in Argentina.

UdelaR´s study shows that, in Uruguay, the majority of public University students belong to the top two quintiles of the income distribution and to relatively highly educated families. In similar ways, the Argentinean study suggests that the highest majority of the students (almost 90%) in tuition-free public Universities have higher than median per capita family income and that close to 50% of them previously attended tuition-financed private secondary schools.

As a consequence Albornoz (1993) concludes:

> *"Latin American Universities remain elite institutions, with the largest masses of Latin Americans unable to enter these institutions. Within each Latin American society the University remains dominated by the axis of political power and defined by the social structure of underdevelopment and unequal distribution of wealth"*(p. 140).

3.1.2.6. Financial pressures

This is a key feature identified by Schwartzman (1993b) who explains that: *"In the public sector, the problems of financing tend to overwhelm all others"* (p.12). Finance of the higher education system, he thinks, is the most significant policy problem for higher education in the continent.

The dominant model of funding for public higher education in the continent, that he describes as historical-bureaucratic, is *"has failed"* because: (a) resources allocated to the sector have been insufficient; (b) it is inadequate for the economic development established by the Governments and (c) the funding systems have allocated the resources in inefficient ways inside the higher education sectors and have not encouraged efficiency, effectiveness or quality (Schwartzman, 1994).

Latin American public higher education, predominantly tax-financed, is also the main recipient of the growth in the student demand through a policy of open admissions and tuition-free education. Within this context, whilst State involvement reflects a priority attributed to education by Governments from across the region, the public resources devoted to sustain this expansion have not been able to maintain the expenditure per student.

At this stage, Schwartzman (1992) wonders how higher education can continue to be financed in a context of scarce public resources and pressures for higher expenditures and increasing enrolments and costs while there will be *"pressures for evaluation, administrative efficiency and accountability are likely to increase, together with a growing movement toward new sources of income, including cost recovery from the better endowed students "* (p. 24).

As a combination of all those factors, Cetto and Vessuri (1998) observe the following picture:

> *" It is currently calculated that approximately one-third of the teachers in the region's higher education system are primarily involved in teaching under more or less overcrowded conditions. There is also a large contingent of teachers who work on an hourly basis in a variety of institutions, particularly public Universities with little prestige or chronic overcrowding, but also in larger public institutions such as the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM*) (p 5).

SECTION 2: NATIONAL CONTEXT

3.2.1. About Uruguay

Uruguay is South America's smallest country with an area of 176,215 square kilometres. It borders the Atlantic Ocean between Argentina and Brazil. The country has 3.314,466 inhabitants (according to the survey carried out by the National Statistics Institute in 2006), with 1.345,010 living in the capital city Montevideo, one of its 19 political departments.

Uruguayans share a Spanish linguistic and cultural background, even though about one-quarter of the population is of Italian origin. Most are nominally Roman Catholic, although the majority does not actively practice a religion. Church and State are officially separated.

3.2.2. Economy

Uruguay's economy is based mainly on livestock breeding and related industries such as wool, leather, and meat production. The country has abundant natural resources, including fertile land, minerals and fisheries. Its main agricultural products are barley, wheat, rice and citrus fruits. Uruguay exports beef and other animal products, wool and textiles, chemicals, rice and fish.

3.2.3. Social aspects

Uruguay has demographic characteristics similar to those of industrialised

countries: life expectancy at birth is 76 years (World Bank, 2006) and infant mortality rate is 12 (World Bank, 2006). Its per capita income of US$ 7.468 is high by regional standards, (see below FIGURE 6).

The Uruguayan level of social development is high, as indicated by the United Nations 2005 Human Development Index (HDI). The country's HDI, based on three factors -health and longevity (life expectancy), education (literacy and years of schooling), and quality of life (per-capita GDP)- puts the country fifth in the Latin American ranking, after Argentina, Barbados, Chile and Costa Rica (UNDP, 2006).

Figure 6: Human Development Index

	IDH position
ARGENTINA	36
BRAZIL	69
MEXICO	53
URUGUAY	43
CANADA	6
UNITED KINGDOM	18

Source: UNDP (2006)

FIGURE 7: Uruguay social basic social indicators (in 2006).

Population: 3.32 (in millions)
Population growth (annual %): 0.1
Life expectancy at birth, total (years): 76

Fertility rate, total (births per woman): 2.0
Mortality rate under -5 (per 1,000): 12
GNI *per capita* (in US$): 7.468
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group): 99

From: Source: World Development Indicators database, 2007. Retrieved from: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N/CPProfile.asp&WSP=N

3.2.4. Political system

Uruguay is a republic state based on parliamentary democracy with a presidential form of Government. The President is elected by a popular vote for a five-year term. He or she is both chief of the state and head of the Government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Executive power is exercised by the President and thirteen cabinet Ministers.

Legislative power is vested in the legislature (usually called the Parliament) which is bicameral with:

- a Chamber of Senators (called the Upper Chamber) having 31 seats with members elected by popular vote (proportional representation) to serve five-year terms and the Vice-president who presides it and
- a Chamber of Representatives (called the Lower Chamber) having 99 seats with its members elected by popular vote (proportional representation) to serve five-year terms.

The judiciary is largely independent of the executive and the legislature. The highest court is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court judges are elected for 10-

year terms by the Parliament. Below it, are appellate and lower courts, and justices of the peace. In addition, there are electoral and administrative courts, an accounts court, and a military justice system. The legal system is based on the Spanish civil law system and the main source of the law is the Constitution of 1967.

3.2.5. Major political parties

Uruguay has a multi-party system, with three dominant political parties:

- ✓ the *Partido Colorado* (Colorado Party) a liberal, right wing, urban based party. It is the most elected party in Uruguayan history;
- ✓ the *Partido Nacional* (National Party), created by conservative landowners. It is a right wing party; and
- ✓ the *"Frente Amplio",* a left wing parties coalition of socialists, former urban guerrilla members (called *"Tupamaros"),* communists, social-democrats, Christian-democrats and dissident members of the Colorado and Blanco parties.

3.2.6. Current situation

In the early 2000s, Uruguay found itself in a serious economic recession which was partly linked to regional difficulties. The Uruguayan economy is very dependent upon regional links. The next door neighbours, Argentina and Brazil, alone, accounted for almost half of Uruguay's trade. With respective GDPs of nearly 50 and 12 times that of Uruguay, the economic size and location of both of these countries enable them to have a strong influence over Uruguay.

A combination of events, such as the financial collapse of the Brazilian currency in 1999 and the external debt *default* in Argentina in 2001, prompted a severe financial crisis, with widespread illiquidity and insolvencies in the domestic banking system; a sharp depreciation of its currency followed by high inflation; and a doubling of the public debt-to-GDP ratio to about 100%.

The Uruguayan 2002 crisis was a major banking crisis.

- ✓ In total, approximately 33% of the country's deposits were taken out of financial system and five financial institutions were left insolvent. A massive run on the banks by depositors caused the Government to freeze banking operations.
- ✓ The national currency *"the peso"* devalued by 98%. In a period of a year, *the peso* became worth almost a half of its previous value.
- ✓ All of Uruguay's foreign debts were in dollars, while the Government revenue was in *"pesos".* This meant that a debt burden of a million *pesos* suddenly became two million. Previously feasible debts suddenly became enormous.

The crisis pushed the Uruguayan economy into negative growth. In the short term, unemployment and growing poverty created greater social exclusion and public insecurity, and threatened the achievements of Uruguay as a middle-income country.

Although Uruguay's economy showed signs of recovery in 2003-2005, this improvement was not reflected to the same extent in income levels and the condition of the more vulnerable groups. According to UNDP (2005), poverty in Uruguay tends to be concentrated within the youngest segments of the population.

However, the increase in child poverty cannot be blamed exclusively on the 2002 economic crisis. Katzman and Filgueira (2001) also point out that the situation in which nearly half of all children and adolescents live in poverty dates back over two decades (pp: 61-64). In 2003, 56.5% of children under 6 were living in poor households and could not access sufficient food and basic goods and services (UNDP, 2003, p. 21).

Currently, the Government of Uruguay is dedicated to addressing the problem of poverty in the country. Social programmes and institutions are attempting to address the highest levels of poverty of an increasingly structural nature that have developed in recent years.

3.2.7. A new administration

A new administration headed by Frente Amplio was elected in October 2004. In Uruguay, this election meant that, for the first time a left-wing party was in charge of a State-wide administration.

When the Frente Amplio party defeated the ruling Colorado Party, it was seen as part of a regional political trend which had seen the emergence of left-wing Governments in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina. In addition, a general distrust of controversial reforms, including privatisation measures, the outsourcing of some public services to the private sector and the severe economic crisis on 2002, were said to have also contributed to Uruguay's dramatic political shift.

On taking office, the newly elected President of the Republic and Frente Amplio leader, Mr Tabare Vazquez, announced that he would pursue a moderate political course, with the emphasis on alleviating poverty, including a US$100 million Emergency Plan to help the poor. He also promised to build better relations with neighbours, Brazil and Argentina; and diplomatic ties with Cuba were restored.

SECTION 3: THE URUGUAYAN SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The higher education system in Uruguay comprises one University -the University of the Republic, UdelaR- and another eight higher education institutions in the public sector, and four Universities and eight university institutes in the private sector.

FIGURE 8: Enrolments in Universities (in 2006)

	Number of students
UDELAR	88057
UNIVERSIDAD ORT	5863
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA	5911
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO	1612
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA EMPRESA	1611



Based on: Anuario estadístico de Educación 2007, MEC, Dirección de Educación ISSN 0797- 6038

As seen in FIGURE 8 (above), the public University represents, by far, the greatest part of student enrolments. In this context, due to cultural and historical reasons, and to the weak role of the Ministry of Education and Culture, UdelaR has played a dominant role in the scene of higher education in the country. It is considered *"the"* University, a centre of gravity so prominent that it practically makes the system all by itself (Brunner and Becerra, 1999; Bentancur, 2002). Consequently, the UdelaR policies and problems are the problems and policies of the whole higher education system.

From 1833 to 1985, the public University had the monopoly of University studies in Uruguay, evolving in isolation with no academic references, except those coming from abroad (Martínez Sandres, 1999). Furthermore, following the pattern of the colonial Universities in the continent, in its creation, this University was in charge of all public education in Uruguay. However, during the 19th and 20th centuries, UdelaR lost, gradually, many of its components and its uniqueness as follows:

i) In 1875, elementary education was moved to a Council of Primary education and in the 1930s the secondary schools were placed in a Council of Secondary education. In 1941, technical and vocational studies were also placed in another public agency. In the 1970s, these three agencies were placed under the framework of a single institution called “educational Administration of Public education”, in Spanish *ANEP.* This evolution reflected the policy direction given by the National Constitution, passed in 1918, of placing certain activities - for instance, transportation, banking, insurance and education - in autonomous agencies that operate with complete independence (institutional autonomy) from the national Government.

ii) In 1984 a national law permitted the creation of private Universities. As a consequence, since 1985 the Ministry of Education and Culture has authorised the creation of several institutions. This was the beginning of a new era for Uruguayan higher education with the emergence of a private market and some reduced involvement of the Uruguayan Government in the sector.

SECTION 4: THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: UDELAR

3.4.0. Introduction

Notwithstanding the fact that during the 20th century UdelaR lost the *role* of provider of public education at all levels, it is still the biggest higher education institution in the country and the only public University. According to MEC, in 2006 UdelaR had 88.057 students enrolled in 109 undergraduate programmes (MEC, 2006, p. 56).

The main features of the University were defined in 1958 in the University Organic Law and the National Constitution of 1967. These measures continue to define the University today, as follows:

- Following the *Reforma* inspiration, the Organic Law established what is called a **co-Government system**, as explained previously: the effective participation in the governance of the University by students, faculty and alumni (pp: 79-82 above).

- In addition, UdelaR is defined by the National Constitution as an **autonomous** institution which means that it is an institution which develops its activities with total independence from the national Government, setting its own rules in all respects.

- Another key element is open access. Following the *Reforma* pattern, access to UdelaR has been traditionally unrestricted to those who complete their secondary studies.

- Last, but not least, the University is a tuition-free institution, a principle that has been inspired by the *Reforma* and vigorously defended and re-inforced in the past by the University authorities. All attempts to introduce fees have encountered major resistance.

3.4.1. Structure of UdelaR

The UdelaR is structured in thirteen Faculties and ten Schools that are subdivided into Departments or Institutes. Each Faculty or School is responsible for educational and research programmes, and for granting diplomas within a general framework of autonomy in academic matters.

In 2006, UdelaR´s Faculties or Schools awarded 109 University degrees (MEC, 2006). Research is a major duty developed by the University as it is responsible for 81 % of the Uruguayan scientific research (Bertola et al, 2005). Due to a recent internal re-organisation, the Faculties are considered as components of five “areas” related to basic academic disciplines: Science and Technology, Social Sciences, Health Sciences, Agricultural Sciences and Arts.

FIGURE 9: UdelaR areas

AGRARIAN
Agronomy
Veterinary Science
SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY
Architecture
Basic Science
Engineering
Chemistry
SOCIAL and HUMAN SCIENCE
Economics
Law
Social Science
Humanities
Librarian Science
Communication Science
HEALTH SCIENCE
Medicine
Hygiene
Dentistry
University Hospital

Psychology
Nursing
ARTISTIC
Arts
Music
OTHER
North Campus
Food Science
Rector's office

Source: UdelaR, Dirección Gral. de Planeamiento and SECIU (2005).

3.4.2. Governing bodies

The University is directed by a Central University Council which comprises the Rector, the members that represent the undergraduate students, the alumni and the teachers, and a representative of each Faculty. The University central administration comprises one Vice-Rector and four Pro-Rectors in Teaching, Research, Outreach and Management respectively.

Each Faculty or School is administered by a Dean or a Director in the case of Schools and a Faculty Council elected each four years. This Council includes the Dean (or School Director) and elected representatives of the undergraduate students, the alumni, and the teachers.

Election of University authorities is an important tradition within University

governance in UdelaR. All political authorities are elected by bodies – called “the Cloisters”- comprising academic staff, students and alumni representatives who are themselves elected in national elections (called “*elecciones universitarias”*).

The participation of the University constituencies in the *elecciones universitarias* is mandatory: all have an obligation to vote. Those Faculty members, students or alumni who do not vote in the *elecciones universitarias* suffer economic punishments (in the case of the teachers and the alumni) or academic penalties (in the case of students).

3.4.3. Student body

According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, in 2006 UdelaR had 88.057 students enrolled in 109 undergraduate programmes (MEC, 2006, p. 56).

All students receiving a secondary school diploma are entitled to access UdelaR and there are no entrance examinations for undergraduate programmes. On the other hand, access to post-graduate programmes is generally driven by high academic standards (UdelaR, 2002).

As the only public University in the country playing a leading role in the sector (Brunner and Becerra, 1999), UdelaR has faced almost alone since the 1990s the burden of massive enrolments. As shown below, and as analysed by Lemes (2002, p.10), from 1958 (the year of the Organic Law) to 2000, enrolments in UdelaR grew more than 400 %.

FIGURE 10: UdelaR total number of students in selected years

YEAR	TOTAL
2006	88057
1999	70156
1988	61428
1974	26220
1968	18160
1960	15320



Source: UdelaR census, University student population SUI (1999); and MEC (2006).

FIGURE 11: Increase in the number of students enrolled in Uruguayan Universities in selected years

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
UDELAR	72417	74862	77333	79885	82521	82244	88057

UNIVERSIDAD ORT	3445	3572	3900	3777	3827	5674	5863
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA	4057	4180	3591	3849	3286	5580	5911
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO	575	775	749	824	916	1300	1612
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA EMPRESA		609	909	790	872	911	1611
TOTAL PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES	8077	9136	9149	9240	8901	13465	14997



Source: MEC (2007)

3.4.4. Academic and administrative staff

The University staff consists of academic and non-academic employees.
In 2004, the University had 7. 824 academic staff and 5.177 non-academic employees (UdelaR SUI, 2005). All employees are subject to Statutes adopted by the Central University Council within the framework of public autonomy.

The academic staff includes five classes of professors: attendant (grade 1), assistant (grade 2), adjunct (grade 3), associated (grade 4) and Chair (grade 5). All positions are held on a competitive basis within public calls and there are no tenured positions.

FIGURE 12: Number of academic positions per academic unit (according to grades) in UdelaR in 2004

	Gr 1	Gr 2	Gr 3	Gr 4	Gr 5	Total
AGRONOMY	71	95	85	28	26	305
ARCHITECTURE	208	148	213	61	38	668
ECONOMICS	294	257	139	62	70	822
LAW	161	266	231	127	82	867
ENGINEERING	172	153	173	52	52	602
MEDICINE	191	386	231	97	43	948
DENTISTRY	71	198	97	23	36	425
CHEMISTRY	115	97	59	24	18	313
VETERINARY	121	87	64	28	7	307
HUMANITIES	52	59	51	18	19	199
NORTH CAMPUS	30	23	6	1	1	61
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL	139	230	140	86	36	631
ARTS	29	27	21	4	15	96

PSYCHOLOGY	125	163	63	17	13	381
NURSING	29	81	48	7	18	183
SOCIAL SCIENCE	56	128	87	20	33	324
BASIC SCIENCE	118	134	82	31	21	386
LIBRARY SCIENCE	18	2	38	0	0	58
MUSIC	9	12	53	0	4	78
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE	26	22	21	0	0	69
FOOD SCIENCE	0	0	0	0	1	1
RECTOR´S OFFICE	14	26	38	11	11	100
TOTAL	2049	2594	1940	697	544	7824

Source: UdelaR, Dirección Gral. de Planeamiento and SECIU (2005).

Post-graduate programmes are still few in number and, in many cases, are very recent in establishment. As a result, only 8% of the academic staff holds master-level degrees, 6% holds doctoral degrees; and 1% has post-doctoral education (UdelaR, 2000; Martinez Sandres et al, 2004).

3.4.5. Management problems

Management problems are identified at all levels of the organisation (Diaz et al, 1992). In addition, co-ordination within the different levels is scarce (UdelaR, 1997). Brunner and Becerra (1999, p.17) suggest that management systems at UdelaR are "in bankruptcy".

Lack of institutional planning, management and monitoring has been repeatedly reported by UdelaR (1997) and by Brunner and Becerra (1999).

- University governance has suffered a system fatigue since the early 1990s (Grompone, 1994; UdelaR 1997). Lack of consensus observed as an ideal for democratic decision making has contributed to an absence of decision-making. Lemes (2002) terms this situation as a *"blockage"* (2002, p. 14) which means that the institution has no capacity to adopt the decisions that are required to change the current situation.

- The management information system is technically inefficient and lacks any ability to evaluate the performance of the component parts of the institution. The difficulties have been reported during the 1990s and the 2000s by Rama (2002) and by UdelaR itself (1997; 2001; 2004), but have still not been overcome. In general, there is a lack of appropriate information about the sector and the information systems that are available are out-dated or not oriented to support the adoption of decisions at any level (Abadie and Pereira, 2001; Serna et al, 2004). Despite these problems, UdelaR has decided to embark on University-

wide processes, like institutional evaluation and accreditation that will require reliable and functional managerial information systems in place.

- Resources available to UdelaR have fallen sharply in real terms. Massive enrolments have not been accompanied by institutional measures or by growth of public funding. Errandonea (1990) summarises this process in explaining that *"the educational growth has been bigger than the economic growth"* (p. 92).

To understand this aspect more clearly, it has been common to compare the budget of the University with the budget of the nation (GDP). In the UdelaR case, the budget allocation represents the following numbers which confirm that the allocation has been falling constantly:

FIGURE 13: UdelaR´s budget as a percentage of GDP on selected years

1994	0.61
1995	0.62
1996	0.64
1997	0.61
1998	0.62
1999	0.65
2000	0.57
2001	0.67
2002	0.57
2003	0.57
2004	0.52

Source: Bentancur (2001) and SUI UdelaR (2005).

- One of the main challenges for UdelaR is how to deal with a large number of students while the current facilities are not enough. One can observe that, simply, the UdelaR does not have room for all the students.

Bentancur (2005) described the picture inside the University as follows:

> *" …classes (are) taught in big rooms or even in locations not specifically designed for teaching (cinemas, amphitheatres, etc.), that usually are not ample enough to allow access to all enrolled students, an extremely low teacher/student ratio, and, as a consequence, a methodology of teacher centered presentations with almost no possibilities of exchange with students" (*p.5).

At the same time, there are not enough teachers. In 2003, UdelaR reported overcrowded classes at several Faculties like Economics, Communication Science and Law (SUI, 2003, p.53).

The fall in the budget/student ratio that was experienced by UdelaR, as a consequence of the relative "freezing" of State allocations during 2001 to 2005 (FIGURE 14 below) and the increase in the number of students (FIGURE 10 above) below exacerbates the stress that exists between quality of education and the needs of a large student population.

FIGURE 14: Resources requested by UdelaR and resources allocated to UdelaR by Budget Laws (2001 to 2005). In *Uruguayan pesos.*

	Requested in $	Allocated in $	Difference in $	Difference in %
2001	1.712.421.842	1.600.835.000	111.586.000	6.5
2002	2.038.308.437	1.657.220.000	381.088.000	18.6

2003	**2.374.010.179**	**1.703.911.000**	**670.999.000**	**28.2**
2004	**2.789.531.130**	**1.823.827.000**	**965.704.000**	**34.6**
2005	**2.789.531.130**	**1.995.873.000**	**793.658.000**	**28.4**

Source: SUI UdelaR (2006) and Banco Central del Uruguay (2001,2002,2003,2004,2005)

- As mentioned above, access to the UdelaR is unrestricted to those who complete their secondary studies. However, while contemplating the current conditions in which courses are taught in the majority of the University's schools, especially in the first years of each programme, it becomes evident that such openness might have had an adverse impact on the quality of the resulting teaching (Bentancur, 2004, p. 10). For instance, the following description was provided during a Parliamentary session:

  "I am a teacher in the (public) University since 1960, I teach every two days in the week. I can assure that the conditions of the facilities are really very bad due to the lack of resources. I am talking about a field that I really know well. For instance the library of the Faculty of Law does not receive any international publications because they can´t afford them. Fortunately since I came back in 1985 -after being dismissed by the dictatorship- I taught to large groups with more than 300 students. I am very happy about that. Unfortunately those students cannot sit down because we don´t have chairs. During this winter we have been very lucky because we had electricity but, during the last years, we had problems with the electricity provision… This is not about bad management…it is about lack of funding" (Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, July 23, 1997)

- According to Bentancur, one form of adjustment has been related to the teaching staff: while the actual University income has decreased

constantly in relation to GDP (FIGURE 13, above) and teacher salaries have decreased by 23%, both the number of teaching positions and the number of hours of teaching dedication have increased (Bentancur, 2001, p. 13).

As an example, FIGURE 15 below shows the amounts of academic salaries, an eloquent enough picture of the economic stress at all levels.

FIGURE 15: Salaries of the academic staff in UdelaR up to January 1, 2004 (in US dollars).

Nr.Hs/week	G 1	G 2	G 3	G 4	G 5
10	39	53	67	79	91
20	87	120	153	180	207
30	149	204	260	306	352
40	246	337	429	505	581

Source SUI UdelaR (2005); and Banco Central del Uruguay (2005)

- Unlimited access and consequent massification might be connected with other indicators of University efficiency which show the low performance of the institution: high drop-out rates and programme-completion times far longer than expected (Bentancur, 2004, p. 10).

UdelaR at a glance

Up to 2005, most statistics for UdelaR showed a serious situation:

- **82, 3 %** of total national enrolments in higher education in the country attended **the public University** (MEC, 2006).

- The **average time** taken by students to **graduate** was **1.7 times** longer than theoretically expected (Serna et al, 2005, p 10).

- **76%** of entrant students **left the institutions before completion** (Chiancone and Martinez Larrechea, 2006, p.41)

- **66,3%** of students came from **Montevideo**, the location where the University is placed (UdelaR , 2006, p.40). This meant an under-representation of students coming from outside Montevideo which represented, in demographic terms, 55% of the total high school graduates (UdelaR , 2005, p.40).

- **78%** of students came from **the richest two quintiles**, which represented middle and upper- middle class households while needy students (poorest two quintiles) represented only **11.6%** of enrolments (UdelaR, 2006, pp 26-40).

- A major contribution by students towards their income while studying came from earnings through employment or personal savings. **43% of** students **worked in full time jobs** (Serna et al, 2005, p.153). Interestingly, while attending a Parliament hearing, the University Rector, Dr Rafael Guarga pictured this situation, commenting: *"we (UdelaR) don´t have students...we have workers..."*" (August 15, 2000).

- Student progress through the system was probably influenced by the elements described above: the **retention rate** represented **23%** (Serna et al, 2005, p.167) and **graduation rate** was **22.2% (**Serna et al, 2005, p.289).

3.4. 6. Internal resource allocation

Internal resource allocations are decided according to historical precedence. The income which is received from the Government allocation is top sliced for central services and the remainder is allocated to Faculties and Departments which operate as semi-autonomous budget centres.

The basis of financial allocation within the University is largely historical. Cost centres receive staff, space and other resources on an incremental basis which implies that every year the Faculties receive "automatically" the same amount of money. Variables like unit costs, enrolment growth or new study programmes are ignored in institutional resource allocation processes. Any reduction of funds to the University flowing from the Ministry of Economy and Finance would be implemented by internal cuts to these recurrent allocations "across-the-board"; so no selectivity is applied.

However, it is important to point out that, in 2000, this internal resource allocation method had variations. As resource allocation from the Central University Council to the Faculties relied on a historical model, the methodology drove to internal imbalances inside UdelaR that were never corrected through resource re-allocation (UdelaR, 2001). In 2000, UdelaR´s Central Council and the Rector´s office introduced the concept of a “correcting historical budget" (UdelaR, 2001, p.24), a notion that entailed some "remediation" to consequences of enrolment growth and the emergence of new units or study programmes. This concept entailed the recognition, for the first time, that University allocations have to consider other

elements rather than purely historical precedence (Abadie and Pereira, 2002, p.45).

3.4.7. A crisis behind the doors

Finally, it is interesting to show that in 1994, Barbato edited a series of essays reflecting some critical views about the performance of UdelaR during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, this book contained the "*Documento de los cuatro"* ("Document of the Four", Barbato, 1994) authored by four dissident Deans of the UdelaR. This essay is considered as a landmark in University reform since the 1990s and is, perhaps, the only proposition about University change coming from within the University authorities. The document emphasised the critical, and often under-recognised, importance of a strategic plan in the higher education sector. In addition, it introduced concerns about the system's structure and about the need for creating new programmes inside UdelaR and other higher education institutions, i.e. Polytechnics. The document argued for a deep discussion of University issues, including open access to studies, institutional evaluations, and reform of institutional management and governance (pp: 179-206).

The "*Documento de los cuatro"* was, at that time, vigorously resisted by most of the University authorities, including members of the Central University Council, the Rector, the Vice-Rector and other important officers. Some of these officers considered the Document as an "internal attack", written under the influence and the ideology of the Inter American Development Bank (Ares Pons, 1994; Ubach, 2000).

Nonetheless, this reaction offers a good example of how the attempts to introduce a discussion about the problems of UdelaR encounter major resistance behind its doors. Furthermore, like other discussions that are mentioned in this study (i.e. the imposition of tuition in Latin American public Universities), some of the internal actors show the capacity of paralysing the discussion and placing the problems in an agenda that is never addressed.

Interestingly, Martinez Larrechea (2003), Bentancur (2002) and Chiancone and Martinez Larrechea (2006) consider that the propositions contained in the Document were the catalysts for changes that were introduced in UdelaR in the late 1990s, including the introduction of a University strategic plan and diverse Institutional Evaluation programmes.

SECTION 5: OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Public non-university institutions are oriented to train students in specific fields as follows:

1. There are four institutes focused on training officers for the military, navy, air force (all of these dependent of the Ministry of Defence) and for the police (dependent on the Ministry of the Interior). These institutes operate with very little autonomy; their teaching staff and study programmes require approval by political authorities, such as the Minister of Defence or the Minister of the Interior.

Military: *Escuela Militar e Instituto Militar de Estudios Superiores*
Navy: *Escuela Naval y Escuela Superior de Guerra*
Air Force: *Escuela Militar de Aeronáutica y Escuadrón de Vuelo Avanzado*
Police: *Escuela Nacional de Policía*

2. There are, also, three other institutes oriented to train teachers, that operate with complete autonomy from the national Government. These institutions belong to ANEP, the public educational body that provides primary, secondary and technical education.

Instituto Magisterial Superior
Instituto de Profesores Artigas
Centros Regionales de Formacion de Profesores

Teacher education in Uruguay follows a pattern in which teachers receive training in specialised institutions outside the Universities. These institutions provide

education to teachers of basic, secondary and technical education. Their degrees are higher education degrees, but are not "University degrees".

3. Two other institutions are focused in training for the fields of industrial design *("Centro de Diseño Industrial")* and drama.

The Uruguayan Government funds these institutions through their "mother" institutions, such as the respective Ministries or *ANEP* (Brunner and Becerra, 2002).

SECTION 6: THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

3.6.0. Introduction

The National Constitution of Uruguay guarantees that all provision of education (public or private) in the country operates within a right that it denominates "freedom of teaching" (article No. 68). This "freedom" is actually *"a right"* that implies that all private educational institutions in Uruguay are free *(have the right)* to select their own staff, approve their study programmes and award their own degrees (Martins, 1975 p. 40).

In 1984, the military Government established by law (Decree-law No. 15661) that private Universities were authorised to function under an *ex ante* control by the Ministry of Education and Culture. At the same time, the Government authorised the functioning of the first private University in the country: the Catholic University (UCUDAL) .

In 1995, ten years after the end of the military dictatorship, the Ministry of Education and Culture promoted the approval of a Government decree No. 308/95 that enabled the creation of three new Universities and various University Institutes. In the absence of a General Law on higher education, the activities of private institutions are regulated by that decree and other successive amendments.

The Decree No. 308/995 provided a regulatory framework to ensure that institutions are financially viable, can count upon the necessary physical and

human resources, and that their academic offerings meet acceptable standards of quality. In order to comply with the latter requirement, private providers of higher education are requested to submit their academic programmes periodically.

Private provision of higher education in Uruguay grew steadily from 1985 to 1998. In 2007, the Ministry of Education and Culture reported that approximately 14997 learners were enrolled in private higher education institutions (FIGURE 16) below which entails 17.6% of total enrolments. According to national statistics developed by that Ministry, there is a tendency towards an increase in total student enrolment in the private sector (MEC, 2003; 2005; 2007)

FIGURE 16: Evolution of enrolments in private Universities (number of students in selected years)
Source: MEC (2007).

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2003	2006
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA	1853	2112	2214	3355	4057	3286	5911
UNIVERSIDAD ORT	3361	3474	4808	3227	3445	3827	5863
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO			186	223	575	916	1612
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA EMPRESA				470	n/a	872	1611
TOTAL	5124	5686	7208	7275	8077	8901	14997

Source: MEC (2007).

The new institutions created since 1985 offer relatively few disciplines, mainly those related to law, economy and computing systems. They are small institutions that have followed the pattern of UdelaR in many ways. They are structured in Faculties and offer programmes that are very similar to those delivered by the

public University, with a strong professional orientation (Martinez Sandres, 1999). However, unlike the public University, the private institutions do levy tuition fees.

Although, tuition fees vary from University to University and between subjects, degrees in professional programmes, like law or administration, will charge similar fees. An average fee would represent an amount of US$ 200 per month in Universidad ORT (http:// www.ort.edu.uy, 2007) or Universidad de la Empresa (Martinez Larrechea, 2006). Only the Universidad of Montevideo charges fees that are, comparatively, 50% higher (Martinez Larrechea, 2006).

It is interesting to observe that, although the enrolment rates in the private Universities are still not very significant, compared with national enrolments, their graduation rates in certain fields are highly significant. In 2004, for example, 43,6% of national graduates in the field of computing systems, corresponded to one of the private Universities, the Universidad ORT (Martinez Larrechea, 2005).

During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the private Universities were almost invisible in the research field. These related to the financing structures as they were highly dependent on student tuition (Martinez Larrechea, 2005). However, since the mid 2000s, some scientific groups placed in the Faculties of Engineering and Management of the Universidad ORT and in the Faculty of Social Science of Universidad Catolica have been successful in obtaining funding on a competitive basis from the National Science and Technology Council (Martinez Larrechea, 2005).

Also, it is interesting to observe that the private Universities have been very active in the creation and development of post-graduate programmes, mostly masters

degree programmes (Martinez et al, 2004; Abadie et al, 2007) as shown in FIGURE 17 below.

FIGURE 17: Number of post-graduate programmes in selected years

	1966-1980	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2000-2003	2003-2006	Total
UDELAR	8	6	35	11	34	8	43	145
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA					13	4	23	40
UNIVERSIDAD ORT					0	2	6	8
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO					6	1	8	15
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA EMPRESA					0	0	10	10
TOTAL	8	6	35	11	53	15	90	

Source: MEC (2006) and SUI (2007).

3.6.1. UCUDAL

The biggest private University, called *Universidad Catolica del Uruguay Damaso Antonio Larrañaga*, UCUDAL, belongs to the Catholic Church and is managed by the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). The University Chancellor is the Archbishop of Montevideo.

Founded originally as an Institute of Philosophy in 1954, this institution was originally oriented to studies in Philosophy and the Humanities. The University awards undergraduate and post-graduate degrees in the social sciences, and the

humanities, computing systems, dentistry and nursing (Monreal, 2004).

3.6.2. ORT University

This institution was founded in 1943 as the technical school *Escuela Técnica ORT* oriented to technical and vocational studies and to support immigration (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). It was authorised to function as a University in 1986.

The University functions as *Universidad ORT de Uruguay*, which is owned by the Asociacion Uruguaya ORT, a branch of ORT International, a Jewish-affiliated association (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). The University awards undergraduate and post-graduate degrees in Engineering, Management and Social Sciences, Communications and Design and Architecture.

3.6.3. Universidad de Montevideo

Founded originally as an Institute of Business Studies *(Instituto de Estudios Empresariales de Montevideo*) in 1986, it was authorised to function as a University in 1997.

The University functions as *Universidad de Montevideo* under the "spiritual" patronage of the Catholic Group called *Opus Dei* (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). The University awards undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Engineering, Management, Social Science and Humanities.

3.6.4. Universidad de la Empresa

Founded originally as a School of Business in 1992 (*Escuela de Negocios del Uruguay*), it was authorised to function as a University in 1998.

The University functions as *Universidad de la Empresa* and operates under the patronage of Association of Marketing Directors (Martinez Larrechea, 2003). It awards undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Management, Social Science and Agricultural Management.

SECTION 7: THE ROLE OF THE URUGUAYAN STATE

The process of decentralising education that operated during the 19th and 20th centuries in the country meant that the Ministry of Education and Culture has become, in the long term, a "ministry without schools". In spite of this, the Ministry is in charge of leading national policies of education (Decree 407/85). As all the educational agencies are autonomous, it has no control over public education. Therefore, there are no central authorities to establish the strategies for the sector (Rama, 1994).

In fact, the relationship between the Government and the educational public institutions operates through the Ministry of Economy and Finance which is responsible for delivering the State subsidies (Decree No 194/997).

Also, due to the evolution of UdelaR´s role in the educational history of Uruguay, as discussed above (p.108), the Constitution and the laws have granted duties to the public University that, in other countries, would belong to a Ministry or an independent agency (Martinez Larrechea, 2003; Brunner and Becerra, 1999). There is an interesting example that illustrates this situation. For some time, UdelaR considered that it had a regulating role over all University education in the country, even the private institutions (UdelaR, 1997). According to this view, UdelaR had to authorise the creation of private Universities. Only a national law that followed a public debate placed this duty within the frame of the Ministry of Education and Culture (Law No 15661).

A possible consequence of this situation is reported by Lemes (2002) who pictures a Ministry of Education and Culture which lacks human and financial resources. This, he thinks, means that the Ministry is unable to address emerging duties in the sector, such as licensing or accreditation of private institutions. A similar view was expressed by Reimers (1994) when reporting that several Ministries of Education in Latin America lacked trained human resources with the ability or expertise to deal with broad technical aspects in the educational field.

For these reasons, a complicated scenario for Uruguay and its higher education emerges. It is agreed that educational policies and eventual reforms require decisions, structures and administrative critical mass, all of which, as shown by Lemes, the Uruguayan Government lacks.

On analysing higher education policies in Uruguay, Bentancur (2002) observes the following key elements:

a. There are very few Government policies.

b. Governments do not have a strategic view about the higher education sector.

c. Almost all legislation related to higher education is contained in budget laws in response to the financial bids coming from UdelaR, which suggests that the solutions are *ad hoc.*

d. The Government´s main preoccupation is about impact on public expenditure and with macroeconomic variables.

Martinez Larrechea (2003) adds that there is a *déficit* in co-ordination at the Uruguayan system of education. The public education institutions, *ANEP* and UdelaR are responsible for more than 90% of enrolments. At the same time, these are autonomous institutions and take their own decisions. The rest of the system,

the private sector, operates within a frame of academic freedom and is only regulated in very specific aspects. The result, he says, is fragmentation (pp: 173-179).

Chapter summary

The aim of this chapter was to provide a vision of the context of Latin American and Uruguay with reference to higher education systems and show some key aspects of the Uruguayan case.

A special section was devoted to the analysis of the public University UdelaR which faces severe management and governance problems due to increasing enrolments, scarcity of funds and political confrontations.

In another sector (pp: 129-134 above), I have analysed briefly some key aspects of the new private sector, which is not only responding to the demands of a growing student population but is facing incipiently some challenges in the field of scientific research.

Finally, I reviewed the current situation of the Ministry of Education and Culture, a “ministry without schools”. The Ministry is in charge of leading national policies of education, but as all the educational agencies are autonomous; it has no control over public education and seems to have no role in the educational scenario.

CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Aim of the chapter

This chapter complements **Chapter 2** but is mostly intended to link the selected topic with a larger field of study, informing past and present policy and practice and providing a context for interpreting the new findings. In addition, this review is intended to show that this research is an original contribution to the discipline that will help to clarify what is already known and will provide continuity with other research and projects that have already been undertaken.

The chapter comprises three sections. The first is intended to present the studies that analyse and explain the concepts that serve as a base for the development of funding models in higher education. The second section reviews the literature about the models in action and the third section examines studies about the funding of higher education in various countries, including European, North American and Latin American cases. This will help in understanding whether the method adopted in Uruguay conforms to other established models or represents a different, innovative approach.

SECTION 1: MODELS AND THEORIES

4.1.0. Introduction

The literature already discussed in **Chapter 2** has demonstrated the evolution in funding models during the last 30 years. The models analysed above have been in use -or are still in use- due to a context that favoured their application. However, it is clear that, in the last 20 years, higher education systems have had to address serious difficulties related, to a large extent, to the process of shifting from elite to expanded mass-based tertiary education under severe resource constraints.

Certainly, it can be observed from the literature that there are significant linkages between the models of funding and the economic and political context (Brunner et al 1995; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992a). That literature also shows the breadth and complexity of the subject. The explanation of their relevance requires placement of the finance of higher education within a broader context of societies with evolving needs. Public expenditure on higher education has emerged to be a significant part of total public expenditure, justified by the crucial role that higher education plays in the development of national economies. Modern societies need to invest in teaching and research to keep up with growing competition in the rapidly evolving global economy (Kaiser, et al , 2001; Vossensteyn, 2004; Koelman, 1998)

Various authors show the policy dimension in the use of funding models.

For instance, Sheehan (1996) suggests that the construction of a framework of finance for higher education requires a reasonably clear understanding of the context of public policy goals for higher education and of the changing structure of society and economy. "*Only within this frame",* he explains, "*is it that a funding model may be crafted"* (p.1). In the same direction, Hauptman (1998) points out that funding is one of the principal public policy vehicles for higher education, while Bowen (1980) summarises this concept in saying that the allocation for higher education expenditures is ultimately determined by the amount of money that a society is willing to devote to the sector. In Latin America, ANUIES fully agrees with this approach arguing that the amount of funds that a society is able to devote to higher education reflects the importance that this society gives to knowledge (2000).

Blondal et al (2002, p. 11) picture the meaning of the policy dimension as follows: *"...public policy enters the picture most directly through the arrangements for public funding of post-compulsory education."*

4.1.1. Expansion of enrolments

An important theme underlying the model reforms agenda is the need for expansion driven by the demands of a growing population in higher education. The major forces for this expansion include: (a) the expansion of basic and secondary education which creates a strong potential demand for the tertiary level; (b) the rate of growth in the proportion of the cohort that opts to enter tertiary education (Johnstone et al, 1998, p.3); and (c) increasing emphasis on social equity, offering opportunities to groups traditionally under-represented in higher education.

4.1.2. The financial crisis

While the sector, throughout the world, experienced a tremendous expansion, the dominant theme of higher education in the 1990s was financial distress. The major factors which contributed to the “fiscal crisis” were (a) the tendency of unit costs in higher education to rise faster than unit costs in the overall economy and (b) the increasing scarcity of public revenue due to the competition with other public needs like basic education, public infrastructure, health, the maintenance of public order, environmental stabilisation and restoration, and addressing the needs of the poor.

Since the 1980s, a series of studies (Psacharopoulos, 1980; Bowen, 1980; Bogue, 1982; Fielden, 1982) reported a dramatic increase in enrolments coupled with reduced Government spending and reductions in per student expenditures. Most of these reports pointed to the need for introducing changes in funding models and for the adoption of alternative strategies to address these problems.

As the increasing demand for higher education services exceeded the capacity of the available public budgets, the place of higher education within public funding priorities became more complicated.

Psacharopoulos (1980) commented:

> *“higher education, the highest step in educational stairs is usually placed at the lowest place in the list of educational priorities. The most common prescription for economic development is to give priority to basic education. This is to be expected when high proportions of the populations are illiterate or University graduates remain unemployed."* (p.1).

Scholars like Psacharoupoulous represented a new school of thought in higher education studies based on works in the Economics of education. This school argued for *"worldwide reform agenda for the finance and management of Universities and other institutions of higher education"* (Johnstone et al, 1993, p.2)**.** The dominant themes of various studies during the 1990s were financial distress and the belief that higher education was *"…in crisis throughout the world."* (World Bank, 1994, p.1).

In Latin America, enrolments in most of the public Universities rose while financial resources per student felt dramatically, and the shortfalls in per student funding resulted in major declines in the quality of higher education across both the private and public sectors (Moura Castro and Levy, 2000). Writing about developing nations, Lewis and Dundar (2002) pictured a terrible situation:

> *"Buildings are deteriorating, most research laboratories lack modern equipment,teaching materials are missing, staff are underpaid and often underprepared, and outdated curricula are prevalent. Travel budgets and supplies are very limited. Not surprisingly, the share of library and publication expenditures are nearly invisible in the overall expenditures of most Universities (...) Most important, salaries of professors have dramatically deteriorated while shifting recruitment and commitment away from the profession. Faculty have taken on second and third jobs in order to maintain professional life standards."* (p. 7).

Johnstone (1993) identifies four major factors that contribute to this fiscal crisis: (a) an increasing enrolment pressure while there is inadequate higher educational capacity to meet the growing demand; (b) a tendency in unit costs in higher education to rise faster than unit costs in the overall economy; (c) increasing scarcity of public revenue; and (d) growing dissatisfaction with the rigidities and inefficiencies of the public sector .

4.1.3. Changes to face the crisis

In the majority of developing countries, economic crisis was, by far, the most important factor driving the introduction of ambitious reforms in the higher education sector since the 1980s (World Bank, 1997 p.151).

How did the countries respond to the relative reductions in the availability of resources? The literature identifies responses that include: a) changes in public policies and reform of public sector financing (including budget, resource allocation, and expenditure models) and b) a shifting of costs to direct beneficiaries, intended for the supplementation of public or Governmental revenues with non-Governmental revenues.

4.1.3.1. Reforms in the public sector finance

Financing of higher education has undergone important structural and functional changes over the past twenty years or so. The ways that Governments finance their institutions have been significantly modified in many countries.

For the allocation of funds to higher education institutions, Governments use several approaches. Sometimes, Governments use a historical-negotiations-based approach. In other cases, we find formula-based mechanisms for the allocation of funds or performance based funding, which, in both cases, introduce a more objective and fair basis. In many countries, budget authorities make use of a

combination of formulae systems, historical or negotiation-based models, and performance based systems.

The evolution in the use of models of funding higher education systems occurs for various reasons, but there is important literature that ties the evolution of models to the need to overcome the financial crisis and the problems of rising costs in higher education (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992a; Otten, 1996; and Gines Mora,1998). Other authors identify other needs, such as using more transparent, fair and predictable methods (Lang, 2004).

In this section, I will analyse the literature about the operation and rationale of the finance models as provided by the literature. Most articles and books are intended to explain the concepts on which funding models are based and the consequences of the use of each of them, and offer suggestions about better models to be adopted when financing a system. These studies show that, within the context of scarcity of funds, there has been a movement away from historical, incremental, negotiated budgets to other systems that are perceived as more transparent and fair.

Hereinafter this section will provide a brief review of the evolution of the models bearing in mind that **Chapter 2** above (pp: 54-68) has already provided a description of each of them.

Historical funding is identified as the traditional model of funding higher education systems worldwide (OECD, 1990; Schwartzman, 1993a; Brunner et al, 1995; Layzell, 1998; and Jongbloed, 2004).

In the case of Latin America, for instance, the dominant funding model has been *par excellence* historical funding. Schwartzman (1993a) and Brunner et al (1995) reported that almost all countries in the region used a combination of annual fixed appropriations and *ad hoc* negotiations.

These authors, together with Delfino and Gertel (1996), suggest that, in this continent, this historical model has resulted in low efficiency in the use of public funds and has created internal inefficiencies inside the Universities. Furthermore, these studies believe that this model has had negative effects in issues of efficiency and equity and in the performance of institutions.
Delfíno y Gertel (1996, p.3), report that "*the long lasting use of a historical model have created inefficient management structures and (…) a perverse relationship between academic achievements and funding levels…" ,* because, as explained by
Brunner (1993),

> "*Political negotiations create a special relationship between the institutions and the State (the Government), in which "give and take" and corporative pressures, tend to limit the desirable transparency in the allocation of public resources"* (p.21)

During the 1990´s, several studies reported the evolution from historical funding patterns to alternative approaches, such as **formulaic or strategic**. During these years, literature focused on new budgeting procedures, resource allocation, devolution and decentralisation, and on the results of the introduction of all these new approaches. It is certainly in that decade when several countries, including some Latin American countries, introduced formulaic approaches to cover elements of efficiency and transparency in public higher education funding. As we will see later in this chapter (p. 182) much of the budget reform agenda in Latin America results from recommendations by the World Bank (Johnstone 1991;

1993b; Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995; Johnstone, Arora, and Experton, 1998; Abeledo and Curcio, 2003).

Already in the 1980s, several authors had introduced explanations about norms and formulae. For instance, studies by Morris and Sizer (1982) and Shattock and Rigby (1983) presented the existing approaches about resource allocation and funding methods in the UK. Interestingly, in "*Resource allocations in British Universities",* Shattock and Rigby devoted special attention to effects of the use of norms and formulae and highlighted that formulaic methods : a) have opened decision-making process to the scrutiny of academic departments; b) have increased confidence in the resource allocation machinery; c) have given academic departments a settled baseline for future planning; and d) have introduced elements of certainty in the systems and the institutions.

Similarly, Darling et al (1989) and Lang (2004) explained and analysed the use of formula funding among Universities and colleges in Canadian and American jurisdictions.

In both countries formulae have been in use in many jurisdictions since the early 1950s to allocate public funds among Universities and colleges. At least thirty American states and seven Canadian provinces use funding formulas of one kind or another (Lang, 2004, p.1), and, according to this author, *"...it is highly probable that formula funding in some form will continue as a major fixture in higher education finance."*

However, Lang (2004) considers that, in Canada and the USA, some Governments and funding agencies are becoming wary of incentive and performance formulae due to political and financial reasons and explains:

> "*The political reason is that (…) formula funding can work in two directions. If a specific performance target is set, is visibly measurable by a "performance indicator," and is financed by earmarked funding, the effects of inadequate funding can be measured as well institutional performance. In other words, the Government's performance as a funding agent becomes visibly measurable too. The second reason is that incentive and performance formulas are expensive"* (p. 34).

More recent studies by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000) and by Jongbloed (2004) showed that, in European countries, one of the main trends of the 1990s and the 2000s was a move towards formula-based mechanisms.

This funding approach induced institutions of higher education to adopt more transparent and flexible mechanisms in their internal allocations (Sandbach and Thomas, 1996, p.61). Additionally, while analysing the impact of national funding policies introduced in the United Kingdom since 1986, Thomas (2000) suggested that these policies had induced institutions to use a formulaic basis for resource allocations. Again, Thomas (2001) highlighted two main trends inside the institutions that had emerged as a result of the application of new frames of funding: (a) the use of formulaic models induced by funding agencies and (b) the use of a strategy of decentralisation that permitted a more prompt response and clarified lines of accountability.

However, formula funding was not the *panacea.* Already in the 1980s, Darling et al (1989) introduced critical concepts about this funding model. These authors found that, in Canadian provinces, there was a tendency to expect funding formulae to offset the effects of under-funding. They concluded that, whilst formulae provided stability, predictability, equitable allocations and accountability, they were just

allocative devices that could not solve questions of insufficient funding. They affirmed: *"those problems must be addressed by policies"* (p.581*).*

Layzell (1998) argued that, during the 1980s, there was an evolution from incremental and formula budgeting to performance-funding categories intended to monitor the performance of public funded institutions through the use of accountability mechanisms (for instance, allocating resources to institutions according to their achievement of previously established goals, objectives or outcomes). This category, called "performance-based funding", was introduced in the State of Tennessee in 1978 in order to provide incentive funding for academic performance of public colleges and Universities (Kaiser et al, 2001).

Burke and Minnasians (2002) consider that, underpinning performance-based funding models is the linkage between performance and public accountability. These authors explain that the approaches were developed because of an interest in monitoring publicly funded institutions through a series of accountability mechanisms.

Performance based categories were analysed earlier in **Chapter 2 above** (pp: 64-68). Their importance has been outlined in the USA by Burke and Minassians (2003) who point out that they have been called *"the most significant trend in State budgeting"* by the *Fiscal Survey of the States* in the late nineties. Furthermore, the annual surveys by the Rockefeller Institute of Government show this practice as the budgeting phenomenon of the 1990s in public higher education; nearly three-quarters of the States considered performance in budgeting for public colleges and Universities.

Influence of the models on institutions

In general, regulations have to do with the influencing of behaviour; for instance, trying to steer the decisions and actions of others according to certain objectives (Neave and van Vught, 1994, p.3). Several authors found that national funding policies have influenced the internal financial systems of institutions (Thomas,1998; Field and Klingert, 2001; Montserrat et al, 1997; Newson,1993).

For instance, on reporting findings from research at two United Kingdom Universities, Thomas (1998) points out that: "*turning now to the experience in the United Kingdom in seeking more efficient and effective methods of allocating increasingly scarce resources, the methodology at both at national and institutional level has become more formula-based. Greater transparency at a national level impacted on internal resource allocation procedures" (p. 5).*

Similarly, the Field and Klingert article analyses the evolution and impact of the use of resource allocation models in Universities of five European countries and is focused on the consequences of the funding models adopted by the Governments. These models, they think, represent a series of shifts that are increasing the scope for the distribution of resources inside the institutions. These shifts are the following: a) from line items to lump sum budgeting, b) from central control to decentralisation and c) from an emphasis on inputs towards an emphasis in outputs. These authors conclude that these developments have encouraged the use of internal mechanisms, like the resource allocation methods for instance, which would have been meaningless without those policies.

In a later study, Thomas (2001) even pointed out that the British Government - through HEFCE- has introduced constraints inside the institutions in relation to

internal allocations. He argues that: "*At the time when the UGC's funding methodology was clouded in mystery heads of department and deans were reliant on historical precedent and the power of their personality and departmental standing to influence resource allocations. Once the Funding Council methodology became more transparent there appeared an additional tool in their armory: the figure published by the Funding Councils themselves, they now had the same figures on which to base their calculations and arguments"* (p. 74).

Similarly, Montserrat et al (1997) explain that Government financing is likely to exert influence on institutional behaviours and suggest that changes in the University sector will occur with the use of strong incentives coming from the Governments. According to Monserrat et al funding mechanisms may influence behaviours in strong ways, even stronger than administrative interventions.

However, it is not only national funding policies that exert influence over institutional financial systems. Research by Jarzabkowski (2002) already mentioned above (p.51), examined the strategic implications of the resource allocation methodologies used on three Universities in the United Kingdom (LSE, Warwick and Oxford Brookes) and suggested that history, culture and structure influenced the choice of resource allocation methodologies and the degree of decentralisation.

Furthermore, in an analysis about recent studies developed in the United Kingdom by Brown and Ramsden and by Bowden and Watson, Webber (2003) identified a direct relationship between institutional funding and institutional freedom pointing out that: *"although Universities are constitutionally autonomous they are at the same time highly dependent of Government funding and therefore are highly exposed on changing political priorities.*

One of the inevitable consequences of dependence upon Government funding is the increasing demand to subject University activities to public scrutiny " (p.93).

4.1.3.2.0. Shifting costs to beneficiaries

In the 1990s, together with the increasing scarcity of public funding, the analysis was focused on the costs of studies and placed them amongst the major issues of higher education policy. Within this frame, the literature shows that the other way that the reform agenda was implemented was through a gradual transfer of the financial costs of higher education from Governments towards the students; in other words through the injection of private money into higher education.

This concept, called *"cost sharing,"* as articulated in Johnstone (1986; 1992; 1993b), was one of the major recommendations from the World Bank and, for many experts, was considered as a solution for increasingly underfunded and overcrowded Universities in the developing world (Johnstone 1991; 1993b; Woodhall, 1992; World Bank, 1994; Ziderman and Albrecht, 1995; Johnstone et al, 1998). As a consequence, the introduction of user fees or charges, as part of the cost recovery measures and efforts to share the cost of publicly financed services with users, was usually introduced as a condition for sectoral adjustment loans (World Bank, 1994).

The need to raise additional funding to supplement Government revenue in the face of increasing demand for services is the key rationale for the introduction of user fees or charges. However, according to Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, p. 6) cost recovery does not only place emphasis on raising funds, but also on

preventing over-use of services by consumers by making the latter more cost-conscious.

4.1.3.2.1. Rationale for tuition and other forms of cost sharing

According to Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, pp: 2-9), the principal rationales behind this shift are three:

The first rationale is a financial one: there is a need for other-than-Governmental revenue within a context of increasing numbers of students, increasing per-student costs and declining tax-payer-based public funding.

The second rationale is an ideological one: the notion of equity, which entails that , since there are high private rates of return—that is, personal benefits—of higher education, those who benefit should at least share in the costs. In a free higher education scenario: (a) education is paid for by all citizens; (b) through taxes that are collected through regressive systems; (c) supporting a system in which the majority of the beneficiaries are from middle, upper-middle, and upper income families who could and would pay, at least, a portion of the study costs.

A third rationale is the economic notion that tuition brings to higher education some of the virtues of the market: therefore

(a) a greater efficiency: that the payment of some tuition will make students and families more discerning consumers and the Universities more cost-conscious providers and

(b) greater producer responsiveness: the assumption that the need to supplement public revenue with tuition, gifts, and grants will make Universities more responsive to individual and societal needs.

Vossensteyn (2000, p. 3) adds a fourth rationale which refers to a practical notion: as the increasing demand for higher education services exceeds the capacity of public budgets, the higher education institutions, the students and their families must be creative in finding opportunities to finance the costs of study for growing numbers of students.

Not everyone, however, shares these views**.** Some suggest that cost-sharing may prevent people from entering higher education, particularly students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000; Blondal et al, 2002). Johnstone and Shroff Mehta (2000, p. 6) point out that, clearly, if public funding of higher education were to be cut, there would be a risk that participation might fall. This might explain why many students and families, both affluent and low-income, and both "left" and "right", often tend to oppose tuition.

In addition, many public institutions and politicians have argued that low -or no-tuition-fees- have provided greater equality of educational opportunity through providing greater access to historically under-served populations (Lewis and Dundar, 2002).

Also, Vossensteyn (2000, p.3) explains that there is a vision which considers that the social benefits of higher education justify full public subsidies**.** In many countries, the answer to the question of *"who should pay for higher education"* traditionally

has been *"the Government."* These countries view higher education as a public service with public benefits (Vossensteyn, 2000, p.2).

Barr (2004) explains this notion as follows:

> *"Since higher education creates social benefits it is right that there should always be a taxpayer contribution.(...) higher education matters no longer as a consumption good enjoyed by an elite but as an important element in national economic performance"*(p. 2).

Considerable ambiguity still exists in the debate over whether tuition should be charged, and if so, to which students (Eurydice, 1999). Lewis and Dundar (2002) consider that around the questioning of which is the proper approach to tuition, there is a further political aspect that has to be considered too. These authors explain that many countries have been strongly opposed to any expansion of tuition or fees as a source of additional funding due to pressures from political grounds (pp: 11-13).

Johnstone and Shroff Mehta agree with this view. As they see it, cost-sharing may not be easily accepted, especially in countries with dominant socio-political ideologies that hold higher education to be another social entitlement (Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000, p.7). In these cases, these authors comment that some people worry that tuition may not lead to more resources for the University, or to a shift in public resources to other socially worthwhile programs, but simply to a shift of taxpayer resources from higher education to some other claims more politically forceful, including tax cuts for the wealthy (Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000 p.7).

Besides, Blondal et al (2002) report that "...*countries which have introduced or raised fees risk to experience an increase in access disparities in the absence of effective and well targeted student aid mechanisms"*(p. 32).

Therefore, Governments should consider possible adverse effects on particular groups and introduce policies to minimise such negative effects on access by students from disadvantaged backgrounds. For instance, in many cases, loan and fee regimes have been introduced with elements of means testing and loan arrangements in ways that ensure that life time repayments are lower for graduates´ with lower incomes and or do not begin until graduates incomes exceed a set threshold in the future (Blondal, 2002, p.27).

In the same direction, considering that, to a large extent, inequalities in the access to higher education are determined by what happens to various groups in primary and secondary education, Barr *(*2001) suggests the use of other measures to promote access, for instance:

> *"… Financial incentives to Universities to widen participation. (…) Extra personal and intellectual support (to students), at least in the early days. (…) Raising aspirations of school children, for instance through the promotion of Saturday Schools, visit days, visits by academics to schools to make the idea of higher education more tangible, visits by current students,(…) mentoring of schoolchildren by current University students. (…) More resources earlier in the education system, which is where the real barriers to access occur. This includes more resources for teaching. It also includes financial support for 16-18 year olds"*(pp: 18-20).

FIGURE 18: Advantages and disadvantages from tuition based systems according to the literature.

THE SOCIAL RATIONALE

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION
▪ Tuition may discourage University attendance. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000** ▪ Imposing tuition or increasing it at a rapid rate might exclude potential students from poor or rural or otherwise disadvantaged families. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000** ▪ Enrolments might be dampened for those whose access is already compromised by low income. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**	▪ While tuition is charged the educational activities may be supported by offering financial assistance to individuals during their studies through loans (i.e., loans that do not depend on the credit worthiness—and thus the financial worth—of the family), or means-tested student grants. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**

THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE	
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	**ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION**
▪ Higher Education is a public service. **Vossensteyn, 2000**	▪ Higher Education has come to be regarded as a shared responsibility between students and society. **Vossensteyn, 2000**
▪ Higher Education generates considerable positive externalities that justify high public subsidies. **Vossensteyn, 2000**	▪ Those who benefit should at least share in the costs. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000** ▪ Tuition free Higher Education is actually paid for by all citizens, whether or not they know that they have been taxed. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000** ▪ Most taxes are collected through regressive taxes. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000** ▪ A very disproportionate number of the beneficiaries of Higher Education are from middle, upper middle, and upper income families who could and would pay at least a portion of the costs of instruction if they had to. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**

THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE	
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	**ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION**
▪ Society is the major beneficiary of Higher Education, **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**	▪ There are demonstrably high private benefits received by the graduates and their families. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**
	▪ There are private benefits that college students receive in the form of higher incomes by virtue of their college attendance and graduation. **Hauptman, 1991**
	▪ Benefits associated with education may accrue to individuals in the form of additional earnings, improved employment probability, stronger attachment to the labour market, better health and a range of other non-monetary benefits. **Blondal et al, 2002**
▪ Tuition free Higher Education provides equal chances to rich and poor for gaining a University place **Psacharoupoulous and Papakonstantinou (2005)**	▪ Higher Education students still tend to come from relatively favoured background. **Blondal et al, 2002**
	▪ Financing arrangements tend to be regressive. Those not participating in Higher Education -- typically people from disadvantaged backgrounds and with modest income prospects -- do not benefit at all from public funding in this area. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**

THE IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION
	▪ An accompanying expansion of students' access to loans to finance their education could offset such effects, and the experience of countries that have combined an increase in tuition fees and an increase in student loan facilities suggest that there are no significant adverse effects on participation. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**
	▪ It is well-known that graduates on average have significantly higher earnings than non-graduates. Since higher education creates social benefits it is right that there should always be a taxpayer contribution. But given the robust evidence on private rates of return, excessive reliance on public funding is inefficient. Graduates should contribute to the costs of their degrees. Higher education should not be free; its costs should be shared between the taxpayer and the graduate. **Barr, 2002**

THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION
	▪ Tuition - as a price- brings to Higher Education some of the virtues of the market : (i) greater efficiency: the payment of some tuition will make students more discerning consumers and the Universities more cost-conscious providers. (ii) responsiveness: will nore responsive to individual and societal needs. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**
	▪ Tuition tends to reinforce the inequities already existing in the country **Blondal et al, 2002**
▪ Public financing of provision has been the traditional means in most countries to encourage post-compulsory education **Blondal et al, 2002**	

THE PRACTICAL RATIONALE	
ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	**ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION**
▪ Increases in tuition may not lead to more resources for the University and will not determine a shift in public resources to other socially worthwhile programs. It will determine a shift of taxpayer resources from Higher Education to some other claims that may be more politically forceful. **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000**	▪ Governments do not or cannot provide sufficient public revenue to Higher Education. Therefore, the continuing austerity will become damaging to the point of severe enrolment limitations and increasingly inadequate quality **Johnstone and Shroff Mehta, 2000; Vossensteyn, 2000** ▪ Public funds are limited. As a result, Higher Education increasingly must compete for scarce public resources with other important public services, such as health care, infrastructure, and primary and secondary education. **Vossensteyn, 2000**

SECTION 2: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Empirical studies have analysed the evolution in the funding approaches in specific cases and show useful experiences from all over the world. This section will focus on cases that are identifiable or relevant for the research topic.

4.2.1. European countries

European countries have experimented with large scale changes in funding methods since the 1990s, that Jongbloed and Salerno consider *" the most important since the emergence of the national higher education systems in the 19th and 20th centuries "* (2004, p.18). According to Eicher (1998), these changes have entailed deep quantitative transformations and very important structural changes that have occurred due to: a) a transition from *élite* to mass higher education which enrols between one-and two-thirds of the secondary school leaving age group, depending on the country; b) an evolution in the models of funding institutions; c) an increase in the application of tuition fees in different forms and methods; and d) increasing problems in student aid systems requesting harmonisation.

In addition, European integration has encouraged major changes in the systems of higher education in a move towards a more common structure. As pointed out by Jongbloed and Salerno (2004):

> *"...for the credentials of a higher education institution in one country to successfully transfer to another it is necessary to not only ensure that certain quality standards be met but also institutional and financial arrangements be made"* (p. 18).

A study by the EURYDICE European Unit (2000) analysed the reforms in higher education funding models in that continent from 1960 to 1998. It reported that, since the 1980s, the reforms had been oriented to provide increased autonomy to higher education institutions focusing on four main areas: (a) a change from earmarked to lump-sum or block grant budgets for recurrent funding; (b) a move towards the introduction of more objective funding formulae; (c) the linking of funding to outputs rather than inputs; and (d) the introduction of contract-based funding. Other trends that were identified by this report were the provision of funds linked to the output of the higher education institutions and the encouragement to institutions to raise money by selling their teaching or research services, either through the provision of additional course programmes or research projects, or through contracts obtained on the open market with private organisations.

Koelman (1998), Jongbloed and Salerno (2004) and Field and Klingert (2001) focus on the evolution of funding models. For instance, Koelman reports on about four generations of models of funding higher education in the Netherlands over 40 years and provides a summary of the rationales of each model. The author argues that, in the Netherlands, there has been a constant evolution in models: from an earmarked input frame to an input funding model which later evolved to a frame that considered output orientations.

Interestingly, the model in use in the Netherlands is a mixture of all the former systems. According to Boezerooy (2003, pp: 34-36) and to Beerkens et al (2005, pp. 32-34) the income of Universities and *hogescholen* (professional education) derives from three "flows of funds" and from tuition fees as follows:

- The first flow of funds (core funds) is supplied by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture and includes the basic block grant allocated for teaching, research and related activities.

- The second flow of funds are allocations for research allocated through the Dutch research council funds to projects on a competitive basis.

- The third flow of funds concerns contract research and contract teaching carried out for Government, non-profit organisations, private companies, charitable boards, and the European Community. For Universities this supplementary source of income has been growing fast since the early 1980s. It now represents about 15% of University income for teaching and research.

- Tuition fees are required but all regular full-time students at funded and designated institutions receive a basic grant for the nominal duration of a higher education program (4 or 5 years). This grant is called the "performance-related grant" because students receive it initially as a loan. If students show satisfactory academic performance, the loan becomes a grant.

Field and Klingert (2001) focus on the consequences of the use of the funding models. Discussing a survey developed by HUMANE, they argue that European Universities are implementing a wide range of administrative reforms while many countries are adopting new legislation and introducing funding mechanisms. One of the most significant consequences of these reforms is the extended use of resource allocation models (RAMs). Field and Klingert conclude that

> *"...systems that had for decades continued in an incremental fashion using black box methods of funding now begin to adopt an increasing open style. Factors such as output based funding, the increasing demand for accountability, contract management, and lump sum budgeting have all provided an impetus for their development in Universities"* (p. 84).

4.2.1.1. United Kingdom

Studies by Williams and Light (1999), Allende and Morones Díaz (2000), Thomas (2001) and El Kawas and Massy (2004, p.223) provide a broad description of the evolution in funding models in the United Kingdom in the last 30 years, including an analysis of reforms introduced following the Jarratt and Dearing reports and the creation of Funding Councils and academic audits. They also provide deep analysis about formulae for funding teaching and research assessment exercises. All agree that the changes in the British system signify a major change in the relationship between Government and the University system, not just a new system of resource allocation and assessment.

Thomas (2001) points out that it is only in the last 50 years that the British State has assumed responsibility of the vast majority of the expenditure on higher

education. He explains that, in 1986, the University Grants Committee abandoned the historical allocations towards a methodology based on formulaic approaches and selectivity. It was the end of a funding pattern and the initiation of a model based on teaching and research components, in which the teaching component is calculated by student numbers and units of resource which differ between subjects. The research component is determined according to quality assessments from a specialised body.

Further important reforms in the British funding system occurred in 1992 when regional (i.e. for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) independent, non-departmental higher education Funding Councils (respectively HEFCE, HEFCW, SHEFC and NIEC) were established (Kaiser et al, 2001).

The English funding model is described in detail every year by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) when it communicates the annual allocation. Key features of the English model are the following:

- Funds for teaching and research are provided as a block grant. Institutions are free to distribute this grant internally at their discretion. In addition, the Institutions receive student fees. The combined total of grant and tuition fees is referred to as "teaching resource" or simply as “resource". Most of these funds are distributed by formulae, which take account of the volume and mix of individual institutions’ teaching and research.
- Research funds are distributed selectively under two main headings: quality-related research and capability funding. Quality is measured in a periodic Research Assessment Exercise, about to be replaced by the Research Excellence Framework.

- The calculation of institutional grants is based on a formula made up of a number of component parts, taking account of teaching and research factors. The resulting institutional allocation is a block grant that can be distributed within the institution at its own discretion as long as the funds are used for the purposes for which they are provided (Thomas, 2001).
- Apart from the recurrent funding for teaching and research, HEFCE supplies other related funding for a wide range of purposes, including the additional costs of operating in the London area; liabilities inherited by institutions previously under local authority control; copyright libraries; museums, galleries and collections; and minority subjects (HEFCE, 2002).
- In addition, each year HEFCE provides additional special funding for a wide range of purposes within earmarked schemes to address past under-investment in the sector (HEFCE, 2005. p.22). These funds are reviewed regularly and, wherever appropriate, new initiatives are introduced or the funds are phased out or incorporated into formula-based allocations (Theisens, 2003).

Underlying these changes is a new view of higher education in the UK and, especially, a new view of the roles of Government funding of Universities. There is a new approach to higher education: a commitment to widening access, a recognition that the economic and social well-being in the UK requires that higher education accommodate more students and the recognition that funding for higher education cannot increase *pro rata* while participation increases. Therefore, according to this new view, costs per student must decrease as participation widens (El Kawas and Massy, 2004).

Finally, a whole picture of the impressive changes that occurred in the UK´s funding system would not be complete if drastic changes in the tuition system are not mentioned. Until 1998, tuition-fees for British full-time students were paid by the Local Education Authorities (LEAs), which implied that the students themselves did not have to pay. Since September 1998, in England, home students have to pay the tuition fees themselves regardless of the discipline or programme of enrolment. Other students had to pay the fees themselves or even a full-cost covering rate (Kaiser at el, 2001). It is important to note that the arrangement applies in England and not elsewhere in the UK.

Students of any age, on a full-time (or part-time course of initial teacher training) designated course (a course which qualifies for support) may get help towards fees. This is based on assessing their (parents') income. A student may have to contribute as well, if they expect to have any income, other than part-time earnings, while studying. If a student is eligible for a tuition subsidy, the subsidy will be directly paid to the University or college by the Student Loans Company. Moreover, all full-time students up to 54 are eligible for student loans covering (part of) the living costs, accommodation, food, clothes and travel (Theisens, 2003, pp: 37-38).

Beginning in the academic year 1998-99, all full-time English students were charged £1000 annually, which they had to pay for themselves. Since then, trends have continued and, as a result of several consultations, a series of changes have been introduced to the system on a permanent basis, either because the amounts of up-front tuition have been increasing or because there have been shifts from up-front fees to deferred tuition fees (Marcucci and Johnstone, 2006, p.65). In a White Paper named "*The future of education",* the Government for the first time took a position on "top up" fees. In 2006, a new Graduate Contribution Scheme was

introduced, in which Universities were allowed to seek a contribution of between £0 and £3,000 per year for each course. Legislation also required those institutions that wished to charge variable fees to have "*Access Agreements"* in place which set out the action they would take in order to safeguard and promote access (Theisens, 2003. p. 39). In practise, almost every English University now charges the maximum fee. Very little of the perceived advantages of a more market based system have resulted.

4.2.2. United States of America

Trow considers that the diversity of funding is at the heart of the diversity of character and function of American higher education. Colleges and Universities receive support not only from national, state and local Governments, but also from many private sources such as churches, business firms, foundations, alumni, students and from many other clients of other services (Trow, p. 41-42).

The size and importance of the resources devoted to the sector is outlined by Duderstadt (2005, pp: 3-4) as follows:

> *"In the simplest sense, today the United States spends roughly 2.6% of its GDP on higher education ($330 billion), with 55% of this ($180 billion) coming from private support (e.g., tuition payments, philanthropic gifts, or revenue from auxiliary activities such as college athletics) and 40% from Government; the states provide 20% ($67 billion), primarily through appropriations directly to institutions; and the federal Government provides the remaining 25% ($81 billion), through federal financial aid and subsidised loans and tax benefits to students ($60 billion), research grants and contracts to Universities ($21 billion), and other support for specific activities such as health care and agricultural extension."*

An extensive literature review reveals the following distinctive features of the higher education system in the United States:

- The largest source of funding, State support, is mainly provided direct to institutions as general operating support through annual appropriations. In addition, the Federal Government provides large amounts of financial aid in the form of grants, loans and work study appropriations (Breneman, 1994).
- Higher education is the responsibility of the States, rather than of the federal Government. This federal system determines a diverse picture because each State responds based on its own unique political and social conditions (Callan, 2002, p.2). In addition, State funding is highly influenced by the States´ fiscal situations (Hovey, 1999 p.1; Zumeta, 2002, p.73).
- There is a large dependence on private sources. Private higher education colleges and Universities are located in 49 of 50 states (Callan, 2002, p.13). As recently as 1950, half of all enrolments in higher education were in private institutions (Johnstone, 1993 , p. 1) . However, in recent years, their share declined to 22% primarily because of the creation and expansion of new public Universities in the 1960s and 1970s (Breneman, 1994, p.112).
- Higher education was born as a private enterprise. Whilst the colonial colleges were created as private institutions, they considered themselves as public foundations. Consequently, they accepted public subsidies which took various forms; for instance, almost every colony aided the struggling colleges within its borders by granting them the right to run one or more lotteries (Brubacher and Rudy, 1976, p.6 and p.35).

After 40 years of significant investment, the golden age of expansion in American higher education may have come to a close (Nolland et al, 2003) as public support

of higher education has been dropping for the past two decades (Duderstadt, 2005, pp:3-4). The big change in recent years in patterns of financial support has been, not only the decline in the relative share of State support, but also the increase in tuition and fees (Kane and Orszag, 2003).

The combination of the decline in State appropriations and political restrictions on raising tuition at public institutions has produced a marked decline in educational and general spending per full-time equivalent student at public schools relative to private schools (Kane and Orszag, 2003, p.3).

This shift in the funding responsibility from State appropriations to student tuition has not been the result of a well planned or thoughtful policy discourse in many States (Callan, 2002). Duderstadt (2005) questions *"…why have the States been methodically disinvesting in public higher education over the past two decades?"* (p.5) and identifies the following determinants: *" In part it has to do with other competing priorities for state tax dollars"* (p. 5) and to *"…an erosion in the perception of education as a public good that deserves of strong societal support"* (p.8) and concludes that*: " State and federal programmes have shifted from investment in the higher education enterprise (appropriations to institutions) to investment in the marketplace for higher education services (subsidised loans and tax benefits to students and parents)"* (p.10).

Breneman (1994) observes that this shift from tax-payers and parents to students can be considered a "privatisation" and identifies a tendency towards the emergence of *"privately-financed public Universities"* (p.111). This trend has been analysed, too, by Johnstone (1986; 1993; 1997; 1998) as mentioned above (p. 147). Layzell (1998) describes that, together with "privatisation" trends, the United

States has experimented with an evolution to performance-funding categories, as explained earlier in **Chapter 2 above** (p.59).

This evolution in funding models entailed a significant change because, as described by Bogue (1982), until the 1980s, the pattern of funding higher education applied by almost all States in United States was the use of enrolment driven formulae, based on activities or size, ignoring achievement or institutional performances. In similar ways, on analysing the funding system in the United States, Shattock and Rigby (1983) point out that formula budget, and incremental budget, are reported as the most commonly used models of allocation public resources. However, they make this distinction: *"the formula budget model represents the form in which a budget request is submitted, not the actual funds allocated" (*p. 146).

By the 1990s, financial constraints determined that higher education institutions began to face external demands, both from State and Federal Governments, as well as from the general public and State level agencies (Zumeta, 2001; Martinez, 2002; Bogue and Aper, 2000).

The introduction of performance based categories in higher education funding represents a consequence of this phenomenon. Burke and Servan (1998), Burke (2001b), Burke and Minnassians (2002) and Burke and Minnassians (2003) have studied the permanent expansion of performance based categories.

According to Burke and Minassians *(*2002)

> *"Up to 2002 about 40 states used performance based categories in public colleges and Universities. (…). A. Performance Funding - (19 states).; B. Performance Budgeting - (27 states). And C. Performance Reporting- (39 states)…(…) Many states employ more*

> *than one model in their accountability plan to measure institutional performance. For example, 70% of states with performance funding and 68% of those with performance budgeting also have performance reporting* (p.12).

Various authors have provided explanations about the use of performance funding categories considering the case of the State of Tennessee as a pioneer in the use of this model (Layzell, 1998; Kaiser et al, 2001; Burke and Minnassians, 2002; Colbeck, 2002; Burke and Minnassians, 2003).

In 1979, Tennessee became the first of several states to implement a policy linking state budget allocations to indicators of college and University performance (Burke and Serban, 1998). According to the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC), performance funding was an incentive-based funding programme for public higher education "*designed to stimulate instructional improvement and student learning"* (THEC, 1990, quoted in Banta, Rudolph, Van Dyke, and Fisher, 1996). In practice, each institution submits a self-study to the Tennessee higher education Commission, which oversees the evaluation process and determines the amount of money to be distributed to each institution. THEC sets policy for the University of Tennessee System and the Tennessee Board of Regents, the state's two higher education systems.

The Tennessee Performance Funding Initiative financially rewards exemplary institutional performance on selected measures of effectiveness, and gives institutions the chance to earn budget supplements on their education and general budgets for obtaining accreditation, demonstrating their students performed at or above national averages on standardized tests, providing evidence of client satisfaction, and receiving good ratings from peer reviews of their academic

programs (Banta et al, 1996, p. 22). Burke (2001b, pp: 427-428) considers that the established programme in Tennessee represents a classic example of performance funding adopted by coordinating boards: it has been adopted without legislation or prescription, but gives importance to careful design, full consultation, phased implementation, and periodic reviews.

4.2.3. Latin America

In the last 40 years the region has experienced an impressive growth in student registrations while social and economic demands have grown simultaneously. However, the resources with which the Universities operated were widely seen as inappropriate (Arocena and Sutz , 2000, p.2; Cetto and Vessuri, 1998, p.58). Like in other regions of the world, most Latin American Governments showed a tendency to reduce public spending and to focus the remaining social spending on the most underprivileged sectors, like basic education, health care and poverty alleviation plans (Bentancur, 2002, p. 5; Ares Pons, 1997, p 5; Garcia Guadilla, 2005, pp:15-16).

The literature shows that, most of these measures resulted from recommendations by international and multi-lateral organisations like the World Bank or the International Development Bank (Ares Pons, 1997, p.3). Since the 1980s, the World Bank experts developed various studies and policy papers establishing strategies and priorities, which that lending organisation was able to support through long-term loans and technical assistance. Those studies commented on and compared the experience of various Governments in the reform of higher education, showed major concern on the efficient use of public resources and attempted to establish a framework of effective policy making.

As a good example of these ideas, two of the most ambitious studies about funding models in higher education, both a basic source and guide on various themes about finance of the sector, are Albrecht and Ziderman´s *"Funding Mechanisms for higher education"* (1992a) and *"Financing Universities in Developing Countries"* (1995). Reporting for The World Bank, these authors focus on developing countries (including Brazil, Argentina and Chile) facing the dilemma of how to continue to expand University provision within a context of a lack of additional funding. With similar intentions, in 1994, the World Bank released *"Lessons from experience",* a landmark about recommendations for higher education finance in developing countries, including some Latin American countries.

Kent (1995) and Experton (1996) explain that the rationale of the World Bank´s thinking consisted of the following:

- The main priority was basic education because investments in higher education have lower social rates of return than those in primary and secondary education and because investments in these levels have a more direct impact on poverty reduction.

- An emphasis on the promotion of private higher education and cost-sharing in order to help to free up scarce public resources for improving basic education.

- An emphasis on the promotion of policy reforms that would increase efficiency and lower public costs of higher education.

- Encouragement for a real shift in the role of the State in which its main responsibility was to establish a proper political frame for the co-ordination of the higher education sector, rather than to provide higher education (Salmi, 1998 p.120).

As a consequence of the particular roles played by the lending organisations, several Latin American authors reflect their preoccupation.
For instance, Bentancur (2002) pictures a problematical *modus operandi* by the World Bank in the following way:

> *"Funding was channelled to the Governments of many countries of the region including the conditions regarding the development of specific policies (restrictions to students access to Universities, imposition of tuition fees, etc.) were included in the sectoral adjustment loans (SECALs) which controlled the application for fresh funding for these countries' national economies* (p.5).

According to this approach, rather than simple recommendations, the lending organisations exerted pressures on the Governments. Ares Pons (1997, p.4) points out that these institutions have used their enormous leverage to impose their own preferences, and finally raises the following question*: Are Latin American countries the victims of coercion by international agencies?*

Meanwhile, UNESCO, another UN agency, has adopted a different position in the international debate about the issues surrounding Government funding for higher education. UNESCO had fewer resources to invest and oriented its work to build consensus among national decision makers in the identification of main issues and trends, and in the diffusion of best practices. Unlike the World Bank, this agency has stressed that, given higher education's status as a public good, no substitute could be found in the future for Government funding of higher education (UNESCO, 1998). UNESCO also disapproved of the use of the limited concept of "rates of return" to higher education as a guide for funding policies. According to UNESCO, higher education is a long-term investment for a society rather than a

burden on public finances. Therefore, the role of the State should remain essential in the finance of the sector (Kent, 1996; Luengo, 2003; *World Declaration and Framework for Priority Action for Change and Development in higher education adopted by the World Conference on higher education, 9 October 1998).*

4.2.3.1. Analysis of the funding models in Latin America
Description of models.

A broadly based report called *"Educacion Superior en America Latina. Una agenda de problemas, políticas y debates"* authored by Brunner et al (1995) was the first study about higher education policies and related issues in the continent. The report provided a special analysis about the funding models used in the continent and described a major crisis in the funding of higher education in Latin America. According to Brunner at al, some interrelated factors were producing this crisis. These included:

(a) the role of Governments, which operated as "benefactors", providing funds but absent in policy making;

(b) the incremental-historical funding models used by the Governments; and

(c) an "institutional paralysis" that tended to avoid the adoption of decisions for change in the system.

The authors pointed out that, due to the interaction of these factors, the State was still unable to exert power in effective ways. The use of incremental-historical model has determined that the institutions counted with automatic funding with total independence from their performance while the Governments avoided confrontation with University constituencies (p.21). At the same time, it has awarded significant degrees of power to the institutions, because "...w*hilst the Governments hold the economic power and even can apply punishments, all these resources are*

useless. Paradoxically, as the dependency on State funding is higher, the Governments are more unable to use financial mechanisms as a policy "pressure" or as a tool of control. Such resources are useless against the "guerrilla warfare" that Universities are willing to fight in order to increase their funding (pp: 27-28).

Rather than just analysing the Latin American problems in the finance of the sector, other studies argued for the adoption of *"the new directions in funding higher education".* Delfino and Gertel (1996) edited a series of studies that acknowledged the fact that most countries, certainly most Latin American countries, were facing serious financial crisis and proposed guidelines for future action. The recommendations of this study included the introduction of formula funding schemes, an intensive promotion of the private sector, collaboration with private business, cost-recovery (tuition), income-generating projects and the introduction of policies to promote quality and equity. They based their recommendations on two lines of action: (a) Governments should concentrate on policies of cost-recovery and (b) institutions should introduce internal adjustments to improve the use of existing resources. The articles also recommended several ways of expanding financial resources for Universities, such as the introduction of formula funding schemes, collaboration with private business and income-generating projects.

4.2.3.2. Ideological discussions about directions

However, not everybody agreed with these ideas. Authors like Hidalgo (1997) and Bentancur (2002) recognised that Universities should expand financial resources but questioned the *"new"* directions explained above. These authors warned that these directions were to be framed within a global movement inspired in New

Public Management approaches that Yarzabal (2001) explained in the following way :

> *" In the 1990s the market was considered the articulator of the relations in the society. Under this frame, the State re-oriented its roles and promoted the adaptation of higher education institutions to the demands of the market, economic globalisation and neo-liberal ideologies. These drove to a re-orientation of public policies which have moved from the attention of social demands and the expansion of higher education Institutions to non-regulated privatisations, result- based assessments, politically oriented accreditation and a total reduction of public funds" (pp: 11-12).*

These authors conclude (like UNESCO) that, as education is a public good the State must remain as the main supporter of funds for higher education.

4.2.3.3. The effects of New Public Management

Some Latin American authors like Bentancur (2004), Narbondo et al (2003), and Ramos (2003) connect the New Public Management Movement with the measures adopted by Latin American Governments in the funding of higher education in the 1990s.

New Public Management is a body of managerial thought based on ideas generated in the private sector and imported into the public sector (Hood, 1991; 1995) which stimulated an scholarly analysis of ideas that set the agenda for organisational change in a number of countries, including UK, Australia and USA (Barzelay, 2000). In the USA, *Reinventing Government* by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) played a major role in the process by which New Public Management doctrines came to influence agenda-setting in the US Federal Government during the first

Clinton Administration, inducing fundamental changes in public service delivery, such as using tax-financed voucher schemes to fund education (Barzelay, 2000).

Larbi (1999, p.13) explains that the rationale of New Public Management captures most of the structural, organisational and managerial changes taking place in the public services of most OECD countries in the late 1970s. According to this author, the broad orientations of New Public Management are explained by the *marriage* of two different streams of ideas:

a) the first stresses business-type "*managerialism*" in the public sector and comes from the tradition of the scientific management movement based on the ideas of *"professional management expertise as portable,...paramount over technical expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results . . . and central and indispensable to better organizational performance, through the development of appropriate cultures . . . and the active measurement and adjustment of organisational outputs"* (Hood, 1991 p.6), and

b) the second derives from the *"new institutional economics"* movement, which has its theoretical foundation in the ideas of public choice, transaction cost and principal-agent theories, which have generated public sector reform themes based on ideas of market, competition, contracting, transparency and emphasis on incentive structures as a way of promoting efficiency in public service delivery.

4.2.3.4. New Public Management and higher education

Milliken and Colohan (2004, p. 382) suggest that *managerialism* is a private sector "solution" to the public sector "problem" because it reflects central Government's view that private sector corporate practices can be used to drive change.

In the higher education context, there is no question that the drive for change and efficiency –doing more with less- was eagerly adopted by diverse Governments. For instance, according to Deem (1998, pp: 3-4) and to Fulton (2004, p. 157), in the UK, an early promotion of this New Public Management approach was the Jarratt Report of 1985.

Deem (1998) describes that *"… the Jarratt Report is one very consistent with 'new managerialism', with emphasis on a compliance culture for University staff, national frameworks for degree work and academic standards and measurable student learning and research outcomes"* (p.2). The Jarratt Report prescriptions laid particular emphasis on aligning University management processes with conventional approaches to management in the private sector, by improving management controls, strengthening line-management hierarchy and reducing academic power.

According to Deem (1998):

> *" ...as the higher education sector (...) has grown in extent, it is also increasingly being required to justify the expenditure of public funds and to demonstrate 'value for money'. Those who run Universities are expected to ensure that such value is provided and their role as academic leaders is being subsumed by a greater concern with the overt management of sites, finance, staff, students, teaching and research (...) At the same time, the emphasis on competition between Universities for students, research income and academic research 'stars', has also served to stress the extent to which higher education can be described as operating under quasi-market conditions"* (p.3).

Deem identifies the adoption of new managerial techniques in higher education institutions in the use of internal cost centres and the monitoring of efficiency and effectiveness through measurement of outcomes and individual staff

performances. Other features include attempts to change the regimes and cultures of organisations to more closely resemble those found in the private 'for profit' sector.

Some research has been done about the adoption of New Public Management Theories in higher education. International studies include Jarzabkowski (2002) in the UK, Neumann and Guthrie (2006) in Australia and Salminen (2004) for Finland.

In a study already mentioned above (pp: 51 and 154), Jarzabkowski (2002) found, based on three British Universities, that inside these institutions, there was increased application of theory based largely on the private sector including New Public Management. In this paper, Jarzabkowski examines the strategic implications of resource allocation models (RAMs) discussing four interrelated aspects of resource allocation, -degree of centralisation, locus of strategic direction, cross-subsidy, and locus of control- in a longitudinal study of three UK Universities: Warwick, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and Oxford Brookes. Findings suggest that RAMs are historically and culturally situated within the context of each University and this is associated with different patterns of strategic direction and forms of strategic control.

In the same way, while analysing the use of New Public Management techniques in Australian higher education, Neumann and Guthrie (2006), report that, as a consequence of the “fiscal crisis” of the State, in Australia there has been the promotion of “new” management systems, which included the use of external sources of funding, an emphasis on the higher education institutions "responsiveness" to the needs of industry, tight management control and cost-reductions.

According to Neumann and Guthrie, in that in Australia, a new corporatised model of University management has emerged, based on business/market principles, *"... edging out the traditional administrative systems focused on academic committees and professional (academic peer) judgements (…). Due to new managerialism, academic activities such as teaching and research have become calculable, marketable and tradable under the commercialised and managerialist regime in which Universities must now operate"*. (p. 6).

4.2.3.5. New Public Management and higher education funding

Weiler (2001) links the application of the New Public Management ideas to higher education to the funding models explaining that the State *"… is moving away from its traditional role of comptroller and pre-emptor of a University's budgetary decisions in terms of "ex ante" and "ex post" operating systems. The old system (...) operated through rules and regulations set up in advance.(…) The new system is a steering system based on allocating resources on the basis of performance"* (p.7).

Final considerations

Despite the concerns expressed by Yarzabal (2000, p.7), public higher education institutions in Latin America remain as predominantly tax-financed and their funding patterns largely rely on historical-block granting allocations. Therefore, although there is evidence that there have been significant pressures exerted by the lending organisations to introduce their ideas, these have not been so strong-or well-accepted- in the region in order to make significant changes in the funding models. As we will observe later, whilst most countries have introduced changes in

their funding patterns, these do not represent a very important shift. Only the case of Chile represents a drastic change.

In particular, reforms to increase reliance on cost-recovery through student payment in many cases have met with important resistance. The historically rooted concept of “free public higher education”, which rejects tuition-fees due to the belief that, as a public good, higher education belongs to a social welfare package which must be paid for through taxation levels, has proved to be still strong and healthy in the continent.

The UNAM´s case, already mentioned above, is extremely interesting. On March 15, 1999, the UNAM´s council passed the General Bylaw on Payments, a modest increase in the existing symbolic tuition fees system. As an immediate consequence, a student protest exploded and in April UNAM found itself paralysed for nearly one year. In addition, some other “solidarity" strikes were initiated at the same time in other institutions (Levy and Arenas, 2000).

After such an intense “battle over tuition”, its political arguments and ramifications still persist as a warning for those considering the hypothetical idea of introducing tuition fees in Latin American public Universities (Sotelo, 2000).

Therefore, as I will analyse below, the funding models in the region have evolved during the 1990s. However, we will also see that, excepting the Chilean case, the classic model already described is still in use, even if in a modified and revised form.

4.2.4. Chile

Literature has revealed an excellent case study in Chile due to the changes that its funding model has experienced in recent decades.

According to Riveros (1996), Chile possesses several unique aspects in the Latin American landscape due to the fact that the State holds a subsidiary role in funding the higher education system through the use of a demand-driven funding model. Chile is also the country within Latin America that allocates the lowest public funding to higher education relative to GDP. This situation arises from the significance of private contributions to the financing of higher education, a pattern that emerged from changes introduced in the 1980s under the influence of policies of cost recovery and growth of private provision (Thorn et al, 2004). Holms Nielsen et al (2002, p.5) explain that, in Chile, the massive expansion of tertiary education has been financed primarily by private sources. Public sector funding comprises only 0.6% of GDP which is compensated by a very high level of private sector funding amounting to approximately 2.7% of GDP.

There has been a re-definition in the role of the National Government since the 1980s (Bernasconi and Rojas, 2003; Holms Nielsen et al, 2002). All institutions, public and private, were compelled to charge tuition and public funding dropped substantially. Today, public subsidies are channelled to the higher education system utilising the following mechanisms:

1) Direct funding support to all traditional public Universities *(Aportes Fiscales Directos)*. This subsidy is allocated on the following criteria: 95% is based on historical precedence and a process of political negotiation while 5% is

allocated based on input, process and output criteria. This allocation represents 50% of the total allocation provided by the Government.

2) There is also indirect public support provided on a formula basis to all institutions (traditional and new institutions) linked to a best- student admission criteria *(Aportes Fiscales Indirectos).* Albrecht and Ziderman (1993, p.47) explain that this indirect support is provided to institutions based on their ability to attract "top students". This type of students are defined by Rodriguez Dias (1998, p. 7) as "*those very bright students from poor families whose secondary school leaving examination scored qualify them for scholarships and chose a high quality public University".* This funding channel operates similarly to a voucher system (there is a limited number of funding granted each year) but the students do not receive the money; it is allocated to the institution that they have chosen (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.47). This allocation represents 10% of total Government support (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002, pp:4-5).

3) Funding for institutions (*Fondo de Desarollo Institucional*) for institutional development and quality improvement on a competitive basis. In this case, all public and private institutions are eligible for this funding. This allocation represents 9% of total Government support (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002, pp:4-5).

4) Funding for students through loans and scholarships. This type of funding is available only for students enrolled in the traditional public and private Universities. This portion represents 31% of total Government support (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002, pp: 4-5) and is allocated directly to the students. The Fund is made up of three components:

   First: a University Loan Solidarity Fund (*Fondo Solidario de Crédito Universitario)* for those students with few resources and studying at state or private dependent Universities. The loan covers student fees totally or

partially and repayment begins two years following graduation, contingent on income. It has a strong subsidy, is administered by each University and shows mixed success at recuperation.

Second: a state guaranteed loan (*Credito con garantía estatal)* which students with scarce resources can use to pay fees at all higher education institutions. These resources are financed and administered by the banking system. .

Third: scholarships that can be used to pay fees or student maintenance. On the other hand, and with the purpose of avoiding or limiting continuous fee increases by institutions and pressure on student aid schemes, the Government fixes 'reference fees' according to the type of programs offered and their quality, reflected in accreditation results.

4.2.5. Brazil

Several authors have examined the Brazilian case which offers an interesting evolution. According to the World Bank (2000), in this country, since the late 1990s, the Government has introduced changes in the historical, block funding model towards a more rational model using some formulae and contracts. The funding model has also been used to introduce changes in the performance of the higher education system and to introduce strategies to link funding of public institutions with their performance.

Changes in the Brazilian system of funding for higher education include:

- Public institutions are allowed greater autonomy receiving fiscal appropriations through block grants, on the basis of performance contracts.

The allocation for each institution is determined using a formula -considered "simple and transparent"- that "rewards" changes that show improvements in productivity in accordance with policy goals of greater access, quality, and efficiency.

- The creation of loan schemes in private institutions.

Nevertheless, Schwartzman (2002) considers that the changes introduced in the funding system in Brazil are small and the system still requires major changes. Only 10% of funds are allocated according to some objective criteria. According to this author:

> *"...public allocations are still strongly tied to historical patterns. 90% of allocations- those which fund salaries- are considered as "automatic". National laws have created a rigid system of administration of human resources in the Universities. The required changes will have to deal with the introduction of alternative policies in University personnel which may allow different uses of the funds allocated to institutions" (*p. 8).

Nevertheless, Schwartzman considers that the reported changes have already produced some impact on the behaviour of institutions, promoting concern for aspects of quality and efficiency. For instance, performance-based funding is allocated on the basis of indicators of success in graduation and quality in research and graduate education (2002).

4.2.6. Argentina

A series of studies describe how the funding model utilised by Argentinean higher education has been changing since the mid-1980s.

Pugliese (2003) edited a series of studies which examined the traditional funding model in Argentina, characterised by historical allocations only augmented with incremental-negotiated appropriations. Tejeiro (2001) termed this model as "*politicking budgeting",* a mechanism that, he explains**,** *"is based on the institution's previous allocation plus some lobbying activity in Congress"* (p.1).

According to Broto and Macchi (2003, pp:166-167), the use of negotiated budgeting contributed to a fatigue in the system and, during the 1990s, created the conditions for the introduction of a new funding model which combines historical - block granting allocations based on formulae with special appropriations for strategic programmes.

The resulting model combines some formulae (7% of total allocations) with historical allocations. Formula funding has been introduced to provide an incentive system for the Universities. The Government is turning to financial incentives as a more effective way of influencing national Universities than administrative controls alone, particularly given the high degree of autonomy these institutions enjoy.

According to Abeledo and Obeide (2003), the new funding scheme for public Universities is used with "*an intention of moving away from traditional historical funding"* (p.169). However, Garcìa de Fanelli (1999), Fernandez Lamarra (2002), Greco (2003) and Delfino (2002), consider that the resulting model is a combination of old and new features, a combination of historical allocations and small provisions based on formulae. These authors explain that, beyond intentions, the Argentinean model still remains the same due to a very high proportion of block granting (93%) based on historical criteria.

For instance Delfino points out that "... *the changes introduced by the Government , as recommended by the World Bank, still fail to introduce patterns of institutional efficiency at the public higher education institutions*" (p.11). Delfino considers that there are some elements that remain unchanged, for instance: (a) only a small portion of public funds are allocated with some objective criteria; (b) the biggest portion of funds, the one corresponding to salaries, is still allocated with a historical basis and is considered "untouchable"; (c) some public institutions (most notably the University of Buenos Aires, the biggest in the country) still offer huge resistance to the current funding model and delay the introduction of the recommended changes.

Even more, Garcia de Fanelli (1999, p.3) adds that:

- ✓ The greatest part of the public funding to the national Universities is still determined through a mechanism based on the institution's previous allocation and lobbying activity in Congress.

- ✓ Public funding is still not keeping up with the significant expansion in student enrolments.
- ✓ Financial resources for funding research projects, scholarships, equipment, library facilities, and laboratory materials are insufficient.

4.2.7. Uruguay

As already mentioned in **Chapter 1** above **(**p.23)**,** technical analysis about higher education in Uruguay is scarce. This is related to the fact that Uruguay has a small system and that the public University was monopolistic until the 1980s. Only some changes in the system, related to the creation of a private sector, have determined

the emergence of some critical mass and of incipient technical analysis in relation to the field.

Literature relating to higher education has concentrated upon a description of the system (Brunner and Becerra, 1999; Martinez Larrechea, 2003; and Martinez Sandres, 1999), focusing on the following key elements: (a) the Ministry of Education and Culture lacks of functions of co-ordination, supervision or regulation of the higher education system and does not exert influence over educational institutions, including UdelaR; and (b) the legal framework has positioned the public University in the centre of gravity of the system while it suffers major problems of management and finance.

Little work has been done on the question of the finance of the system and the Uruguayan funding model has not been studied before. Only two studies by Bentancur (2002) and Oddone and Perera (2004) have analysed matters that can be seen to be relevant to the topic of this thesis.

Bentancur, a political scientist, has analysed the role of the Uruguayan Government and its historical and unique relationship with the public University, but has not explored concepts around the funding patterns. Meanwhile, Oddone and Perera have focused on economic issues, describing the sources of funding in the University system and providing a description of the newest source at UdelaR´s funding: the graduate tax. Their study also provides a special analysis of the economic returns of University education in Uruguay, developing the calculation of the economic gains in individual wages associated with increasing levels of higher education attainment. This was the first time that this kind of economic analysis was developed in reference to higher education in this country.

4.2.7.1. Literature about tuition fees in Uruguay

Analysis about the imposition of tuition fees in Uruguayan higher education institutions is relatively scarce. Only Galmes (1992) and Bentancur (2004) have studied the likelihood of charging tuition fees and both focus in the negative effects of the introduction of tuition fees.

In 1992, Galmes carried out a study about the viability of introducing tuition fees in the Universidad de la República. The purpose of the study was to identify weaknesses and strengths of the adoption of tuition fees as an alternative funding source in the public University.

The findings reported a series of problems that the introduction of tuition-fees would cause to the public University. While reporting various complications, Galmes pointed out that:

> *"…It is very difficult to determine the ability of families to pay tuition fees in Uruguay, because in this country there is not a income tax . The University would not be able to determine who is in the condition of paying a fee. It would only rely in the declaration of the student. The University would not be able to check the income of the families. The net result of the application of a tuition fee would cause serious problems to the University administration , in its management and control structures"* (p.45).

Galmes´s study has been consistent with the dominant view sustained by the public University authorities and has been an important basis for UdelaR in deciding whether the introduction of tuition fees would have negative effects for students and the University.

In the same direction, while analysing the use of the graduate tax, Bentancur (2004) suggests that, considering that there exists a graduate tax, the imposition of a tuition fee scheme would entail a double imposition, because the student would pay fees as a student, and after graduation a tax as a graduate, concluding that " *As we see it, the imposition of a tuition fee would be unjust (...) public funding must remain as essential for the public University"* (p.17).

Chapter summary

The review has identified the rationale that underpins the application of each model of funding and has positioned the topic within a larger field of study.

Literature shows that, worldwide, higher education is facing problems because it is a costly enterprise which faces competing imperatives for public spending. As a result, there has been a movement away from historical-incremental-negotiated budgets to other systems that are perceived as more transparent and fair. This evolution has occurred for a series of reasons, including the need to react to financial crisis and the need to use more transparent, predictable and visible models. Furthermore the literature highlights a more recent demand from Governments and the public for more accountable models that enable the performance of the systems to be monitored.

Another aspect that has deserved an important attention in this Chapter has been the role of the use of tuition-fees as a financial source, and, therefore, a way to face the increasing financial crisis. As universities are underfunded and the financing of universities in many countries is regressive, many authors observe that

it is necessary to bring in private finance in the form of tuition fees, but in ways that do not dissuade students from poor backgrounds.

This chapter has shown, finally, that the topic has been barely addressed in Uruguay. Technical analysis about higher education in Uruguay has been scarce, probably related to the fact that Uruguay has a small system and that critical mass on the field is, still, small.

Therefore, this analysis is an original contribution to the discipline. The next chapter will show how the study methodology was developed.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.0. Introduction

This chapter aims to describe in detail the research methods undertaken in this thesis. It comprises three sections. **Sections 1** and **2** outline the way in which the research approach was developed around the research questions. The following sections provide analysis about other relevant aspects of the implementation strategy of the study, including a description of the research tools that were utilised **(Section 3),** the analysis of the data **(Section 4),** and a consideration of validity issues **(Section 5).**

SECTION 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1. The research questions

The design of any study begins with the selection of a topic and a research methodology. Two general approaches are widely recognised: quantitative research and qualitative research.

Quantitative research is an inquiry into an identified problem, based on testing a theory, measured with numbers, and analysed using statistical techniques (Creswell, 2003), and *"data is gathered to be counted, evaluated, statistically tested and measured"* (State of Victoria DET, 2005, p.10). By contrast, a study based upon a qualitative process of inquiry focuses on holistic, subjective meaning and experience. Its goal is to understand a social or human problem from multiple perspectives (Malterud , 2001).

Creswell (2003) suggests that, in the case of qualitative research, the research questions should begin with words such as ''what' or 'how', as these will convey an open and emerging design, whereas 'why' questions are more relevant to quantitative research.

Qualitative research places the researcher within a naturalistic setting. This approach uses interviews, focus groups, observations and case studies to examine the experiences of individuals and groups. Sources of information in qualitative research include analysis of documents and programmes in which the researcher seeks to explore the ways individuals, systems and organisations behave and respond within a specific setting (State of Victoria DET).

In order to answer the research question of this study, a qualitative approach was employed because, as showed by Campbell- Evans (1992), it enables the researcher to consider the whole situation and seeks to understand what are the elements that are "inter-acting" and determining the research phenomenon.

One of the purposes of this research was to obtain and use stakeholders´ perceptions and perspectives. These people are those who, for different reasons, are closely related to the phenomenon or are actively involved in the organisation or system performance. As I saw it, a direct contact with the stakeholders would strengthen an awareness of the social reality to the point where the phenomenon under consideration actually took place.

Stakeholders identification

According to Freeman (quoted by Mitchell, p.853), the concept of stakeholder is associated with the principle of *who or what really counts*, in other words to elements of relevance and salience.

Under this frame, I first reviewed the stakeholder literature laying out the various explicit and implicit positions about *who and what really counts.* After that, I analysed the Uruguayan context, considering the situational uniqueness of Uruguay in which there is a historical predominance of the public University, an incipient importance of the private sector and a weak involvement of the Government, represented by the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of Planning and Budget.

Following Clarkson, (1995, p.16) and Savage (1991, p.2), I found two categories of stakeholders:

- Those who have formal official or contractual relationships and have a direct and necessary economic impact upon the sector. These are called “primary stakeholders”, i.e. presidents, rectors, members of governing boards, teachers, students, Government officers, University administrators, practitioners and members of unions.

- Secondary stakeholders, those who are not directly engaged in the sector´s activities but are able to exert influence or are affected by the activities. They might influence or affect, or are influenced or affected, but are not essential for its survival, i.e. connoisseurs, academics, technical advisors at the Legislature, policy analysts.

In some way, all these people have created the current model either by doing something or by avoiding doing something, and are those who are most knowledgeable about the phenomenon (Trochim, 1996). Moreover, these same people will shape the next funding model.

It was very important to provide findings that could be understood by others, not just by academics or social scientists, but by politicians, policy-makers and

practitioners. In this context, the project was not intended just to theorise, but to provide evidence of elements that may help to understand directions or substance for required changes (Campbell-Evans, 1992). Also, ordinary people and practitioners “operate" within the model like the one that will be identified, described and analysed. These people will have a view, available, usable and "friendly", that will help us to understand what is really going on.

The highly practical nature of this research also distinguishes a project undertaken within the framework of a professional doctorate, as is the case with this research from a project undertaken for a traditional PhD.

SECTION 2: RESEARCH DESIGN

5.2. 1. Specific method of qualitative measurement.

In this study, the methods of data collection that emerged from the research question were all non-quantitative. I used different sources of data: documents, literature, semi-structured interviews, a focus group and parliamentary and press discourses. The logic behind data collection was to use multiple sources of evidence under the rationale of triangulation (Yin, 2003).

Following the collection of data, I examined the texts and coded them, going through data again and again, comparing each element with all other elements, looking for key issues, recurrent events, or activities in the data that become analytical categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). From that analysis, certain themes emerged which captured or summarized the contents of all data.

5.2.2. Why select this specific method?

Clearly, one of the key elements of this research was that information was scarce or was not available. Before this study, there was no examination of resource allocation in Uruguayan higher education, no theory and no prior construction. Rather, a range of random, disconnected, decisions occurred with no attempt to provide any oversight or co-ordinating rationale. Only when the data was collected and gathered was it possible to learn about and to answer the following questions:

RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in reference to the following elements:
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?
ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations?

ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?

ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability?

ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource allocation?

ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded University?

RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to change in the future?

ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources of revenue in public higher education?

That was the project's *raison d´etre:* the collection and retrieval of data and information in order to analyse and characterise a model and predict how it may evolve or change.

A priori, it was known that the *state of the art* of the information was the following:

- There was no available data about the origin of the funds that each institution of higher education received from sources other than from the "traditional" budget. In particular, it was important to learn if there were funds obtained from research councils, research and teaching contracts, consultancies or fees paid in clinics or hospitals.
- There was not compiled data about the relative importance of tuition within the sources of funding in the private institutions. It is perceived that these institutions rely on tuition, and the amount of the tuition-fees is sometimes available in sources (i.e. institutional web-pages) that are available to the general public. However the volume of the resource was not known.

- There were no written directives, guidelines, objectives or policies - or at least certainly none publicly available- explaining the model and the criteria used to allocate funds to each institution or what are the goals or objectives that support the current models.
- There was no compiled information about regulations or directives about the degree of decentralisation existing between the institutions and the respective funding authorities.
- There was no information about directives or regulations about accountability procedures once the funds have been received by the institutions and have been expended.

For readers of this thesis from a European or North American background, there is a very stark contrast here. The absence of authoritative information, data or procedures about higher education in Uruguay is a reality which outsiders often find surprising and difficult to comprehend.

SECTION 3: RESEARCH TOOLS SELECTED

5.3.0. Introduction

In order to obtain a more complete picture, as well as the stakeholder´s perspectives, multiple sources of evidence were used. The multi-modal tools that were chosen tried to address several questions from different perspectives. These various techniques also enabled the researcher to cross-check data coming from the different sources. Not least, the aim was to avoid any reliance on only one source of data and to make the different methodologies contribute to an overall, agreed set of conclusions (Rezabeck, 2000).

FIGURE 20 : Triangulation



As pictured in FIGURE 20, the techniques that were used were the following: interviews, focus groups and unobtrusive methods:

- A total of 16 interviews were carried out, including University Presidents or Vice Presidents, members of University governing boards, University

administrators, senior Ministry officers, legislators, advisors at the Legislature and academics. The list of interviewees is included in **ANNEX 3.**

- The focus group members included academics, experienced practitioners and technicians. The list of the members is included in **ANNEX 3.**
- The interview data was integrated with information drawn from the focus group, archived parliamentary speeches and observations; field notes; and gathered policy documents including internal, memoranda and letters. In particular the following documents were considered:
  - ✓ National level regulations, including Constitution, laws and decrees.
  - ✓ Ministry-level documents related to accounting, procurement and budgeting requirements.
  - ✓ University regulations by UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT, UM.
  - ✓ University Strategic Plans by UdelaR, UCUDAL,ORT, UM.
  - ✓ Self assessment reports UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT, UM and accreditation reports by MERCOSUR accrediting agencies.
  - ✓ Country papers by World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF.
  - ✓ UNESCO documents
  - ✓ Country and institutional statistics and budget data
- Altogether three Universities UdelaR, UCUDAL, ORT and four Ministries were visited. These included: the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Office of Planning and Budget (which holds the status of a Ministry according to the Uruguayan Constitution). Further evidence was found through internet web-pages and media reports.
- The data was collected from 2004 to 2006 covering a period from 1994 to 2004.

5.3.1.0. Interviews

Interviews are defined as conversations with certain purposes that enable a flexible and adaptable way of finding out things. Through the use of the interview technique, it was expected to:

- ✓ obtain an understanding about the general context,
- ✓ fill the gaps of information that persist after the use of the other techniques.
- ✓ see what the decision-makers feel about the funding model and its operational aspects, and what are their priorities in this aspect, and
- ✓ learn about their perceptions and experiences in order to construct a general vision of what is going on and how the funding model will evolve or change.

According to Partington (2001), the use of this technique enables the researcher to gain explanations and information on materials that are not directly accessible: perceptions, attitudes and values, matters that are difficult to obtain by alternative methods. However, in this case, the use of interviews was also intended to fill in the gaps that emerge from the other techniques in use.

Selection of interviewees

Purposeful sampling was used to ensure that the respondents would provide or generate the information requested for the needs of the investigation and the research questions. The selection criteria used included identifying individuals who: (a) were deemed knowledgeable or experienced about the area, and (b) held representation of the different perspectives associated with this study.

First. I mapped out the population of interest, or target population (see: FIGURE 19, p. 195 above). This target population included primary and secondary stakeholders according to Clarkson, (1995, p.16) and Savage (1991, p.2), (p.194 above).

Second. Once I was clear about the target population, I identified and created a list of potential individuals who, I considered, were able to provide relevant information to answer the research questions because they had their knowledge or experience in the area, either because

- they held positions that enabled them to inform this study's research questions by providing their thorough perspective, or
- their professional connection to the topic and ability to inform the research questions of this study with both overarching views and practical details as necessary.

At this stage, I felt that certain groups would not be able to provide relevant information to answer the research questions and were left behind. Such the case of the students who, initially, were included in the primary stakeholders´ groups (FIGURE 19, p. 195 above) because they had a contractual relationship with the higher education institutions. I considered that the students did not have the required knowledge, expertise and experience in the field and, therefore, were not able to provide useful information for analysis.

Third. I narrowed down my list trying to get a diverse set of representatives of primary and secondary stakeholders with different backgrounds and from different sectors in order to provide diverse perspectives. In this task I consulted with people familiar with the groups under consideration because it was important to recruit individuals who could represent their stakeholder groups.

The final group had a diverse mix of respondents which, I felt, ensured a variety of perspectives. For example, the list included people from different institutions, either from Government, private and public institutions, such as Senior Officers from Universities, Ministries, Unions, administrators, technicians, members of

Parliament, advisors at the Legislature, members of University councils and committees.

The uniqueness and the size of the Uruguayan Higher Education system determined the following aspects:

- ✓ That the target population was small and, consequently, the number of interviewees was relatively small. However, I was able to interview a large proportion of the population.
- ✓ That several interviewees were, at the same time, Government officers or MPs and University members, either as officers, administrators or teachers. Interestingly, three of the interviewees (two MPs and one advisor at the Legislature) were ex-members of UdelaR´s Councils (either at the Central Council or at Faculty councils) as representatives of the student union during the period 1994 to 2004.

According to the aims of the project, there were two kinds of interviews:

- The first type of interviews was intended to obtain information about the two components of the research: the existing model and the possible new model. These were interviews held with University officers or with officials of Ministries or other funding authorities.

- The second type of interviews, in this case with legislators or advisors at the legislature, was intended to obtain their perceptions and insights about possible changes or evolutions in the model.

Interviews with legislators and selected officers were developed to obtain information directly. Most of the interviewees (10/16) were people in charge of crafting the policies in the field. Others were professionals that operate the institutions (University administrators) or members of the institutional bodies that set their internal policies.

5.3.1.1. Type of questions

A structured interview guide was used in all interviews. The questions to be addressed during the interview were sent to the interviewee at least one week before the appointment. All questionnaires included semi-structured questions.

The questionnaires used during the study are attached in **ANNEX 3.**

5.3.1.2. Interview procedures

Face-to-face interviews were selected over telephone calls or written surveys because of the small number of participants and the possibility of improved openness in face-to-face interviews (Gillham, 2000). In two cases, however, it was necessary to develop the interviews by telephone, because the interviewees were not available in other ways.

- ✓ The selected individuals were contacted by e-mail to request their permission to participate. When an appointment had been agreed, the individuals were sent by e-mail a short introduction to the study, its main aims and research questions, together with a set of questions to be addressed during the interview (see: **ANNEX 3**) at least one week before the appointment.

- ✓ A request to permit audio tape-recording was included in this exchange of e-mails. In some cases participants asked for a further verbal explanation about the questions as a preliminary to answering.
- ✓ The interviews were conducted on a private one-on-one basis at their workplace in order to help them to be at ease and to overcome apprehension, and thus increase openness. At the commencement of the interview each respondent was asked if they consented to audio-tape recording of the conversation. This approval existed in all cases.
- ✓ The time used for each interview varied between 30 minutes and two hours.
- ✓ All interviews were undertaken between May 2004 and June 2005.

5.3.1.3. Interviews with University representatives and officers of funding authorities

In the case of the interviews with University representatives or with officers of funding authorities, the questions were centred upon the elements that could provide information about the existing model of finance (funding methodology and criteria, decentralisation, accountability) in each institution. These questions added to the information that was obtained through the use of unobtrusive methods.

They were also asked if they considered that the existing model should evolve or change and, if so, what should be the features of an alternative model.

5.3.1.4. Interviews with legislators or advisors at the Legislature

Legislators interviewed had been elected in the elections held in October 2004. These legislators were selected bearing around that they have a background of involvement in educational matters. However, it is important to bear in mind that none of the current legislators showed a clear affiliation or involvement in higher education issues. As a result, it was also considered important to interview certain

officers that operated as advisors to the new Legislature. These officials are people with a long involvement in University matters, especially with reference to UdelaR.

The list of interviewees and their positions is shown in **ANNEX 3.** Each has been assigned the pseudonym of "Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the alphabet corresponding to the sequence in which his participation occurred. In this way, anonymity for the interviewees was assured.

5.3.2.0. Focus group

One focus group was developed with researchers and practitioners in higher education administration and policy.

The focus group is a technique that gathers selected individuals to discuss and comment, from personal experience, the topic or problem of research (Rezabeck, 2000). This methodology utilises interaction to explore topics in more detail and draw out feelings of participants (Nelson, 1997). As stated by Gibbs (1997), interaction is a crucial feature in focus groups as it enables participants to ask questions to each other as well as to re-evaluate and reconsider their own understandings of their specific experiences. However, it can also lead to one participant exerting influence over the others.

The aim was to involve people in an organised discussion. It was intended to gain information about their views or experiences around the funding issues and the possible evolution of the model. The assumption was that the use of this technique would provide a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time as the gathering would involve many people who would interpret things in different ways or would see things from different perspectives. The focus group was also considered as a key source of information offering various perspectives of how the

funding model operates, what are its weaknesses and strengths, and how it may evolve or change.

The general intention was to obtain the participants´ insights. The assumption was that through the use of this technique the people were more likely to reveal their opinions or thoughts through social gathering and interaction (Gibbs, 1997). Members of the focus group were asked to express their opinions about the funding model and were expected to state what they believed.

The list of the participants in the focus group is included in **ANNEX 4.** Each has been assigned the pseudonym of "Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the alphabet.

5.3.2.1. Rationale for creating the group

Participants were chosen not on a random basis but purposely. The main criterion for inclusion was that the persons possessed special qualifications which would enable them to understand the higher education sector´s situation and analyse it.

They were expected to have particular or “expert” knowledge, either because some have developed studies about higher education issues coming from different disciplines (political science, public administration, economy and sociology) or because they were practitioners with wide experience in the field.
They were chosen carefully through personal contacts or references from peers or colleagues.

Homogeneity was preserved to make group members feel comfortable (Gibbs, 1997) and to enable coherent conversations. This was a key aspect in building the group; participants should not feel threatened. Also, people need to feel

comfortable with each other and to feel that they are meeting with others whom they think of possessing similar characteristics (Gibbs quoting Morgan, 1997).

5.3.2.2. Reason for using this tool

The main interest was to obtain the views from selected informants about the topics involved. In addition, as mentioned above, the use of this technique enabled us to gain a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time as the gathering involved many people with various interpretations and perspectives.

5.3.2.3. Procedures

Some days in advance of the focus group session, all the participants were provided with some of the data that was collected within the project. The focus group was developed after the interviews and documentary collections so many aspects about the current model were already known and it was even possible to describe it.

5.3.2.4. About the participants in the focus group.

Participants were individuals with a common background, age and demographic characteristics that were selected on account of their experience and background, or their considerable experience, in higher education management.
This encouraged the group to speak freely.

Members also represented several different sectors of the Uruguayan higher education system. That is, some of the members were from the public University,

others were from the private Universities and one was an officer at the Ministry of Education and Culture.

All participants were individuals with specialist knowledge, who offered their personal views (not necessarily an official view) based on experience and expertise.

5.3.2.5. About the focus group gathering

Only one focus group could be run due to the scarcity of people with the required characteristics. There was not enough people in the country with these characteristics.

Ten participants were invited but not all of them were available. While most respondents identified for inclusion in the focus group were within my reach and access, four individuals, which I believed to be invaluable for informing this study, either did not respond to my inquiries or were unable to participate at the time that the focus group was conducted. In the event, the group comprised six members.

After the introduction and comments, they were asked to talk generally about the questions under discussion.

I began the gathering with some affirmations about the model that could challenge the participants and "push" them to express their opinions. These assertions were:

- ✓ *In the Uruguayan model there is a co-existence of different models of financing higher education between public and private institutions. Basic funding of public institutions was from Government funds.*

- ✓ *Accountability, according to the modern term, was absent. Whilst the Government required numerical information that institutions should provide within a prescribed format of indicators, allocations were not provided according to these criteria. Therefore, the follow up in the use of resources and accountability was not connected with resource allocation.*

- ✓ *Finance of private institutions relied on fees paid by students. Institutions were exempted by the State from the payment of certain taxes, but this had little meaning in final costs. There was a weak framework of accountability.*

5.3.2.6. Ethical issues about the focus group

As already mentioned, all members of focus groups were informed in advance and provided with appropriate detail about how the data would be used and how it would be disseminated. A written invitation was sent to each of them in advance with that purpose.

Focus group participation was voluntary. The primary means of communication was telephone and e-mail. Those who expressed interest in participating in the focus group were sent more information about the procedures and topics to be discussed.

Full information about the purposes and uses of their contributions was given.

Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed.

5.3.2.7. Focus group organisation

Some key elements of the organisation were the following:

- ✓ The focus group session was developed after the interviews, in order to test or triangulate the elements that had emerged from interviews.
- ✓ The meeting was tape recorded and transcribed.
- ✓ The work of the focus group was predominantly conducted by the researcher who operated as the moderator.
- ✓ Number of participants: As suggested by Gibbs (1997), the focus group was composed of six members. The session lasted two hours.
- ✓ The focus group session drew upon the experiences of individuals who have a high level of knowledge in the field. A wide range of information and knowledge surfaced within the discussion among these people. Reactions, discussion, supporting and contrary points were brought to light, and added into the discussion.
- ✓ The members of the focus group were first asked to consider an initial question from the researcher, respond with their thoughts, feelings, experiences and suggestions, and then react to the responses given by the various members of the group. In this way, a discussion was generated. They were, then, asked to react to the responses given by the various members of the group. Subsequent questions were then posed to the group after everyone had had a chance to comment and react to the others' comments.

5.3.3.0. Unobtrusive methods

Documentation and archival records are called "unobtrusive methods" because they do not demand an intrusion in the research context. In this study, documentary information was most important to corroborate or augment evidence (Yin, 1994).

Through this research technique a wide range of qualitative information was obtained. Relevant documents, such as policy statements, mission statements, transcriptions of meetings, newspaper articles, and technical papers related to University budgets, were obtained and analysed. In addition, I worked over archival records from the Uruguayan Parliament in order to analyse speeches from members of Parliament and University leaders.

The analysis of documents provided insights into important social and political issues related to higher education policy making. As well, it was particularly useful in trying to understand the philosophy of those involved in the decision-making processes related to University funding and to provide insights of a group of people that cannot be observed or noted in another way. In many ways, the parliamentary speeches revealed conceptual underpinnings shared by the congressional community and offered understanding about how MPs conceive the different relationships that they have with the higher education sector, either with the individuals (i.e. University authorities, unions) or with institutions (i.e. UdelaR).

It is very important to recall that, in this study, **the use of the congressional speeches was oriented to complement other data.** My intention of using those speeches as sources of data was pragmatic; it is evident that congressional texts offer a significant amount of information that is not available from other sources (i.e. from policy documents). In this case, the difficulty was simply that some critical views from the political community about certain University issues were not registered in written official policy documents. Therefore, the difficulty was practical, the information that was regarded as vital in providing evidence for a given analytical point was missing in the other sources.

Finally, I have to point out that rather than developing a detailed linguistically-textually based analysis I developed a pragmatically and interactionally based analysis. I extracted the significant concepts in the texts that provided a conceptual repertoire of how those individuals (the MPs) see certain matters from their particular points of view. As I see it, this procedure enables a better understanding of how the policy-making cycle works in Uruguay.

For instance, it was remarkable to observe that there are no references at all to University tuition-fees in the policy-documents authored by the political parties that were analysed. This is, certainly, a sensitive issue and it may be inferred that political parties have preferred to exclude its treatment in written documents. However, I certainly could find several contributions about this matter (tuition) by the MPs of all parties during a series of congressional sessions. This example certainly applies to other matters too, such as to the conflicting relationship between the Parliament and the public University.

5.3.3.1. National and institutional regulations

There are national and institutional regulations that govern the financial system, covering allocations, ways to allocate, criteria, accountability and auditing procedures. At national level, these include: the National Constitution and a series of laws that regulate the accounting systems exerted by the public bodies to all institutions that administer public funds. At sectoral and institutional levels, these include a series of laws and decrees that rule the linkage between the institutions and the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

All these regulations are included in **ANNEX 1** and have already been listed in page 201 above.

Organisational charts or diagrams: These figures are useful to understand the relationship between the institution and the funding authority, and showed the steps and locations required to exercise forms of decentralisation, devolution, control and accountability and patterns of hierarchies and decision-making structures. I could obtain these diagrams from the University Planning Offices. These documents are listed in **ANNEX 2.**

Technical papers: including reports from consultants, documents from political parties, self assessment reports, accreditation reports, and other working and interim papers. These documents are listed in **ANNEX 2** and have already been listed in page 201 above.

Institutional statistics and budget data. I could obtain this data from the Planning Offices at the public and the private Universities.

5.3.3.2. Archival records

A systematic search of relevant documents, communications or memos about the funding system of each institution was undertaken, either inside them or in the archives of Ministries or Parliament.

Many of these documents that have been produced in a normal course of affairs, specified roles and relationships (Yin, 1994) and provided understanding about the general context. These documents are listed in **ANNEX 1.**

5.3.3.3.0 Parliamentary speeches

As a complementary source, this study examined the speeches of members of Parliament. The use of this data enabled a greater understanding of policy construction than was possible only from the official textual discourse. This analysis was employed to demonstrate interests and motivations and as a tool to analyse competing and contradictory claims.

The study of parliamentary speeches focused on debates developed from 1994 to 2004 on University funding. During that period, both Parliament chambers gathered 1698 times and, in those sessions, I found 91 speeches related, specifically, to University funding. Some other official legislative records were analysed too, such as those of the Parliament Committees involved, i.e., the Education Committee and the Budget Committee, both in the High Chamber and the Low Chamber. In these cases, the hearing testimonies before congressional committees were recorded too and were available to the general public at the Parliament archives.

In general, the statements made in the Parliament by its members are read by the MPs and are intended for the parliamentary record. Therefore they are recorded to

be transcribed in official records (see **ANNEX 7** in which I include a transcription of a congressional session).

It is **important to recall** that, during the period 1994-2004, the Parliament had a majority of members from the "traditional" parties: the Colorado Party and the Blanco Party. Only since 2005, when the Frente Amplio Party won the national elections, has the Parliament had a majority of members from this party. As explained in **Chapter 3**, the Blanco and the Colorado Parties have a conservative orientation, while the Frente Amplio is defined as a leftist party.

5.3.3.3.1. Reasons to develop the analysis of parliament speeches

The funding model and all the aspects related to the finance of higher education are largely an agenda for public policy. As such, it is driven mainly by public persons such as legislators or leaders, whether elected or unelected, or those in positions of power who influence them. In the Uruguayan system, legislators are expected to hold a privileged position in the higher education funding allocation process, as almost all University funding comes from public revenues that are determined in laws which are enacted by the Parliament.

Last, but not the least, as commented above, parliamentary speeches provided insights that could not be obtained from the other sources. As explained by Van Dijk (1993), the study of political cognition largely deals with the mental representations that people share as political actors. Political information processing is often a form of discourse processing because much political action and participation is accomplished by discourse (p.5).

5.3.3.3.2. Parliamentary speeches: selection criteria.

Discourse has the important property that it may show what information is *"important", "prominent"* or *"relevant".* Relevance is a relative notion (Van Dijk, 1997) and, in our case, such a decision was made within the framework of a theory and relevance to the research questions.

This was certainly critical. While reading and analysing a large number of sessions, I was under risk of getting lost in the jungle of a multitude of discursive structures and strategies. How to make a reasoned choice of *relevant,* or at least *interesting,* speech was essential.

The choice of references was based on theoretical and practical arguments that linked the speeches with our aim to understand political and ideological beliefs and insights into the ways MPs speak about the theme "University funding" and about the social representations they share (or do not share) about the theme. There was a focus, too, on those discourses that expressed or implied the *opinions* of MPs that are shared by a *group,* i.e. by their own parties.

5.3.3.3.3. Use of quotations

- Quotations are presented in **Chapter 6** with a linking commentary and have been selected to illustrate such features as: the strength of opinion or belief, similarities between respondents, differences between respondents, the breadth of ideas. Many of the quotations will "*speak for themselves".*

- Special indication is provided when a unique minority voice is presented.

- In all the cases, quotations are taken from the corpus, put together with the discussion, and used as evidence for the ongoing argument.

5.3.3.3.4. Meaning of parliamentary speeches

Finally, the parliamentary speeches can only be understood if they are considered in their social and psychological context. Words and utterances do not carry meaning by themselves. Texts must be interpreted with respect to a knowledge base, which includes knowledge of the local environment (the context in which the speech is delivered) and knowledge of the particular and the surrounding ideologies. Therefore, speeches cannot be interpreted without specifying that knowledge base. Van Dijk (1999, 2000a) explains that ideologies play a crucial role while analysing discourses. Ideologies must be viewed as interpretation frameworks which organise sets of attitudes in a society. Therefore, ideologies provide the cognitive foundation for the attitudes, goals and interests of the groups that integrate a society (Van Dijk , 1999, p.2).

5.3.3.3.5. Positive features of parliamentary speeches as a source of data.

In this study the analysis of parliamentary speeches was extremely useful because its use enabled me to fill in the gaps of information that persisted after the use of the other techniques.

There are other advantages to consider related to its use:

- ✓ It provided valuable historical/cultural insights;
- ✓ It enabled me to understand the conditions behind a specific "problem";
- ✓ It helped to reveal the motivation and politics involved in arguing for or against a specific statement, or value (Van Dijk, 2000b);
- ✓ It provided an understanding about the general context, and helped me to see what the decision-makers feel about the funding model (and

several other issues) and its operational aspects, and what are their priorities in this aspect ;

- ✓ Finally, I learned about their perceptions in order to construct a general vision of what is going on and how the funding model will evolve or change.

5.3.3.3.6. Limitations of the analysis of parliamentary speeches

I have made clear already that the purpose of utilising this analysis was not to provide definite answers but to expand my knowledge about political agendas or motivations. Nonetheless, I understand that there are strict limitations on the inferences that I can make with this kind of analysis. For example:

- Inferences about motivation or intent cannot normally be made. The analysis is only analysis of what is in the text. I cannot utilise possible *"hidden meanings"* (Ariel del Val, 1999, p.5).

- While analysing the texts, it became very clear that discourses are incomplete and implicit in the sense that much information is not expressed, but only understood to be *implied* or *presupposed* (Bolivar and Kohn, 1999, p.10). In addition, while talking about delicate issues, such as tuition-fees or the relationship between the public University and the Parliament, I found forms of vagueness.

SECTION 4: DATA ANALYSIS

5.4.0. Introduction

Data analysis and interpretation focuses on organising and reducing information, making inferences and attaching meaning to organised information (Worthen and Sanders, 1987). In addition, the researcher has to report and document his or her analytic processes and procedures fully and truthfully so others may evaluate the credibility of the researcher and his or her findings.

Qualitative data analysis consists of identifying, coding, and categorising patterns found in the data (Byrne, 2001). I analysed the collected data thoroughly and converted it to analysable forms. At the simplest level, the analysis undertaken involved examining the assembled data to determine how they answered the research questions.

Data emerging from documents, interviews, the focus group and the Parliamentary and news discourses was analysed through content analysis.

5.4.1. Content analysis

Berelson defined content analysis as "*a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications*" (Berelson, 1974, p.2). It is used to determine the presence of certain words, concepts, themes, phrases, characters, or sentences within texts or sets of texts and to quantify this presence in an objective manner.

The use of content analysis enables us to predict or infer phenomena that cannot be observed directly. In fact, the inability to observe phenomena tends to be the primary motivation for using content analysis

Krippendorf (2004) describes content analysis as "....*an empirically grounded method exploratory in process and predictive and inferential in intent (…) what distinguishes content analysis from other methodologies of enquiry, is its analysis of data from their contexts of their uses* ."(p.xviii).

To conduct a content analysis on a text, content is quantified objectively according to explicitly formulated rules (Worthen and Sanders, 1987, p.315). The text is coded, or broken down, into manageable categories and then examined. The results are then used to make inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer, the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part.

I used content analysis in the following way: I examined the texts and coded them for the existence of certain words or concepts. In looking at this texts, I was interested not only in quantifying these words, but in examining how they were related, i.e. whether there was a stronger presence of positive or negative words used with respect to a specific argument or respective arguments. In addition, some qualitative data can be dealt with in a quantitative way. If an idea appeared in the data frequently, it was reasonable to count how often it appeared. But, it must be made clear that simple counts were used to provide a useful summary of some aspects of the analysis and that these figures do not represent a statistical sample.

The major purpose of the use of content analysis was to identify patterns in text and the themes or major ideas emerging from the sources of data. As I was working through the different categories, links were made between categories to demonstrate how the themes emerged and how conclusions about the findings were drawn.

The analysis contributed to the gradual building of an explanation that linked elements of collected data to themes. Matters alluded to in interviews, the focus

group and the Parliamentary speeches were identified and categorised around specific ideas. This general approach, called “constant comparative analysis”, involves taking pieces of data and comparing them with all others that may be similar or different in order to develop conceptualisations of the possible relationships between various pieces of data.

The process that I followed may be summarised as follows:

1. Marking and coding was done manually as it was considered that the size of available data was manageable.

2. All collected data was read and re-read, line by line, and divided into meaningful analytical units and coded around themes with a thematic list. A coding frame was developed to facilitate the analysis of the content of interview transcripts and to characterise each comment. This frame is included in **ANNEX 6.**

3. Data was displayed in a matrix which enabled me to extrapolate from the data enough to begin to discern systematic patterns and interrelationships (see an example in **ANNEX 9**).

4. The accounts of references and answers to a certain issue were explored in order to identify patterns of convergence between data sources.

5. Data was organised and meaningfully reduced or reconfigured. The process involved selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appeared in the different sources. As expected, this analysis gradually drove towards an explanation that linked elements of collected data to themes.

6. A template containing full data was developed. Although, I did not seek to quantify data, the "final" template helped me to interpret and write up my findings.

7. Throughout the course of the analysis the following questions were asked:

- ✓ *What patterns and common themes emerge?*
- ✓ *Are there any deviations from these patterns?*
- ✓ *What interesting or new elements emerge from the responses?*
- ✓ *Do any of these patterns or findings suggest that additional data may need to be collected?*

Finally, collected data was contrasted with what has been previously said in the literature about similar data; was oriented to areas in the literature that I had not previously considered and triangulated with the literature as a way to validate my impressions.

Specific steps undertaken in the analysis of parliamentary speeches.

As mentioned above, I analysed the transcriptions of 1698 sessions. While reading each session, I first developed a search for general statements among the following categories of data: "University funding", "University budget", "University finances". The raw data was brought together on the basis of their similarities into categories. I first created broad categories, and then related them to subcategories. When the core categories were decided, minor categories were discarded as irrelevant.

The choice of categories for analysis depended on the research questions.
I used the concept of "relevance" (Van Dijk, 1997) which entailed that the decision of the category was made within the framework of a theory and relevance to the research questions. The core categories that were, finally, selected were the following: *a) funding allocation criteria, b) University autonomy with reference to funding model, c) lack or scarcity of funds, d) views about the use of the allocated funds, e) tuition-fees and f) Parliament-University relationship.*

The category headings were the basis for the data analysis. In **Chapter 6,** under each heading, extracts of data are taken from the corpus and put together with discussion.

ANNEX 9 shows the analysis of the category *tuition-fees*.

SECTION 5: ISSUES OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

Though the concepts of validity and reliability developed within the quantitative tradition require strict procedures, they can still be employed within the qualitative study as hallmarks to check if the information is adequate. The concept of "reliability" is concerned with the degree to which the analysis or findings can be repeated by another researcher.

Some strategies were implemented during the research process to ensure the attainment of its rigour and maintain reliability. These methods were the following:

- Use of multi-modal methods. The use of various sources of data enabled the comparisons for congruity and added perspectives (Yin, 1994).

- Triangulations: Availability of different sources of data enabled me to make counter checks (Trochim, 1996). I compared the results from either two or more different methods of data collection (i.e. interviews and discourses) or, more simply, two or more data sources (for example, interviews with members of different interest groups).

- Interviewees were asked to check transcripts of their statements.

- The interpretation of data was corroborated with the interviewees who provided the ideas.

- Colleagues were consulted in order to share project evidences. Their interpretations and impressions were requested.

- In this study I relied on literature for definitions and provided them when appropriate.

Limitations

I identify the following limitations:

1. I am aware that this study will not provide a basis for generalising our findings for other countries, but I do not aim at generalisation.

2. Interviews with various researchers, University officers and MPs and a focus group were a primary source of information for our in-depth studies. I needed to complement the missing information with other sources of evidence, such as the parliamentary discourses and press discourses.

Chapter summary

In this chapter I described the research methods undertaken in this thesis.

In order to answer the research questions of this study, a qualitative approach was employed because it enabled me to consider the whole situation and to understand what were the elements that were "inter-acting" and determining the research phenomenon.

The methods of data collection that emerged from the research question were all non-quantitative. I used different sources of data: documents, literature, semi-structured interviews, a focus group, parliamentary and press discourses. The logic behind data collection was to use multiple sources of evidence under the rationale of triangulation (Yin, 2003). The multi-modal tools that were chosen tried to address several questions from different perspectives.

Data emerging from documents, interviews, the focus group and the Parliamentary and news discourses was analysed through content analysis. The analysis contributed to the gradual building of an explanation that linked elements of collected data to themes. Matters alluded to in interviews, the focus group and the Parliamentary speeches were identified and categorised around specific ideas.

Finally, I reviewed some strategies which were implemented during the research process to ensure the attainment of its rigour and maintain reliability.

CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS

Aim of the chapter

The results presented in this chapter comprise the findings from the three types of data source: interviews, focus group and documentary analysis. The data are presented by research question integrating the data from the different types of source through triangulation (Trochim, 1996). This technique uses multiple methods to investigate a single phenomenon, but was limited in this case to a single observer, and, therefore, was potentially subject to ethnocentric bias.

Introduction

As described in **Chapter 5** (pp 212-233 above), documentary data from legislation, policy documents, institutional charts and institutional communications were gathered to provide a series of systemic and macro-institutional perspectives. Data from semi-structured interviews conducted with institutional administrators and policy makers, and from a focus group of experts in the field were collected to provide the systemic perspective. Finally, a series of parliamentary and news discourses from decision makers in the sector were collected in order to complement the data collected from the other sources.

The data were organised around the research questions and then interpreted thematically, using the procedure of constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

As already mentioned, to ensure the anonymity of the participants, both at interviews and in the focus group, each has been assigned the pseudonym of "Interviewee" coupled with a letter of the alphabet corresponding to the sequence in which his or her participation occurred (e.g. Interviewee A, Interviewee B, Interviewee C), and potentially identifying characteristics have been either omitted or disguised.

In the case of data that was extracted from congress discourses and news discourses, the name and the affiliation (i.e. political party or union) of the source is identified because these officers have reflected their opinions in texts that are publicly available.

Despite the presence of an interview guide outlining various aspects for potential discussion, the interviews and the focus group tended to focus on the broad categories that are identified in the operational questions associated with the research questions, as shown in **Chapter 5** (p.224 above). The comments and perspectives of the interviewees, as well as those from MPs and University constituencies, are presented within the context of these categories.

Organisation of this chapter

As already explained in **Chapters 1** and **5,** this study was oriented to answer two research questions and their related operational questions. This section will present the emerging data directly relevant around those research questions. All data is presented utilising the structure that was established for the operational questions.

6.1. Which is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay How are funds provided?

6.1.I. Funding provided to UdelaR

Sources: Policy documents (Uruguayan Constitution, Law No 12549 and Law No 15903), UdelaR´s "Consensos para la transformacion de la UdelaR", interviews, Focus Group and Parliamentary discourses.

The main sources of funding for UdelaR are the following:

6.1.I.i. State funding.

The data revealed a six stage process for the allocation of funds from the Government to UdelaR:

First step. Preparation of the University budget proposal.

Allocations to UdelaR are based on requests, the budget proposal, elaborated by the University within a so called "global frame", which means that the University does not have to explain how it projects to use the funds (National Constitution Art. 220, Organic Law 12549, art . 23). Each five years, UdelaR`s budget is approved by the Parliament in the National Budget Law (Constitution, art 220). This is preceded by a procedure described in the University law (Organic Law No 12.549, art 23): in each Faculty, the Faculty Council prepares a budget project (bid) and sends it to the Central University Council which considers it and can introduce changes.

Second step. Submission of the budget proposal.

The Central University Council submits the overall University bid (University budget bid) to the Government which can introduce changes on it. If there are modifications introduced by the Government, both projects (the modifications and the original University bid) must be submitted to the Parliament as a part of the National Budget (Constitution, art.220). At this stage, as in all the budget process, the Government operates under the advice of the Office of Planning and Budget. The final decision is taken by the Parliament in the National Budget Law.

The University budget bid which is submitted to the Government includes a sum of requests that invariably exceed the final allocation by a wide margin (Focus Group; Senator R Sanabria Colorado Party MP, December 8, 1995; FIGURES 14

above, p. 122, and 21 below). Thus, in 2005, the sum requested exceeded the sum allocated by 28.4% (FIGURE 14 above, p. 122).

FIGURE 21: Difference (between resources requested by UdelaR and resources allocated to UdelaR by Budget Laws in years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). In Uruguayan *Pesos.*



Source: SUI UdelaR (2007).

Third step. Negotiations between legislators and University officials.

Once the University bid is introduced in the Parliament, UdelaR´s officials negotiate a final budget with the legislators (Interviewees A and B, Focus Group).

A major point of the discussion with the legislators is about increments in grant that which are needed because the UdelaR asserts property rights to use the current base, arguing that new initiatives should be funded as adds-ons (Interviewee B, Focus Group).

Fourth step. Enactment of the National Budget Law, including the allocation of funds to the public University.

Funds are allocated and received by UdelaR as a block grant. While allocating the funds, the Parliament does not refer to any specific elements (i.e. students, staff), rather it only refers to the amount of money that is allocated.

Most of interviewees (10/16) described the basic model as “block granting”, which means that the funds are received as a block grant in ways that the University can spend the money for whatever it deems necessary (Interviewees A and B).

The block comprises two parts: a basic grant, based on the historical, current base, and an incremental grant, negotiated by the legislators and University officials oriented to fund special programmes. Both are received as blocks (Interviewee B). The basic grant is a block that contains a certain sum based on past experience (the former allocation).

The major discussion is about how much of an increase will be provided for special programmes (Focus Group), because since 1995, the National Budget Law allocated (earmarked) some special grants to specific educational and research programmes of UdelaR including: continuing education programmes, International co-operation programmes, support of research activities and building edifices and facilities of the University hospital (Laws No 16320 and 16662, Interviewee L).

The final allocation is determined in the National Budget Law through funds that are allocated on a five-year basis.

Fifth step: Supply of funds to the public University.

Funds are supplied by the Government through the National Treasury, part of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Law 15903, art.533).

State funding comes from tax-collection, particularly VAT and the graduate tax. These funds are collected and administered by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (through the General Taxes Office) and are appropriated according to the *status* of the public purse managed by the National Treasury (Law No 15903, art.533).

Two of the interviewees (Interviewee A and Interviewee B, both University administrators) reported that, whilst funds are allocated to institutions, the grant does not pass over to the University. State appropriations are under the control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which operates like a public cashier. The grant is held by that Ministry to be called upon as reserves. Both interviewees claimed that this arrangement implies that appropriations depend on the state of the public purse: if the State collects more taxes, the institutions will receive the complete appropriation. However, if there are fiscal constraints, they will receive less funds. Thus, there is no guarantee that the University will actually receive the funds as agreed in the budget.

At the Parliament, Senator Alberto Couriel (Frente Amplio MP) confirmed this situation as: *"perverse and complicated mechanisms that have been imposed by the Government offices (which) determine that the already scarce funds turn to be even smaller"*(September 25, 1997).

Sixth step: Account of the use of funds

Each year, the University Council also presents an account of the use of allocated funds and proposes the changes in the budget allocations that it considers that are required (Law No 12549, art 23). This account is submitted to the Government which can introduce changes on it. If there are modifications introduced by the Government, both projects (the modifications and the original University proposal) must be submitted to the Parliament as a part of the Annual Law of Account (National Constitution, art. 215). The National Constitution allows changes to be introduced to the National Budget Law through the Annual Law of Account in special circumstances (National Constitution art. 214).

FIGURE 22: Six stage process for the allocation of funds from Government to UdelaR



6.1. I.ii. Other funding sources for UdelaR

6.1. I.ii.a. Donations, contracts and services

UdelaR receives 9% of its total income from alternative sources, such as donations, contracts and services. This data emerges from the study *"Indicadores de*

la Universidad de la Republica" which was developed in 2001 by the Planning Office of UdelaR (FIGURE 23). Unfortunately there is no updated available data about income from donations, contracts and services at all-University level.

FIGURE 23: UdelaR`s Faculties alternative sources of income in 2001.

	--%--
AGRONOMY	21
ARCHITECTURE	5
ECONOMICS	23
LAW	5
ENGINEERING	18
MEDICINE	2
DENTISTRY	5
CHEMISTRY	4
VETERINARY	4
HUMANITIES	3
HOSPITAL	N/A
ARTS	1
PSYCHOLOGY	2
NURSING	1
SOCIAL SC	2
BASIC SC	4
LIBRARY SC	N/A
MUSIC	N/A
COMMUNICATION SC	N/A
FOOD SC	N/A

Source: "Indicadores de la Universidad de la Republica", UdelaR (2001).

Chiancone et al (2005, pp: 31-32) report that, the UdelaR Faculties have developed different strategies to obtain funds from contracts of consultancy

services. While the Faculty of Engineering has important customers in the public sector, i.e. the National Electricity Agency and the National Telecommunications Agency, the Faculty of Chemistry has small size customers.

One of the most successful Faculties in this matter has been the Faculty of Economics which has provided technical support to several Ministries and public agencies in areas of institutional redesign and general management. (SUI, 2001, p.32).

Chiancone et al do not provide data about the amount of funds that these Faculties obtain through contracts or services.

6.1.I.ii.b. Levy of the Graduate Tax

In 1994, an additional source of funding was introduced with the creation of a tax called *"The Solidarity fund additional"* which represents taxation over UdelaR´s graduates (Law 16524).

This law was created with the specific intention of providing new funds to UdelaR. Graduates from UdelaR have to contribute on an annual basis with a fixed amount of US$ 264 per year for twenty five years, or until retirement. Income from this graduate tax is allocated into a fund - called *"The Solidarity Fund"* that is supplied to UdelaR to finance estates, libraries and some specific programmes in rural areas. The public University receives this funding annually and is free to use it within the purposes mentioned above.

Chiancone et al (2005, pp.34-35) report that income from the collection of the graduate tax in 2004 represented 3.7% of University total budget.

6.1. I.ii.c. Tuition-fees from post-graduate programmes

Another source of funding is represented by tuition-fees that are charged in post-graduate programmes. In 2000, UdelaR approved a regulation called the "Post-graduate Ordinance of the UdelaR" which established that tuition fees could eventually be charged in post-graduate courses.

The proposal to charge fees to post-graduate students in certain programmes (professional programmes) came from the Rector, Rafael Guarga. According to his view, charging fees would not affect the University´s root-based values of free higher education because *"... we talk about post-graduate programmes, those programmes that are beyond the undergraduate studies... post-graduates are not students, they are graduates. Then, we can charge tuition – fees in the post-graduate programmes, and in this case we do not violate the Constitution or the Law...."* (La Republica, August 4, 2001). Besides, according to his view, "*tuition free higher education is a rule and charging tuition fees to post-graduate students is only an exception to the rule"* (La Republica, August 4, 2001).

The adoption of the University ordinance was preceded by great debate at councils and union assemblies at the University. The University unions presented different views. For instance, the students represented in the **FEUU** were opposed to charging any kind of fees. Their message was: "*Tuition free education is an unquestionable rule without exceptions"* (La Republica, June 19, 2001).

The teachers´ union represented in **ADUR** adopted a more flexible position, arguing that charging fees to post-graduate programmes could be considered as an exception to the rule. This union therefore approved the Rector´s proposal to charge tuition for certain, professional-oriented, programmes (ADUR, 2001).

I cannot provide data about the amount of funds that UdelaR`s Faculties are levying through this type of tuition-fees because there is no available data either at UdelaR or at the Ministry of Education and Culture.

6.1. I.ii.d. Tuition fees from undergraduate programmes

Although the Organic Law 12549 established that University teaching is free of charge, a law passed in 1991 (Law 16226) authorised UdelaR to charge tuition-fees to those students who can afford it. In legal terms, Law 16226 revoked Law 12.549.

However, UdelaR has refused to use this authorisation based on the following elements:

- First, a study by Gottifredi and Hidalgo in 1995 showed that, if a progressive fee were applied (from US$ 50 to 150 per month) to students whose families belong to the three quintiles of highest income in the population, the potential collection would represent from 10 to 15% of the University budget (Gottifredi and Hidalgo, 1995).
- The introduction of tuition-fees would entail implementing political and administrative operations, considered "complex" by UdelaR`s officers, which, according to their views, would cause major disruption (UdelaR, 2001).
- The fee collection would only represent relatively modest resources to the University and would not solve its basic needs (UdelaR, 2001).

At the Parliament, this decision to refuse the legal authorisation to charge tuition-fees was criticised several times by the MPs from the Blanco Party and Colorado Party, especially when the Congress had to consider the University budget bids in 1995 and 2000. For instance, on one of these occasions, Senator Alberto Heber (Blanco Party MP) considered that:

> *"The University is not using a right to charge tuition fees, furthermore...an obligation to charge tuition fees...because these should be considered an obligation, an obligation to charge tuition to the wealthy. In this matter the University shows lack of solidarity. "Solidarity" is not about asking for more funds, which entails more taxes, higher rates of*

inflation and, finally, a punishment to the poor. …However, the University avoids this discussion... it has been authorised to use this right many years ago and it is still avoiding this debate..." (December 7, 1995).

6.1. II. Funding of other public institutions.

Sources: Policy documents (Uruguayan Constitution) and Interviews.

The budget for military educational institutions is allocated on a five year basis in the National Budget Law, through the allocation to the Ministry of Defence **(FIGURE 24** below, page 259). This Ministry determines what are the allocations for all its programmes, including the higher education programmes that operate inside it (Interviewee D).

This process begins with a budgetary request submission from the head of the military educational institution who estimates the number of courses that will be taught in the coming five years, and, therefore, the needs for that period. There follows a process in which that request is submitted to the military authorities and later to the Minister of Defence and to the Executive Branch (in this case: the office of the President of the Republic).

The process results in a procedure described in the National Constitution (art. 214). Each five years, the Executive Branch prepares a budget proposal, which includes two parts: an application for its own units (for example: the Ministries and the Planning Office) and an application for the rest of the publicly owned entities (for instance: public entities of education, UdelaR and ANEP) and public corporations.

The Government submits this budget proposal to the Parliament as a National Budget Law proposal (National Constitution, art. 168, inc.18 and art. 220). The

budget of the Ministry of Defence, as one of the Government´s units, is included in the whole Government budget proposal.

As described above, during all the budget process, the Government operates under the advice of the Office of Planning and Budget. The final decision about allocations is taken by the Parliament in the National Budget Law.

FIGURE 24: Budget allocations to institutions



6.1.III. Funding of private institutions

Sources: Institutional documents, interviews and Focus Group.

In the private sector, almost all funding comes from tuition paid by students (Oddone and Perera, 2004, pp:26-27; Interviewee C). Oddone and Perera estimate that tuition fee income represents more than 90% of their total income (p.26), which was confirmed by Chiancone et al (2006, p.45) as shown in FIGURE 25 below:

FIGURE 25 Evolution of tuition fee income in private Universities (2000 to 2005)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005

UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA	88.96	90.83	89.72	91.87	91.27	90.86
UNIVERSIDAD ORT	98	98	82	97	99	97
UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO	92.8	70.5	83.3	95.9	97.8	98.8
UNIVERSIDAD DE LA EMPRESA	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Chiancone et al (2006, p. 40).

Fees vary between subjects, but an average fee would represent an amount of US$ 200 per month (Martinez Larrechea, 2006; Universidad ORT, http:// www.ort.edu.uy, and El Observador (04/06/2006).

Martinez Larrechea (2006, p.98) shows that each University charges fees which vary from programme to programme. These fees are set by each institution according to its own criteria and considerations. Interestingly, Martinez Larrechea finds out that UCUDAL, ORT University and the Universidad de la Empresa charge similar fees in “professional” programmes like Engineering, Accounting and Law. According to Chiancone and Martinez Larrechea (2006, p.34) only the Universidad of Montevideo charges fees that are, comparatively, 50% higher.

In addition, due to Constitutional regulations (art. 69), private education institutions are tax–exempted, both at national and local levels.

Oddone and Perera (2004, pp 30-32) report that the private institutions provide significant financial support to students through a number of special admission schemes and scholarships. In general, these scholarships are awarded based on two different considerations: a) academic merit, oriented to award academically talented students; or b) financial need, oriented to help disadvantaged students

with costs associated with their higher education. Oddone and Perera´s findings suggest that the use of different scholarship programmes in the private institutions introduces elements of competition in the market.

6.2. Criteria used to determine allocations.

Sources: Interviews, Focus Group, Parliamentary discourses

Funding criteria are based on historical allocations and incremental-categorical funding**.** Many interviewees (8/16) and several statements at Congress concurred to demonstrate that the criteria used to allocate the basic block grant funds are historical (Interviewee C and Representative Martin Ponce de Leon, Frente Amplio MP, July 23, 1998 and October 3, 2001).

Funding relies heavily on historical allocations that are always the same and are expected to be the same. According to Interviewee J :*"The base is the historical allocation.... at least until now"*

Interviewee L pictured the concept well as follows

> *"Allocations are determined based on historical precedence…historical criteria. Allocations are the same, each year, because it is expected to occurr in that way…everything must remain the same. It seems to be that the University has to keep an inercial balance… everything must remain the same, if we expect to introduce new programmes, they will demand incremental allocations…"*

Schwartzman (1993a) has referred to this type of funding as *"bureaucratic"* due to the ways in which allocations are decided. Allocations are made without consideration to internal working, enrolments, institutional performance or cost changes and, as shown by Pratt (1987), quality is rarely considered.

However, the data that emerges from this study shows that the historical funding model traditionally used has changed during the 1990s converting the model from a historical to a historical/ incremental model (Laws No 16320 and 16662, Interviewees L and N, Focus Group). During these years, the late 1980s and the 1990s, the Parliament introduced special allocations for certain projects in the National Budget Laws.

Parliamentary speeches reveal that this innovation was introduced by the Blanco party´s legislators. These legislators considered that categorical funding was positive because, while receiving earmarked funding, UdelaR would "...*avoid an internal debate and ... use the funds quickly, avoiding discussions about how to allocate the funds internally"* (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 6, 1995).

This is a point that deserves special attention because, generally speaking, the leftist MPs expressed disagreement about the worth of allocating earmarked funds. For instance, several Frente Amplio MPs found this situation, in general, unsatisfactory and argued that funding certain, earmarked projects represented a violation of University autonomy . According to Senator H Sarthou (Frente Amplio MP, December 7, 1995),

> *" We consider that University autonomy means that we cannot establish how the University can use the allocated funds. These has to do with our conception about the University. If we supply funds to certain programmes, we will be establishing how the University must use the funds, and that will be a violation of the University autonomy"*

Furthermore, Frente Amplio MP, H Korzeniak, showed that he had quite negative feelings towards this new mechanism which, he considered, was utilised by the Parliament to decide which University programmes would receive funding and which would not. According to his view, and based on the concept of University autonomy, only UdelaR could and should decide how to use the allocations (Senator H Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, July 22, 1998).

Additionally, Senator Marina Arismendi (Frente Amplio MP) expressed her suspicion about earmarking funds because:

> *"…whilst the Parliament does not supply the funds that the University requests because -it is said- they are not available, the funds "appear"to supply "certain" programmes. This entails a violation of University autonomy. I will never vote a proposal which will entail a violation of autonomy.* (December 5, 1995)

5. Interestingly, most participants in the focus group suggested that, in this approach, the Parliament showed an intention of linking funds to strategies which were determined in the laws, something considered as positive by the focus group participants (Interviewees L and N).

However a negative aspect of the model was pointed out by one of the interviewees (Interviewee N) who considered that this new model lacked political compromise. He judged that:

> *"We have a logic of incrementalism. The State has not assumed that it must have policies about higher education and that is why there are no policies for the finance of higher education"*

6.3. Autonomy as a distinctive element

Sources: Policy documents: National Constitution; Law No 12549; Law No 15.661; Decree No 308/995; Interviews.

6.3.I. Public institutions

All public educational entities Uruguay function with extensive autonomy.
The Higher, Secondary, Primary, Industrial and Arts education institutions are ruled by one or more autonomous councils (National Constitution, art 202). UdelaR is

defined by the National Constitution as an autonomous institution which means that it develops its activities with a total independence from the national Government (Law 12549, art. 1-5).

This independence was confirmed in this research. Most of interviewees emphasised that degrees of decentralisation are very high (6/7). Decentralisation was associated by many (6/7) with autonomy.

However, there was a notable exception: military higher education. Interviewee E (University administrator) described a very different picture:

> *"My institution has no autonomy. All guidelines, and institutional objectives and study programmes are set and established by the military authorities and we are submitted to hierarchy. In addition , there is not academic freedom."*

6.3.II. Private institutions

Private institutions operate with full independence from public authorities and are only subject to inspections in case of irregularities (Decree No.308/995). According to their private status, they are ruled by the Private Law (Interviewee C). This interviewee revealed that, whilst the Ministry of Education and Culture requests annual reports, these are not reviewed or examined at all. Thus, a high level of autonomy is enjoyed with minimal and ineffective oversight by Government.

6.4. Requirements for accountability.

Sources: Policy documents (National Constitution art. 208; Law No 12549; MEF/ CEPRE, 2000); Interviews; Parliamentary discourses.

6.4.I. Controls over UdelaR.

UdelaR develops its functions with very significant autonomy (The Organic Law 12549, arts.1-5). According to the Constitution and the laws, as a public entity, it is subject to the following controls:

6.4. I.i. By the Court of Accounts

All expenditures made by public entities are submitted to accounting controls exerted by an independent body called the Court of Accounts (National Constitution art. 208). This Court is a national body created by the Constitution (art. 208). Its jurisdiction extends to national and local Government and to all bodies that use public funds or properties. It conducts pre-audit, concurrent and special audit functions. The powers to perform these audits are mandated by the Constitution (art. 211) and by national legislation (Law 15903). It performs its functions "on site" through its own staff who are registered accountants.

The Court cannot decide or take actions on the audit findings, does not discharge judicial functions and cannot develop investigations. When it finds irregular uses of funds, or other infractions, it must report all the irregularities to the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Powers.

6.4. I.ii By the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Law 15903, art 549 and art 550)

The National Accountant Office, part of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, is in charge of internal control over all economic-financial acts performed by bodies mentioned by the Constitution (art. 220).

6.4. I.iii. By the Office of Planning and Budget

This office is a part of the Office of the President of the Republic (CEPRE). The office requires that all public agencies submit reports of their annual activities and prepares a complete National report integrating all the information collected from the different agencies.

6.4. I.iv. By the Parliament

The Organic Law 12549 established extensive autonomy under the inspiration of the *Cordoba Movement,* which considered that political autonomy would prevent external (political) interferences in academic affairs (Van Aken, 1990). Such a wide autonomy means that the Government and, in particular, the President of the Republic or the Ministries cannot review or change University decisions, and that the Parliament can only exert an indirect control over the public University through the discussion and the allocation of budget funds. In addition, every year, UdelaR has to submit an accounting report to the Parliament.

However, it is clear from the debates in Parliament that there was disagreement as to what extent the University was obliged to provide information to the Congress. Speeches in Parliament demonstrate that, in this matter, the political parties held opposite points of view.

While the Frente Amplio MPs considered that, as an autonomous institution, UdelaR´s only linkage with the Parliament was related to discussion of the budget allocation (Representative Silvana Charlone, August 27, 1997), the Blanco Party MPs considered that the Parliament had a right to know how the public University utilises the allocated funds. According to Senator Luis Alberto Heber: *"The University is funded by public funds, community resources. In spite of considering its autonomy, we deserve to know how the University funds are been utilised." (*December 6, 1995). Furthermore, other Blanco Party MPs showed an apparent preoccupation about the lack of information from UdelaR, because, according to their view, University autonomy should not

entail a lack of accountability (Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa, Blanco Party MP, October 3, 2001).

6.4.2. Controls over private institutions

Sources: Policy documents Law No 15.903 and Decree No. 308/995, Interviews.

The Ministry of Education and Culture can require inspections in private Universities if there are serious irregularities (Decree No. 308/995). However, the interviews show that, in fact, these controls are oriented to the application of legal formalities and do not cover the use of funds. Furthermore, Interviewee C reported that these controls are not performed at all.

Interviewee C pointed out that *"...according to the laws, private institutions are controlled by the Ministry (of education). We (private institutions) submit financial reports annually . However , as I see it , these controls are not really exerted. We have never received observations or comments about those reports".*

While some interviewees, such as Interviewee H (advisor at the Legislature), indicated that "*The Ministry of Education and Culture should pay attention to the control of private institutions..."* others considered that *"...sometimes It is better if the institutions are not controlled and sometimes it is not"* (Interviewee J, legislator).

6.5. Historical and political factors that influence resource allocation

Policy documents; Interviews; Focus Group; Parliamentary debates; Press discourses.

The data derived from interviews, focus group discussion and parliamentary speeches was used to compare the opinions expressed, looking for possible convergence or divergence within each group about a series of elements that emerge as key factors that interact to influence the allocation of public funds to UdelaR.

A list of themes emerges from the data and may be ordered according to their overall importance or relevance. These themes were as follows:

- ✓ Lack of involvement of Government agencies in the process of allocating resources to higher education.
- ✓ Perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of UdelaR and the consequences.
- ✓ Perceptions and beliefs of distrust between the University and the related political powers.

6.5.1. Lack of involvement of Government agencies in the process of allocating resources to higher education

All members of the Focus Group and several respondents were explicit and outspoken about the absence of involvement of the Government agencies in the cycle of resource allocation to higher education institutions.

The Ministry of Education and Culture remained outside the budget cycle (Brunner and Becerra, 1999). Whilst allocations were determined by a National (quinquennial) Budget Law, they were appropriated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of Education has no involvement in higher education funding; allocations are determined by the Parliament based on the bids submitted by the University directly without any consultation with that Ministry.

This is certainly a key feature of the Uruguayan model: all the cycle of allocating resources to the educational public entities is developed in a scenario in which the body in charge of leading national policies of education has no legal authority to exert influence or to intervene.

Interviewee N (University administrator) remarked that

> *"...the State has no mechanisms to set priorities and therefore is not really involved in the finance of higher education. (...) The State has not assumed that it must have policies about higher education and that is why there are no policies for the finance of higher education. It is always easier to receive more and more funds than re-distributing funds".*

In addition, at the focus group, all participants agreed that the Government lacks mechanisms for setting strategies at all levels and therefore for the funding of higher education.

One of the participants remarked: *"While considering the public funding of higher education we should recall that the various administrations have not assumed that they have to construct national policies of higher education. They do not assume their role on setting strategies…"*

Interviewee I had a similar opinion, stating:

> *" I feel that, in Uruguay, during the last 30 or 40 years, there has not been (creation of) policies in relation to higher education. Uruguay has little debate about this issues…"*

6.5.2. Existing perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of UdelaR and their consequences.

Institutional autonomy, as it is conceived in Uruguay and in Latin America, is a key element which arises while trying to understand how the current model has been shaped and operates. Certainly, this issue was raised on a regular basis either in the interviews, at the focus group session and in the Congress debates.

The literature offers some theoretical background about the concept of autonomy. Today, the concept of autonomy is conceived as a shifting notion which is historically dated, and which should be understood as a relational feature at a given moment in time and space.

In the modern Western University system, the concept of University autonomy emphasises *"the power of a University or college ... to govern itself without outside controls"* (Berdahl et al., 1971, 8). Autonomy, along with academic freedom, is defined as intrinsic to the nature of the University, and as a pre-condition if a University is to best fulfil effectively its role and responsibilities toward society (Neave, 1998). The expression of autonomy is that Governments not only fund the institutions, but delegate, voluntarily, much of their power over them, and thus give them a large measure of independence in the use of the funds they provide (Trow, 1996, p.4). It is perceived as a basic value and as the key element that allows for the transformation of the institution from the inside and guarantee the freedom of research and teaching (Felt, 2002, p.14).

In Latin America, institutional autonomy is considered to be a supreme, jealously guarded value, even protected by the National Constitutions, which maintains certain unique features. Autonomy is judged as *"the essence of University life. It defines the relationships between the State and the society. It entails that the University is the owner of its own destiny"* (Naisthat and Toer, 2006, p.4).

The notion of University autonomy was already embedded in the colonial Universities which were founded under the inspiration of the Spanish Universities of Salamanca and Alcala de Henares, and which, like all the original Universities, were founded on a principle of collegial self-governance. However, clearly, the 20th century Cordoba Reform, also strengthened the notion of University autonomy. The *Reforma,* which considered political autonomy as one of the most important values to defend, established an extremely ample concept of autonomy. It

comprised not only the freedom of an institution to run its own affairs, but also its right to select its own authorities and to operate within a frame of self-Government. This frame, called *"the co-Government system"* signified that the University community, teachers, students and graduates, selected and were represented in the University bodies which ran the institution and which appointed the University authorities (Rectors, Deans and members of Councils). The *Reforma* was based on the assumption that Universities required this broad autonomy (comprising the classic concept autonomy and the co-Government system) to withstand external pressures or intrusions from political authorities *(The Cordoba Manifesto,* p.3).

In Uruguay, as in the Latin American pattern, autonomy is considered a key concept *"…closely linked to UdelaR´s history and to its future"* (Senator Marina Arismendi, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 1995) and is associated with the Cordoba belief that *"… political corporations cannot interpret or judge about knowledge, culture or scientific research*"(Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio MP, December 6, 1995).

The Uruguayan National Constitution and the Organic Law have instituted a model in which UdelaR functions with the widest autonomy comprising both the "classic" concept of autonomy (freedom to run its own affairs) and the co-Government system. In relation to budgetary and financial aspects, University autonomy entails that, while submitting the budget request, UdelaR does not have to explain how it projects to use the proposed funds (Constitution art.220). In addition, as already mentioned, according to the legal frame, UdelaR is only submitted to formal (accounting) controls.

Some historical background has to be considered at this stage in order to understand the relevance of the concept of University autonomy in Uruguay. In 1973, a civilian-military *coup d'etat* conducted by President Juan Maria Bordaberry dissolved the Uruguayan Parliament and began a 12-year repressive dictatorship.

As one of the principal measures adopted by the new authorities, University autonomy was eliminated and University elected officials (the Rector, Deans and most members of councils) were outlawed, detained and jailed. The student organisation FEUU was also banned.

In 1985, after a period of negotiations between the military and the political parties, Uruguay re-gained a democratic system and UdelaR recovered its full autonomy. Within this historical context, the concept of autonomy holds key political and ideological connotations and any accusation of interference, intrusion or violation of University autonomy is to be considered with extreme care.

All sources used in this study show that the Uruguayan concept of autonomy is to be observed as a key principle in the management of funding of higher education. Moreover, all sources agreed that autonomy has to be considered in the broadest sense. This means that the Government is expected to respect University autonomy because it is embedded in legislation and because it has been instituted precisely to set limits to what the Government can do with respect to the public University.

In the interviews, I found that all respondents confirmed that the degrees of decentralisation within which UdelaR operated were very high and almost all interviewees (14/16) associated this feature with institutional autonomy.

In the Parliament, I found that speeches are predominantly positive about the worth of autonomy (Representative Julio Aguiar, Colorado Party MP, August 21, 1997; Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio MP, December 6, 1995) because *"….since 1958, autonomy is in the heart of the history and the future of the University"* Senator M Arismendi, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 1995).

However, there are indications that the conservative MPs from the Colorado and the Blanco Parties and the leftist Frente Amplio MPs hold dissimilar perceptions about *"how wide"* this autonomy should be.

Frente Amplio MPs consider that "... *University matters should be kept outside the political interests* (Senator Helios Sarthou, December 6, 1995) because autonomy is *"…complete and absolute and it has been established by the law to protect the University from external pressures, specially from the political parties"* (Senator Helios Sarthou, December 6, 1995).

According to this view, the role of the Parliament in relation to University affairs is restricted to the allocation of a budget. For instance, according to Representative Silvana Charlone (Frente Amplio MP): "*Due to University autonomy, the only linkage between the State and the University is placed in the moment of the budget allocation"* (August 21, 1997)

On the other side, both Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs usually take a more distant stance and consider that University autonomy has limits and that the Parliament is entitled to talk and consider matters related to the public University. Their argument is typified by to Senator Wilson Sanabria, Colorado Party MP: *"We don´t mean to attack the University, we wish to analyse some University matters"* (December 6, 1995*).*

Further, according to the Representative Gustavo Penades (Blanco Party MP): ***"****There is a misunderstanding about the concept of autonomy. Autonomy does not mean to be independent of what is going on in this country, or being independent of the general feelings in this Parliament.. We must develop a debate about the future of UdelaR, and about its aims" (*May 5, 2004). Similarly, Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa (Blanco Party MP) wondered: *"… is.. that autonomy or autarchy? University autonomy does not entail to receive funds and to be*

independent to use them without providing information. The Parliament must receive information from the University about how the allocated funds are utilised every year." (October 3, 2001)

Some consequences emerge from these diverse perceptions and beliefs about autonomy.

The approach to University autonomy manifested by the Frente Amplio MPs implies a notion of autonomy which stands as a barrier of protection to prevent intrusions in University matters. For instance, Representative Silvana Charlone (Frente Amplio MP) claimed that *"the discussions about the University of the Republic has to be developed by the own University within its own bodies. This matter does not belong to the political system"* (August 21, 1997). Other Frente Amplio MPs also viewed some demands, comments or critics about University functioning made at the Parliament as an undermining of autonomy or even as interventionism (Senator Jose Korzeniak, December 7, 1995; Senator Marina Arismendi, December 5, 1995; Senator Helios Sarthou, December 7, 1995).

On the other hand, several statements by the Blanco Party and Colorado Party MPs demand Congress discussion about University issues and an involvement which should not be limited to the votation of the budget laws (Representative Daniel Corbo Blanco Party, August 21, 1997; Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco Party MP, October 4, 2000). Moreover, Colorado Party MPs proposed a open discussion about all University issues because, as stated by one of those MPs, " *I want to be clear, we do not want to exert control over the University, we want to discuss about University projects and priorities*" (Senator Hugo Fernandez Faingold, December 6, 1995).

Another consequence to consider is that the allocation of funds to certain programmes instituted by the Parliament in the 1990s has created a space for the consideration of certain University issues at the Parliament.

As already commented above (p. 247), the introduction of the model of allocating funds to specific projects has received major criticism from the Frente Amplio MPs who have considered it as a violation of University autonomy. Statements by MPs Senator Helios Sarthou (December 7, 1995) and Senator Marina Arismendi (December 5, 1995) say that they consider that the concept of University autonomy relied on two elements: the University bid does not have to explain how the University will use the funds to be allocated and that the University has the freedom of using the allocated funds according to its own decisions, with total independence from the Parliament. Therefore, if the Parliament allocates funds to certain projects it *"…undermines autonomy"* (Senator Helios Sarthou, Frente Amplio MP, December 7, 1995; Senator Marina Arismendi, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 1995)

At the same time, Blanco Party and Colorado Party MPs are very outspoken about the merits of categorical funding and explain that *" our political message seeks for the discussion of priorities and to focus on special projects"* (Colorado Party MP Senator Hugo Fernandez Faingold, December 6, 1995). And as a result *"...we propose an increment of 7.000.000 which is oriented to specific programmes. We don´t intend to violate the autonomy, this amount is oriented to discuss together with the University about its priorities"* (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 5, 1995).

Against this background it is interesting that, according to Interviewee A and B and to the members of the Focus Group, the new model of allocating funds to specific programmes was the result of negotiations between University officials and Parliament members (Interviewee B, Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 5, 1995). Hence, UdelaR´s officials have agreed to use this system, in spite of the resistance of some Frente Amplio MPs, and their own beliefs about autonomy.

Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa (Blanco Party MP) contributed to a better understanding of this matter, suggesting that *"…at last we allocated funds to almost all UdelaR´s Faculties. All the Faculties received funding. In the beginning UdelaR resisted this model of allocating funds, but it had no choices, and - at last- it decided to accept the funds and to devote them to the specific objectives that were established in the law".*(September 6, 2000)

6.5.3. Existing perceptions and beliefs of distrust between the University and the political powers.

Another important theme noted by several respondents and appearing throughout parliamentary debates is a sentiment of distrust between UdelaR and the Parliament.

Trust must be considered one of the fundamental links between public higher education and society, because, based on it, the society provides funding support without the requirement that the institutions account specifically and in detail for the use of those funds (Trow, 1996).

Several statements by Frente Amplio MPs refer to this feeling as *"embedded in the beliefs of the political right"* represented in Parliament by the Colorado Party and the Blanco Party (Senators Daniel Diaz Maynard and Reinaldo Gargano, Frente Amplio MPs, May 17, 1994) due to the historical fact that the public University has frequently confronted the political powers represented historically in those parties (Senator Daniel Diaz Maynard, Frente Amplio MP, December 5, 2001, December 7, 1995, July 12, 1998).

Furthermore, some Frente Amplio MPs, considered that certain Colorado Party and Blanco Party legislators held negative sentiments about the Universty. Senator Jose Korzeniak (Frente Amplio MP) pictures his feelings as follows: *" It makes me*

remember those people who get bored of their mothers and decide to send them to a nursing house" (December 7, 1995).

Although both Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs rejected this accusation, they also admited that they had apprehensions about the functioning of the University because *"There is general understanding that there is a general disconfort with the University of the Republic. On one side it is said that (the institution) lacks of resources and on the other side (the institution) does not provide the services that it must provide"* (Representative Juan Federico Bosch, Blanco Party MP, August 21, 1997).

Also, while Blanco Party MP Juan Federico Bosch talked about *"a divorce between the University and the Parliament"* (August 21, 1997), he considered that the latter was entitled to discuss University matters because *"the University is not only a problem for the University people...all the country must participate in the discussion about it...including the politicians, too.."* (August 21, 1997).

Several statements refer to MPs from both sides who expect to receive, or not, information about University matters, and especially about the utilisation of funds.

While conservative Colorado Party and Blanco Party MPs considered that the Parliament should expect to receive financial information from the University (Senator Guillermo Garcia Costa, Blanco Party MP, September 6, 2000, and Representative Gustavo Penades, Blanco Party MP, May 5, 2004), the leftist Frente Amplio MPs reacted by considering that institutional autonomy determined that the use of funds was an internal decision that could not be considered at the Parliament (Senator Marina Arismendi, December 5, 1995; Senator Helios Sarthou, December 7, 1995).

An important element perceived at the legislature was the recognition of an endemic lack of funding at the public University (Senator Mariano Arana, Frente

Amplio MP, May 17, 1994; Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, May 17, 1994 and December 6, 1995; Senator Alberto Couriel, Frente Amplio MP, September 12, 1996; Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco Party MP, July 16, 2003).

Parliamentary speeches show that MPs from all parties shared the view that the scarcity of funds had caused major problems for the University and that the University was developing its duties in conditions of major distress. However, I found considerable disagreement in the Parliament about how the University must face these problems related to inadequate funding.

Several statements by Blanco Party and Colorado Party MPs show concern about the ways that the public University had faced the problems related to lack of funding; for example they asked *" ... if resources are so scarce, why is the University so resistant to charge a tuition-fee?.* (Colorado Party Representative Ruben Diaz, December 7, 1995). Moreover**,** Blanco Party and Colorado Party legislators agreed that, as there is a legal authorisation to charge tuition-fees, UdelaR must –at least- consider the possibility of charging them (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 6, 1995; Senator Luis Hierro Lopez, Colorado Party MP, September 12, 1996).

Representative Ronald Pais (Colorado Party MP) summarised the opinions of the legislators of the conservative parties as follows *: "We are placed in a complicated economic context, in particular we have a high public burden. Within this frame I wonder what it has been done inside the University, to learn about the possibility of charging some kind of tuition-fee and how much funding would be provided by charging a fee. I think that these would entail a signal for the society, as it would mean a student contribution to the University cost"* (December 5, 2001).

However, the Frente Amplio legislators reacted strongly and expressed disagreement with this position because according to their views *"… the debate*

(about tuition-fees) has to be developed by the own University within its own bodies"
(Representative Silvana Charlone August 17, 1997).

It is important to observe that the debate about tuition holds an important position in the discourses relating to University matters at the Parliament. These debates also show that there is significant disagreement between the MPs about this point. The debate about the authorisation awarded to UdelaR to charge tuition-fees (and why UdelaR has not used that authorisation) was not only based on the practical argument that tuition- fees could be charged to augment public revenues. Parliamentary speeches show that MPs judged that there were ***other reasons*** which underlay the debate about the levy of tuition-fees in University programmes.

They may be grouped as follows:

- arguments about tuition based on ideological reasons
- arguments about tuition based on social reasons
- arguments about tuition based on practical reasons
- arguments about tuition based on economical reasons

Arguments about tuition based on ideological reasons

Ideological arguments against the application of tuition in Uruguay are based on the key concept that, as society is the major beneficiary of higher education (i.e. higher education is primarily a public good), these must be considered a social entitlement and, therefore, that higher education must be tuition-free.

This idea has been asserted at the Parliament by Frente Amplio MPs. According to Senator Helios Sarthou*: "Our Constitution establishes that all individuals must have access to*

education. It does not matter if they are rich or poor, all must have the same access. We consider that within this frame a tuition free education has played a key role as an instrument of social mobility. Therefore we consider that it is extremely important to keep and safe guard this principle. We do not agree with charging tuition at the University" (October 13, 1998).

At the same time, the arguments that favoured the application of tuition, based on ideological assumptions, tried to demonstrate that free higher education was supported (funded) by all citizens while graduates and their families (most of them from middle or upper classes) received high private benefits.

In this context, Senator Luis Alberto Heber (Blanco Party MP) judged that *" All the sociey is paying taxes to support ths studies of a few, who benefit, grow and probably will improve our society, but in particular, will benefit their own lifes, and will become richer"* (December, 6, 1995). Whilst, Representative Daniel Corbo (Blanco Party MP) also considered that "*We have to question if the tuition free system is a falacy. It has been instituted to serve as an instrument towards equity and democracy in our society. However we see that (in the University) enrolment there is no representation of all the sectors of our society."* (August 21, 1997).

■ Arguments about tuition based on social reasons

The objection to imposing tuition based on social assumptions considers that tuition might exclude potential students from disadvantaged backgrounds, while the rationale that supports the application of tuition considers the notion of equity: the view that those who benefit of higher education should (or should not) share the costs.

In Parliament, I found several speeches that refer to these ideas. For instance, Senator Jorge Gandini (Blanco Party MP) considers that "*the University has to admit that most of its students drive fancy brand-new cars. We can see those cars in the University parking lots.*

Those students certainly can pay for their education. Those students can act with solidarity, and support the studies of those who cannot afford for their education" (December 6, 1995).

In addition, Representative Guillermo Gonzalez Alvarez (Blanco Party MP) commented as follows: *"I wonder why the University is not considering the possibility of charging a tuition fee considering that it has an authorisation to do so. According to our experience and to what we have heard, almost 80% or 90% of University students come from families that can afford a tuition-fee because the greatest majority or at least half of them had previously attended private (Primary and Secondary) schools. Those families had payed more than 300 or 400 hundred (USA) dollars per month in private schools. But when they arrive to the University, the system is completely free. During twelve years the family is paying more than 4000 (USA) dollars at the private system but in the higher level … this is tuition-free"* (September 15, 2000).

■ Arguments about tuition based on practical reasons

This rationale assumes that the collection of tuition-fees might supplement and augment scarce public revenues.

Representative Ronald Pais (Colorado Party MP) supported this vision stating that *" We are placed in a complicated economic context, in particular we have a high public burden.(…) charging a fee.(…) would mean a student contribution to the University cost and an individual and personal effort of those involved in the University matters"* (December 5, 2001).

■ Arguments about tuition based on economical reasons

Arguments about the convenience of charging tuition based on economic reasons assume that tuition brings some of the benefits of the market to higher education, and, in particular, the presumption of greater efficiency. They assume that the payment of tuition-fees will ensure that students will become more conscientious consumers.

For instance, Representative Gabriel Pais (Colorado Party MP) argued that "*As I see it, the student contribution could be a very positive aspect, because the student will apreciate more for what he pays… if there is some kind of individual or family financial effort the student will be more careful with his studies and his courses… he will attend classes because it will not be a societal burden."* (September 15, 2000).

6.6. Resource allocation as a means of influencing the behaviour the publicly funded University

Source: Interviews; Focus Group; Parliamentary debates

All data collected in this study revealed that the strength of University autonomy has determined a particular role to be played by the Government. According to Interview B *"...It really has no role at all in this scene, it is absent of all discussions and therefore keeps no influence over the budget allocations."*

One of the interviewees (M) commented:

> *"When we talk about the State, about what State are we talking about? Is it the Government, is it the UdelaR... because as I see it, the one who defines the University policies in this country is UdelaR... or even worse, we don´t know who is in charge of setting the policies at the National levels…"*

Another (Interviewee L) reflected:

> *"The State is indeed an outsider, an entity without legitimacy to demand some kind of performance or behaviour. As it has no strength to propose anything, it has no strength to co-ordinate, and therefore it has no power to provide orientation or guidance. In this scenario...who will consider its orientations?"*

However, there is one aspect which emerges as a potential tool in order to influence behaviours: categorical funding. As the Parliament is in charge of allocating all the funds, at least the majority of funds that the public University

receives, one could expect that this body could exert some kind of influence, if it so wished.

Indeed, incremental-categorical funding is perceived as a means to induce actions (Interviewee A and Focus Group). For instance, Interviewee A commented:

> *"… Funding certain projects or programmes… I think it is really acceptable.UdelaR would accept them. I think about projects oriented to specific strategies in health problems, innovation issues, in matters considered of high interest by the Congress or the Government…"*

Most interviewees and Focus group members revealed that, according to their views, Parliament has used incremental budgeting to induce the University to develop actions in specific fields that it considered strategic. Additionally, most respondents (7/12) considered that this type of incremental funding must be observed as a positive innovation. It is certainly considered as the only way that Parliament has introduced elements of strategy (national strategies) and priorities into University funding.

At the same time, a negative aspect is that, as the discussion is focused on the increment, it only relates to a small part of the allocation. The block element is "untouchable" and is considered to be a given by UdelaR (Interviewee B, Focus Group).

Furthermore, Interviewee N considered this new model lacked any sense of political compromise. He judged that: *"It is always easier to receive more and more funds than re-allocating funds".*

However, as reported above, at the Parliament, statements by the Frente Amplio MPs questioned this model of allocating resources. Several MPs considered that, as the University enjoys wide autonomy, the Parliament cannot direct allocations

(under the risk of violating University autonomy); it must just provide the funds (Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, December 7, 1995).

6.7. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

Sources: Policy documents: Political parties proposal for the National elections held in October 2004, Frente Amplio IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez","El Uruguay Social" 6 de setiembre 2004 Ciclo: "Una transición responsable"; Blanco Party , Programa para un gobierno de compromiso nacional Dr Jorge Larrañaga; Statements made to the press by Ministries and politicians; Interviews; Focus Group; Parliamentary discourses.

6.7.1. Documents of political parties

A review of the policy documents written by the political parties suggests that these do not include consideration of the current patterns of finance of higher education or any recommendations about possible changes about it; higher education does not figure prominently in political debate or electoral argument.

Uruguay had national elections in October 2004. For that occasion, the political parties published their programmes containing their proposals and promises for action in all areas.

Hereinafter, I will show how those documents referred to the topics that are under consideration in this study.

6.7.1.I. By the Frente Amplio

This party won the October 2004 elections; the President of the Republic and all his Ministers belong to this party. During the campaign, the basis of the Frente

Amplio´s proposal about education was to increase the amount of funds devoted to *all* educational sectors to 4.5% of GDP.

Policy documents presented by Frente Amplio considered that *"The educational sector needs a significant increment in the allocation of funds, in percentages of GDP, in order to get adjusted to the recommendations of agencies like UNESCO"* (Frente Amplio IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez", p.3).

Mr Tabaré Vazquez, who was elected President of the Republic in October 2004, declared during the presidential campaign that *"We are committed to devote the biggest efforts to increase the resources for education" ("El Uruguay Social" 6 de setiembre 2004, Ciclo: "Una transición responsable").* However there were no specific comments about the funding of higher education.

6.7.1.II. By the Blanco Party

The Blanco Party received close to 30% of total votes in the country in the October 2004 elections. The document written by this party mentions the Solidarity fund, created during a *blanco* administration, and recommends its use as revenue in the construction of a University campus intended to provide room and board to students coming from locations placed far from the capital city, Montevideo (*"Programa para un gobierno de compromiso nacional Jorge Larrañaga*", available in: http://www.alianzanacional.com.uy/)

Also, in August 24, 2004, the press reported that, during the presidential campaign, the *blanco* presidential candidate, Jorge Larrañaga, promised in public to increase the educational expenditure by 50% which would entail an increase in total close to 4.5% of GDP(Ultimas Noticias August 24, 2004, p.5).

Again, however, there was no specific reference to the funding of higher education.

6.7.1.III. By the Colorado Party

The Colorado Party had close to 10% of the votes in the October 2004 elections. The document written by this Party does not mention higher education in any way, including its finance.

6.7.2. Public statements made by officers from the elected Government

After the elections on August 12, 2005, the Minister of Education and Culture declared to the press that *"The Government is committed to allocate this year the claimed 4.5% to the sector, which is one of the Governmental priority principles"* (Diario La Republica: http://www.diariolarepublica.com/2005/larepublica.htm).

FIGURE 26 below shows references to the research questions in policy document by political parties. As we can see in those documents, there was no consideration about the current patterns of finance in the sector or recommendations about possible changes in the future.

FIGURE 26: Policy documents by political parties: reference to the research questions.

BASIS FOR A NEW MODEL	FRENTE AMPLIO	BLANCO PARTY	COLORADO PARTY
BASED ON FORMULA:	no	no	no
BASED ON QUALITY	no	no	no
BASED ON PROGRAMMES OR STRATEGIES	no	no	no
CONTROL OVER THE USE OF FUNDS	no	no	no
REQUIREMENTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY	no	no	no

6.7.3. Interviews and Focus Group

In discussion about possible changes to the arrangements for funding higher education, most interviewees (8/12) indicated that the current model was likely to change. Other interviewees (4/12) affirmed that the current model would not change, although, in their view the system would receive more funding.

Overall, the participants (8/12) took the view that the system would receive more funds because there would be an increase of the educational expenditure in total, close to 4.5% of GDP.

Most concurred with interviewee I:

"I think there will be changes in the next future in order to make available more funds in order to ensure that the national allocations are equal or similar (in percentages of GDP) to the regional allocations to higher education" and with interviewee J that *"there will be more funds for higher education in the next years".*

Interviewee B (University administrator) expressed similar sentiments stating that :"*I don´t expect that there will be changes in the current model ... but there will be more funds".*

All participants of the focus group agreed that the public educational system as a whole would receive more funds and that, as a consequence, public higher education would receive more funds. However, the participants felt that these would not imply *a change* in the system. All concurred that the model would remain the same. Interviewee L (University administrator) expressed the group's view when he explained that: *"I think that there must be more funds for higher education but that the current model must be repeated, it will remain the same".*

6.8. Future changes

Sources: Interviews, Focus Group.

As the Frente Amplio was successful in 2004 elections and it keeps a majority in the current composition of the Parliament, all interviewees and members of the Focus Group expected major changes in some of the factors which shaped the model.

6.8. 1. About the lack of involvement of Government agencies in higher education policies

Several respondents concurred that, in the future, the Ministry of Education and Culture would be more involved in higher education issues. According to interviewees I and H (both advisors at the Legislature), the Ministry of Education and Culture would be more involved in the creation of public policies in the sector, and that such policies would also be more concerned about the status of private higher education.

Interviewee I explained that *"...a leftist Government (like the one that has been elected) may facilitate the adoption of public policies in education. This has been the case of Spain and Chile"* while interviewee H advised that:*"The Ministry will show a preoccupation with what is going on in the private sector of higher education".*

However, several other interviewees doubted that the Ministry of Education and Culture would be in a position to develop some kind of discussion about higher education policies. Interviewee F (officer at the Ministry of Education and Culture) stated that:

> *"I think that the Ministry of Education and Culture will not give priority to these themes. It has already established the guidelines for change and the funding aspects are not a*

priority for the Ministry. However there could be some changes in the current balance within public and private funding".

Some interviewees (all of them advisors at the Legislature) agreed that external advice by international agencies, such as IDB or the World Bank, might help to analyse the funding system in higher education. It was suggested by Interviewee H that:

> *"International agencies may help to introduce changes in the model. This has been the case in Argentina. In this country we have seen that the international agencies provided funds for improvements in higher education, such as FOMEC (a fund created within a major loan from the World Bank to the Argentinean Government oriented to improve the quality of higher education institutions)."*

6.8. 2. About the existing perceptions and beliefs about autonomy

Although institutional autonomy has been a value that has been historically preserved and defended by the Frente Amplio MPs, most of the respondents (7 /12) affirmed that, as the new Government would be more involved in higher education policies, it might introduce "elements of strategy" in the allocation of funds to the system of higher education. One of the interviewees expressed the views of several others when he explained that:

> *"The Ministry of Education and Culture may allocate some funds through competition. For instance... this is the case with research projects...why not with other University programmes?"* (Interviewee F).

Most of the interviewees that answered this question (10/12) suggested that incentives would be used to promote the application of national policies or reflect political priorities. For instance, two of the interviewees (Interviewees A and K) considered that allocations might seek to reward those institutions committed to

addressing areas of high national priority. Interviewee A (University administrator) explained:

> *"Budget allocations may be linked to certain national-level issues that the Legislature or the Government consider "strategic", for instance, projects oriented to face, consider or solve wide, national- based, problems. Such the case of the role of higher education in the creation of a national scientific research system, or in the national health system…"*

Besides, Interviewee K (legislator) stated that

> *" …I think that allocations may be associated to certain strategic fields. Besides, the Parliament must consider that, the public University has already received funding for certain projects, specially international funds, with excellent outcomes."*

6.8. 3. Use of formulae

While considering alternative funding models, most of the respondents (8/12) explained that a new model would not consider the use of formulae.

Interviewee J (legislator) explained why, according to his view, the Parliament will not use formulae in the allocation of resources for higher education:

> *"The use of formulae is a possible approach to this issues… but this is a political matter and, in this particular case, we (the Parliament) must apply political considerations."*

However, one of the interviewees (interviewee K, legislator) disagreed with most of the interviewees who answered this question. He pointed out that, according to his view, the use of formulae, is feasible and might help to improve institutional performance. He commented:

> *"We (the Parliament) may allocate resources based in formulae. It could improve institutional performance. I can remember that, even inside UdelaR, in some areas there has been resource allocation considering formulae"*

6.8. 4. Use of quality considerations

None of the interviewees believed that the future model will utilise considerations of quality. Interviewee J (legislator) claimed that

> *"... we cannot use quality control in the public University... however it could be worth to use them in the private institutions."*

Only one of the interviewees (Interviewee K, legislator) explained why, according to his view the funding model will not link quality considerations to budget allocations. His comment was: *"....UdelaR will never approve it...."* This assertion introduces an explanation or, at least, a possible reason why the element "quality" is to be avoided in the allocation of funding to the sector. It certainly suggests that UdelaR is in the position of introducing a *"veto"* about certain discussions.

However, it is really paradoxical to realise that, although the Frente Amplio MPs have traditionally stated that the Parliament is not entitled to get involved in University matters due to the broad concept of University autonomy, the interviewees considered that, in the future, the Parliament would introduce incentive funding to UdelaR associated with national strategic fields. We must recall that in the 1990s and the early 2000s, several Frente Amplio MPs considered this as a violation of autonomy.

6.8.5. Alternative sources of funding

Sources: Interviews; Parliamentary speeches

All views expressed in the course of data collection suggest that public allocations to the educational system would rise to 4.5% of Uruguayan GDP. This could mean that the educational system would receive more funds because there would be an increase of the educational expenditure.

6.8.6. Alternative sources: tuition-fees.

Based on interview evidence and analysis of speeches in Parliament, the introduction of a tuition fee scheme in UdelaR looks very unlikely, at least in the next future, due to the following elements:

a) the availability of additional Government funding will mean that there will not be less pressure to introduce alternative funds to complement public revenues.

b) the ideological and political predominance of the Frente Amplio Party in the Parliament. Historically, the Frente Amplio legislators have supported the belief in free higher education.

We must recall that the possibility of charging tuition-fees was introduced by the Blanco Party MPs in the 1990s. All discourses supporting a tuition-fee scheme at UdelaR came from the conservative Colorado and Blanco Parties legislators. All discourses from Frente Amplio MPs are clearly manifested against charging tuition.

6.8. 7. Alternative sources: the solidarity fund (Graduate Tax)

The solidarity fund, in other words, the Graduate Tax, has looked like a “politically correct” option to utilise in order to complement public subsidies.

Statements at the Parliament supported this view (Senator Luis Alberto Heber, Blanco Party MP, December 7, 1995). MPs from all parties joined to consider that the imposition of a graduate tax has instituted a fair and equitable system in which University graduates contribute to support the costs of their higher education under a scheme of a deferred payment (Senator Ruben Correa Freitas, Colorado Party MP, December 8, 2000).

Furthermore, discourses by the University Rector, Dr Rafael Guarga, showed full support to utilise and improve the collection of this tax. "*This tax is a reasonable contribution from graduates, who repay through taxation upon entering the workforce. Rather than being a levy on all taxpayers the solidarity funds is an intelligent deferred payment scheme, that only applies to those who benefit from higher education studies".(*September 15, 2000)

In addition, one of the interviewees (Interviewee I, advisor at the Legislature) recommended an increase in the graduate tax scheme because this would introduce more funding in the system. According to his view:

> *"The graduate tax scheme should be improved and strengthened. This tax combines with intelligence that education is a mixed (public and private) good. It acts like a delayed tuition scheme that was introduced in the country smoothly and without confrontation".*

Chapter summary

In this chapter I presented the data that emerged from the three types of data sources: interviews, focus group and documentary analysis. The data were presented around the research questions integrating the data from the different types of source through triangulation and then interpreted thematically, using the procedure of constant comparison.

The data revealed the following elements:

- The National budget is the dominant source of public higher education finance. UdelaR´s budget relies, mostly, in the allocation of funds from the National Budget Law.

- Funds are allocated and received by UdelaR as a block grant and it relies heavily on historical allocations.

- Government agencies remain absent in the cycle of resource allocation to higher education institutions. UdelaR develops its functions with the widest autonomy and it is, only, subject to the formal controls.

- Other public higher education bodies receive their allocations on a five year basis in the National Budget Law, through their mother institutions.

- In the private sector, almost all funding comes from tuition paid by students estimate that tuition fee income represents more than 90% of their total income. They are submitted to formal control from the public authorities. These controls are oriented to the application of legal formalities and do not cover the use of funds.

- An important element that emerges from data is a shared agreement about an endemic lack of funding at the public University. However, there is important disagreement about the ways how UdelaR should face this problem and about the possible use of tuition fees.

- I found that the introduction of a tuition fee scheme in UdelaR looks very unlikely due to ideological and political reasons. However, there is wide agreement about the worth of the imposition of a graduate tax which is considered a fair and equitable system in which University graduates contribute to support the costs of their higher education under a scheme of a deferred payment.

- While considering alternative funding models, most of respondents explained that a new model would not introduce the use of formulae or quality aspects.

- As perceived by interviewees and Focus Group members and several political actors, public allocations to the educational system would rise to 4.5% of Uruguayan GDP, which, in principle will imply that the sector will experience some relief to the problems related to lack of funding. However, according to data, we cannot predict that the model of funding will change.

In the next chapter all this findings will be reviewed and analysed *in extenso* (page 315, below in 7.1.3. Findings) and some key aspects will be identified.

CHAPTER 7: OVERVIEW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the study on the current model of financing higher education in Uruguay and its possible evolution or change according to the views of decision makers in the sector.

It comprises three sections. In the first section the purpose, justification, method, context, and findings of the study are reviewed. The next section identifies some key areas where the study has contributed to the higher education literature. The chapter concludes with recommendations for practice and further research and, finally, I proceed to a critical reflection of the study's strengths and weaknesses from different angles. Based on these reflections, I propose further research avenues.

SECTION 1: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

7.1.1. Purpose and justification

The purpose of this study was to provide an analytical view of the current model of financing higher education in Uruguay and its possible evolution or change according to the views of stakeholders.

I have tried to explain the importance of developing this study showing that there are no previous studies about this topic in Uruguay. A review of the Uruguayan higher education literature suggested that there has been no technical analysis about the funding model of higher education in the country. In addition, the funding authorities, in the case the Congress and the Ministries involved in the funding cycle, do not provide an official explanation about the method utilised to allocate funds to the sector. Thus, whilst some recent studies mention aspects related to institutional budgets, none -excepting Oddone and Perera (2004)-concentrates on financial concepts and none are oriented to the analysis of the model of funding at the system level.

Also, funding arrangements in use in the rest of the system are almost ignored in existing literature. Only some general aspects are known. For instance, I already knew that private Universities were, mainly, supported by tuition (Martínez Larrechea, 2003, p. 98 and Oddone and Perera, 2004, pp: 26-27) and that other public institutions of higher education received appropriations from their “mother” institutions (Brunner and Becerra, 1999, p.13). However, nothing had been written about the precise funding models of these institutions.

7.1.2. Analysis

The analysis was guided by the following Research Questions (RQ) and data were sought in relation to the following operational research questions (ORQ):

RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in reference to the following elements:

ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?

ORQ 1.2 What criteria are used to determine allocations?

ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?

ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability?

ORQ 1.5. Which are the historical and political factors that influence resource allocation?

ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded University?

RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

ORQ 2.1. Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to change in the future?

ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources of revenue in public higher education?

I have addressed these questions on the basis of a theoretical framework and conceptual tools provided in **Chapters 2** and **4**. As was shown in these two chapters, during recent decades higher education worldwide has experienced notable changes in its funding systems. The landscape of higher education finance has been complicated by several issues in recent years, including competition for resources with other sectors (Booth, 1982), concerns about efficiency and effectiveness in the use of funds (Thomas, 2001), and the convergence of several economic and demographic forces. Without any doubt, today, no country can provide through the State as much budget as is wanted by

its society.

These factors have placed constraints on Government funding to higher education throughout the world and have given impetus to a series of innovative dimensions of financing and budgeting in the sector. As a result, there have been notable changes in two main aspects:

First, there has been an evolution in the models used to provide funds to institutions. Whilst many Governments still transfer funds using historical models based on past allocations and, therefore, ignoring institutional performances or other objective criteria, since the 1980s there has been a clear move to other models to allocate public funds among Universities, like formulae and performance-based models.

Formula funding was originally conceived as a more rational and non-political distribution of funds among higher education institutions, using objective criteria, providing a clear insight in the distribution of funds among higher education institutions and facilitating comparisons between institutions (Jongbloed, 2001). However, in the 1990s, some states in USA considered that simple reports of numbers or inputs were not enough to satisfy expectations of productivity or efficiency and began to link part of the budget allocations to performance measures based on the underlying concept that higher education institutions were motivated to improve their performance when performance was linked to budget allocations.

As we saw in **Chapter 4**, formulaic or performance based models are currently in use in several countries, including North American, European and some Latin American countries. Interestingly, Uruguay´s neighbours, Brazil and Argentina, have introduced, at least partially, some aspects of both these models in their funding models.

Second: in the past quarter century, most developed and developing countries around the world introduced policies of cost recovery (Thorn et al, 2004). Within this context, many countries introduced tuition-fees or introduced substantial increases in existing tuition into higher education sectors hitherto supported primarily, or wholly, by public revenues (Johnstone, 1998, p.8). This phenomenon, called "the shift of costs to parents and students" (Johnstone and Shroff Metha, 2000, p.2), entails a transfer in the burden of higher educational costs from the general taxpayer or general citizen to parents and students.

Even though in the Latin American region, public Universities remain reluctant to move towards cost sharing, the endemic problems associated with a shortage of funds have pushed institutions to search and introduce alternative funds, including those coming from tuition-fees. Today in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia and Mexico public institutions are accepting an increasing proportion of their students on a fee-paying basis. (Garcia Guadilla, 2005).

Contextual information about the region and the country and about its system of higher education relevant to the analysis of the findings was presented and summarised in **Chapter 3**.

It revealed that Latin American Universities present common patterns and problems. Public institutions have inherited and preserved the model of Spanish Universities, oriented to dispense education to economic, political and religious *élites.* Research, technological development, and post-graduate training emerged late and with difficulties, and, as a result, research activities are scarce and the number of individuals working in scientific activities is low if we compare it with the numbers of some industrialised countries.

In spite of all these factors, public Universities, have had a significant role in the creation of knowledge in the region (Arocena and Sutz, 2001, p.65; Cetto and Vessuri, 1998, p.5) and have remained as the main vehicles for scientific research.

Public institutions share, too, some key features. They have suffered a major expansion as middle-class women went to work and continued to study and at evening courses opened everywhere for working lower-middle class sectors (Schwartzman, 1999). Today, various of the largest Universities of the region have an enrolment of 60.000 students or more. This enrolment expansion was, principally, absorbed by the public Universities, some of which grew to unmanageable proportions (Kent 1998, p.3) and suffered a consequent over-saturation in the number of students per classroom.

However, in the region access to higher education is still insufficient and reveals severe inequities. Most students at the tuition-free public Universities come from the middle class; the very rich and the very poor are only a minority. In the meantime, the public resources devoted to sustain this expansion have not been able to maintain the expenditure per student.

All these elements interact in a scenario of political activism, locally considered to be a normal aspect of the University experience. Under the influence of the Cordoba Reform, student organisations have maintained close links with workers' organisations and labour unions, frequently joining them in demonstrations and protests. Student centres inside the Universities are usually connected with, identified with, and supported by national political parties. They are, too, the most important protectors of the Latin American sacred values of co-Government and tuition-free education. Reforms to increase reliance on cost-recovery through student payment in one form or another are often not politically viable and are, in many cases, met with major resistance.

The literature reveals that reforms in the funding models in the region have occurred in a somewhat lighter fashion. Historical funding is still the most popular model. Certain countries, like Brazil and Argentina, have introduced partial changes and are slowly moving to alternative models. Only Chile represents an exception in the region with a unique and drastic shift in its funding model. It is the country within Latin America that allocates the lowest public funding to higher education relative to GDP.

The Uruguayan higher education system was shown as unique in the continent. The country has only one public University which is, also, an institution that is known by its co-Government regime (students, teachers and graduates) in which student access is non-competitive, tuition is free, and unconditional public subsidies constitute, almost, the only source of income.

The public University was born together with the Republic and, in many ways, it represents the principles of the Uruguayan citizenship. Open access, tuition-free courses and shared-governance are considered the representation of the embedded values of democracy, justice and equity. However, as the only public University in the country, UdelaR had to face the burden of massive enrolments. In 40 years, enrolments have grown more than 400% while financial resources fell almost equally sharply.

Today, the literature suggests that unlimited access and its consequent massification might be connected with low performance of the institution, high drop-out rates and programme-completion times far longer than expected (Bentancur, 2004, p. 10). If we consider the current conditions in which courses are taught in the majority of the public University´s Faculties, it becomes evident that such openness has an impact in the quality of the resulting teaching. Various observers have pictured the following scenes: classes taught in big rooms or even in locations not specifically designed for teaching (cinemas, amphitheatres, etc), an

extremely low teacher/student ratio (Bentancur, 2003, p.17), poor libraries (Senator Jose Korzeniak, Frente Amplio MP, December 9, 1995) and poor conditions at research facilities (Senator Maria Julia Pou, Blanco Party MP, December 17, 2000). Nonetheless, University management structures are reported to be collapsed and decision-making processes face constant obstacles while internal discussion is resisted.

In this scenario, the Ministry of Education and Culture appears like an absent actor. Even though, according to the Uruguayan law, the Ministry is in charge of leading national policies of education (Decree 407/85), as all the educational agencies are autonomous, the Ministry has no control over public education.

7.1.3. Method

This study employed a **qualitative approach** in order to obtain a more complete picture, as well as the perspectives and perceptions of people involved in higher education. For the data collection phase of the study, multiple sources of evidence were employed under the rationale of triangulation (Yin, 2003). The study has used documents, literature, semi structured interviews, a Focus Group and speeches at Parliamentary sessions.

The multi-modal tools that were chosen tried to address several questions from different perspectives. Using these various techniques enabled me to use their respective benefits and to cross-check data coming from the different sources. Not least, the aim was to avoid the reliance on only one source of data and to make the different methodologies interact with the others (Rezabeck, 2000).

The Parliamentary narrative addressed the period between 1994 to 2004. The interviews took place between 2004 and 2005 and were undertaken with University

managers and policy makers from various fields, including the higher education system, the Congress and the Government.

I organised and analysed the collected data thoroughly. At the simplest level, the analysis undertaken involved examining the assembled data to determine how they answered the research questions. Qualitative data analysis involved identifying, coding, and categorising patterns found in the data (Byrne, 2001). The data was categorised by using descriptive, topic and analytical coding. The categories have been derived from both the interview protocols and the themes emerging from the corpus.

The veracity and credibility of the analyses were enhanced through the explicit reporting of the procedures employed, by incorporating the successive stages of analysis into the structure of each chapter of findings, and through the extensive display of data throughout the study.

7.1.4. Findings

Research findings were presented, summarised and discussed in **Chapter 6.** Hereinafter, there is a synthesis of the findings of the study together with the research described in the literature review to answer the two research questions.

The research questions posed at the end of **Chapter 1** have provided an organisational framework for this study. This section shows how the findings have confirmed, disconfirmed and extended previous research in the field.

RQ. 1. What is the current model of funding higher education in Uruguay in reference to the following elements?
ORQ 1.1 How are funds provided?

In the Uruguayan model, there is a co-existence of different models of financing higher education between public and private institutions. Like in most countries, public education is financed from general revenues collected by the Government. The National budget is the dominant source of public higher education finance and is oriented to fund the institutions and not the students. In this way, funding is supply driven not demand-led.

According to our calculations, in 2004 the public University, UdelaR received 87% of its funding supplies from the Government through the Budget Law block grant allocation. In addition, Chiancone et al (2005) report that, during 2004, the graduate tax supplied 3.7% of University revenues. Other funding from private sources came through research contracts and services which represent 9% cent of total income. This number assumes that UdelaR maintained the same amount of funds collected from contracts and services which were reported in 2001, which has been the last available data (UdelaR, 2001),(FIGURES 27 AND 28 below).

FIGURE 27: UdelaR´s total funding



UdelaR does not charge tuition although there is national legislation that allows the public University to charge it (Law No 16226).

FIGURE 28: UdelaR total funding



Other public institutions are funded through their mother organisations. Moreover, they do not charge tuition. Funds from the National Budget Laws are allocated to the mother organisation (for instance: a Ministry), and this organisation allocates funds to the higher education programmes that operate inside it. All these results confirm assertions in literature by Martinez Larrechea (2003), Brunner and Becerra (1999) and Oddone and Perera (2004).

Private institutions rely on tuition levying (Interviewee C). In addition, they are exonerated from paying taxes (Constitution, art. 62) which implies a State indirect subsidy. All these results are consistent with Martinez Larrechea (2003), Brunner and Becerra (1999), Oddone and Perera (2004). Funds from other sources, for instance, for research or contracts, are insignificant (Interviewee C)(FIGURE 29).

FIGURE 29: Private universities total funding



UdelaR receives allocations through block grants on a quinquennial basis determined by the National Budget Laws. Allocations are determined by the Parliament and are based on requests submitted to the Parliament following an initial study by the Office of Planning and Budget. The allocation process is based on an automatic device of providing the same allocation that was provided in the previous Budget Law augmented with appropriations for specific projects.

The new appropriations are the result of negotiations between University representatives and Parliament members, as already described by Brunner and Becerra (1998, p.8) and by Interviewees L, M, N, O, P and Q. At the Focus Group one of the participants was very clear about how these negotiations occur: *"...(During the budget discussion), UdelaR operates at the Parliament through a series of lobbies that excerpt pressure over different Parliament members or groups."*

During the 1980s and 1990s, the National Budget Laws allocated some special grants to specific educational and research programmes of UdelaR (Laws No. 16320 and 16226; Interviewees L and O).

UdelaR is free to use the funding block grant at its own discretion due to its autonomy established in the National Constitution and by the law (Law No 12549). The State audits the use of allocated resources through accounting controls (National Constitution art. 211-213), but no public response is requested about the internal allocations or other elements such as unit costs, strategic uses or operational aspects.

Allocations are determined by the Parliament in a National Budget Law but are appropriated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of Education has no involvement in higher education funding.

For other higher education institutions (i.e. military higher education Institutions), funds are allocated on a five-year basis in the National Budget law, through the allocation to the Ministry of Defence. This Ministry allocates funds for the higher education programmes that operate inside it under the frame of strategies established by the military authorities (Interviewee D).

ORQ 1.2. What criteria are used to determine allocations?

The criteria to allocate funds to UdelaR are, mostly, historical. The budget allocation is based on the previous year's allocation which is only augmented due to the annual fiscal cycle. Any new "fresh" resources are allocated to special projects.

Since the 1980s, the National Budget Laws allocated some special grants to specific educational and research programmes of UdelaR such as in: a) Continuing education; b) Support for international co-operation; c) Support for research activities; and d) New buildings and facilities of the University hospital (Laws No 16320 and 16662, Interviewee L).

This new appropriations have resulted from negotiations between University representatives and Parliament members.

In addition, each year the University Council presents a proposal for the use of allocated funds and proposes the changes that it considers are required (Law No 12549, art 23) which have been negotiated between the public University representatives and the funding authorities (Interviewees B, J, L, M, N, O, P and Q).

As already discussed in **Chapter 2** (p.51), this is the most traditional type of funding in Latin American countries (Schwartzman, 1993a), a model that has been

fully described by Layzell (1998), Schwartzman (1993a), Pratt (1987), Albrecht and Ziderman (1993) and Jongbloed (2001), among others.

This study suggests that Uruguay mirrors the regional pattern in which very little strategic planning occurs in the financing process (Schwartzmann et al, 1995). However, it suggests, too, that the traditional historical funding mode used in Uruguay has been evolving during the 1990s converting the model into a historical/incremental model. In this case, the increases, or new funds that are allocated to the system, are tied to certain specific purposes determined in the Budget laws. This has been the pattern followed by the Parliament since the late 1980s and during the 1990s; it has introduced new funds to the system -the incremental funding- but has oriented them to fund certain projects.

In this way, funding relies on: (a) historical allocations which are actually the biggest part of the allocations, which are always the same and are expected to be the same; and (b) new allocations (increases) focused on certain projects which are specified in the Budget Laws by the Parliament (Laws No. 16320 and 16662; Interviewees A, B, L and N).

In the other public institutions, such as the military higher education institution, dependent on the Ministry of Defence, interviews show that funds are allocated following opaque criteria. It appears that the priorities set by the military authorities are kept in the dark and the allocation of resources is kept confidential between those in power positions (Interviewee C).

Private institutions set their own funding criteria according to their strategic or developmental plans. Interviews and a review from the legal framework suggest that these institutions operate with full autonomy according to the regulations of the Private Law. As private institutions, they operate with total independence from

public authorities and are only requested by the Ministry of Education and Culture to submit annual financial reports.

The evidence suggests that, in this model, the legislators accept past allocations and decide only about the allocation of increments, as described by Layzell (1998, p.106). In literature, this model has been named “incrementalism”. Its use reveals a conservative nature of decision making at the Legislature and at the political system by and large.

As I see it, incrementalism provides a number of benefits:

- ✓ The current budget decision is the product of previous decisions. Legislators accept past allocations and decide only on the allocations of increments;
- ✓ It reduces political conflict or, in some cases, reinforces an existing equilibrium of political forces;
- ✓ Budget allocations are predictable;
- ✓ It is simple and is easily understood by all;
- ✓ It allows decision makers to focus more closely on the few new programmes.

However, incrementalism might entail, too, a lack of political compromise as getting attention for an issue on the agenda may cause a struggle with other eligible policy matters.

Besides, if I consider the case of Uruguay, it is clear that a change in the incremental model would overwhelm the system. A new, more rational or strategy-based model would require data, calculations and would open discussions and conflict. The answer to this dilemma is, again, incremental decision-making.

ORQ 1.3. What are the degrees of decentralisation?

Resources are allocated by the Parliament to UdelaR on a fully decentralised basis. The public University keeps broad decision-making powers over expenditures such as staff salaries, consumables and equipment. It preserves, as well, full control over earned income from research grants and contracts (Law No 12549). UdelaR is defined by the National Constitution as an autonomous institution which means that it develops its activities with a total independence from the national Government. In addition, it keeps control and is entirely responsible for the use of the block grant. As a consequence, eventual gains and losses are under institutional control, as described by Brinkman and Morgan (1997).

In the other public institutions (i.e. the military higher education institution dependent of the Ministry of Defence), all funding decisions are taken by central authorities and there is no decentralisation at all. This was pointed out by Interviewee D, confirming reports by Brunner and Becerra (1999).

Private institutions operate in a fully decentralised way from the Government (Interviewee C).

ORQ 1.4. With what requirements for accountability?

UdelaR is an autonomous institution and develops its activities with a total independence from the national Government. It is subject to various controls, all accounting controls, exerted by different bodies: the Court of Accounts, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Parliament (National Constitution, art 211-213, Decree No 194/997).

The other public institutions, such as those submitted to military control, do not have autonomy. They are submitted to confidential military rules (Interviewee D). However, like all public institutions, these institutions are submitted to various

accounting controls, exerted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Court of Accounts and by the Parliament.

Private institutions operate with total independence from public authorities and are only requested by the Ministry of Education and Culture to submit annual financial reports (Decree No 308/995). Findings in this study suggest that these reports are not considered or analysed by that Ministry (Interviewee C).

This is consistent with Bentancur (2002) who describes the high degree of autonomy of the private institutions and compares this status with the autonomy determined by the Constitutions and the laws for the public University. According to Bentancur *"this situation is due to the lack of effective policies to create structures to oversee and verify their performance"*(2002, p. 12).

This study suggests a particular approach to accountability in Uruguayan higher education. Resources are allocated to the system on a decentralised basis and institutions keep broad decision-making powers. The Government applies no control on institutional performance or efficiency. Findings reveal that institutional autonomy is considered the *raison d´etre* of this approach.

Information gathered for this study suggests that Governmental agencies hold very little concern about the use of public funds. Internal use of public appropriations has bureaucratic controls and is only monitored through the conventional accounting audits prescribed by law.
Considering the distinction made by Trow, mentioned in **Chapter 1 (**p.29), findings in this study suggest that, in Uruguay, the National Government uses a frame of legal/financial accountability that Trow has defined as: *"the obligation to report how resources are used: is the institution doing what it is supposed to be doing by law, are its resources being used for the purposes for which they are given?"*(1996, p.8).

This study could not identify any evidence of the use of New Public Management ideas in the mechanisms used by the Government in relation to higher education as expected by Hidalgo (1997) and Bentancur (2002). Yarzabal (2001) even warned that the use of those ideas by Latin American Governments would determine: *".. re-orientation of public policies (...) to non-regulated privatisations, result- based assessments, politically oriented accreditation and a total reduction of public funds"* (pp: 11-12). This study shows that, at least in the case of Uruguay, none of these have occurred.

ORQ 1.5. What are the historical and political factors that influence resource allocation?

From the evidence provided by the parliamentary speeches, I have identified the following elements:

- **That the Government agencies are not involved in the process of allocating resources to higher education.**

We found general agreement about this point which is certainly a key feature of the Uruguayan model. All the cycle of allocating resources to the educational public entities is developed in a scenario in which the body in charge of leading national policies of education has no legal authority to exert influence or intervene.

This finding is supported by earlier research developed by Brunner and Becerra (1999).

- **That the existing perceptions and beliefs about the autonomy of UdelaR have consequences on the allocation of resources.**

The outcomes of this study indicate that autonomy, as it is conceived in Uruguay and in Latin America, is another key element that arises while trying to understand how the current model has been shaped. Certainly, this point was raised regularly

at the interviews, at the focus group session and in the Congress debates**.**

The approach to University autonomy manifested by the MPs from the leftist party Frente Amplo implies a notion which stands as a barrier of protection to prevent intrusions in University matters. The message is *"due to autonomy the University is untouchable".* Even stronger, some speeches by Frente Amplio MPs Senators Marina Arismendi (December 5, 1995) and Helios Sarthou (December 7, 1995) show that they consider demands, comments or critiques about University functioning made at the Parliament as an undermining of autonomy or even as interventionism.

- **That there exists distrust between the University and the political powers.**

We found an evident sentiment of distrust between UdelaR and the Parliament. Several statements by Frente Amplio MPs indicate that they consider that this feeling is embedded in the beliefs of the political right (Colorado and Blanco Party) due to the historical fact that the public University has frequently confronted the political powers represented, historically, in those parties. However, in various cases I found statements by Colorado and Blanco Party denying this consideration.

- Finally, a perceived important element at the legislature is **the recognition, by all groups, of an endemic lack of funding at the public University. However, I found considerable disagreement at the Parliament about how the University must face those problems related to inadequate funding.** For instance**,** several legislators agreed that, as there is a legal authorisation to charge tuition-fees, UdelaR must, at least, consider the possibility of charging them.

FIGURE 30: Identified factors influencing funding of UdelaR



ORQ 1.6. To what extent is the Uruguayan Government utilising the current model of resource allocation as a means to influence the behaviour of the publicly funded University?

All collected data in this study reveals that the essence of University autonomy, within the particular notion of autonomy that is held in Uruguay, has determined **a particular role to be played by the Government. It really has no role at all in this scene; it is absent from all discussions and therefore exerts no influence over the budget allocations** (Interviewee N, Focus Group)

Moreover, i**t is my belief that Resource Dependence Theory has not been used as a driver of change in the higher education sector**. An interpretation of the Resource Dependence Theory might suggest that changes can be stimulated

through resource dependence, rather than self induced changes. This does not appear to be true in the case of Uruguay, or only to a very limited extent (considering the orientations given in Parliament to incremental funding).

The findings in **Chapter 6** indicate that the Uruguayan State has not used the strong position that could have been expected according to the descriptions of the Resource Dependence Theory described in pages 43-44. Furthermore, as described by Lemes (2003, p.19), at present the Ministry of Education and Culture has important problems to resolve before it can approach policy making, co-ordination and reform implementation within the higher education system.

RQ: 2. Is the current model likely to change, according to the views of decision makers in the sector?

Most of the respondents were positive about this point. They suggested that Uruguay would devote more funds to finance higher education. This general sentiment was based on the fact that political leaders and Government officers had announced that the educational sector will receive increased funding in a future New Budget Law. For instance, the current Minister of Education and Culture has announced that *"...the Government is committed to allocate this year the claimed 4.5 % to the educational sector which is one of the Governmental priority principles"* (Diario La Republica: August 12, 2005 www.diariolarepublica.com/2005/larepublica.htm).

However, as several interviewees suggested, whilst the system would receive further funding, the funding model will remain the same because of a *"logic of incrementalism"* (Interviewee N).

Slight, or at least, less important changes are likely to be introduced without introducing a new funding model. This study suggests that funding authorities might be interested in a resource allocation scheme oriented to fund strategic

programmes and even to introduce funding through competitive schemes (Interviewee F).

This study suggests, also, that further funding might be originated in the collection of the graduate tax, and that this scheme could be improved in ways to introduce more funding to the system.

ORQ 2.1.Are the historical/policy factors that shape the current model likely to change in the future?

A review of the policy documents written by the political parties revealed that they do not have any clear strategies about the current patterns of finance of higher education. Furthermore, they do not make any recommendations about possible changes in the funding model.

However, according to most of the respondents, the current model was likely to change. A minority of interviewees affirmed that the current model would not change although the system would receive more funding.

Overall, the participants agreed that the system would receive more funds because there would be an increase of the educational expenditure in total close to 4.5% of GDP.

All participants in the Focus Group agreed that the public educational system as a whole would receive more funds and that, as a consequence, public higher education would receive more funds.

Nevertheless, the participants felt that these developments would not imply *a change* in the system. All concurred that the model will remain the same.

Several respondents concurred that, in the future, the Ministry of Education and Culture would be more involved in higher education issues. According to interviewees I and H (both advisors at the Legislature), the Ministry of Education and Culture would be more involved in the creation of public policies in the sector, and that such policies would be most concerned about the status of private higher education. However, several other interviewees doubted that the Ministry of Education and Culture would be in a condition to develop some kind of discussion about higher education policies.

It emerges as an interesting point that, whilst institutional autonomy has been a value historically preserved and defended by the Frente Amplio MPs, most of the respondents affirmed that the new Government would be more involved in higher education policies and will introduce "elements of strategy" in the allocation of funds to the system of higher education.

ORQ 2.2. Are public subsidies likely to grow in the near future? Are there other sources of funding, like tuition fees, likely to be considered as alternative sources of revenue in public higher education?

As the Frente Amplio won the 2004 elections and held a majority in the current composition of the Parliament, all interviewees and members of the Focus Group expected that, as promised, public allocations to the educational system will rise to 4.5% of Uruguayan GDP. This would entail that, as all the educational system would receive more funds, there would be an increase in the funding for the public University and other higher education public institutions.

The introduction of a tuition-fee scheme looked very improbable in the short term because the availability of further funding would reduce the pressures to introduce alternative funds to complement public revenues. Moreover, the ideological and political predominance of the Frente Amplio party in the Parliament (historically

placed against tuition-fees) would certainly abort discussions about cost-recovery in the public University. At the same time, the graduate tax, looked like a more “politically correct” option to utilise in order to complement public subsidies.

Several statements at the Parliament supported this view and there was general agreement that the imposition of a graduate tax had instituted a fair and equitable system in which University graduates contributed to support the costs of higher education (December 8, 2000; July 16, 2003).

SECTION 2: CONCLUSIONS

First. The evidence presented in this study confirms that, in the Uruguayan model, the National Budget is the dominant source of funding of public higher education while private institutions rely on tuition levying. Public funding is oriented to fund the supply and is allocated to institutions through block grants.

The allocation process is based on an automatic device of providing the same allocation that was provided in the previous Budget Law augmented with appropriations for specific projects. These new appropriations are the result of negotiations between University representatives and Parliament members. This study reveals that in Uruguay the model of funding is historical-incremental-negotiated, according to the description of models made in **Chapter 2** pages 49-53 above. The model pictured in this study is consistent with descriptions by Layzell (1998, p.106) and Schwartzman (1993a).

The criteria to allocate funds to public institutions are historical/incremental. As a result the provisions rely, in most cases, not on future but on past actions. In addition, they reflect strategy and deliberate policies only in a very small proportion of allocations. This study suggests that there exists inadequate linking between the funding allocations and strategy.

Public institutions are free to use the funds at their own discretion. Institutions operate in fully decentralised ways. In the case of UdelaR, this is linked to legal aspects bearing in mind that the Constitution and the laws establish its broad autonomy. These aspects might also be re-inforced by cultural and historical elements described in **Chapter 3,** pages 109-114.

The State audits the use of allocated resources through accounting controls within a framework of legal/financial accountability, a somehow “no-brainer” procedural accountability. Findings in this study suggest that University autonomy is considered *the raison d´etre* of the system and that there is a clear connection between institutional autonomies and the idea of accountability, because, due to their autonomy, institutions are not obliged to an academic accountability as defined by Trow (1996, p.8).

This is consistent with Trow (1996, p.6) who concludes that:

> *“Whatever we might call all this, it is accountability in name only. It much more resembles the reports by a civil service in a defeated country to an occupying power, or by state-owned industrial plants and farms to central Government in a command economy. In all such cases, the habits of truth- telling erode, and reports flowing up from the field come to have less and less relation to the facts on the ground that they represent. So a central problem is how to create a system of accountability that does not punish truth-telling and reward the appearance of achievement”.*

Whilst it is the main provider of funds, the State is not involved in the process of higher education and budget allocations *“are a consequence of the combinations of the actions of pressure groups over the Parliament”* (Interviewee L). This is consistent with Bentancur (2002), Martinez Sandres (1999), Brunner and Becerra (1999) and Martinez Larrechea (2003) who have pointed out that the Uruguayan Governments have been absent from policy setting in higher education.

Second. This study suggests that the State is not using the funding model as a tool to introduce changes in the sector and that probably would not use it in the future with such intentions. The analysis of data presented in **Chapter 5** supports this interpretation and pictures a Ministry of Education and Culture with weak capacities to oversee the system, unable to exert influences over it and not prepared to assume a leading role in the scene of higher education.

At last, now that we have examined the characteristics of the funding model utilised in the finance or Uruguayan higher education, let us briefly re-visit some the characteristics that, according to some authors, should underpin a funding model (Serban, 1998 p.16; Burke, 1998, p.12; and Marks and Caruthers 1999, p.3)

FIGURE 31: Whether the Uruguayan model is achieving the desirable characteristics

BE STRATEGY- BASED	**No**
PROVIDE ADEQUATE FUNDING	**No**
PROVIDE INCENTIVES	**No**
REWARD PERFORMANCE	**No**
BE EQUITABLE	**No**
BE SIMPLE	**Yes**
BE FLEXIBLE	**No**
BE PREDICTABLE	**Yes**

At a first glance, it seems clear that the model is not achieving most of the desired characteristics developed by the literature. However, at the same time, the model is simple and easy to administer from a Government, institution and student perspective. Also, it is predictable, as it is largely based in past allocations which are already known.

Nevertheless, it is evident that:

- The current model is not strategy-based. I could not identify any kind of strategies on the historical block allocation. Some incipient strategy can be found in the incremental allocations, but the impact is minimal.

- The current model does not provide adequate funding. In practice, the Government, the Parliament and even the institutions themselves ignore how much funding is needed to fulfil its approved mission. There is apparently no awareness of costs or needs.

- The current model does not provide incentives for quality or rewards for high or improved performance. This arises from the historical block allocation. However, there is some evidence that the incremental categorical block has been utilised to introduce some incentives for the development of certain activities and programmes.

- The current model is not equitable. The model does not recognise institutional differences and missions.

- The current model is not flexible. The model is not responsive to changes in demand from students, in external conditions or in the costs encountered by institutions.

Third. This study suggests that Uruguay will devote more funds to finance higher education. This general view reflects the fact that political leaders and Government officers have announced that the educational sector will receive increased funding in a future Budget Law.

Some interviewees suggested that, whilst the system would receive further funding, the model would remain the same (Interviewees L and N). In addition,

according to one of the interviewees, changes in the funding model will not occur because *"the State is not involved in the finance of higher education"* (Interviewee N).

Some changes, which can be considered of lesser importance, are likely to be introduced without introducing a new funding model. This study shows that, according to the views of stakeholders, the funding authorities might, increasingly, use the mechanism of allocating funds oriented to special programmes and, in this way, introduce some kind of strategic orientations. In addition, this study suggests that further funding might be provided through the collection of the graduate tax and that this scheme could be improved in ways to introduce more funding to the system, i.e. increasing the tax sum in ways that reflect the costs of University instruction.

This study suggests that it is unlikely that a future model will consider the use of formulae or quality considerations.

The outcomes of this study also indicate that, as the pressures to introduce alternative funds to complement public revenues will probably be diminished, due to the availability of supplementary funds, the introduction of a tuition fee scheme in UdelaR is unlikely.

The resulting situation is paradoxical. As observed by respondents and as announced by various Government officers, budget allocations for public higher education will be increased in very important proportions. However, as the incremental model in use relies on the absence of strategies and real analysis or debate about higher education, the new allocations will, probably, reinforce incrementalism.

FIGURE 32: Summary of the model of funding higher education in Uruguay

	Government strategies	Funding		Control	Accountability	Performance indicators
		allocated	directed			
PUBLIC (UDELAR)	NO	YES	NO (block)	NO (block)	WEAK (Block)	NO (block)
PUBLIC OTHER	YES	YES	YES	STRONG	STRONG	STRONG
PRIVATE	NO	NO	NO	NO	WEAK	NO

7.3. 1. Financial crisis

In Uruguay, there is a perception that public higher education is in endemic financial crisis due to growing enrolments (Errandonea, 1990). While between 1960 and 2000, the Uruguayan population of individuals aged between 20 to 24 years grew by 26% (Lemes, 2003), the growth of UdelaR´s population grew by 457% (MEC, 2006). At the same time, the amount of recurring public resources allocated to higher education has decreased on a permanent basis in real terms (Oddone and Perera, 2004).

These dramatic financial declines in per student support have led to major concerns about diminished quality, while staff are underpaid, buildings are deteriorating and most research laboratories lack modern equipment.

Oddone and Perera (2004) have shown that Uruguay devotes fewer funds to the system of higher education than the rest of its neighbour countries. In FIGURE 33 below, Uruguay is placed with other countries in the region and some others in the developed world. It can be seen that Uruguayan expenditure on education is significantly smaller than its neighbours in the region.

FIGURE 33 : Total expenditure on educational institutions and administration as a % of GDP. All sources (2005).

	All levels	Tertiary education (*)
UNITED KINGDOM	5.9	1.1
USA	7.2	2.6
SPAIN	4.9	1.2

BRAZIL	**N/A**	**N/A**
ARGENTINA	**4.7**	**1.1**
PARAGUAY	**6.6**	**1.6**
CHILE	**7.5**	**2.2**
URUGUAY	**2.8**	**0.6**

Based in: UNESCO-UIS/OECD 2005 Education trends in perspective – analysis of the World Education indicators, available in: http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/wei/WEI2005.pdf

(*) In the case of Uruguay, "tertiary education" should be identified only with UdelaR Funding to the rest of the sector is allocated to the Ministries and ANEP and not directly to the higher education institutions. Information about the amount of these appropriations is not available.

Oddone and Perera (2004) deepen thinking on the issue in the following way:

> *" According to UNESCO, in 1964 in Uruguay, public expenditure in education was similar to the regional average. But, during the mid 1990s Uruguayan public expenditure in education represented less of the 2/3 of regional averages (p.16)."*

Certainly all this information has to be considered as a key element for the analysis of the funding element in higher education. It is clear that, in Uruguay, most stakeholders perceive that the state is devoting inadequate funding to higher education. Most perceive that this funding is not only inadequate but insufficient.

As we could expect, this study indicates that the majority of stakeholders are, primarily, concerned with the insufficient amount of funds devoted to the sector. Quantity appears to be a greater concern than strategy or efficiency of use.

Probably, as a direct result of this concern, it was expected that the new Government would devote a major increase in the funding of the public educational sector as a whole and of UdelaR in particular. It had announced that funding for the educational sector would rise to 4.5% of GDP. Under this policy, UdelaR funds would be augmented in more than 80% (Interviewee B).

However, this study also pointed out that the majority of stakeholders were not paying attention to the merits or problems of the current mode of funding the sector.

At this stage and after understanding the importance of the funding models in the management of higher education, some fundamental questions could be: "How much funding is sufficient? . or: “what are the elements that will guide the new allocations? Quality, widening access...?" These questions become more essential, and more difficult, as the availability of funds seems to be changing. None of these questions can be answered right now. Nevertheless, it is important to indicate that the promises made by the new Government do not link the new allocations with special or "strategic" purposes, such as a projection of the State’s needs on economic, social, or political directions.

Whilst it is clear that those promises represent the way that the new authorities express their concern about the importance of supporting higher education and a recognition that the sector has been historically underfunded, just to increase the available funds without constructing a rationale might reinforce the existing incremental model. In this model, as we saw, the discussions, when they exist, are not centred in policies or strategies but on the increments. This move might also reinforce the traditional resource allocation model described in this study in which institutional accountability is an absent concept due to historical and cultural reasons.

7.3.2. The consequences of the model

Several lessons can be learned from the findings in **Chapter 6** which have highlighted that the current model determines a series of consequences.

1. As mentioned in **Chapter 3** (p.127 above), in Uruguay, the process of decentralising education that operated during the 19th and 20th centuries has resulted in the fact that, in the long term, the Ministry of Education and Culture has become a "ministry without schools", that has no control or supervision over public education in the country. Whilst there is a Ministry of Education, all the educational agencies are autonomous and there are no authorities to establish the strategies for the sector (Rama, 1994).

2. As a consequence, the relationship between the Government and the educational public institutions operates through the Ministry of Economy and Finance which is responsible for delivering the State subsidies. This situation hardly represents a policy of decentralisation. On the contrary, all evidence suggests a *de facto* abdication of responsibility by the central authorities.

3. This study shows that there is a general understanding amongst the respondents that the absence of Government control in higher education is a positive fact. For many, there is an assumption that this absence reinforces institutional autonomies. However, at the same time, others perceive that this situation shows the lack of a strategic and systematic approach to public policies in higher education. Probably, the interaction of these elements might have led to a situation in which there is no overall policy structure to co-ordinate the various public policies that affect the financing of higher education.

4. This study also suggests that the net result of not having a rational strategic approach is that institutional policies are often leading to actions that are contrary to the expressed goals of the policies. This is clear when we talk about the unresolved, but crucial, question concerning equity in access. Does the system of public funded higher education with free tuition schemes provide equity in opportunities such as in access between different socioeconomic groups? The evidence shows that, while the stated goal of public policies is to provide more

access for the poor, most students at UdelaR come from the middle and upper-middle class (UdelaR, 2000). As a result, State funding for public institutions disproportionately benefits middle and upper- middle class students since they constitute the bulk of enrolments in these institutions.

So far, the combination of policies of no tuition, open admissions and lack of assistance to needy students at the public institutions, seems to perpetuate, rather than helping to reduce, the inequities that characterise the Uruguayan society. They certainly suggest that the non-tuition policies are not a sufficient condition for the provision of greater equity in access to higher education. But, even worse, current arrangements are, in practice, socially and economically regressive because those not participating in higher education, typically people from disadvantaged backgrounds and with modest income prospects, do not benefit from public funding in this area (Blondal et al, 2002, p.7).

Brunner (1993, pp: 61-63) pictures this phenomenon at the regional level as follows:

> *"The combination of a free higher education (free for the benefitiaries) and automatic public funding is explosive from the equity point of view. In practice, it means that a high proportion of students at the public sector (who come from the three highest quintiles of the income distribution) receive education at no cost and later receive significant economic advantages in their professional lives. Only a small proportion of low income students is benefitted with the same system."*

In similar ways, Lewis and Dundar (2002) and Blondal et al (2002), suggest that most countries who have historically offered free higher education as a perceived means of expanding access to working-class students, eventually found that participation rates among those students had not increased and that most of the subsidies had been received, largely, by middle- and high-income students.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the imposition of tuition is observed with special distrust in Uruguay as there is a rooted ideology of free education, which views higher education as a basic societal obligation. It is also believed that holding to a non-tuition policy will also ensure access disadvantaged low-income students. Let us recall that this ideology has been defended in Parliament by the leftist Frente Amplio, currently in power. However, this study indicates, too, that most of discourses by conservative MPs are also opposed to with the imposition of tuition-fees at UdelaR.

Moreover, some perceive that tuition is much more than an economic issue and reflects a traditional distrust of Government motives within higher education. As they see it, tuition is not a means of diversifying support and, thereby, of reducing the financial pressures on the budgets and the financial dependence on the state. What is more, they consider that, even though high and middle class students are effectively over-represented in the classrooms, the main concern is that there are, also, students that come from lower socio-economic sectors. Therefore, they do not believe that increased fiscal input from the better-positioned students would allow reductions in University public spending or that it could be re-oriented to other social objectives or increase the scholarship system benefiting their excluded peers.

Unfortunately, the result of all this views is that the proposed "equity policies" are not necessarily leading to their expected results. The outcomes are just the opposite.

5. It is our belief that the Resource Dependence Theory has not been used as a driver of change in the higher education sector in Uruguay. An application of the Resource Dependence Theory might persuade Government and institutions to introduce changes through resource dependence, rather than self induced changes.

The findings in **Chapter 6** indicate that the Uruguayan State has not used the strong position that could have been expected according to the ideas of Resource Dependence Theory described above in pages 44-45. Furthermore, as shown, currently the Ministry of Education and Culture has important problems to develop policy making, co-ordination and reform implementation within the higher education system. As already mentioned, Lemes (2002) has reported that, due to a lack of human and financial resources, the Ministry of Education and Culture is clearly unable to address emerging issues in the sector. Similar problems were described by Reimers (1994), in reporting the condition of education in Latin America, showing that several Ministries of education in the region lack trained human resources with the ability or expertise to deal with broad technical aspects.

Nevertheless, it is clear that, if Uruguay decides to elaborate a new framework of higher education, the Ministry of Education and Culture has to re-think its role in a changing scene, while considering the particular institutional setting in which the higher education sector is operating. A Ministry of Education and Culture with new roles will need expertise, technology and other resources and a "re-inforced" position in the sector, that is currently lacking.

SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations from this study fall into two main groups: those for future research and those for use by policy makers and practitioners in the sector.

7.4.1. Recommendations for further research

1. **How and in what ways the absence of public policies about the finance of higher education is increasingly significant in Uruguay is a matter of future research**. Technical literature reported in **Chapter 4** suggests that State funding mechanisms are increasingly significant for the application of policies in the sector in several countries of various regions. This study has shown that the funding model used in Uruguay is a historical/incremental model which relies on former allocations and does not consider at all institutional performance or quality aspects. Furthermore, the country lacks policies of widening access in broad terms.

It also suggests that this model is the result of the actions and in-actions of a State that remains outside of sectoral public policies.
In particular, it might be worthwhile to explore in which new ways the model of allocating resources in Uruguay might be linked to the performance of the public institutions, specially to the performance of UdelaR. As commented in **Chapter 3** (pp:116-119 above), UdelaR is experiencing severe problems at all levels. This performance might be determined by a series of elements, including the way resources are allocated to the institutions from central authorities and are utilised inside them. The linkage between the model of funding used in Uruguay and the institutional behaviour at UdelaR is a matter of future research.

2. **Other aspects of interest that emerge from this study are the linkage between resources and behaviours that has been analysed by the Resource Dependency Theory.** Literature cited above suggests that, in the higher education sector, the allocation of resources has been used as a tool to induce change within the system and the institutions. Moreover, Zinberg (quoted by Newson, 1996, p. 285) and Mora (1997), observed that many Governments see financial incentives as a more effective way of influencing the pattern of activities in higher education institutions than administrative intervention. These incentives, they think, have been a more effective influence on the functioning of Universities and are likely to induce changes in attitudes at institutional levels.

This consideration confirms a strong linkage between resources and behaviours described by Pfeffer and Salancik which should be studied by future research with a special focus on the Uruguayan case, especially in relation to the public University.

3. **The potential use of financing policies as tools to influence behaviours requires a closer and deeper inspection of the incentives structure**. In the current poor policy framework within which institutions operate, funding has no relationship with incentives.

Furthermore, **this study reveals that the current patterns may be driving to disincentives**. This is clearly the case if we consider the ways how the Ministry of Economy and Finance appropriates resources to UdelaR. Interviewees have revealed that the State allocations are appropriated to UdelaR in ways that do not favour an efficient use of funds (Interviewees A and B). Certainly those procedures do not permit UdelaR to manage its resources. A minimal stability is required, which clearly is not assured today.

In addition, **the current model of allocating resources to institutions, mainly based on historical precedence and *ad hoc* negotiations, may be considered a disincentive *per se*.** The introduction of a model of funding institutions using objective criteria, based on predictable and open procedures to allocate public resources, may operate as an incentive for better and more accountable use of resources.

4. However, while analysing the use of incentives, some further aspects should be considered:

- **Not all incentives may be the "right" incentives** and their choice is critical because, if they do not reflect the fact that the University system (and its autonomy) is deeply embedded into the nation´s history and culture, they may have adverse and unintended effects. To that end, particular attention might be devoted to developing an incentive structure that fits with the country´s particular case and the possible consequences of its use.

- As described above, Uruguay is suffering a critical economic and social situation. However, this study reveals that the Government is committed to devote more funds to the higher education system. **If further funding is to be introduced into the system, the Government might pay special attention to utilising a portion of allocations as incentives** towards the achievement of State goals, such as improvement of quality in teaching and research, promotion of efficiency and enhancement of student access.

For instance, **a possible linkage between funding and access should be explored**. If maintaining and improving access is an important political goal, the Government should consider the use of some kind of student-based funding techniques like those used in Chile. This system, which is called an "indirect approach" because funding is channelled via students rather than directly to institutions (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.46), may guarantee an "education for all" in better ways than the current system of no tuition and might induce UdelaR to a revision of its current "no tuition" frame.

5. Another fundamental aspect while considering the use of an incentive frame, is the source of the funds that the incentives will allocate. Indeed, these may influence the effectiveness of the system because, if funds are new or additional, the University may choose to ignore the incentive and forego whatever funding it might have provided. As stated by Lang (2003, p.12):

" If, however, the funds available for allocation come from existing public grants to colleges and Universities, the incentive may be as much a stick as a carrot, and as such will be harder for institutions to ignore, regardless of their autonomy."

7.4.2. Recommendations for practice.

7.4.2.1. Improve the graduate tax scheme

This recommendation is not very surprising, but may be important. The creation of the graduate tax has implied the replacement of the traditional "no fee" approach to higher education financing. By definition, the introduction of the graduate tax signifies that, rather than being a levy on all taxpayers, the tax applies only to graduates. It is, indeed, the most significant change in the scenario of a tuition-free public higher education in the last 20 years.

Furthermore, it is this aspect of the Uruguayan case that deserves further analysis. Since the 1990s, there has been considerable debate about the desirability of the introduction of tuition fees in public higher education. For many people, a situation of no tuition was regarded as a basic right (UdelaR, 1999) and, in some ways, the goal of achieving access for all became an end in itself.

This situation was confirmed by Johnstone (1997) who explained that inauguration of tuition where such a policy does not yet exist is a politically difficult act, regardless of its merits. Vossensteyn (2000) explains that, in theories of economic behaviour, this phenomenon is called *"the endowment effect".* He points out that, based on this effect, people often ask a much higher compensation for giving up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.

However, it is interesting to observe that, in the end, the fee debate was superseded by the introduction of the graduate tax without any significant resistance. The creation of this tax entailed a recognition, for the first time, that users can contribute to support the system and that users are, actually, beneficiaries from higher education. In this sense, higher education is both a public and a private good. In addition, the existence of a graduate tax implies a belief that

students may not be able to finance their education at the time of their studies and, therefore, are allowed to reimburse, at least in part, the aid that they receive from the society from their future earnings (Eicher, 2000).

The graduate tax is becoming an increasingly important element of higher education funding and is creating an innovative situation in Uruguay. For the first time, a special tax collects funds for higher education according to a pre-established procedure: all income collected through this tax is put into a fund whose revenues are reallocated to the public University and oriented to certain programmes that have been linked to strategies set by the Parliament in the law.

Oddone and Perera (2004) are the only authors who have studied the context of this tax. However, there is still no analysis about its effectiveness. Oddone and Perera's research suggests that, whilst this tax provides 4% of University revenue - a very small proportion of University finance-it has the potential to grow if some changes are introduced in its composition.

However, *prima facie,* it seems clear that the current taxation scheme is regressive because:

(a) The amount of the tax has no relationship with the costs of instruction and, therefore, all graduates pay the same charge. There is also no consideration of the rates of return of the different disciplines.

(b) The payment schedule is fixed. This implies that graduates with high income are not allowed to repay rapidly and that graduates with high incomes pay the same tax of those with lower incomes. Only those graduates who attest an income lower than US$ 170 per month are exonerated from payment.

The scheme, therefore, is in need of some modifications as follows:

- The tax must reflect some percentage of the total cost of instruction. Otherwise, an unintended consequence can be that certain graduates may be asked to pay more than the cost of their programmes. A new system may introduce tariff bands in order to differentiate between costs and the presumed benefits from studying in a particular programmes

- Some graduates, for instance graduates with very low income, may be exempted from making repayments.

- The system might induce UdelaR to use the fund as a mechanism to recover costs. That also means that UdelaR will actually have to know and measure its costs, e.g. how much does it cost to educate a lawyer or an engineer? Such information, at present, is totally unknown.

- Uruguay might learn from international experience in this matter. The case of Australia, for instance, deserves a careful consideration. In Australia, a graduate tax was introduced in the 1980s within a frame called higher education Contribution Scheme (HECS). During the 1990s, the scheme was evaluated, modified and improved, and has become an important element of higher education funding. Some key features of Australian HECS are the following :

- Payment arrangements are based on the student´s capacity to pay. In this scheme, students have the choice of either paying their tuition fees, up front at the beginning of each semester and receiving a 25% discount, or repaying their HECS debt through an income-contingent liability scheme after graduation (Kaiser et al, 2001; Wagner, 1996).

- All units of study are divided into three bands according to instructional costs and to rates of return of disciplines. The amount of HECS payable depends on which band a student's units of study fall within.

- Graduates with dependants are exempted from making repayments if they qualify for a medical care levy exemption (DEETYA, 2003; Kaiser et al, 2001).

7.4.2.2. Learn about what is going on in the higher education finance of neighbouring countries.

While it is seldom possible to apply policies or practices from one country to another, important lessons can be learned from abroad (Boyer, 1993). The world has become increasingly interconnected and, in particular, the regional linkages have become very active due to the creation of MERCOSUR, the regional economic association between Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. MERCOSUR has Chile and Bolivia as external associated members.

A perspective of what is happening in the rest of the MERCOSUR countries is essential in understanding how funding models have evolved in countries with significant similarities with Uruguay in cultural and historical aspects. As shown in **Chapter 4** (pp: 180-186 above), Uruguayan neighbours (Brazil, Chile and Argentina), have introduced changes in their funding models in the last years. This perspective might help to analyse patterns, reactions and alternatives about these matters.

- **Brazil** has introduced a strategy in which funding for public institutions is linked to improved access, increases in the quality of education and improvements in institutional performances (World Bank, 2000). Public institutions receive fiscal appropriations through block grants on the basis

of performance contracts. The allocation for each institution is determined using a formula, considered "simple and transparent", that "rewards" changes that show improvements in productivity in accordance with policy goals of greater access, quality and efficiency. In granting institutions greater autonomy, the Government is requiring that institutions be accountable to their stakeholders.

Nevertheless, Schwartzman (2002) laments that the Brazilian model still requires further improvements because public allocations are still strongly tied to historical patterns as 90% of allocations are devoted to salaries; only 10% of the total budget is allocated through performance funding on the basis of indicators of success in graduation and quality in research and post-graduate education.

- The **Chilean** higher education system was changed profoundly in 1981 following structural and financial reforms introduced by Pinochet´s military Government. The range of institutions grew from originally 8 public and private Universities (called the “traditional” Universities) into a total of 257 tertiary institutions encompassing 68 Universities (public and private), 70 private professional institutes and 119 private technical training centres (Holms Nielsen et al, 2002).

The funding model was modified completely. Government funding, which entailed almost 100% of higher education finance support before the 1980s (both public and private Universities received public support), dropped to 50% and all Universities were induced to charge tuition. The new system abandoned the terms public and private and simply distinguished between institutions that received fiscal support and those that did not (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1993, p.47).

Today public institutions receive budgetary allocations from the Government whereas the private institutions finance their budgets with tuition and fees (World

Bank, 1995, p.63). Public subsidies to public institutions rely on the combined criteria of a historical-negotiated model and formula funding. This allocation represents 60% of the total public appropriation, including funds from the Direct Public support *(50% Aportes Fiscales Directos)* and funds from an indirect public support *(10% Aportes Fiscales Indirectos),* already explained in pages 180-183 above. These funds are provided on a formula basis to all institutions (traditional and new institutions) linked to a best- student admission criteria.

The rest of the subsidies are appropriated based on the principle that "State funding follows the student". This allocation is divided in two parts: (a) 9% of this support is allocated to the all institutions on a formula basis based to a best-student admission procedure and (b) 31% is awarded directly to students through loans and scholarships.

- In **Argentina,** since the 1990s, the Ministry of Education (through the Secretariat of University Policy) has introduced a new funding scheme: the budget traditionally negotiated in the Parliament is progressively substituted by allocation mechanisms based on performance criteria (Thorn et al, 2004). In this way, since 1997, the total budget is distributed through the new scheme bearing in mind the following items:

✓ 87% is devoted to salaries and

✓ 13% is distributed through a new scheme that considers special programmes (new buildings, salary incentives to professors, research programs and scholarships) and an amount which is distributed through a funding formula based on unit cost per student in each discipline.

7.4.2.3. Re-examine and discuss the model and the frame of funding of higher education.

This study provides information to examine the current funding frame for higher education in Uruguay. Its findings certainly suggest that this frame of funding is a part of the whole problem, together with the funding model, and that both elements deserve further analysis and discussion.

In FIGURE 32 below I summarise the funding cycle and, at the same time, the Uruguayan funding model. Certainly, it provides a picture of certain key aspects that emerged from this study such as: the predominance of the public University, the absence of the Ministry of Education and Culture and the significant role of partisan-political actors represented in Parliament.

FIGURE 34: University funding cycle



Indeed, Uruguayan society deserves a discussion about the funding of higher education, which includes not only the funding model but also the frame of funding and other aspects, such as: who allocates the funds and what bodies oversee the behaviour and performance of the sector on behalf of the Uruguayan citizens.

This study shows that, in the current frame, the funds are allocated by the Parliament through laws based on requests made by the institutions. This frame lacks an agency or a body with oversight of higher education. The Parliament is not involved in the sector, and, in practice, it should not be involved, because it is the body that allocates resources to all the activities that receive public funding in the country, such as Education, Health Care, Social Security and Defence. The Parliament was created to vote the laws in which funds are allocated, but was not created to be the funding agency of all those sectors. Its current role has to be reviewed.

The Parliament is a body that reflects the result of different and conflicting forces. It is the arena for negotiations focused on approving legislation and the national budget. However, it is neither prepared nor positioned to develop a technical analysis or discussion about the sector´s matters. Furthermore, it is a body which lacks technical structures and expertise.

It is clear that there must be another body created to undertake this analysis. Some specialised body, probably the Ministry of Education and Culture -or another independent body, for instance an intermediary or buffer body such as exists in other countries- should take care of what is going on in the sector. The final question is, however, whether politicians are willing, and able, to place this duty in a technical, rather a political, body.

POST- SCRIPT

Funding for Education

Education has been a priority of the current administration. Despite immediate concerns with the fiscal deficit, and after a notable discussion with the teachers´ unions, in 2008 the Government recognised the need to dedicate more resources to this sector and, as promised, set 4.5% of GDP as the target figure for total education expenditures.

The 2007 Budget Law, passed in 2008, confirmed additional budget allotments of which US $ 134.000.000 was earmarked for education. With this increase, education has funds equivalent to 4.5% of GDP, as requested for years and as promised by the Frente Amplio Party, now in the Government.

As an example of the highest priority of this point, the President of the Republic declared that "*the Government is acting responsibly and is meeting the commitment of granting 4.5% of GDP to education and maintaining a needed balance and fiscal responsibility in order to respect and maintain a healthy economy.*" (El País Digital, 22 April, 2008), http://www.elpais.com.uy/08/04/22/pnacio_342484.asp

Funding for UdelaR

In total, during the last three years, the 2005 Budget Law No 17.930, the 2006 Budget Law No 18.172 and the 2007 Budget Law No 18.362, have increased UdelaR´s allocation in 31% and have allocated an increase of $ 929.000.000 (US$

40.000.000)**(ANNEX 10).** Following a pattern already described in this study, UdelaR was requesting an increase of more than 60% in its budget allocations.

The increase of funds represents an allocation to higher education close to 0,79% of GDP. UdelaR was requesting 0, 85% of GDP.

The new Budget laws have mirrored the pattern of former laws which has been already described in this study and have allocated funds as follows:

1. 82% as a block grant and
2. 17% of the increments are allocated to ear-marked funds to specific programmes, including:
    - Development of new post-graduate programmes
    - University programmes in inner Uruguay (outside the capital city Montevideo)
    - New buildings
    - Joint programmes with ANEP
    - Joint projects with industry.

As predicted in this study, the allocation process remained the same, based on an automatic device of providing a block grant allocation augmented with appropriations for specific projects.

Besides, the Ministry of Education and Culture was maintained outside the discussion of the new appropriations. The main actors in the discussion were the Parliament, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, UdelaR and the teachers´ unions and the focus in the discussion was centred, only, in the amount of the funds. Interestingly, there were no mentions or considerations about quality aspects or to strategic elements.

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES
School of Management

Funding higher education in Uruguay: a policy question

by

Panambi Abadie

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration
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VOLUME 2

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 1

CONSTITUTION AND UNIVERSITY LAWS

1. National Constitution

CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA
SECCIÓN XI
DE LOS ENTES AUTÓNOMOS
Y DE LOS SERVICIOS DESCENTRALIZADOS

CAPÍTULO II

Artículo 202. La Enseñanza Pública Superior, Secundaria, Primaria, Normal, Industrial y Artística, serán regidas por uno o más Consejos Directivos Autónomos.

Los demás servicios docentes del Estado, también estarán a cargo de Consejos Directivos Autónomos, cuando la ley lo determine por dos tercios de votos del total de componentes de cada Cámara.

Los Entes de Enseñanza Pública serán oídos, con fines de asesoramiento en la elaboración de las leyes relativas a sus servicios, por las Comisiones Parlamentarias. Cada Cámara podrá fijar plazos para que aquellos se expidan. La ley dispondrá la coordinación de la enseñanza.

Artículo 203. Los Consejos Directivos de los servicios docentes serán designados o electos en la forma que establezca la ley sancionada por la

mayoría absoluta de votos del total de componentes de cada Cámara.

El Consejo Directivo de la Universidad de la República será designado por los órganos que la integran, u los Consejos de sus órganos serán electos por docentes, estudiantes y egresados, conforme a lo que establezca la ley **sancionada por la mayoría determinada en el inciso anterior.**

Artículo 204. Los Consejos Directivos tendrán los cometidos y atribuciones que determinará la ley sancionada por mayoría absoluta de votos del total de componentes de cada Cámara.

Dichos Consejos establecerán el Estatuto de sus funcionarios de conformidad con las bases contenidas en los artículos 58 a 61 y las reglas fundamentales que establezca la ley, respetando la especialización del Ente.

Artículo 205. Serán aplicables en lo pertinente a los distintos servicios de enseñanza, los artículos 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 198 (inciso 1 y 2), 200 y 201.

2. Law No. 12.549

LEY ORGANICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA

LEY Nro. 12.549

(Publicada en el Diario Oficial el 29 de Octubre de 1958)

Aprobacion del presupuesto de la UdelaR

Los presupuestos de la Universidad son aprobados por el Parlamento a traves de ley (art 220)

Art.23 -PREPARACION DE LOS PRESUPUESTOS -Los proyectos de presupuestos preparados por cada Consejo de Facultad, serán enviados al Consejo Directivo Central con la anticipación necesaria para permitir su consideración y aprobación. El Consejo Directivo Central podrá introducir en los proyectos recibidos las modificaciones que estime convenientes. Los proyectos de presupuestos de la Universidad comprenderán los rubros necesarios para el pago de las retribuciones personales y gastos de todas sus reparticiones. Se proyectarán estableciendo separadamente las p artidas globales para gastos y retribuciones de todo su personal.

Art.24 -EJECUCION DE LOS PRESUPUESTOS -Anualmente el Consejo Directivo Central presentará al Poder Ejecutivo la rendición de cuentas y el balance de ejecución presupuestal correspondiente al ejercicio vencido, dentro de los seis meses siguientes. Conjuntamente podrá proponer las modificaciones que estime indispensables en los presupuestos de sueldos, gastos y recursos.

El Consejo Directivo Central podrá disponer las trasposiciones de rubros requeridas para el mejor funcionamiento de sus servicios, dentro de las partidas de retribuciones como así también de las fijadas para gastos en los presupuestos.

El sobrante de rubros al final de cada ejercicio, acrecerá los rubros disponibles del ejercicio siguiente.

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3. Law Nº 16.226, Art. 407 and law Nº 16.736, Art. 595

Ley Nº 16.226

Artículo 407.- Facúltase a la Universidad de la República a cobrar una matrícula a sus estudiantes que se hallen en condiciones económicas de abonarla. Al presentar el mensaje de su Presupuesto y Rendiciones de Cuentas deberá incluir el detalle de la utilización proyectada y ejecutada de tales .

Ley Nº 16.736

Artículo 595.- Facúltase a la Universidad de la República a crear el "Fondo de Solidaridad Estudiantil", que tendrá como objeto otorgar becas para vivienda, alimentación y traslado, a estudiantes universitarios del interior del país que estudien en la capital y a estudiantes de bajos recursos económicos, que en ambos casos demuestren regularidad y rendimiento en sus estudios. Serán recursos del Fondo de Solidaridad Estudiantil lo que disponga la Universidad de la República para ese fin y los provenientes de donaciones o legados. A los efectos de obtener mayores recursos para el mencionado Fondo, la Universidad de la República también podrá disponer el pago obligatorio de una o varias "Cuota de Solidaridad" cada año, por parte de todos aquellos estudiantes cuyo poder adquisitivo, personal o familiar, así lo permita.

4. Budget laws

Ley 16462

UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA

Artículo 200.- Increméntase el rubro 0 de la Universidad de la República en el equivalente a U$S 18:161.765, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América dieciocho millones ciento sesenta y un mil setecientos sesenta y cinco).

Artículo 201.- Consolídase la partida establecida en el artículo 424 de la Ley Nº 16.320, de 1º de noviembre de 1992, con cargo a Rentas Generales y con el destino previsto en el artículo 408 de la Ley Nº 16.226, de 29 de octubre de 1991, la que tendrá carácter permanente.

Artículo 202.- Consolídase la partida establecida en el artículo 425 de la Ley Nº 16.320, de 1º de noviembre de 1992, con cargo a Rentas Generales y con destino a los gastos de funcionamiento del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor Manuel Quintela", excluidas las retribuciones personales, la que tendrá carácter permanente.

Artículo 203.- Consolídase en el presupuesto universitario global la partida de $ 552.319, (pesos uruguayos quinientos cincuenta y dos mil trescientos diecinueve), a precios de 1º de enero de 1993, destinada a atender las retribuciones y cargas legales correspondientes a los funcionarios de la Universidad de la República comprendidos en el artículo 14 de la Ley Nº 15.783, de 28 de noviembre de 1985.

Artículo 204.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 1:392.800, (pesos uruguayos un millón trescientos noventa y dos mil ochocientos), equivalentes a U$S 400.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América cuatrocientos mil), para financiar el dictado de cursos intensivos de actualización, especialización y reciclaje de graduados.

Artículo 205.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:089.200, (pesos uruguayos dos millones ochenta y nueve mil doscientos), equivalentes a U$S 600.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América seiscientos mil), a efectos de ser utilizada como contrapartida de convenios de carácter nacional o internacional.

Artículo 206.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 696.400, (pesos uruguayos seiscientos noventa y seis mil cuatrocientos), equivalentes a U$S 200.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América doscientos mil), a efecto de apoyar las actividades que desarrollen los investigadores que se han perfeccionado en el exterior.

Artículo 207.- Asígnase una partida anual, con destino al programa de Bienestar de Funcionarios de la Universidad de la República.

Para financiar el déficit actual del pago de las cuotas mutuales de los funcionarios docentes y no docentes $ 6:077.259, (pesos uruguayos seis millones setenta y siete mil doscientos cincuenta y nueve), equivalente a U$S 1:745.336, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América un millón setecientos cuarenta y cinco mil trescientos treinta y seis).

Artículo 208.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 1:392.800, (pesos uruguayos un millón trescientos noventa y dos mil ochocientos), equivalentes a U$S 400.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América cuatrocientos mil), destinada a la mejora de gestión de los servicios universitarios.

Artículo 209.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:785.600, (pesos uruguayos dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil seiscientos), equivalentes a U$S 800.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América ochocientos mil), con destino al proyecto "Construcción, Reparación y Mantenimiento del Hospital de Clínicas Doctor Manuel Quintela".

Autorízase a la Universidad de la República a gestionar un programa con financiamiento externo para el reciclaje del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor Manuel Quintela".

Artículo 210.- Otórgase una partida anual de $ 2:785.600, (pesos uruguayos dos millones setecientos ochenta y cinco mil seiscientos), equivalentes a U$S 800.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América ochocientos mil), a efecto de atender el funcionamiento del Hospital de Clínicas "Doctor Manuel Quintela".

Artículo 211.- Las partidas asignadas a la Universidad de la República por el artículo 615 de la Ley Nº 16.170, de 28 de diciembre de 1990, incluidas en el Inciso 24 "Diversos Créditos", serán transferidas, por la Contaduría General de la Nación, al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República".

Artículo 212.- El Fondo Permanente que se asigne al Inciso 26, Universidad de la República, será equivalente a tres duodécimos

de la suma total asignada en el respectivo Presupuesto para Inversiones y Gastos de Funcionamiento, con la excepción de la correspondiente a retribuciones de servicios personales, cargas legales y prestaciones de carácter social y suministros de bienes o servicios efectuados por organismos estatales y paraestatales. Dicho monto será ajustado anualmente al 1º de enero de cada año, de acuerdo a los créditos permanentes vigentes a esa fecha.

Artículo 213.- Facúltase al Poder Ejecutivo a incorporar a los beneficios establecidos por el artículo 462 de la Ley Nº 16.226, de 29 de octubre de 1991, a las empresas contribuyentes del Impuesto a las Rentas de Industria y Comercio, Impuesto a las Actividades Agropecuarias, Impuesto a las Rentas Agropecuarias e Impuesto al Patrimonio, por las donaciones que realicen a la Universidad de la República.

El contribuyente entregará su donación a la Universidad de la República debiendo ésta expedirle recibo de donación y constancia firmada.

El Poder Ejecutivo reglamentará las formas en que le serán canjeados al contribuyente los recibos otorgados por la Universidad de la República por certificados de crédito.

Artículo 214.- Destínase la suma equivalente a U$S 300.000, (dólares de los Estados Unidos de América trescientos mil), con destino a la creación de una Escuela Técnica de producción lechera en Bañados de Medina, departamento de Cerro Largo, dependiente de la Universidad de la República.

Ley 16226

Artículo 462.- Las empresas contribuyentes del impuesto a las Rentas de la Industria y el Comercio, Impuesto a las Actividades Agropecuarias, Impuesto a las Rentas Agropecuarias e Impuesto al Patrimonio, gozarán de beneficios

tributarios por las donaciones que realicen para la compra de alimentación escolar, útiles, vestimentas, equipamiento, construcciones y reparaciones a escuelas públicas que atiendan a las poblaciones más carenciadas.

El 75% (setenta y cinco por ciento), del total de las sumas entradas convertidas en UR (unidades reajustables) a la cotización de la entrega efectiva de las mismas, se imputará como pago a cuenta de los tributos mencionados. El 25% (veinticinco por ciento), restante podrá ser imputado a todos los efectos fiscales como gastos de la empresa.

La Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, (ANEP), publicará para cada año civil la lista de escuelas que atienden la población más carenciada; y autorizará contribuciones hasta un máximo de 7 UR, (siete unidades reajustables), por alumno, que no podrá superar 1:500.000 UR, (un millón quinientas mil unidades reajustables), al año, en el total de escuelas beneficiarias. La empresa contribuyente podrá sugerir la escuela que desea beneficiar.

El contribuyente entregará su donación a la Inspección Departamental de Educación Primaria para la compra de los bienes y servicios, debiendo expedirse el recibo correspondiente e indicará la escuela elegida.

Dentro de los treinta días siguientes de recibida la donación se deberá poner a disposición de la Dirección de dicha escuela, los bienes y servicios aludidos, dejándose constancia firmada.

El Poder Ejecutivo dentro de los noventa días de promulgada la presente ley, reglamentará la forma en que le serán canjeados al contribuyente los recibos otorgados por la Inspección Departamental de Educación Primaria, por certificados de crédito.

Artículo 463.- Declárase que el Estado, los organismos comprendidos en el artículo 220 de la Constitución y los Gobiernos Departamentales, gozan de inmunidad impositiva, tanto nacional como departamental, por sus bienes y actividades no comerciales ni industriales.

5. Laws and decrees about the private universities

Decreto Ley Nro. 15.661

UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS

Se establecen disposiciones para los títulos profesionales que otorguen las Universidades Privadas. (Publicado en "Diario Oficial" el 20 de noviembre de 1984).

El Consejo de Estado ha aprobado el siguiente:

PROYECTO DE LEY

Artículo 1.- Los títulos profesionales que otorguen las Universidades Privadas, cuyo funcionamiento haya sido autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo, para su validez deberán ser registrados ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, que organizará el Registro correspondiente.

Artículo 2.- Los Títulos a que se refiere el artículo anterior tendrán, una vez registrados, idénticos efectos jurídicos que los expedidos por la Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay, e independientemente de éstos.

Artículo 3.- Derogase toda disposición que directa o indirectamente se oponga a lo preceptuado por esta ley.

Artículo 4.- Comuníquese, etc.

Sala de Sesiones del Consejo de Estado, en Montevideo, a 23 de octubre de 1984.

GREGORIO C ALVAREZ –
ARMANDO LOPEZ SCAVINO

DECRETO Nº 308/995
DECRETO DE ORDENAMIENTO DEL SISTEMA DE ENSEÑANZA

Apruébase el Ordenamiento del Sistema de Enseñanza terciaria Privada y fíjanse sus cometidos.

Visto: el Decreto-ley Nº 15.661, de 29 octubre de 1984.

Considerando:

I) Que el mencionado Decreto-ley confiere a los títulos profesionales que otorguen las Universidades Privadas cuyo funcionamiento haya sido autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo, una vez registrados ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, idénticos efectos jurídicos que los expedidos por la Universidad de la República.

II) Que la aplicación de esas disposiciones legales referentes a la validez y eficacia de los títulos profesionales, hace necesario establecer por vía

reglamentaria los conceptos de "universidad" y de "título profesional", y consecuentemente los requisitos mínimos necesarios para reconocer a Cierta enseñanza la calidad de "universitaria".

III) Que la notoria proliferación de instituciones privadas que ofrecen públicamente enseñanza post-secundaria, hace aconsejable establecer, en la misma oportunidad, un régimen que permita otorgar un reconocimiento oficial de calidad a aquéllas que acrediten ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el adecuado nivel académico de la enseñanza impartida y de los títulos que expidan.

IV) Que a los efectos indicados en los numerales anteriores, el Poder Ejecutivo se ajustará a conceptos y requisitos generalmente admitidos, que han sido objeto de larga elaboración en el medio cultural y académico nacional einternacional, y en organismos internacionales como la UNESCO y la OIT.

Todos esos antecedentes, así como las legislaciones de Argentina, Brasil, Costa Rica, Chile, España y Estados Unidos de América, fueron considerados en las deliberaciones que culminaron con el documento acordado en la Comisión Consultiva convocada por el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, integrada por representantes del propio Ministerio, de la Universidad de la República y de instituciones privadas que funcionan en el país.

V) Que todo ello se hará con el más estricto respeto a la libertad de enseñanza, garantizada por el artículo 68 de la Constitución de la República, que es inherente a la personalidad humana (Constitución, artículo 72) y forma parte de las bases fundamentales de la nacionalidad (Constitución, artículo 80 Nº 6º).

Atento: a lo dispuesto por el artículo 168 numeral 4º de la Constitución de la República,

El Presidente de la República

DECRETA:

CAPITULO I

De la enseñanza terciaria universitaria y no universitaria: conceptos y principios generales.

Artículo 1.- (Enseñanza terciaria). Se considera enseñanza terciaria la que, suponiendo por su contenido que sus estudiantes hayan cursado con aprobación los ciclos completos de enseñanza primaria y secundaria o técnico-profesional en institutos estatales o privados habilitados, profundiza y amplía la formación en alguna rama del conocimiento. La enseñanza terciaria es libre, conforme a lo dispuesto por el art. 68 de la Constitución de la República.
En todas las instituciones docentes de enseñanza terciaria se atenderá especialmente la formación del carácter moral y cívico de los alumnos (Constitución, art. 71).

Artículo 2.- (Enseñanza universitaria). A los efectos del artículo 1 del Decreto-ley Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, se considera universitaria la enseñanza terciaria que por su rigor científico y profundidad epistemológica, así como por su apertura a las distintas corrientes de pensamiento y fuentes culturales, procure una amplia formación de sus estudiantes que los capacite para la comprensión crítica y creativa del conocimiento adquirido, integrando esa enseñanza con procesos de generación y aplicación del conocimiento mediante la investigación y la extensión de sus actividades al medio social.

CAPITULO II

De la autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento de instituciones de enseñanza terciaria universitaria y no universitaria.

Artículo 3.- (Autorización para funcionar como institución de nivel universitario). El Poder Ejecutivo otorgará la autorización para funcionar prevista en el artículo 1 del Decreto-ley Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, a aquellas instituciones que, cumpliendo con los requisitos formales y sustanciales previstos en los artículos siguientes, proyecten impartir enseñanza universitaria en una o más áreas de conocimiento.

Artículo 4.- (Tipos de instituciones universitarias). Las autorización prevista en el artículo 3º podrá solicitarse para:

a) realizar las actividades de enseñanza, investigación y extensión en tres o más áreas disciplinarias no afines, orgánicamente estructuradas en facultades, departamentos o unidades académicos equivalentes; las instituciones autorizadas conforme a este apartado utilizarán la denominación "Universidad".

b) realizar las actividades de enseñanza, investigación y extensión en una o más áreas disciplinarias afines, o en dos no afines orgánicamente estructuradas en facultades, departamentos o unidades académicas equivalentes; las instituciones autorizadas conforme a este apartado utilizarán la denominación "Instituto Universitario".

Artículo 5.- (Reconocimiento de instituciones de enseñanza terciaria no universitaria). Las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria no universitaria podrán solicitar al Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el reconocimiento del nivel académico adecuado de la enseñanza impartida y de los títulos expedidos por ellas, según pautas de valoración generalmente aceptadas en el ámbito nacional e internacional. Esas instituciones se abstendrán de utilizar la denominación "Universidad" o sus derivados, de atribuir carácter "superior" a la enseñanza que impartan, y de aplicar a los títulos que expidan las denominaciones referidas en el artículo 19 de este decreto.

Las instituciones universitarias podrán además impartir enseñanza y expedir títulos de nivel no universitario, haciendo constar expresamente ese carácter en los respectivos planes de estudio, programas y títulos, y podrán solicitar para ellos el reconocimiento previsto en el inciso primero.

No serán consideradas las solicitudes de reconocimiento que refieran a carreras no universitarias cuya duración sea inferior a 750 horas-reloj de clases distribuidas en un lapso inferior a un año y medio lectivo.

Artículo 6.- (Alcance de la autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento de nivel académico). La autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria y el reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones terciarias no universitarias referirán a las carreras, incluidas en la solicitud inicial o en las solicitudes de inclusión posteriores, que cumplan con los requisitos formales y sustanciales contenidos en el presente decreto.

Artículo 7.- (Revocabilidad de la autorización para funcionar y del reconocimiento de nivel académico). La autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria y el reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones terciarias no universitarias se otorgarán inicialmente con carácter provisional por un lapso de cinco años. Durante ese lapso podrán ser revocados por apartamiento relevante de las condiciones tenidas en cuenta para su otorgamiento o por incumplimiento de los planes y programas de desarrollo presentados para ese lapso.

Vencido el lapso inicial de cinco años, la autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria y el reconocimiento de nivel académico de instituciones terciarias no universitarias sólo podrán ser revocados por apartamiento relevante de las condiciones tenidas en cuenta para su otorgamiento o por manifiesta inadecuación superviniente de la enseñanza impartida a la evolución científica, técnica o artística ocurrida.

La revocación puede recaer sobre la actividad global de la institución o sobre una o más carreras incluidas en ella.

Lo establecido en este artículo será sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto por el Decreto-Ley Nº 15.089 de 12 de diciembre de 1980.

Artículo 8.- (Diligencias probatorias). Los hechos relevantes para las decisiones previstas en este Capítulo podrán acreditarse por cualquier medio de prueba no prohibido por la ley. El Ministerio de Educación y Cultura podrá disponer de oficio las diligencias probatorias que estime necesarias para comprobar el cumplimiento de las condiciones tenidas en cuenta para el otorgamiento de la autorización o reconocimiento, y de los planes y programas de desarrollo, así como la adecuación de la enseñanza impartida a la evolución superviniente, incluyendo las inspecciones que considere pertinentes.

CAPITULO III

De la naturaleza jurídica y de los estatutos de las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria.

Artículo 9.- (Naturaleza y estatutos de las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria). Las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria que pretendan la autorización para funcionar (art. 3º) o el reconocimiento de nivel académico (art. 5º), deberán estar constituidas como asociaciones civiles o fundaciones sin fines de lucro, con personería jurídica. A tal efecto, la resolución aprobatoria de estatutos y de reconocimiento de personería jurídica, o aprobatoria de reforma de estatutos, según corresponda en cada caso se dictará conjuntamente con la autorización para funcionar o el reconocimiento de nivel académico, previo cumplimiento de todos los trámites requeridos por ambos actos jurídicos. Además de las disposiciones comunes a las entidades de su naturaleza, sus estatutos deberán prever:

a) Órganos de dirección administrativa y académica y procedimientos de designación de sus integrantes, la mayoría de los cuales deberán ser ciudadanos naturales o legales, o bien contar con una residencia en el país no inferior a tres años.

b) Fines, objetivos y misión de la institución.

Artículo 10.- (Estatutos de instituciones universitarias). Los estatutos de instituciones universitarias (artículos 3 y 4) deberán prever la participación de

docentes y estudiantes en los órganos de asesoramiento académico o en los órganos de dirección. Deberán establecer también que los titulares de cargos de dirección académica (Rector, Decano, Director de unidad académica o equivalentes) deberán poseer grado universitario y experiencia académica no inferior a cinco años. Esos estatutos consagrarán un régimen que permita a la institución ejercer, dentro del marco legal y reglamentario vigente, las siguientes atribuciones con plena autonomía institucional y académica:

a) Reformar sus estatutos, definir sus órganos de dirección y de asesoramiento decidir su integración y forma de designación o elección de sus integrantes, y establecer sus funciones.

b) Elegir sus autoridades.

c) Crear carreras de grado y post-grado.

d) Formular y desarrollar planes de estudio, de investigación científica y de extensión y servicios a la comunidad.

e) Establecer el régimen de acceso, permanencia y promoción del personal docente y no docente.

f) Establecer el régimen de admisión, permanencia y promoción de sus estudiantes.

g) Otorgar grados académicos y títulos.

h) Designar y remover a su personal.

i) Administrar sus bienes y recursos.

j) Impulsar y participar en emprendimientos que favorezcan el desarrollo académico.

k) Mantener relaciones de carácter educativo, científico y artístico con instituciones del país y del extranjero.

CAPITULO IV

De la solicitud de autorización para funcionar y de reconocimiento de nivel académico.

Artículo 11.- (Solicitud de autorización para funcionar y de reconocimiento de nivel académico: requisitos comunes). La solicitud de autorización para funcionar o de reconocimiento de nivel académico en su caso se presentará ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, acompañando la siguiente documentación e información:

1) Estatutos de la institución.

2) Antecedentes de la institución en actividades de enseñanza, si los tuviera.

3) Datos personales, con expresión de antecedentes profesionales, académicos y en actividades de enseñanza, de los integrantes de los órganos de dirección administrativa y académica, con indicación de los cargos que ocupan.

4) Proyecto institucional fundamentando los programas o unidades académicas.

5)Carreras ofrecidas.

6) Personal docente acorde a la oferta de carreras prevista, con expresión de los antecedentes profesionales, académicos y en actividad de enseñanza de sus integrantes.

7) Personal de apoyo y de servicios complementarios a la tarea docente, acorde a la oferta de carreras prevista.

8) Bibliotecas, laboratorios o equipos técnicos acordes a la oferta de carreras prevista.

9) Vinculaciones interinstitucionales existentes y previstas, si las hubiere.

10)Servicios de información y comunicación interna.

11) Planta física disponible, número de aulas y oficinas acordes a la oferta de carreras prevista.

12) Inventario inicial y balances constitutivos y posteriores con certificación profesional; acreditación de un patrimonio suficiente en función de la oferta de enseñanza, plan financiero institucional, con expresión de apoyos financieros externos si los hubiera.

13) Plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco años en materia de carreras ofrecidas, personal docente, apoyo técnico y administrativo, infraestructura y proyección de sus recursos económicos.

Artículo 12.- (Carreras ofrecidas). La información sobre las carreras ofrecidas requerida en el art. 11 Nº 5, incluirá los datos siguientes:

a) Pertinencia y objetivos de la carrera.

b) Plan de estudios: objetivos, orientaciones metodológicas, asignaturas, duración total, carga horaria global y por asignatura, sistema de previaturas, perfil esperado del egresado.

c) Programa analítico de cada asignatura.

d) Bibliografía básica de cada asignatura.

e)Director o responsable académico de la carrera.

f) Docentes de cada asignatura.

g)Régimen de evaluación de los estudiantes.

h)Régimen de asistencia de los estudiantes.

Artículo 13.- (Requisitos del personal docente). A los efectos de la autorización o del reconocimiento, el personal docente (artículo 11 Nº 6º) deberá cumplir con los siguientes requisitos:

a) Las tres cuartas partes del personal docente asignado a cada carrera, como mínimo deberá poseer al menos un grado de nivel equivalente al de su culminación.

b) El 10% (diez por ciento) del personal académico, como mínimo, deberá acreditar experiencia en investigación o docencia no inferior a cinco años.

c) La mayoría absoluta del personal académico deberá estar integrada por ciudadanos naturales o legales, o bien residentes, en el país por un lapso no inferior a tres años, con un dominio solvente del idioma español.

Artículo 14.- (Solicitud de autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria). La solicitud de autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria deberá acompañar, además de la prevista en el artículo 11, la siguiente información:

a) Tareas de investigación programadas y plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco años.

b) Tareas de extensión programadas y plan de desarrollo en un plazo de cinco años.
c) Programa de publicaciones, si existiera.
Artículo 15.- (Actualización de información). Las instituciones de enseñanza terciaria autorizadas o reconocidas deberán actualizar ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura toda la información referida en este Capítulo, anualmente durante el lapso inicial de cinco años del artículo 7 inciso 1, y posteriormente cada tres años.
Artículo 16.- (Gastos de tramitación). Todos los gastos que insuma la tramitación y evaluación de las solicitudes de autorización o reconocimiento, y de las inclusiones posteriores de nuevas carreras, incluyendo los asesoramientos o peritajes que se requieran, serán de cargo de la respectiva institución de enseñanza.
El Ministerio de Educación y Cultura podrá requerir el depósito anticipado del importe estimado de esos gastos, antes de dar trámite a los procedimientos pertinentes.

CAPITULO V
De los títulos profesionales.
Artículo 17.- (Concepto de título profesional). A los efectos de los artículos 1 y 2 del Decreto-Ley Nº 15.661, de 29 de octubre de 1984, se entiende por título profesional el que acredita haber cursado con aprobación en instituciones universitarias, los estudios correspondientes a una carrera universitaria completa de carácter científico, técnico o artístico, incluyendo las que carecen de propósitos utilitarios inmediatos.
Artículo 18.- (Validez de los títulos profesionales otorgados por instituciones universitarias privadas). Los títulos profesionales otorgados por instituciones privadas sólo serán válidos cuando la otorgante haya sido autorizada para funcionar como institución universitaria por el Poder Ejecutivo de conformidad con las normas de este decreto, y hayan sido registrados ante el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura.

Cumplidos tales requisitos, esos títulos tendrán idénticos efectos jurídicos que los expedidos por la Universidad de la República, independientemente de éstos.
Artículo 19.- (Tipos de títulos profesionales universitarios). Los títulos profesionales expedidos por instituciones universitarias serán de siguientes niveles:
a) Licenciatura universitaria: será el título acreditante de la culminación de la carrera de primer grado terciario. La duración de los estudios respectivos no será inferior a 1.800 horas-reloj de clases, distribuidas en un lapso no inferior a cuatro años lectivos;
b) Especialización: será el título acreditante de la culminación de estudios específicos de profundización en una disciplina o conjunto de disciplinas afines, comprendidas en la carrera universitaria de primer grado. La duración mínima será de un año lectivo.
c) Maestría o Magíster: será el título que acredite la culminación de estudios de complementación, ampliación y profundización de los estudios universitarios de primer grado, y de tareas de investigación que impliquen un manejo activo y creativo de conocimiento, incluyendo la elaboración de una tesis o memoria final. La duración mínima será de dos años lectivos.
d) Doctorado: será el título que acredite la culminación de estudios de complementación, ampliación y profundización de los de maestría, y el desarrollo de tareas de investigación original superior, mediante la elaboración de una tesis. La duración mínima será de tres años lectivos.
Artículo 20.- (Reválida de asignaturas). Los títulos profesionales expedidos por instituciones universitarias se fundarán en estudios cursados y aprobados en la propia institución que lo otorga.
Por excepción, podrán fundarse en asignaturas revalidadas, cursadas y aprobadas en la Universidad de la República o en otras instituciones universitarias, siempre que su número no exceda de los dos tercios del total de asignaturas que conforman la respectiva carrera.
Si se trata de asignaturas cursadas y aprobadas en la República, deberán haberlo sido en la Universidad de la República o en instituciones universitarias cuyo

funcionamiento haya sido autorizado por el Poder Ejecutivo y formando parte de carreras incluidas en esa autorización.
Artículo 21.- (Reválida de títulos). La reválida de títulos profesionales extranjeros es competencia exclusiva de la Universidad de la República, con exclusión de toda otra corporación (Ley Nº 12.549 de 16 de octubre de 1958, 211 artículo 21 apartado G).

CAPITULO VI

Del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada.
Artículo 22.- (Cometidos) Créase en el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura el Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada, con el cometido de asesorar al Poder Ejecutivo y al Ministerio de Educación y Cultura en las solicitudes de autorización para funcionar (art. 3º) o de reconocimiento de nivel académico (art. 5º), en las solicitudes posteriores de inclusión de nuevas carreras (art. 6º), y en la revocación de los respectivos actos (art. 7º). Podrá también proponer las modificaciones que entienda convenientes al régimen establecido en el presente decreto.
El dictamen del Consejo Consultivo previamente a la resolución del Poder Ejecutivo o del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura en su caso será preceptivo pero no vinculante. Si el órgano decisor se apartara del criterio del Consejo Consultivo, deberá hacer constar en la parte expositiva de la resolución los fundamentos por los cuales adopta decisión divergente.
Los dictámenes del Consejo Consultivo serán públicos y estarán a disposición de quien quiera conocerlos en el ministerio de Educación y Cultura.
Artículo 23.- (Integración). El Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada estará integrado por ocho miembros designados por el Poder Ejecutivo, quienes serán ciudadanos de destacada trayectoria académica que no ocupen cargos en órganos de dirección en instituciones de enseñanza terciaria públicas o privadas. Tres de los miembros serán designados a propuesta de la Universidad de la República, dos a propuesta del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, uno a propuesta

de la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública y dos a propuesta de las instituciones universitarias autorizadas a funcionar como tales. Si el Poder Ejecutivo entendiera que alguno de los propuestos no cumple con los requisitos establecidos en el inciso anterior, podrá requerir nueva propuesta. Si las propuestas no fueran formuladas dentro de los treinta días siguientes al requerimiento que el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura formule a quien corresponda, el Poder Ejecutivo podrá proceder a la designación prescindiendo de la respectiva propuesta.

Los miembros del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada, que permanecerán tres años en sus cargos, actuarán con autonomía técnica en el desempeño de sus funciones de tales y su permanencia no estará condicionada al mantenimiento de la confianza del o los proponentes.

Artículo 24.- (Presidencia del Consejo). La Presidencia del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada corresponderá al integrante que el Poder Ejecutivo designe con esa calidad, entre los propuestos por el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura o la Universidad de la República.

Artículo 25.- (Asesoramientos previos). Para emitir su dictamen, el Consejo Consultivo podrá requerir los asesoramientos y peritajes que estime pertinentes. Cuando se trate de una autorización para funcionar como institución universitaria privada, requerirá necesariamente la opinión de la Universidad de la República, que deberá expedirse dentro del plazo de sesenta días contados a partir del requerimiento formal con agregación de antecedentes. Transcurrido ese plazo sin reconocimiento de la Universidad de la República ,podrá prescindirse de su opinión.

Artículo 26.- (Pronunciamiento del Consejo). El Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada sesionará con la presencia de cinco de sus integrantes.

Los discordes con el dictamen del Consejo podrán hacer constar y fundar su disidencia.

Si el Consejo Consultivo no emitiera su dictamen dentro del plazo de 120 días contados a partir de la fecha en que el asunto fue sometido a su consideración, el órgano de decisión podrá resolver prescindiendo de su opinión, tomando en cuenta los elementos de juicio producidos.

CAPITULO VII

Disposiciones transitorias.

Artículo 27.- (Primera integración del Consejo Consultivo de Enseñanza Terciaria Privada). Los miembros que integren inicialmente el Consejo Consultivo permanecerán un año en sus cargos, transcurrido el cual se procederá a la designación de nuevos integrantes de conformidad con el artículo 23.

Artículo 28.- (Institutos autorizados y carreras reconocidas). Las instituciones autorizadas a funcionar y las que tengan carreras reconocidas se considerarán incluidas en el inciso 2 del artículo 7, disponiendo de un plazo de tres años para adecuarse a todas las disposiciones de este decreto.

Artículo 29.- (Denominación provisoria de los títulos profesionales universitarios). La denominación de los títulos profesionales expedidos por instituciones universitarias privadas podrá apartarse de las previstas, en el artículo 19, únicamente para equipararse a la de los que expida la Universidad de la República por similar carrera y nivel.

Artículo 30.- Comuníquese, publíquese, etc.-

SANGUINETTI - SAMUEL LICHTENSZTEJN

(*) Publicado en "Diario Oficial" el 29 de agosto de 1995.

6. Law about the Graduate tax

Law N. 16.524

Ley N° 16.524.

BECAS PARA ESTUDIANTES DE LA

UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA Y DEL NIVEL TERCIARIO DEL CONSEJO DE EDUCACION TECNICO PROFESIONAL

CREASE UN FONDO DE SOLIDARIDAD, PARA FINANCIAR LAS MISMAS

El Senado y la Cámara de Representantes de la República Oriental del Uruguay, reunidos en Asamblea General,

DECRETAN:

Artículo1°

Créase un Fondo de Solidaridad que tendrá como destino financiar un sistema de becas para estudiantes de la Universidad de la República y del nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico-Profesional (Administración Nacional de Educación Pública).

Artículo2°

El Fondo será organizado y administrado por una Comisión Honoraria

integrada con seis miembros que serán designados, uno por el Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, que la presidirá, cuyo voto decidirá en caso de empate, uno por la Universidad de la República, uno por el Consejo Directivo Central de la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, a propuesta del Consejo de Educación Técnico- Profesional, uno por la Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios, uno por la Caja Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones y uno por el Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay.

Dicha Comisión establecerá:

A) Las directivas generales a las que se ajustarán la Universidad de la República y el Consejo de Educación Técnico- Profesional para asignar las referidas becas, conforme a lo dispuesto por los artículos 6° y 7° de la presente ley.

B) Los mecanismos de contralor de los correspondientes aportes.

C) La forma de acreditar la calidad de sujetos pasivos de la obligación de aportar y la de beneficiarios de las becas. Asimismo deberá determinar anualmente el porcentaje de lo aportado que le corresponderá administrar a cada Ente de enseñanza.

Artículo3°

El Fondo se integrará con aportes anuales efectuados por todos los egresados
en actividad que posean título profesional expedido o revalidado por la Universidad de la República o por el nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico-Profesional, una vez cumplidos los diez años de expedición o reválida del mismo.

El aporte anual será como mínimo el equivalente a un Salario Mínimo Nacional determinado de acuerdo a lo que disponga la reglamentación dictada por el Poder Ejecutivo a propuesta de la Comisión Honoraria creada por el artículo anterior.
Los profesionales universitarios deberán efectuar su aporte ante la Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios o ante la Caja Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones en su caso. Dicho aporte será debido en
forma solidaria con el respectivo aportes jubilatorio y deberá hacerse efectivo en forma simultánea al mismo en un solo pago anual o en cuotas.
Los egresados del nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico-Profesional pagarán su aporte al contado en forma anual o en cuotas, ante cualquier dependencia del Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, el que a tales efectos habilitará una cuenta especial.
Anualmente se exigirá a todo profesional, tanto en organismos públicos como en empresas privadas, que acredite estar al día con dichos aportes mediante constancia que expedirán la Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios y la Caja Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones.
Para el caso de los egresados de los cursos de nivel terciario del Consejo de Educación Técnico- Profesional bastará la presentación del recibo de pago otorgado por el Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay. En caso de no hacerlo, no podrán realizar trámites oficiales ni percibir sueldos o remuneraciones de especies alguna.

Artículo 4°

Quedarán exceptuadas de la obligatoriedad del aporte aquellos profesionales

con más de diez años de antigüedad desde la expedición del título respectivo que acrediten, mediante declaración jurada ante la Comisión Administradora del Fondo, no percibir ningún tipo de ingresos derivados de su condición de profesionales universitarios o de egresados de los cursos de nivel terciario del
Consejo de Educación Técnico-Profesional.

Artículo 5°

El Fondo financiará las becas con parte del capital y la renta.
Anualmente, la comisión podrá asignar hasta un 70% (setenta por ciento) del monto disponible. Sólo en casos de excepción y por razones fundadas podrá financiar becas con el 30% (treinta por ciento) restante.
El capital y la renta del Fondo serán depositados en Bancos oficiales.

Artículo 6°

Las becas tendrán un monto máximo de dos Salarios Mínimos Nacionales por
mes, durante el tiempo que dure, según el programa oficial, cada período lectivo y sus correspondientes evaluaciones.

Artículo 7°

La Comisión sólo concederá becas a los estudiantes que carezcan de recursos económicos suficientes.
Para la concesión de las becas se tomarán en cuenta los siguientes criterios:

a)Situación socio-económica
b) Procedencia geográfica.
c) Rendimiento y aptitudes.
La reglamentación, dictada a propuesta del Ente de enseñanza respectivo, determinará los niveles mínimos de cumplimiento del programa de cursos o exámenes de cada año lectivo, que serán indispensables para poder usufructuar la beca en el siguiente año, salvo circunstancias de fuerza mayor, debidamente acreditadas.
La Comisión podrá establecer prioridades temáticas a los efectos del otorgamiento de becas.

Artículo 8°

La Caja de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios, la Caja Notarial de Jubilaciones y Pensiones y el Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay deducirán de cada aporte recibido al 1% (uno por ciento) por conceptos de gastos de administración.
La Comisión Administradora del Fondo utilizará y administrará hasta un 1% (uno por ciento) de los aportes recibidos para sus gastos de funcionamiento, realizando su actividad en el ámbito del Ministerio de Educación y Cultura.

Artículo 9°

La Universidad de la República y la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública enviarán a la Comisión Administradora del Fondo, dentro de los primeros treinta días de cada año, la nómina completa de quienes hayan227

obtenido títulos profesionales comprendidos en la presente ley durante el año inmediato anterior y la fecha exacta en que se produjo su expedición.
La Universidad de la República proporcionará a la Comisión, asimismo, la información registrada en el Servicio Central de Bienestar Universitario, a efectos de establecer la coordinación necesaria para el debido cumplimiento de la presente ley.

Artículo 10

(Transitorio). Dentro de los tres meses inmediatos a la fecha de vigencia de la
presente ley las autoridades de la Universidad de la República y de la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública enviarán a la Comisión Administradora del Fondo, que deberá ser nombrada en un plazo de treinta días, la nómina completa de los profesionales egresados así como la fecha de expedición de los títulos respectivos.

El Poder Ejecutivo reglamentará la presente ley en un plazo de noventa días.
Sala de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes, en Montevideo, a 6 de julio
de 1994.

MARIO CANTON, Presidente.
HORACIO D. CATALURDA, Secretario.
MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION Y CULTURA.
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA Y FINANZAS.
MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL.

Montevideo, 25 de julio de 1994.

Cúmplase, acúsese recibo, comuníquese, publíquese e insértese en el Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos.

SANTORO.

ANTONIO MERCADER.

IGNACIO DE POSADAS MONTERO.

RICARDO REILLY.

7.CEPRE Regulations

Ministry of Economy and Finance

Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay

Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto

Comité Ejecutivo para la Reforma del Estado

INSTRUCTIVO PARA LA EVALUACIÓN DE LAS METAS E INDICADORES DE DESEMPEÑO

I. Plazo

• ***Plazo***

El plazo para completar esta información es **29 de noviembre de 2002**

• ***Consultas***

Las consultas relativas a la Evaluación de las Metas e Indicadores de Desempeño:

Email: sev@cepre.opp.gub.uy

Teléfonos: 150 Interno 1415 o 1417 Edificio Libertad Piso 4 OPP-CEPRE.

II. Objetivo

La finalidad de este instructivo es proporcionar pautas para evaluar las metas e indicadores de gestión presentados en los Planes Anuales de Gestión (PAG) contenidos en "Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004" (SIP), presentado anexo a la Rendición de Cuentas 2001.

Específicamente se considerará el grado en que las Metas e Indicadores permiten evaluar el desempeño y aportan elementos relevantes para la toma de decisiones de las Unidades Ejecutoras. Este análisis servirá de base para modificar los PAG en próximas Rendiciones de Cuentas y será considerado para participar en un futuro sistema de incentivos dirigido a reconocer el desempeño de las unidades organizativas de las Unidades Ejecutoras

III. Material de apoyo

Para realizar la evaluación de los indicadores de desempeño se utilizarán los siguientes documentos: Formulario de Evaluación, en formato Excel, donde se registrarán los resultados de la evaluación (disponible en la página web: www.cepre.opp.gub.uy).

El tomo "Resultados de la Gestión Pública" (SEV) de la Rendición de Cuentas 2001 1 , que contiene las Metas definidas para el Presupuesto 2002-2004 y los valores de los Indicadores de Gestión correspondientes al año 2001.

1 Se puede consultar en : www.cepre.opp.gub.uy/ Rendición de Cuentas 2001

El tomo "Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004"

(SIP), presentado anexo a la Rendición de Cuentas 2001, donde figuran las metas

propuestas para el año 2002 al 2004

Ö El documento donde están disponibles las fuentes de información que fueron ingresados por cada Unidad Ejecutora en el momento de la

Formulación del Presupuesto por Resultados, es ConsultasFuentes.xls (disponible en la página web: www.cepre.opp.gub.uy).

Ö El libro "La Reforma Administrativa del Estado" que contiene las reestructuras
organizativas realizadas antes de 1999.

IV. Año de análisis

Se evaluarán las metas e indicadores de gestión del año 2002 ya que son pasibles de ser modificadas en la próxima Rendición de Cuentas, a mediados de 2003. En el caso de aquellas metas que se repiten cada año será necesario tomar en cuenta, además, la presentación de metas e indicadores del año 2001(SEV), a efectos de examinar su evolución, la forma en que se ingresaron los datos y la calidad de los mismos.

V. Definición de algunos conceptos

Meta es un fin que las Unidades Ejecutoras se proponen alcanzar en un período de tiempo especifico, cuantificándose los resultados que se desean lograr e incluso el costo estimado para llegar a los mismos. Una meta de gestión es, por definición, el propósito de una Unidad Ejecutora de pasar de un estado actual, considerado perfectible o insatisfactorio, a un estado futuro deseado.

En el Presupuesto 2000-2004 las metas se establecieron en el ámbito de los Centros de Actividad y en general expresan los fines a lograr en términos de los productos de los Centros de Actividad. En los Planes Anuales de Gestión (PAG) la meta es la expresión concreta, para cada año, de los objetivos estratégicos que la Unidad Ejecutora se propone alcanzar en el mediano plazo, en general en el período de gobierno.

Indicador de gestión es una variable cuantitativa cuya finalidad es dar información acerca del grado de cumplimiento de una meta. Los indicadores

no son más que la expresión cuantitativa de un compromiso de la institución por alcanzar ciertas metas o estándares de desempeño y, por lo tanto, al tener este carácter de "compromiso interno" deben basarse sobre variables que la Unidad Ejecutora pueda controlar.

Es sólo un instrumento que permite la medición y por lo tanto, su calidad y utilidad como tal estará determinada principalmente por la claridad y la relevancia de la meta que tiene asociada.

Las Metas deben reflejar tres dimensiones principales a través de los indicadores de gestión: eficacia, eficiencia y calidad (Artículo Nº 41 de la Ley 16.736 de 5 de enero de 1996). Para analizar el desempeño global de la Unidad Ejecutora debe tomarse en cuenta todos los indicadores en forma integral.

Los indicadores de eficacia y de eficiencia deben expresarse como una relación entre dos variables.

Indicador de Eficacia: se refiere al grado de cumplimiento de las metas establecidas y relaciona en general la cantidad de producto realmente obtenida en la gestión con la cantidad prevista en la meta (por ejemplo: número de análisis realizados sobre número de análisis previstos).

2 Idem. 3 Se incorporará un glosario completo con los conceptos relativos a Evaluación de la Gestión Pública

Indicador de Eficiencia: describe la relación entre dos magnitudes, la producción física de un bien o servicio y los insumos que se utilizaron para alcanzar ese nivel de producto. Por ejemplo, cantidad de recursos empleados para obtener un bien o servicio (expresada en general en valores monetarios) dividida la cantidad de bienes o servicios producidos. Generalmente se expresa en costos unitarios, por ejemplo: costo por Km.

pavimentado, pero también puede expresarse como unidades producidas dividido cantidad de horas trabajadas o cantidad de personas (productividad). Indicador de Calidad: se refiere a la capacidad de la institución para responder en forma rápida y directa a las necesidades de sus usuarios. También se puede referir a la calidad técnica del producto entregado por el CA o la UE. Por ejemplo: tiempo de espera promedio para atención en consulta, demora promedio en la entrega del servicio, porcentaje de defectos o quejas. La calidad se valora en función del cumplimiento de expectativas de los administrados.

En general, un servicio público es de calidad si el servicio prestado coincide con lo que espera de él quien lo recibe.

Algunos factores de calidad a tener en cuenta son: a) la información que recibe el usuario; b) la accesibilidad del servicio; c) la competencia del personal en contacto; d) tiempos de respuesta; e) simplicidad del trámite; f) calidad técnica; g) percepción del usuario

VI. Procedimiento

1. Abrir la planilla Excel, **FormularioEvaluación .xls**

2. Identificar Inciso, UE, Número de Centro de Actividad, Número de Meta en el tomo ("Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004" (SIP). Por ejemplo: Inciso 10, UE 005, CA 10 – Estudios y Proyectos y Meta 01.

2. Analizar las Metas e Indicadores presentados en el tomo "Propuesta de modificaciones de las Metas e Indicadores de Gestión 2002-2004" (SIP), en el marco de los Productos y Objetivos Estratégicos 5 , de la Misión 6 y de los cometidos sustantivos de cada Unidad Ejecutora
3. Complementar el análisis del punto anterior con la información del SEV, observando en particular los datos presentados en el 2001 (lo

que es posible si la meta se repite en el 2002) y examinar la relación de la meta con los principales productos de la Unidad Ejecutora.

4. Evaluar la Meta a través de los atributos que se listan a continuación y que deberán ser calificados según el grado que se entienda pertinente. Se contemplan los siguientes valores para cada uno de los atributos:

0- No se cumple

1- No se cumple pero es solucionable (con alguna modificación se puede llevar a que el
atributo se cumpla)

2- Se cumple

4 “Guía para la Construcción de Indicadores de Gestión” SEV – Feb/99 5 “Programa Estratégico de Gestión y Planes Anuales de Gestión por Inciso y por Unidad Ejecutora” Tomo VI-1 del
Anexo al Presupuesto Nacional 2000-2004. 6 “Resultados de la Gestión Pública” (SEV) Rendición de Cuentas 2001 y de los Decretos de Reformulación de las
Estructuras Organizativas presentadas en “La Reforma Administrativa del Estado” CEPRE 7 Decretos de Reformulación de las Estructuras Organizativas presentadas en “La Reforma Administrativa del Estado”

Atributos de metas Concepto

Tipo A – Cuantitativa; B – Cualitativa

Relevancia CA Contribuye claramente con los productos y cometidos sustantivos del CA

Relevancia estratégica Contribuye claramente a los productos y objetivos estratégicos de la
Unidad Ejecutora.

Claridad Expresa concretamente el objetivo que se quiere lograr

Independencia Responde a acciones que dependen solamente de la Unidad Ejecutora

Indicador de eficacia 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador

Indicador de eficiencia 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador

Indicador de calidad 1: tiene indicador; 0: no tiene indicador

6. Evaluar los Indicadores a través de los atributos que se listarán a continuación y que deberán ser calificados según el grado en que se entienda pertinente. Como en el caso anterior, se contemplan los siguientes valores para cada uno de los atributos:

0- No se cumple

1- No se cumple pero es solucionable (con alguna modificación se puede llevar a que el
atributo se cumpla)

2- Se cumple

Atributos de Indicador de eficacia

Concepto

Pertinencia Refleja claramente el logro o no de la meta propuesta

No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad)

Fuentes de información Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para su cálculo

Sistemas de información

Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que
proporcionan los datos en forma rutinaria.

Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1- si existe dato para un año, 2- si existe dato para los dos años

Atributo de indicadorde eficiencia

Concepto

Pertinencia Expresa la cantidad de recursos usados para la producción del bien
o servicio referido en la meta.

No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad)

Fuentes de información

Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para su cálculo

Sistemas de información

Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que proporcionan los datos en forma rutinaria.

Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1- si existe dato para un año,
2- si existe dato para los dos años

Atributo de indicador de calidad

Concepto

Pertinencia Que esté referido con precisión a la satisfacción del cliente o a la
calidad técnica del producto o servicio que se entrega.

No manipulable Que sea resistente a comportamientos indeseables (por ejemplo es posible que resulte una expedición exagerada de multas si un departamento es evaluado solamente por esta actividad)

Fuentes de información Se indican claramente las fuentes utilizadas para su cálculo.

Sistemas de Existen sistemas internos verificables o auditables, que proporcionan los datos en forma rutinaria.

Datos 0- si no existe dato, 1- si existe dato para un año, 2- si existe dato para los dos años.En caso de que haya más de un indicador, se evaluarán todos ellos colocando el mismo número de identificación que figura en el SEV.

Una vez ingresados los valores asignados a cada atributo en la planilla **Formulario de Evaluación,** se puede sumar a nivel de cada fila obteniendo así un puntaje global de las metas e indicadores que permite realizar comparaciones entre distintas metas y entre los Centros de Actividad.

El control del desempeño es posible si los indicadores son en conjunto:

• oportunos, recogidos y distribuidos en tiempo como para ser considerados por los directivos y responsables en la toma de decisiones.

• obtenidos a un costo razonable, ya que el costo de recolección y procesamiento de la información no puede exceder el valor de la misma.

• tales que responden a una meta que refleja los Objetivos y Productos estratégicos de la Unidad Ejecutora.

VII. Pasos a dar para mejorar el sistema de evaluación

Para realizar efectivamente el control de la gestión y la evaluación, se deberán tener en cuenta aspectos organizativos como los que se señalan a continuación:

• Fijar la frecuencia con que se informará sobre cada indicador.

• Designar un responsable de la recolección de datos y de la preparación de informes en cada Centros de Actividad.

• Designar un responsable para la recepción de datos, la supervisión y retroalimentación a nivel de la Unidad Ejecutora. También será responsable de coordinar con el Inciso.
• Auditar periódicamente los datos.
• Asegurar que los datos contenidos en los indicadores tengan información de años anteriores o estándares que sirvan de base de comparación.

El éxito de un sistema de evaluación del desempeño depende, en gran medida, de que los directores de las organizaciones se comprometan con el mismo y que sus resultados sean incorporados en los procesos de toma de decisiones y de definición de políticas. Ello es particularmente relevante a la hora de formular los presupuestos y discutir las asignaciones presupuestales en el ámbito parlamentario.

VIII. Bibliografía consultada

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ANNEX 2

DOCUMENTS FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES

1. FRENTE AMPLIO

DOCUMENTOS
IV CONGRESO "Hector Rodríguez"
FRENTE AMPLIO
PROPUESTA DE GRANDES LINEAMIENTOS PROGRAMATICOS PARA EL GOBIERNO 2005 - 2010
PORQUE ENTRE TODOS OTRO URUGUAY ES POSIBLE

Educación para el desarrollo y la cultura ciudadana

La democratización del acceso – a través de la superación de las condiciones que hoy la limitan - y la mejora sustancial de la calidad de la enseñanza resulta fundamental para la construcción de un país productivo y justo que apunte al desarrollo humano, la construcción de ciudadanía, la formación permanente, la cultura y la innovación.

La educación debe atender las tremendas desigualdades sociales existentes, rescatando su carácter integrador y su apertura a la comunidad. La educación técnica y profesional debe jerarquizarse para todas las edades y a todo nivel, así como la investigación y la extensión en función del interés nacional. Debe apostarse a la formación y profesionalización docente.

Es imperioso construir un sistema nacional de educación acorde a estos objetivos promoviendo la participación, la descentralización y la autonomía, recobrando la

esencialidad del carácter público de la educación. La enseñanza no formal y comunitaria, al igual que los medios de comunicación, deben aprovecharse al máximo en esta dirección.

Todo ello requiere un aumento presupuestal significativo contemplando el planteo plebiscitado en 1994 en relación al PBI tendiendo a ajustarse a las recomendaciones de organismos como la UNESCO.

Rechazamos los proyectos de mercantilización de la educación, impulsados por organismos internacionales como la OMC, en la medida que reivindicamos su carácter de derecho esencial y patrimonio nacional.

2. BLANCO PARTY

PROGRAMA PARA UN GOBIERNO DE COMPROMISO NACIONAL

DR JORGE LARRAÑAGA

http://www.alianzanacional.com.uy/

Educación

EL CENTRO EDUCATIVO PASARÁ A SER EL EJE DE LA INNOVACIÓN, EL ELEMENTO ESTRATÉGICO DE LA MEJORA EDUCATIVA

Fines de la política educativa:

Principios Básicos

La política educativa estará orientada al cumplimiento de los siguientes fines fundamentales.

• El desarrollo de una educación en valores, que contribuya a la construcción autónoma de personas con sólidas disposiciones éticas y una ciudadanía democrática sustentada en los valores universales que consagra nuestra Constitución y las Declaraciones de Derechos Humanos.

Se jerarquizará la función ética de la enseñanza y la dimensión formativa del acto educador. La educación no puede limitarse sólo a la instrucción

en unas materias, sino a la formación integral de las personas, acompañando y apoyando la función de las familias.

Las fisuras que se advierten en el entramado social y el debilitamiento de las agencias de socialización tradicionales, demandan del sistema educativo un papel activo en la afirmación de valores compartidos para la convivencia. El fortalecimiento de una cultura democrática debe proveer competencias y virtudes ciudadanas (en su doble dimensión cognitiva y moral) para una convivencia sin exclusiones, para ser agentes participantes en la vida de la comunidad, para la adopción de decisiones fundadas y responsables, para el desarrollo de un sentido crítico, la adquisición de habilidades dialógicas, el intercambio respetuoso de ideas y la formación de una razón pública informada.

• La educación debe contribuir a recrear las bases de la integración social y cultural de la comunidad nacional.
Se fortalecerán con ese objetivo las políticas de igualdad de oportunidades y acciones compensatorias de las asimetrías de origen socio-cultural;
los programas de atención a alumnos con dificultades de aprendizaje y propuestas socializadoras.
La educación debe ser un derecho efectivo que resulte accesible para toda la población. Esto incluye el desafío de atender las necesidades educativas especiales a través, por ejemplo, de soluciones desde lo pedagógico que hagan posible acceder a una educación para todos en entornos lo menos restrictivos posibles.
Se generarán importantes incentivos para atraer maestros y profesores bien calificados a las escuelas y liceos emplazados en las zonas y
barrios más desprotegidos. Destinar “mejores” recursos a los lugares donde existan las mayores necesidades. Hoy el domicilio del alumno termina en los hechos convalidando oportunidades educativas diferentes.

La administración pública acordará un proyecto pedagógico específico con cada centro educativo y brindará apoyos que capaciten a cada institución para ser agente de su transformación. En contrapartida, las evaluaciones de su funcionamiento y los resultados de aprendizaje, permitirán identificar debilidades y proveer medios para el fortalecimiento institucional y la mejora pedagógica.

Se incentivará el concepto de comunidad educativa, buscando que cada institución con la participación y el compromiso de todos sus actores, diseñe y desarrolle un proyecto educativo que provea de identidad y clarifique el sentido del “para qué” educar.

Una educación de calidad sólo puede darse en buenas instituciones, que a partir de un proyecto pedagógico y una cultura institucional, propician un contexto apto para el aprendizaje y el desarrollo de las capacidades de los alumnos. El concepto central es que la buena educación la hace la buena institución.

La construcción de un proyecto de centro educativo permite trascender los contenidos curriculares y lo que ocurre estrictamente en el aula.

Todo el centro educa con la experiencia cotidiana de los alumnos en la institución, a partir de un proyecto vertebrador que otorga significado y sirve de marco de referencia a todas las actividades de aprendizaje.

El éxito de esta modalidad de gestión institucional requiere directores con liderazgo pedagógico y conformar equipos de trabajo estables, evitando la rotación de docentes y directores.

Los docentes son actores claves en la dinámica de cualquier política educativa. Es necesario avanzar hacia un sistema integral de implementación de mejores prácticas de enseñanza que vincule la capacitación docente con necesarios cambios a nivel de la escuela, el liceo y el salón de clase. El desarrollo de políticas efectivas requiere además entender mejor los incentivos –o desincentivos- que subyacen a la organización y funcionamiento de nuestras instituciones y que influyen sobre el comportamiento y desempeño de los actores involucrados.

Se buscará que las instituciones de enseñanza de todo el país incentiven la participación de los estudiantes en diversas actividades, que retroalimenten positivamente las sinergias de la sociabilidad juvenil. Esto contribuirá a dar mayor sentido a los estudios, identificando a los alumnos con el centro.
Los estudiantes se enfrentan a un sistema educativo rígido que no contempla la heterogeneidad de contextos, determinantes de diferencias
en sus necesidades. Aquí vuelve a ser valiosa la autonomía del centro educativo que le otorga flexibilidad y le permite adaptarse a los requerimientos particulares de cada comunidad. En este sentido se reconoce la importancia de mantener una amplia red de escuelas rurales. Cada escuela rural operará como centro de irradiación cultural de su zona, como ámbito de socialización y de vinculación de niños y jóvenes con su propio entorno y como centro de animación de actividades de capacitación y promoción social.

Acceso y permanencia en el sistema educativo

En el período 1985-2003 la educación pública no universitaria incorporó casi 200 mil nuevos alumnos a niveles de enseñanza, a los que estos sectores de la población no tenían antes acceso. Ello marca una fuerte progresividad de la escolarización del país. El problema no es el acceso sino la permanencia en el sistema educativo, así como los aprendizajes y rendimientos de los alumnos.

En el nivel primario la repetición centrada en 1ero. y 2do. grado, (21%) es un problema endémico y ha sido impermeable a estrategias específicas orientadas a su abatimiento. La extensión prácticamente universal de la educación inicial a las edades 4 y 5 años no ha tenido el impacto esperado sobre el aprendizaje de estos primeros grados. Problemas de regularidad en la asistencia y permanencia de los matriculados, podrían explicar la debilidad de las adquisiciones.
La repetición en los primeros grados de primaria tiene impactos negativos determinantes del abandono escolar temprano. En el Ciclo Básico de Educación Media sólo el 45% del alumnado egresa del mismo en los tres años previstos, un

33% abandona y un 22% queda rezagado. La deserción durante el Ciclo Secundario alcanza a uno de cada dos alumnos.
Los promedios no dan cuenta de las diferencias significativas por estrato socio-económico, indicadores de la transmisión intergeneracional de la desigualdad. Estos adolescentes y jóvenes que interrumpen tempranamente sus estudios, se verán afectados en el modo de integración a la propia sociedad, debido fundamentalmente a las desventajas con las que hacen frente a la estructura de oportunidades de que disponen.

Acciones para abatir el fracaso y el abandono temprano

En el Ciclo Primario

• Captar el adicional de niños de 4 y 5 años que aún no se ha incorporado a la educación inicial. Fortalecer la regularidad de la asistencia y permanencia de los alumnos matriculados, evitando el desgranamiento progresivo de la matrícula a lo largo del año.
• Ampliar el proceso de extensión del modelo de escuelas de tiempo completo.
• Fortalecer los vínculos escuela-familia-comunidad, trabajando en redes con instituciones de cada zona como forma de sumar recursos y coordinar acciones de protección social.
• Formular un plan de acción para la mejora de los aprendizajes y de los niveles de desempeño escolar en los primeros grados de enseñanza
primaria.
Dicho plan comprenderá:
• La adjudicación preceptiva a los grupos de primer ciclo escolar de Maestros efectivos, bien calificados y con experiencia en el grado.
• La jerarquización de los objetivos y contenidos de grado fijando la centralidad de unos aprendizajes básicos, que todos los escolares deben adquirir satisfactoriamente.

• La clasificación de las dificultades de los alumnos y formas de intervención pedagógica para la mejora de los aprendizajes, mediante apoyos específicos y ayudas diferenciales según la índole de los problemas detectados.
• Una estructura curricular por ciclos extendidos de aprendizaje, que promuevan el progreso individual del escolar y potencien futuras 36experiencias de aprendizaje.
• La ampliación del programa “verano solidario” como instancia de complementación alimentaria, de recreación, de deporte y de apoyo pedagógico para los alumnos cuya situación socioeconómica les impide el acceso a mejores alternativas.

En el Ciclo Básico de la Educación Media

• Restablecer espacios curriculares que permitan la atención personalizada y la compensación pedagógica de los alumnos con desempeños disminuídos.
• Impulsar una política de protección social básica de los adolescentes, mediante programas que combinen apoyo alimentario, acceso a textos, facilidades de transporte, promoción de la recreación y el deporte.
• Fortalecer la capacidad de los liceos para constituirse en referente para el estudiante, a través de: un clima educativo propicio para la sociabilidad con sus pares, el fortalecimiento de los vínculos con las familias y el desarrollo de un sentido de pertenencia.

Reinserción educativa de los jóvenes que no estudian ni trabajan

El número de jóvenes entre 15 y 18 años que desertó del sistema educativo sin completar el Ciclo Básico obligatorio se estima en casi 44 mil. De estos, 28 mil ni estudian ni trabajan. Estos jóvenes se encuentran en una condición de marginalidad respecto de cualquier ámbito público, con interrupción del proceso de formación de capital humano, lo que implica el riesgo de volverse un patrón estable de marginalización.

Lograr la reinserción educativa de los mismos es un objetivo a priorizar, requiriéndose de una propuesta educativa flexible, adaptada a sus intereses y aptitudes y capaz de integrar en un núcleo de formación básica una orientación profesional que favorezca su inserción laboral y social. Esta nueva propuesta educativa debe motivar al joven desertor para retomar los estudios y potenciar al máximo sus capacidades, brindando
protagonismo y orientación a sus expectativas, para así fortalecer su autoestima.
A tales efectos y entre otros mecanismos, se utilizarán en verano las aulas vacías para la realización de cursos de reinserción.
Debe crear espacios de recreación y de información en temas de su interés y favorecer institucionalmente la socialización con sus pares.
Lograr su inserción y que cursen con éxito este ciclo formativo requerirá una política de protección social que incluya alimentación y transporte colectivo, así como apoyos pedagógicos permanentes para sustentar su proceso de aprendizaje.
El diseño curricular atenderá las formaciones requeridas para la acreditación del Ciclo Básico y estará basado en competencias a desarrollar en los jóvenes, desde un enfoque de enseñanza aprendizaje activos, basado en la elaboración y desarrollo de proyectos educativos.

Formación de recursos humanos para el emprendimiento productivo

En la época actual el mundo del trabajo está sometido a cambios permanentes y transformaciones radicales que inciden en la cualificación y competencias requeridas a los trabajadores, demandando una formación polivalente que habilite procesos de reconversión y adaptación a los cambios.
La oferta de cursos y su diseño curricular deberán concebirse a partir de una investigación prospectiva, que plantee diversidad de escenarios productivos y de evolución tecnológica en una proyección a mediano y largo plazo. Aquellos no pueden surgir unilateralmente del sistema educativo, sino de una fuerte

articulación con las cámaras empresariales y el ámbito sindical, los que deben implicarse firmemente en la formación de los futuros recursos humanos para la producción y el trabajo.
Los procesos de aprendizaje en el área técnico-profesional no pueden resolverse satisfactoriamente en el ámbito exclusivo de las aulas y talleres.
Allí no pueden aprenderse las destrezas y aptitudes necesarias para el mundo real del trabajo, capacitarse en el uso de equipos de última generación y comprender la complejidad de roles, de procesos productivos y de organización empresarial implicados. La educación técnicoprofesional requerirá una visión más global del proceso de aprendizaje donde participen la escuela técnica, el mundo empresarial, el ámbito sindical y sean incluidos los intereses de los jóvenes aprendices. Estos deberán adquirir capacidades no sólo técnicas sino para gestionar cambios organizativos, para tomar o compartir decisiones, para el trabajo colaborativo, adquirir hábitos y cultura de trabajo, desarrollar espíritu de iniciativa y de emprendimiento personal y productivo.

Profesionalización docente y calidad educativa

En el horizonte temporal de una década la sociedad uruguaya debe apostar al logro de un cuerpo docente de la enseñanza media totalmente profesionalizado, con formación específica de excelencia. Esta es una prioridad para el logro de la calidad educativa y la mejora pedagógica.
La formación inicial de maestros y profesores en todas sus modalidades, tendrá una duración de cuatro años y su titulación nivel universitario.
A partir de un marco común institucionalizado y jerarquizado como sistema de formación docente que garantice un perfil de formación de alta calidad, se deben habilitar diversidad de caminos y formatos de formación inicial, de posgrados y especializaciones y de capacitación permanente
de los educadores. Se fortalecerán como centros de excelencia los institutos de formación docente existentes.

Programa de recursos para ampliar la inversión educativa

La relativa baja asignación de recursos económicos a la educación de nuestro país, en comparación con la inversión que realizan sociedades de desarrollo comparativo, ha determinado una base salarial poco acorde con los requisitos de profesionalidad docente. La significativa expansión de la matrícula desde la recuperación democrática en los niveles educación inicial y educación media, acotaron aún más las posibilidades
de mejorar las condiciones de trabajo.

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de mejorar las condiciones de trabajo.
Consolidar los logros de escolarización y una enseñanza de calidad supone una inversión sostenida en locales y equipamiento didáctico y una mejora en las remuneraciones y condiciones de trabajo de los docentes. Su viabilidad requiere de un acuerdo en torno a un programa de recuperación salarial en el tiempo que concilie la mejora de los ingresos con la disponibilidad de los recursos financieros. Esto podría asegurarse vinculando la asignación de recursos a la enseñanza con el mantenimiento de un porcentual del producto en los años en que éste registre crecimiento.
La asignación y uso de los recursos presupuestarios puede traducirse no sólo en impactos de eficiencia sino también en impactos de equidad buscando reducir la desigualdad con políticas redistributivas. En este sentido proponemos, en el marco de políticas de distribución progresiva del gasto público una organización del sistema de remuneraciones de los docentes y una redistribución de los recursos de la educación
pública mediante los cuales las escuelas y liceos emplazados en las zonas más desprotegidas tengan una proporción mayor de protección y apoyo.

Política universitaria

Se establecerá un Sistema de Educación Superior que coordine la gestión pública y la privada sobre la base de niveles académicos de calidad.
El sistema garantizará la libertad de enseñanza, la autonomía y el rigor académico, la formación y la capacitación continua. La educación superior deberá insertarse en el país real y ser co-protagonista en proyectos de desarrollo de la comunidad nacional.
• Se ampliará y fortalecerá el proceso de descentralización y las actividades universitarias en el interior del país, mediante:

• La elaboración de un plan para el afincamiento de las Facultades de Agronomía y Veterinaria en el interior del país, así como el traslado a diversos departamentos de otros centros universitarios, especialmente de investigación y extensión.
• La ampliación del proceso descentralizador de la Regional Norte, dotándola de nuevos servicios y carreras, una adecuada atención presupuestal y de un sistema de bienestar universitario. La Regional Norte deberá elaborar un plan de desarrollo estratégico propio, como base para estudiar la posibilidad de su conversión progresiva en una segunda Universidad pública.
• Se dará cumplimiento y efectivizará con los recursos que la ley del “Fondo de Solidaridad” dispone al efecto, la construcción de la ciudad universitaria con destino a los estudiantes provenientes del interior del país.

La organización de aulas a distancia

• Se desarrollarán mecanismos de cooperación e integración internacional y regional con instituciones de educación superior los que, a través de programas conjuntos, redes académicas, planificación común de sistemas de becas y subvenciones, y la ejecución de programas de educación a distancia, contribuirán a la actualización permanente de contenidos docentes y de investigación. Se promoverá asimismo la realización de estudios avanzados en el exterior y el retorno de científicos al país.
• Generar un sólido y renovado programa de becas que garantice apoyo financiero a los estudiantes académicamente calificados que no puedan absorber los gastos directos e indirectos (ingresos no percibidos) de la enseñanza superior.
• Con el propósito de proteger la equidad en el acceso a la educación superior, proponemos generar fondos especiales para dar apoyo a estudiantes del interior del país (estudiantes académicamente calificados y de bajo ingreso) en el financiamiento de los gastos de subsistencia mientras estudian.

• Avanzar con mayor determinación en una propuesta importante de posgrado, complementada con una oferta dinámica de educación continua (permanente) a lo largo de la vida profesional de los egresados.
• El marco normativo de la Universidad de la República resulta inapropiado para responder a los desafíos vigentes. Su revisión se hará en consulta con todos los actores involucrados. Se atenderá especialmente al modo y alcance que debe darse al cogobierno para garantizar la eficacia de los órganos colegiados y la adopción de decisiones de política en tiempo real. Se deberá corregir el déficit democrático en la
elección de Rector, Decanos y Directores, mediante formas electivas directas por la comunidad universitaria.
La nueva Ley Orgánica debería incorporar una Auditoría Académica Permanente, de conformación mixta, con miembros de la Universidad y pares externos a ella, para la evaluación permanente de sus programas de enseñanza, de investigación y de extensión y la difusión pública de sus resultados. Un sistema de evaluación permanente universitario deberá comprender igualmente a las instituciones de gestión privada.
• Se deberá crear un nuevo sistema universitario para dar respuesta a los procesos crecientes de superpoblación en las carreras de grado, los fracasos masivos en los primeros años, así como la saturación de las titulaciones tradicionales.
La reestructura de los cursos universitarios, a partir de un núcleo generalista al inicio, debería abrir a los estudiantes diversidad de opciones formativas, con la creación de carreras cortas y títulos intermedios que habiliten la inserción laboral y permitan regular y reorientar la matrícula según vocaciones y los créditos académicos logrados por los estudiantes.
• La realidad de una Universidad de la República crecientemente elitizada compromete sus fines, al tener un fuerte efecto regresivo en lo social. La política universitaria deberá facilitar el acceso a la misma de los jóvenes del interior y

satisfacer las aspiraciones por educación superior de jóvenes provenientes de los sectores de la población con menores recursos.

3. COLORADO PARTY

La Revolución del Centro

Bases programáticas del Partido Colorado
para un cambio hacia la modernidad

Mas calidad y más tiempo

Ha mejorado persistentemente la calidad del producto educativo en todos sus niveles, con mejores comportamientos en lenguaje y matemática. Mientras que en lenguaje la proporción de alumnos suficientes pasó de 57.1% en 1996 a 66.3% en el año 2002, en la prueba de Matemática dicha proporción fue de 34.6% en 1996 para luego ascender al 48.3% en 2002.
Hay 800 centros de enseñanza vinculados a la red de conectividad educativa, lo que abre enormes posibilidades de instrumentar programas de educación a distancia.
Las inversiones en infraestructura permitirán superar uno de los problemas serios de nuestros liceos: la acumulación de tres turnos, con atosigamiento de alumnos y docentes.
Desde 2006 se logrará que los centros del ciclo básico, es decir, todos los liceos y las escuelas técnicas, funcionen con un máximo de dos turnos.
Hacia el largo plazo del país, pensando en la próxima década, la enseñanza pública tendrá que apuntar a la hazaña de dar a todos sus alumnos un sistema de doble horario, como ofrece la enseñanza privada. Ahí está planteada la gran brecha entre unos alumnos y otros, desafío que solamente ha superado hasta ahora la escuela de Tiempo Completo. La masificación impide por ahora que el

sector público encare ese tema, que puede ir resolviéndose con programas de educación física o artística o de recreación que permitan una mayor vinculación horaria del alumno con la escuela o el liceo. Pero el camino del futuro es el horario completo o doble para toda la enseñanza pública. Suena utópico, pero las utopías educativas son relativas y más realizables en el país de José Pedro Varela. Junto a estos esfuerzos, la mayor y más completa profesionalidad de los docentes del ciclo medio permitirá redondear la apuesta a la calidad. La creación de los CERP, la nueva legislación para el reconocimiento de los títulos y una redimensión del IPA van a permitir que en los próximos 5 años todos los docentes de Educación Media tengan formación específica en profesorado.

Una Gestion más eficaz

La tendencia preponderante en el primer mundo es la de darle mayor autonomía de gestión a los centros de Enseñanza, para que cada unidad educativa tenga sus propias facultades de administración y de orientación, dentro de los parámetros pedagógicos que establezcan las autoridades competentes.
Sin llegar a los extremos autonómicos que muestran algunas experiencias sajonas y norteamericanas, podría aceptarse que en Uruguay es oportuno ensayar algunas formas de descentralización, que paulatinamente vayan complementando el centralismo administrativo que suele mostrar nuestra organización educativa. Eso no debe significar un debilitamiento del sentido representativo y democrático que la ley da a la organización de la Administración de Educación Pública y, por lo tanto, deben evitarse los excesos corporativistas según los cuales se propone que la Enseñanza sea dirigida exclusivamente por los profesores. La ANEP representa por sus tradiciones y estructuras una sabia armonización de la participación técnica y política en la dirección de la Enseñanza y debe mantenerse la centralidad de las decisiones.

Pero seguramente se podrá aligerar la gestión si se comienza un proceso paulatino pero firme de delegación en los centros de enseñanza de algunas cuestiones de la administración. Varias evaluaciones internacionales demuestran que son más exitosos los centros educativos con mayor autonomía de gestión y que cuenten con una intensa integración de padres, alumnos y profesores, con una comunidad responsable que se comprometa positivamente.

Ello va de la mano de una nueva mentalidad, en la que la “rendición de cuentas” o accountability pase a ser un ejercicio habitual de información y transparencia, de manera que los rendimientos del centro educativo puedan evaluarse y mejorarse permanentemente.

La Democracia necesita Demócratas

Así como la República necesita republicanos, la democracia requiere demócratas, personas educadas en los valores cívicos y la tolerancia y preparados para ejercer responsablemente sus derechos y obligaciones.
Esto significa que la Enseñanza tiene que formar ciudadanos competentes, sujetos de pleno derecho, jóvenes con autoestima, uruguayos con sentido de nacionalidad, personas predispuestas a la racionalidad y a la mentalidad científica, capaces de discernir y criticar.
Hombres y mujeres que libremente puedan desarrollar sus vidas a través de la aplicación de sus talentos y virtudes.
Para ello es imprescindible que el principio de laicidad sea respetado cotidianamente, en todos los ámbitos de formación y socialización. La Enseñanza debe mantener y cuidar la laicidad todos los días, para que sea absolutamente inadmisible todo intento directo o subliminal que vaya en su contra.

ANNEX 3

INTERVIEWS

1. Request of interview

Fecha

Sr

Mi nombre es Panambi Abadie y soy estudiante del doctorado en Administración de la Educación Superior en el Centro de Administración de la Educación Superior de la Universidad de Southampton, Gran Bretaña.

En el marco de ese programa estoy realizando una tesis acerca del financiamiento de la Educación Superior en el Uruguay. La tesis tiene como finalidad proporcionar información de tipo integral acerca de los criterios, formas y métodos utilizados para asignar fondos al sector que permitan categorizar un modelo de financiamiento a nivel nacional. En este caso, y a diferencia, de otros estudios no hay una focalización en los montos asignados a este nivel educativo, sino que, de manera principal, se analizarán las formas y las metodologías utilizadas para la asignación de fondos.

El estudio abarca instituciones de Educación Superior públicas y privadas. Se prevé que sus resultados sean de utilidad tanto para los ámbitos académicos como para aquéllos en los que se toman decisiones acerca de esta temática.

En este contexto le solicito una entrevista de una hora de duración en la que, si Ud. lo permite, le realizaré las preguntas que constan en el formulario que le adjunto.

Panambi Abadie
Estudiante
DBA-HEM

2. List of interviewees

Interviewee A : Rector of a public university.

Interviewee B : Director of Planning of a public university.

Interviewee C : Vice rector of a private university.

Interviewee D: Director of Planning of a public university.

Interviewee E: Director of Human Resources of a public institution of Higher Education.

Interviewee F : Director at the Ministry of Education

Interviewee G: Senior officer Ministry of Economy and Finance

Interviewee H & Interviewee I : Advisors at the legislature

Interviewee J & Interviewee K : Legislators

3. Questionnaire for university officials (public institutions)

Name of interviewee
Position
Institution
Date

1. Which is the amount of funds that your institution receives as budget?

a) Amount of the main funding source that supports the system?

b) Amount of the other sources of revenue such as: tuition, teaching and research contracts, grants from research funding bodies, consultancies, fees paid by hospitals and clinics or other services.

2. Which are the funding methodologies in use by the funding authorities?

For example:

- block grant,
- with a separation between research and teaching funds,
- using some formula to "follow" v. gr. students or teachers?

3. Which is the funding criteria used by the authorities when providing the allocations?. For example:

- The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.
- The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the institution.
- The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae.
- There are orientations or guidelines and allocations are linked to this specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments.

3. Which is the degree of decentralisation that exists between your institution and the funding authority? For instance, is the institution in the position of using the funds at its own wish?
4. Are there controls in use by the funding authorities in relation to the use of funds allocated?
5. Which are the requirements of accountability to the funding body or other bodies (e. g. The Parliament, to the Ministries, etc).
6. Which are the procedures, or methods, that are used to report how funds have been used, for instance: the use of performance indicators, auditing procedures, etc.
7. Do you know other model that is used in our country to fund all the system?
8. Do you think that this model (if known) may change?
9. Which could be an alternative model?
10. Do you think that the sector should receive more funds?

4. Questionnaire for university officials (private institutions)

Name of interviewee
Position
Institution
Date

1. Which is the amount of funds that your institution receives as budget?
   a) Amount of the main funding source that supports the system?
   b) Amount of the other sources of revenue such as: teaching and research contracts, grants from research funding bodies, consultancies, etc.

2. Which are the funding methodologies in use by the funding authorities?

For example:

- block grant,
- with a separation between research and teaching funds,
- using some formula to "follow" v. gr. students or teachers?

3. Which is the funding criteria used by the authorities when providing the allocations?. For example:

- The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.

- The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the institution.
- The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae.
- There are orientations or guidelines and allocations are linked to this specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments.

4. Which is the degree of decentralisation that exists between your institution and the funding authority? For instance, is the institution in the position of using the funds at its own wish?
5. Are there controls in use by the funding authorities in relation to the use of funds allocated?
6. Which are the requirements of accountability to the funding body or other bodies (e. g. The Parliament, to the Ministries, etc).
7. Which are the procedures, or methods, that are used to report how funds have been used, for instance: the use of performance indicators, auditing procedures, etc.
8. Do you know other model that is used in our country to fund all the system?
9. Do you think that this model (if known) may change?
10. Which could be an alternative model?
11. Do you think that the sector should receive more funds?

5. Questionnaire for members of parliament

Name of interviewee

Position

Date

1. Do you know which are the funding methodologies that are used in Uruguay to fund Higher Education institutions?

For example:

- block grant,
- with a separation between research and teaching funds,
- using some formula to "follow" v. gr. students or teachers?

2. Do you know which is the funding criteria used in Uruguay when providing the allocations to Higher Education institutions ?. For example:

- The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.
- The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the institution.
- The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae.
- There are orientations or guidelines and allocations are linked to this specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments.

c) Do you know which is the degree of decentralisation that exists between the authorities that provide funds to Higher Education institutions and the Higher

Education institutions? For instance, are the institutions in the position of using the funds at their own wishes?

d) Do you know which are there controls in use by the authorities that provide funding to Higher Education institutions in relation to the use of funds allocated?

5. Do you know if there are requirements of accountability that apply to Higher Education institutions in relation to the funding body or other bodies ?

6. Do you know if there are procedures, or methods, that Higher Education institutions have to follow to report the use of allocated funds?

6. Questionnaire for members of parliament

Name of interviewee
Position
Date

1. Do you know which are the funding methodologies that are used in Uruguay to fund Higher Education institutions?

For example:

- block grant,
- with a separation between research and teaching funds,
- using some formula to "follow" v. gr. students or teachers?

2. Do you know which is the funding criteria used in Uruguay when providing the allocations to Higher Education institutions ?. For example:

- The basis is the former budget , for instance: historical allocations.
- The basis is the result of a negotiation between the funding authority and the institution.
- The allocations are a consequence of the application of formulae.
- There are orientations or guidelines and allocations are linked to this specific orientations or to specific policies or commitments.

3. Do you know which is the degree of decentralisation that exists between the authorities that provide funds to Higher Education institutions and the Higher Education institutions? For instance, are the institutions in the position of using the funds at their own wishes?

4. Do you know if the authorities that provide funding to Higher Education institutions apply controls about the use of funds allocated?

5. Do you know if there are requirements of accountability that apply to Higher Education institutions in relation to the funding body or other bodies ?

6. Do you know other models of funding Higher Education systems that are used in other countries that are different from the one that is used in Uruguay?

7.Do you think that the Uruguayan model (if known) may change?

7. Questionnaires in Spanish

CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA

Nombre de la persona entrevistada:
Institución:
Cargo:
Fecha:

1. Cuál es el monto que su institución recibe como presupuesto? Por favor distinguir:

Fondos presupuestales

Fondos extrapresupuestales (obtenidos por ejemplo por: convenios, servicios de investigación o enseñanza, servicios técnicos, matrículas, servicios clínicos, etc)

2. Cuáles son las metodologías que utilizan las autoridades que financian a su institución para asignar fondos? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
Los fondos se asignan en bloque		
Existe separación de fondos para enseñanza e investigación		

Se usan fórmulas que “siguen” a unidades, ej: a estudiantes o a docentes.		

3. Cuáles son los criterios que utilizan las autoridades para asignar el financiamiento a su institución? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
La base es la asignación anterior (asignaciones históricas)		
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre las autoridades financiadoras y la institución		
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una fórmula		
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones están ligadas a esos lineamientos o políticas.		

4. Su institución está en condiciones de usar los fondos que se le asignan de acuerdo a su propia voluntad?

5. Su institución está sometida a controles de las autoridades que la financian acerca del uso de los fondos asignados?

6. Qué tipo de rendiciones de cuentas tiene que realizar su institución a las autoridades que la financian o a otras autoridades (por ejemplo: al Parlamento, Ministerios)

7. Cuáles son los métodos que utiliza su institución para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados? Por ejemplo: se utilizan indicadores de rendimiento o auditorías ?

8. Ud conoce el modelo de financiamiento del sistema de Educación Superior que se utiliza en Uruguay.? Puede describirlo?

9. Ud cree que el modelo de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se utiliza en Uruguay (si lo conoce) puede cambiar?

10. Cuál podría ser un modelo alternativo?

11. Ud considera que el sistema de Educación Superior de Uruguay debería recibir más fondos?

CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA

Nombre de la persona entrevistada:
Institución:
Cargo:
Fecha:

12. Cuál es el monto que su institución recibe como presupuesto? Por favor distinguir:

Fondos presupuestales

Fondos extrapresupuestales (obtenidos por ejemplo por: convenios, servicios de investigación o enseñanza, servicios técnicos, matrículas, servicios clínicos, etc)

13. Cuáles son las metodologías que utilizan las autoridades que financian a su institución para asignar fondos? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
Los fondos se asignan en bloque		
Existe separación de fondos para enseñanza e investigación		
Se usan fórmulas que “siguen” a unidades, ej: a estudiantes o a docentes.		

14. Cuáles son los criterios que utilizan las autoridades para asignar el financiamiento a su institución? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
La base es la asignación anterior (asignaciones históricas)		
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre las autoridades financiadoras y la institución		
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una fórmula		
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones están ligadas a esos lineamientos o políticas.		

15. Su institución está en condiciones de usar los fondos que se le asignan de acuerdo a su propia voluntad?

16. Su institución está sometida a controles de las autoridades que la financian acerca del uso de los fondos asignados?

17. Qué tipo de rendiciones de cuentas tiene que realizar su institución a las autoridades que la financian o a otras autoridades (por ejemplo: al Parlamento, Ministerios)

18. Cuáles son los métodos que utiliza su institución para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados? Por ejemplo: se utilizan indicadores de rendimiento o auditorías ?

19. Ud conoce el modelo de financiamiento del sistema de Educación Superior que se utiliza en Uruguay.? Puede describirlo?

20. Ud cree que el modelo de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se utiliza en Uruguay (si lo conoce) puede cambiar?

21. Cuál podría ser un modelo alternativo?

22. Ud considera que el sistema de Educación Superior de Uruguay debería recibir más fondos?

CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA

Nombre de la persona entrevistada:
Institución:
Cargo:
Fecha:

1. Ud sabe cuáles son las metodologías de financiamiento que se utilizan en el Uruguay para financiar a la Educación Superior ? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
Los fondos se asignan en bloque		
Existe separación de fondos para enseñanza e investigación		
Se usan fórmulas que "siguen" a unidades, ej: a estudiantes o a docentes.		

2. Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan en Uruguay para asignar fondos a la Educación Superior? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
La base es la asignación anterior (asignaciones históricas)		

La base es el resultado de una negociación entre las autoridades financiadoras y la institución		
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una fórmula		
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones están ligadas a esos lineamientos o políticas.		

3. Ud sabe si las instituciones están en condiciones de usar los fondos en base a su propia voluntad?

4. Ud sabe si las autoridades que financian la Educación Superior aplican controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados?

5. Ud conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen las instituciones de Educación Superior con respectos a las autoridades que las financian o a otras autoridades?

6. Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que deben seguir las instituciones de Educación Superior para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados?

CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA

Nombre de la persona entrevistada:
Institución:
Cargo:
Fecha:

7. Ud sabe cuáles son las metodologías de financiamiento que se utilizan en el Uruguay para financiar a la Educación Superior ? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
Los fondos se asignan en bloque		
Existe separación de fondos para enseñanza e investigación		
Se usan fórmulas que "siguen" a unidades, ej: a estudiantes o a docentes.		

8. Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan en Uruguay para asignar fondos a la Educación Superior? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
La base es la asignación anterior (asignaciones históricas)		
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre las autoridades financiadoras y la institución		
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una fórmula		

Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones están ligadas a esos lineamientos o políticas.		

9. Ud sabe si las instituciones de Educación Superior están en condiciones de usar los fondos en base a sus propios deseos?

10. Ud sabe si las autoridades que financian a la Educación Superior aplican controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados ?

11. Ud conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen las instituciones de Educación Superior con respectos a las autoridades que las financian o a otras autoridades?

12. Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que deben seguir las instituciones de Educación Superior para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados?

13. Ud conoce otros modelos de financiamiento de la Educación Superior que se utilicen en otros países y que sean diferentes al que se utiliza en Uruguay? Puede describirlos?

14. Ud cree que el modelo uruguayo (si lo conoce) puede cambiar?

CUESTIONARIO DE ENTREVISTA

Nombre de la persona entrevistada:
Institución:
Cargo:
Fecha:

23. Cuál es el monto presupuestal que su organización recibe (o asigna) para los programas de Educación Superior ? Por favor distinguir:

24. Cuál es el monto extrapresupuestal que obtienen los programas de Educación Superior de su organización ? Por ejemplo por: convenios, servicios de investigación o enseñanza, servicios técnicos, matrículas, servicios clínicos, etc)

25. Ud sabe cuáles son las metodologías de financiamiento que se utilizan dentro de su institución para financiar al/ a los programas de Educación Superior? Por ejemplo:

	Si	no
Los fondos se asignan en bloque		
Existe separación de fondos para enseñanza e investigación		
Se usan fórmulas que “siguen” a unidades, ej: a estudiantes o a docentes.		

26. Ud conoce cuáles son los criterios que se utilizan dentro de su institución para asignar fondos al/ a los programas de Educación Superior? Por ejemplo:

	si	no
La base es la asignación anterior (asignaciones históricas)		
La base es el resultado de una negociación entre las autoridades financiadoras y la institución		
Las asignaciones resultan de la aplicación de una fórmula		
Existen lineamientos y políticas y las asignaciones están ligadas a esos lineamientos o políticas.		

27. Ud sabe si la institución que brinda el o los programas de Educación Superior dentro de su organización está en condiciones de usar los fondos en base a su propia voluntad?

28. Ud sabe si las autoridades que financian los programas de Educación Superior de su organización aplican controles sobre el uso de los fondos asignados?

29. Ud conoce cuáles son los requerimientos de rendición de cuentas que tienen la institución que brinda programas de Educación Superior dentro de su organización con respectos a las autoridades que las financian o a otras autoridades?

30. Ud conoce cuáles son los procedimientos que debe seguir la institución que brinda programas de Educación Superior dentro de su organización para reportar el uso de los fondos asignados?

ANNEX 4

FOCUS GROUP

1. Invitation to participants

Fecha

Sr

Tal como se le mencionado personalmente estoy realizando una tesis acerca del financiamiento de la Educación Superior en el Uruguay. La tesis tiene como finalidad proporcionar información de tipo integral acerca de los criterios, formas y métodos utilizados para asignar fondos al sector que permitan categorizar un modelo de financiamiento a nivel nacional. En este caso, y a diferencia, de otros estudios no hay una única focalización en los montos asignados a este nivel educativo, sino que -de manera principal- se analizarán los criterios y las metodologías utilizadas para la asignación de fondos.

En este contexto le solicito su apoyo participando en un focus group en el que se desarrollará un diálogo acerca del modelo de financiamiento actual de la ES en el país y las perspectivas de cambio en el modelo.

El focus group se desarrollará el día ... a la hora.... (duración 60 minutos aprox) en .....

Saluda muy atentamente,

Panambi Abadie,

Tel 902 1505 ext 220
e-mail. Abadie@ort.edu.uy y panambiabadie@hotmail.com

2. Participants of the focus group

Interviewee L, Deputy Director of the Graduate School in a public institution, an Assistant to the Dean and a senior officer at one of the private university institutes

Interviewee M, Director at the Ministry of Education and an academic at a private university .

Interviewee N Director of the Graduate School at private university of Uruguay and an academic at the same university.

Interviewee O, Senior Officer at the Office of Planning in a public institution also in charge of a major project of e-government that involves informations systems at her institution.

Interviewee P, Director of Planning in a public institution.

Interviewee Q, Senior Officer at the Office of Planning in a public institution, also an academic at private university.

3. Basis for the discussion at the focus group

BASES PARA LA DISCUSION EN UN FOCUS GROUP

30 de mayo de 2005

Disertación:

El modelo de financiamiento de la Educación Superior en el Uruguay

Constataciones iniciales

Sumario

1. El Estado es la caja pagadora de la Educación Superior pública

2. Las instituciones públicas cuentan con un financiamiento asegurado por el Estado (automático) con independencia de su desempeño.

3. Las asignaciones se fijan en base a criterios históricos. La metodología de asignar los recursos no está vinculada a criterios, costos, eficiencia, rendimiento, calidad, etc.

4. Los únicos controles aplicados al uso de los fondos asignados a las instituciones de Educación Superior son burocráticos.

5. La Educación Superior privada no recibe subsidios del Estado y se autofinancia por vía de las matrículas. Está sometida a baja regulación.

I. EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR PUBLICA

I. i. Formas de determinar las asignaciones a la EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR

1. En base a asignaciones presupuestarias automáticas, de ser posible incrementales.

2. El monto asignado se determina en base al presupuesto del año anterior, (criterio histórico de asignación) incrementado si hay disponibilidad fiscal y en base a negociaciones del Parlamento con las corporaciones del sistema, tales como los gremios, las Facultades, etc,

I. ii. Mecanismos de financiamiento

1. Las instituciones reciben las asignaciones a través del pago de las cuentas mediante transferencias ligadas a la disponibilidad del erario público.

2. Los gobiernos buscan congelar el gasto directamente transferido a las instituciones de Educación Superior

I. iii. Criterios de financiamiento

1. Los subsidios otorgados a cada institución se definen conforme a un criterio histórico de distribución que ha ido desarrollándose y cristalizando a lo largo del tiempo, producto de negociaciones ad-hoc.

2. Las asignaciones responden más a la evolución del gasto en el pasado que a previsiones futuras.

I. iv. Seguimiento del uso de los fondos. Control. Accountability

- Controles burocráticos (Tribunal de cuentas) con el fin de garantizar la legalidad de los actos de autoridad y de las decisiones de gasto.

II. EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR PRIVADA

El Estado autoriza la creación de nuevas instituciones en base a un proceso político- administrativo de reconocimiento oficial.

II.i. Financiamiento

1. La Educación Superior privada no recibe subsidios del Estado aunque está exonerada de determinados tributos. Las instituciones se autofinancian por vía de las matrículas.

2. Funcionamiento y control: la Educación Superior privada tiene baja regulación. Las instituciones deben proporcionar informes anuales -meramente formales - al MEC.

Comentarios:

ANNEX 5

MATRIX OF QUESTIONS

MATRIX OF QUESTIONS

Current model

1. How funds are provided ?

1) Block

2) formula : input driven or output driven?

2. According to which criteria?

3) Historical

4) negotiations

5) formula : input or output/predictability

6) strategies

3. Degrees of decentralisation

7) control over the use of funds,

8) control is loose or tight, etc.

4. Requirements of accountability

9) performance indicators,

10) auditing procedures, etc.

Future model

1. How funds might be provided ?

11) Block

12) formula : input driven or output driven?

2. According to which criteria?

13) Historical

14) negotiations

15) formula : input or output/predictability

16) strategies

17) quality

3. Degrees of decentralisation

18) control over the use of funds,

19) control is loose or tight, etc.

4. Requirements of accountability

20) performance indicators,

21) auditing procedures, etc.

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ANNEX 7

SAMPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS

Nº 230 - TOMO 415 - 26 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2002

REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY

DIARIO DE SESIONES

DE LA

CAMARA DE SENADORES

TERCER PERIODO ORDINARIO DE LA XLV LEGISLATURA

77ª SESION EXTRAORDINARIA

PRESIDEN EL SEÑOR LUIS HIERRO LOPEZ Presidente

EL SEÑOR SENADOR DOCTOR GUILLERMO GARCIA COSTA Primer Vicepresidente

Y EL SEÑOR SENADOR DOCTOR RUBEN CORREA FREITAS Segundo Vicepresidente

ACTUAN EN SECRETARIA LOS TITULARES SEÑOR MARIO FARACHIO Y ARQUITECTO HUGO RODRIGUEZ FILIPPINI

S U M A R I O

1**) Texto de la citación**

2**) Asistencia**

3**) Levantamiento del receso**

- El Senado resuelve levantar el receso para considerar el asunto motivo de la convocatoria.

4**) Situación de la salud en los ámbitos público y privado y políticas implementadas por el Poder Ejecutivo en el área de la salud**

- Moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública formulada por varios señores Senadores.

- En consideración.

- Se vota negativamente.

5**) Se levanta la sesión**

1) TEXTO DE LA CITACION

"Montevideo, 23 de diciembre de 2002.

La CAMARA DE SENADORES se reunirá en sesión extraordinaria, el próximo jueves 26, a la hora 16, a fin de hacer cesar el receso, a efectos de considerar la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y resolver sobre su curso. (Artículo 147 de la Constitución de la República).

Carp. Nº 975/02

Hugo Rodríguez Filippini Secretario **- Mario Farachio** Secretario.**"**

"Montevideo, 23 de diciembre de 2002.

De conformidad con el artículo 147 inciso 2º de la Constitución, presentamos una moción de censura respecto del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, por lo cual deberá convocarse a una sesión especial del Senado, que proponemos sea para el día 3 de enero de 2003 a la hora 16.

José Korzeniak, Manuel Núñez, Mónica Xavier, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, Reinaldo Gargano, Alberto Couriel, José Mujica, Enrique Rubio, Danilo Astori, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, Alberto Cid, Marina Arismendi, Senadores.**"**

2) ASISTENCIA

ASISTEN: los señores Senadores **Arismendi, Astori, Barrios Tassano, Brause, Cid, Correa Freitas, Couriel, de Boismenu, Fernández Huidobro, Gallinal, Garat, García Costa, Gargano, Heber, Herrera, Korzeniak, Michelini, Millor, Mujica, Nin Novoa, Núñez, Pereyra, Pou, Riesgo, Rubio, Sanabria, Scarpa, Singer** y **Xavier.**

FALTAN: con licencia, el señor Senador **Virgili;** y, con aviso, el señor Senador **Larrañaga.**

3) LEVANTAMIENTO DEL RECESO

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Habiendo número, está abierta la sesión.

(Es la hora 16 y 15 minutos.)

- El Senado ha sido convocado para hacer cesar el receso y considerar la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública.

Se va a votar si el Senado desea levantar el receso para considerar el asunto motivo de la convocatoria.

(Se vota:)

- 26 en 26. **Afirmativa.** UNANIMIDAD.

4) SITUACION DE LA SALUD EN LOS AMBITOS PUBLICO Y PRIVADO Y POLITICAS IMPLEMENTADAS POR EL PODER EJECUTIVO EN EL AREA DE LA SALUD

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- El Senado pasa a considerar el único asunto que figura en el Orden del Día: "Moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y resolver sobre su curso. (Artículo 147 de la Constitución de la República) (Carp. Nº 975/02)".

Tiene la palabra el señor Senador García Costa.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Señor Presidente: en nombre del Partido Nacional quisiera expresar las razones por las cuales no vamos a votar afirmativamente la moción a la que se ha hecho referencia y que debe dilucidarse en esta sesión.

A nuestro juicio, el episodio de la interpelación no ha resultado en los términos establecidos en la Constitución. No cumplió el objetivo esencial que debe tener, necesariamente, el llamado a Sala de un Ministro. En definitiva, redundó en aspectos negativos para el Senado, por lo menos, en cuanto a la labor que este cumple y al alcance que la opinión pública le da a su tarea.

No vacilamos ni tenemos dificultad en señalar que tales circunstancias negativas se deben a ambas partes. En lo que tiene que ver con la parte interpelante: en primer lugar, por proponer un tema tan vasto que terminó siendo inasible y se prestó a muchos alcances como los que tuvimos que ver y soportar. En segundo término, porque se propuso la moción de censura antes de saber la respuesta a lo planteado. Aunque en términos políticos a veces se sabe, se conoce, se supone, cuál va a ser la actitud que se adoptará por quienes interpelan, parece lógico que primero se complete el trámite antes de dar por sentado que este será negativo. En tercer lugar, por el retiro de Sala, del que supongo que la Bancada del Frente

Amplio brindará las explicaciones correspondientes. Tal actitud nos resultó totalmente sorprendente. Se había solicitado un cuarto intermedio, como tantas veces ocurre en este ámbito. Eso no justificaba -es obvio decirlo- el retiro de la Bancada del Frente Amplio, convocante del Ministro, y mucho menos el de la señora Senadora interpelante, dejando sin efecto el diálogo, al faltar una de las partes.

La parte interpelada, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública, a nuestro juicio, cumplió en su inicio adecuadamente el objetivo e informes para los que fue convocado a Sala. Realizó una exposición sobre el tema en su propio estilo. Pero, en un medio político como éste, de grande repercusión en la opinión pública, es evidente que se espera, y se descuenta con lógica, otra agilidad conceptual; otra agilidad en el manejo de los informes y en las respuestas. No fue así, y los nacionalistas comenzamos a sentir que se podía augurar una muerte por inanición al pedido de informes. Por tanto, consideramos que el señor Ministro pudo haber recurrido a medios más eficaces que el que ensayó para defender su posición.

Hubo, pues, responsabilidad de la parte interpelante y de la interpelada. Durante todo este episodio -aunque no se haya querido, lo que damos por descontado- quedó ajeno el interés público. La opinión pública, en un tema de particular gravitación como es la salud pública y privada del país, estaba esperando un amplio intercambio de ideas para luego conocer algunos acuerdos que permitieran solucionar, al menos en parte, esta problemática tan acuciante. La opinión pública esperaba que desde el Senado se brindaran algunos avances que fueran valiosos. Incluso, el Partido Nacional, en una reunión previa, analizó el tema de acuerdo a los elementos de juicio de que disponía hasta ese momento. Íbamos a proponer -obsérvese cuán deslucido fue nuestro criterio- la concreción de dos, tres o cuatro temas que, según supusimos, iban a ser planteados por la señora Senadora Xavier y de los que estimamos el Ministro iba a brindar respuestas. De esa forma, se podría haber logrado que el Senado avanzara en materias trascendentes. Por supuesto que nuestro deseo estaba subordinado a lo que ocurriera durante la interpelación. Por lo sucedido en el día de hoy no vamos a presentar moción de clase alguna al respecto. ¿Qué podríamos mocionar? Daríamos nuestra opinión, pero lo que estamos haciendo es juzgar sobre el pedido de informes realizado por el Senado y que, a raíz de lo acontecido, no pudo ser evacuado. A nuestro juicio, este Cuerpo dejó transcurrir una excelente oportunidad y ello hoy no se puede remediar.

Hemos recibido -supongo que también los demás integrantes del Senado- las respuestas escritas del señor Ministro -aunque ni siquiera tuve tiempo de hojearlas- a las preguntas de la señora Senadora Xavier. Esto no es adecuado. No es la manera de responder a un pedido de informes. Aclaro que no lo he leído y no dudo de que debe ser una singular demostración de eficacia. Habrá que analizar si la verdad contenida en esos escritos es absoluta. Pero no dudo de su honestidad. Más, reitero que ese no es el procedimiento adecuado. Tampoco lo es que continuemos con la interpelación. Incluso, comentaba con un periodista amigo que esto no es como un partido de fútbol, que si termina por empate Juan y Pedro, vuelven a la

cancha a tirar los penales correspondientes. Esta interpelación es un hecho mucho más serio, formal y profundo.

En síntesis, dejamos esta constancia de que nuestra colectividad considera que se ha perdido una excelente oportunidad de avanzar en los temas de la salud, no de discutir porque, en definitiva, lo segundo tiene un valor muy relativo y lo primero es lo que la gente está esperando, en estos momentos que está viviendo una situación tan crítica en este tema, tan brutal, que tanto afecta a nuestra sociedad.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Xavier.

SEÑORA XAVIER.- Señor Presidente: la verdad es que no salgo de mi asombro con relación al curso de esta interpelación y de la convocatoria del día de hoy para discutir la censura del señor Ministro de Salud Pública.

Lógicamente, hubiésemos deseado que el curso de la interpelación fuera otro, puesto que si nuestra intención hubiese sido censurar, habríamos comenzado por una convocatoria como la que se está realizando hoy. Ocurre que considerábamos más importante llevar adelante una interpelación y un debate en torno a temas que no pueden ser considerados -ninguno de ellos- novedosos. Con relación a todos estos temas está planteada, desde hace mucho tiempo, la búsqueda de solución y todos están encima de la mesa del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, de éste y también de los anteriores, que no han encontrado ningún paliativo.

Quiero dejar bien en claro que lo que acaba de anunciar el señor Senador preopinante refuerza, aún más, mi asombro. En el mediodía de hoy escuchamos decir al señor Ministro que las respuestas vendrían por escrito al Senado. No obstante ello, le hicimos saber al señor Presidente de que era deseo de nuestra Bancada -más allá de que el señor Ministro no está obligado a estar presente en esta sesión en la que se va a decidir si se lo censura o no- que concurriera, puesto que si las 48 horas habían alcanzado para completar las respuestas, resultaba importante que este Parlamento y la ciudadanía las conocieran. Pero resulta que ahora escucho que esas respuestas le llegaron a alguien; y nosotros, en cuanto arribamos al Senado, nos comunicamos con quien corresponde, es decir con la Secretaría, para saber si, efectivamente, lo que el señor Ministro había anunciado en medios de prensa estaba disponible, puesto que allí no había señalado cuándo iban a llegar las respuestas, sino simplemente que las haría llegar por escrito a este Cuerpo.

Por lo tanto, son absolutamente llamativos los procedimientos que este Ministro utiliza para relacionarse con el Poder Legislativo. En consecuencia, no podemos hacer otra cosa que asombrarnos y quedar atónitos ante un mecanismo por el cual si hay diez para elegir, eligió el número once: el que no corresponde de ninguna manera.

Se han hechos planteamientos en torno a la vastedad del cuestionario hecho al señor Ministro de Salud Pública; pero les puedo asegurar que va haber mucha gente que me va a decir que tales y cuales temas no formaron parte de él, puesto que, como señalamos durante la interpelación, sólo elegimos algunos. Ahora bien, ¿cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que piensa que no le íbamos a preguntar sobre el mutualismo, el destino del préstamo del BID, el cierre de las instituciones mutuales y la pérdida de fuentes de trabajo? ¿Cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que no imagina que le vamos a preguntar sobre el desabastecimiento permanente que ha estado planteado, durante todo el año, como una necesidad general del país? ¿Cuál puede ser la ubicación de un Ministro de Salud Pública que asume la Cartera a raíz del relevamiento del Ministro anterior producto de la crisis que se produjo por la vacuna contra la meningitis, y que no encuentra una solución y se sorprende ante nuestras preguntas, hechas de todas las formas posibles, es decir, por teléfono y hasta en forma escrita? ¿Acaso esto era sorpresivo para el Ministro?

El señor Ministro de Salud Pública tuvo tiempo de operar todos los temas planteados desde tiempo antes; tuvo la oportunidad de haber asignado el préstamo otorgado por el BID de manera que no hubieran cerrado las mutualistas que cerraron durante estos trece meses en que ese dinero estaba depositado en un banco; tuvo la oportunidad de vacunar e inmunizar adecuadamente a nuestros niños y adolescentes, y no lo hizo; y tuvo la oportunidad, además, de venir a decir que todos los intentos que hizo para solucionar el tema de desabastecimiento le fracasaron por cuestiones externas. Seguramente, no utilizó los mecanismos más idóneos para encontrar una solución.

Asimismo, tuvo la oportunidad de venir aquí a decir que implantaba una política de medicamentos, para que se legisle sobre eso. Este Parlamento le ha dado mil señales para que, justamente, manifestara su voluntad política de que se legislara sobre medicamentos, sobre todo, si se trataba de genéricos y de todos aquellos que terminaran con el desabastecimiento de la medicación más elemental que necesita nuestra población. No vio las señales y no dio respuestas sobre eso. Entonces, ¿podía el señor Ministro llamarse a sorpresa en cuanto a que esas iban a ser algunas de las preguntas?

En cuanto a la vastedad del cuestionario -que parece ser algo que no tiene antecedentes en otro tipo de interpelaciones- debo decir que todos tienen las preguntas de estos ocho capítulos, que son preguntas que guían las respuestas, justamente, para que hubiera una coincidencia en la manera de encarar estas últimas y, en función de ello, tener un debate en el que pudiéramos intercambiar alternativas y soluciones a todos estos problemas. Algunas de ellas se contestan con un sí o con un no; algunas, inclusive, posibilitan seguir desarrollando cada uno de los temas. Por lo tanto, ¡vamos a dejarnos de embromar con las 94 ó 100 preguntas! Se trata, en definitiva, de ocho preguntas esenciales sobre las que se debe responder. Sistema de salud: ¿a dónde va, en este país, la salud? Atención primaria de sa-lud: ¿terminaremos, de una vez por todas, con las décadas, con los asesores, con todos los libros que se escriben sobre las bondades de la

atención primaria de salud y pasaremos a hacer efectivo algo más que no sean las costosas experiencias que, con ayudas extranjeras, se hacen en el país? ¿Terminaremos o no esas experiencias? Al parecer, el Ministerio las quería implantar en todo el país y, por lo tanto, resultaba elemental que supiéramos cómo se iba a financiar esto. ¡Bienvenido sea un cambio en el modelo de atención! ¿Pero acabó el modelo de atención que se sustenta sin un modelo de atención adecuada? ¿Se sustenta sin un modelo de gestión adecuado y un modelo de financiación que se debía discutir? Aquí parecería que todos fuéramos escolares y no supiéramos que hay determinadas cosas que no son sustentables si no se encadenan con otras alternativas.

Le preguntábamos al señor Ministro sobre el Hospital de Clínicas y le aclaramos que no lo hacíamos porque estuviéramos confundidos en materia de financiación, sino porque ese es un punto fundamental de la cadena asistencial, puesto que sigue con cierres técnicos un día tras otro y, cuando logra obtener recursos, los tiene que diferir en la cadena asistencial porque las compras llevan su tiempo.

También preguntábamos sobre el tema de los contratos. En diciembre se hicieron anuncios con relación a la revisación que se iba a hacer de los contratos. Las máximas autoridades dijeron que había contratos que no eran asistenciales y que fueron celebrados en épocas de bonanza. Pero recordemos que hace muchos años que este país no tiene tiempos de bonanza y, también, que los que estamos en la cuestión pública, así se trate de momentos de bonanza, no podemos dilapidar los esfuerzos y la plata de la gente.

También el cuestionario abarcaba la materia tecnológica. Pero eran ocho capítulos y no el mundo y sus alrededores. Por lo tanto, desmitifiquemos aquello de las cien preguntas porque, repito, éstas eran una guía para facilitarle las respuestas al señor Ministro.

El señor Ministro vuelve a perder la oportunidad de responder y actúa de un modo que me asombra sobremanera. Por lo visto, aquí hay algunas Bancadas que no tenemos el derecho a recibir, de parte del Poder Ejecutivo, las respuestas que solicitamos. Hoy el señor Ministro dijo: "cumplí con el 25% de lo que tenía para leer". Puesto que llevaba dos horas, íbamos a tener que "bancarnos" ocho horas de lectura de las memorias del Ministerio de Salud Pública. ¿Le parece que eso es respeto a la institución parlamentaria? No; no lo es. Es más, hoy vuelve a ratificar esto con una modalidad, sumamente extraña, de responder a este Parlamento y a esta fuerza política.

En consecuencia, la moción de censura que planteamos el otro día está más que justificada y le pedimos, señor Presidente, que se proceda a su votación luego que se culmine con la lista de oradores porque la verdad es que esto queda para la peor historia del Parlamento, y lo lamentamos muchísimo, puesto que no sólo nuestra Bancada ha quedado sin respuesta, sino también la ciudadanía.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Corresponde informar que la Mesa no dio trámite a una sugerencia de la señora Senadora Xavier y del señor Senador Korzeniak en el sentido de que estuviera presente el Ministro en esta circunstancia, porque entiende que no es procedente. El Ministro debe estar en el momento del llamado a Sala, pero esta sesión es convocada expresamente para que el Senado instrumente los mecanismos de los artículos 147 y 148.

SEÑOR FERNANDEZ HUIDOBRO.- Pido la palabra para una aclaración.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR FERNANDEZ HUIDOBRO.- Señor Presidente: he escuchado con atención al señor Senador García Costa decir que tiene en su poder las respuestas que por la prensa el señor Ministro anunció que había enviado al Parlamento. Sin embargo, como acaba de decir la señora Senadora Xavier, nosotros no las tenemos. Creo que a otros no les ha constado la claridad de lo que la señora Senadora Xavier dijo. Entonces, señor Presidente, quería saber si esas respuestas vinieron, porque a nuestra Bancada no llegaron.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No tengo información oficial. A mí me enviaron las respuestas y se me dice que así se hizo porque me quedé a escuchar al señor Ministro cuando vino a darlas en Sala.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Pido la palabra.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Señor Presidente: antes de referirme al tema -lo que haré con la mayor brevedad- quiero decir que lo que comunicamos al señor Presidente es que originalmente en la moción de censura habíamos incluido una frase, que después eliminamos, que decía que si el día en que la moción se discutiera y se votara, afirmativa o negativamente, se invitaba al Ministro nosotros estaríamos de acuerdo con ello, pero no más que eso. Quiere decir que se trataba de una invitación cordial. Sin embargo, la Mesa acaba de aclarar que entendió que no era procedente.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No sólo me pareció improcedente, sino también curioso que los Senadores del Frente Amplio se retiraran y luego sugirieran invitar al señor Ministro.

Puede continuar el señor Senador.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Improcedente no es. El Parlamento no está obligado a invitarlo, pero no es improcedente, ya que el Senado puede invitar al Ministro o permitir su ingreso.

Por otra parte, el objetivo de esta reunión es votar si se censura o no al señor Ministro de Salud Pública.

Quiero empezar por decir que considero que la actuación del Ministro de Salud Pública el otro día aquí -y por estas cosas que voy a decir, me gustaría que estuviera presente- fue una insolencia. Un Ministro que viene a leer cuatro tomos durante 6 u 8 horas, sinceramente, es un insolente.

En segundo lugar, contando con la información que nos habían proporcionado nuestros compañeros integrantes de la Comisión de Salud Pública, en lo personal -no comprometo a nadie- ya estaba absolutamente convencido de que este Ministro es una calamidad como Ministro de Salud Pública. Un desastre. Ha mentido, ya que veinte veces dijo en la radio, la televisión y en las Comisiones del Parlamento cosas que se probó que no eran ciertas. Estoy pensando, por ejemplo, en el tema de las vacunas, historia que no sé quién fabuló. El hecho es que o es un ignorante en materia de medicina o es un mentiroso. Si sabía y le mintieron a él y después lo dijo públicamente, es un mentiroso. Si no lo sabía, al no ser médico, puede administrar un Ministerio pero se supone que hay que conocer el tema cuando se trata de asuntos técnicos. En otros aspectos puede ser un excelente Ministro, aún no conociendo la técnica de la Medicina.

De todas maneras, quiero aclarar que no tengo ninguna duda de que este Ministro tenía que ser censurado. Resulta que hay toda una tradición de hacer una larga exposición y después se entrega una hoja de preguntas. Una vez estuve en una interpelación que duró veinte minutos, oportunidad en la que lo que se hizo fue pedir la censura y el Ministro se fue porque había mentido, como una vez pasó con el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Se siguen tradiciones que en el Parlamento juegan, lo cual no está mal.

Quiero decir que esta introducción vale porque podíamos haber hecho una moción de censura sin pedir una interpelación, que fue lo primero que trató la Bancada.

Aquí termino la explicación que justifica esa conversación informal respecto a que si se quería invitar al Ministro nosotros no íbamos a estar en contra. La moción de censura del artículo 147 no requiere -como tradicionalmente se hace en el Parlamento- que primero haya una interpelación. En absoluto. Se puede venir acá y proponer la censura. ¿Por qué se procede tradicionalmente así y no está mal que se haga un llamado a Sala antes de una moción de censura? Porque el Ministro no está el día en que se vota la censura y entonces, para darle la oportunidad de que explique, se realiza una interpelación. Reitero: no porque la Constitución imponga que primero haya una interpelación. En el concepto vulgar siempre se entiende que antes debe haber una interpelación pero con relación al concepto técnico-jurídico, no es así. No es malo que se haga. ¿Para qué? Para oír al Ministro, para que no pueda decir que lo censuraron sin escucharlo. Por esa razón, como nosotros propusimos una censura, no queríamos que se pudiera decir que se propone la censura y el Ministro no está para defenderse. En ese sentido dijimos que si se lo quería invitar, nosotros no nos íbamos a oponer.

En tercer término, se realizó un cuarto intermedio y oí voces vivas del Partido Nacional y del Partido Colorado -con esto quiero decir de viva voz- acerca de que era un desastre lo que estaba haciendo el Ministro al leer las memorias del Ministerio de Salud Pública, completadas con menciones a hortalizas o tubérculos, aunque no en la sesión. Es decir que no fuimos sólo nosotros que nos sentimos primero perplejos y después realmente molestos.

Entonces, cuando después del cuarto intermedio la Bancada del Partido Nacional -que salía de una reunión- nos comunicó que iban a plantearle al Partido Colorado que le dijera al Ministro que contestara las preguntas y no siguiera leyendo -esto me lo dijeron aquí dentro algunos miembros del Partido Nacional y también del Partido Colorado- resolvimos esperar qué decía el Ministro. Personalmente nunca pude saber qué dijo. Sé que le dijo a un grupo de técnicos que tenía, que fueran preparando las respuestas pero que se aprestaba a seguir leyendo las memorias del Ministerio. No sé cuál fue la respuesta del Ministro en las Bancadas, pero acá se acaba de preguntar cómo es posible que se haga una moción de censura sin haber escuchado las respuestas del Ministro, moción que vamos a votar sin ninguna duda en forma afirmativa. ¿Y qué lógica tiene que los partidos tradicionales -por lo que han anunciado- voten en contra la moción de censura si tampoco escucharon al Ministro de Salud Pública? ¿No lo escucharon por culpa nuestra? No, señor Presidente; no lo escucharon por que no se quedaron en Sala o por que el Ministro se fue. Los miembros del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional más el señor Presidente del Senado suman 18 y resulta que levantaron la sesión. Debido a que ya no soportaban más al Ministro, me fui a mi despacho y encendí el parlante -que esta vez funcionaba- para continuar escuchándolo desde allí. Sin embargo, a los cinco minutos la sesión se había terminado. Tratándose de 18 Senadores, podrían haberlo escuchado y hoy habrían concurrido con todos los elementos. Nuestra compañera planteó una cantidad de puntos incontestables. ¿Qué va a contestar el Ministro? Podrá contestar sobre el tema de la política, es verdad, si es que tiene una política de crear por ejemplo seguros privados. En ese caso, sí. Pero respecto al tema de las vacunas, ¿qué es lo que va a contestar? ¿Nos iba a mentir de nuevo? Lo mismo sucede con otros temas. Menciono el de las vacunas porque no me quiero meter en honduras y estoy pensando en las contrataciones. No me refiero a las contrataciones de los médicos que tuvieron un conflicto, porque eran contratados, sino en las contrataciones privilegiadas que el Ministro ha hecho -ya sea porque lo mandan o porque le piden- con sueldos muy grandes. Aclaro que estas últimas nada tienen que ver con el conflicto al que hice mención. ¿Qué iba a decir a este respecto? ¡Si hasta le podemos dar los nombres!

Entonces, en lo que me es personal tenía y tengo elementos para solicitar que se declare la censura. Por cierto, los señores Senadores del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional escucharon la interpelación; si hubieran querido, se hubieran quedado y escuchado al señor Ministro. No sé si fue conminado pero, en todo caso, creo que le trasmitieron la idea de que querían escucharlo. Sin embargo, ¿por qué no lo escucharon? ¿Por qué se terminó la sesión?

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador?

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Con mucho gusto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Señor Presidente: no me gusta interrumpir y menos al señor Senador Korzeniak, pero ¿debe suponerse que la Bancada del Partido Nacional tenía que quedarse en Sala cuando a la señora Senadora interpelante, que había pedido los informes, ya no le interesaba más escucharlos? Disculpe, señor Senador Korzeniak, pero el Partido Nacional elige cuándo le parece oportuno llamar, dirigirse o visitar al señor Ministro. No vamos a esperar a que un integrante de la Bancada del Frente Amplio, con los votos de la misma, proponga que venga el señor Ministro a informarnos, pero cuando éste -como ya lo explicité en una forma que no nos parece lógica- trata de hacerlo, esa Bancada se retira de Sala. Pero, sobre todo, se va de Sala la señora Senadora interpelante, quien podría haber entrado, señalar que estaba presente y proponer el diálogo. Sin embargo, ella también renuncia. Entonces, el señor Senador Korzeniak no nos puede pedir que nos transformemos en personeros del Frente Amplio y de la señora Senadora interpelante; hacemos lo que debemos, pero no más que eso.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Korzeniak.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- El señor Senador García Costa, con su gracia e ironía características, hizo lo que hace siempre: me atribuye cosas que no digo y planteos que no hago. Precisamente, el otro día, cuando tratamos el tema de la Corte Electoral, hizo lo mismo y me divertí mucho.

Por supuesto, no pretendo indicarle al Partido Nacional lo que tiene que hacer. Expreso que si los señores Senadores del Partido Nacional, para poder votar hoy con conocimiento de causa, querían escuchar a la señora Senadora interpelante y al interpelado, lo podían haber hecho; si no lo quisieron hacer, allá ellos. De todos modos, tengo derecho a decir que van a votar en contra la declaración de censura sin haber oído al señor Ministro; lo digo, porque es así. Lo mismo ocurre con el Partido Colorado.

Si el señor Senador García Costa me pidiera otra interrupción y volviera a inventar cosas que no digo, pues, que lo haga, porque es una dialéctica con la que me divierto mucho. Siempre hemos tenido un trato correcto y lo vamos a seguir teniendo, pero no comparto esa técnica de atribuirle al otro cosas que no dijo, para poder criticarlo fácilmente. Esa técnica también se utiliza para abordar ideologías y criticar a algún autor que no nos gusta -personalmente, no lo hago pues tengo cierta probidad y, por razones académicas, me sentiría mal si lo hiciera- presentándolo mal para poderlo criticar o, por el contrario, si alguien es muy hincha de determinado autor, se le borran aquellos aspectos que no gustan a los efectos de poder alabarlo. Por cierto, esto es bastante común.

Es verdad que se le puede cuestionar a los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio cómo es que piden la censura sin escuchar al señor Ministro. En lo que me es personal, la hubiera planteado, incluso, antes de abocarnos a la interpelación pues -lo vuelvo a decir- este Ministro me parece una calamidad y ha tenido una actuación muy mala. Pero, si por una cuestión de formas y de tradiciones parlamentarias hay derecho a que se nos diga: "Se hubieran quedado a escuchar y, entonces sí, después podrían votar fundadamente la censura", tengo el mismo derecho de contestarles que para votar en contra de la censura también tendrían que haber escuchado al señor Ministro. Si no lo escucharon, tenían todo el derecho del mundo a hacerlo, a irse de Sala y a dar por terminada la sesión. Honestamente no sé qué pasó y por qué el señor Ministro no habló. Quizás el señor Ministro pensó que debía irse porque no estaban los que querían oírle o tal vez es lo que pensaron las dos Bancadas. Yo creo que no es así y que en esos temas todo el mundo está interesado en escuchar los detalles, ya sean los interpelantes, los interpelados, o se trate de los señores Senadores del Partido Colorado, del Nuevo Espacio o del Partido Nacional. Reitero que, en mi opinión, todo el mundo está interesado en saber qué pasa con este tema.

Es habitual que se diga que la izquierda vota siempre en contra o que tiene una predisposición en contra. Sin embargo, cuando se enciende la computadora se comprueba que en más del 80% de los casos no ha sido así, sino que ha colaborado sanamente para que todo siga adelante. Precisamente, conozco el tema muy de cerca y sé que en determinado momento se iba a hacer una publicación, pero la persona a quien se le encomendó esta tarea señaló que no era oportuno hacerlo porque se iban a encontrar con que el Frente Amplio había presentado más proyectos que los otros Partidos. Entonces, acá ocurre el mismo fenómeno y lo voy a decir con mucha simplicidad. Cada vez que se plantea la censura a un señor Ministro advierto muchos votos en contra a pesar de que hay gente que quiere que ese Ministro se vaya. Esto lo vi muchas veces, inclusive, hace poco vivimos el episodio, muy concreto, del ex-Ministro Bensión. Recuerdo que planteamos ¿por qué el Partido Nacional no votaba, si estaba reclamando que se fuera? Por supuesto, al final eso se logró y en esa instancia el Partido Nacional jugó un rol muy importante. Pero la censura no la votaban ni puestos contra la pared, porque señalaron que yo quería interpelar al Partido Nacional. Eso no era así y hoy tampoco estoy interpelando al Partido Nacional ni al Partido Colorado.

Insisto en lo siguiente: si se nos imputa falta de lógica por haber planteado la censura antes de escuchar las respuestas, a mi juicio, existe la misma falta de lógica en votarla en contra sin haber escuchado las respuestas. Las preguntas fueron escuchadas y pienso que fueron contundentes y muy duras sobre el tema de la salud pública; otras no fueron formuladas, porque todavía no tenemos las pruebas suficientes de las malas actuaciones que se han llevado adelante en ese Ministerio.

SEÑOR GARGANO.- Pido la palabra.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GARGANO.- Señor Presidente: teniendo en cuenta la seriedad del tema, voy a tratar de manejar con austeridad los conceptos. En lo que me es personal, voy a votar la censura. Y voy a hacerlo porque la interpelación ha tenido un trámite muy peculiar; diría que ninguna ha sido manejada en una forma tan mala.

En principio, se demoró 25 días en convocar al señor Ministro. Siempre había un problema: primero estaba el sistema financiero y había que resolverlo, y luego nos ocuparíamos del tema de la salud. No se podían tratar los dos al mismo tiempo. Nosotros aceptamos y vinimos a discutir un proyecto de ley sobre el sistema financiero. Fue así que, a un mal proyecto que venía del Poder Ejecutivo, le introdujimos modificaciones sustantivas a los efectos de poder votar algo que sirviera para sacar del escollo en que estaba al sistema financiero. No pido que el Gobierno aplauda esta posición. Y cuando digo "Gobierno" me refiero al Partido Colorado y al Partido Nacional, porque este último, aunque no tenga Ministros, sigue estando en el Gobierno.

Es así que pasa un mes y se fija la interpelación para el 23 de diciembre, la antevísperas de Navidad.

Se dice que la actitud del Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio es inasible. Me pregunto cómo califican los señores Senadores de todos los Partidos lo que hizo el señor Ministro de Salud Pública, que vino y exhibió, delante de todo el mundo, seis tomos. Todos los señores Senadores del Gobierno nos dijeron que su exposición insumiría seis u ocho horas y reiteraban ese planteo, inclusive, cuando la interpelación estaba comenzando. Fue así que el señor Ministro hizo una larga exposición sobre la historia de la poliomielitis en el Uruguay para señalarnos que estaba erradicada hace veinte años; en mi opinión, hasta los escolares de este país tienen esa información que, por otra parte, ya empiezan a abordarla en segundo año de escuela. Lo mismo hizo con el tema de la difteria, para indicarnos que estaba erradicada y con un minucioso análisis, de diez páginas, de cada una de las enfermedades prevalentes, si es que precisamos bien el término porque, en verdad, no logramos saber exactamente de qué se trataba. Supongo que los médicos lo sabrán, pero los demás no tenemos la fortuna o la información sanitaria suficiente como para identificar, por ejemplo, el virus de Egipto. En verdad, todo esto nos resulta inasible.

La señora Senadora Xavier, en una exposición demoledora de dos horas -no era preciso ser muy sagaz para decir que el tema central estaba en lo que sucede en el sistema público y privado- ejemplificó diciendo que se cierran las mutualistas y que el sistema público no tiene hilo para suturar, no hace operaciones y que la emergencia del Hospital de Clínicas está cerrada porque de los $ 20:000.000 que le deben, prometieron darle $ 1:000.000 por mes para atender las necesidades. Obviamente, todo esto es responsabilidad del Ministro de Salud Pública, porque es la persona del Gobierno que se ocupa de eso. Tampoco se puede operar en el Hospital Maciel y los hospitales psiquiátricos no tienen medicamentos. Eso se le preguntó al señor Ministro y no se necesitaba consultar libros para responderlo. Además, observé que el Ministro no tomó ni un solo apunte de lo que se le estaba preguntando. Vino con la idea de hablar durante seis horas, dormir al Senado matándolo de cansancio y después ver si se aguantaba o no. Los

integrantes del gremio de la prensa y de comunicación han calificado esta situación como atípica y eso es exacto. Que al Ministro de Economía y Finanzas le pregunten qué pasó con el préstamo del BID, de U$S 70:000.000 o U$S 80:000.000 -quien habla escuchó con atención que había llegado en noviembre del año pasado- y haya señalado hace dos meses, ante la opinión pública, que por él pasó la aspiradora del Banco Central, es inédito en el Uruguay. Vamos a detenernos un poco, con austeridad, señor Presidente y manejando los vocablos en su justo término. Es insólito que el señor Ministro de Economía y Finanzas diga que a los préstamos que vienen para atender la salud de la gente, el Banco Central le pase la aspiradora y los destine a otra cosa. Seguramente los utilizó para asistir financieramente al Banco de Montevideo, al Banco Comercial o al Banco la Caja Obrera. Sin embargo, ante esa pregunta, no dio ninguna respuesta durante dos horas. Se le dice que el sistema público está en una crisis total, que no está funcionando la emergencia del Hospital de Clínicas, que hay una absoluta parálisis, que cierran las mutualistas y no dice nada al respecto. Recientemente se ha terminado un conflicto con los médicos que trabajan contratados por Salud Pública en régimen de Comisiones de Apoyo que fue provocado por el Ministro, porque no discute. Ahora hay un nuevo método: para bajar los salarios o para disminuir el ingreso de la gente, no se discute con el gremio interesado, sino que se hace directamente. A los diez o quince días, como se paralizó el sistema de salud que atienden estos médicos, en 24 horas se solucionó un problema que no debería haber existido. Acá no hay sólo falta de responsabilidad, sino que también hay incompetencia total. Se le preguntó sobre eso concretamente, pero no dijo una sola palabra.

El señor Senador García Costa dijo que era inasible, pero lo que es inasible es esto. Los mismos miembros de su Bancada estaban horrorizados de lo que estaba haciendo el señor Ministro. Además, las exclamaciones no partían solamente de la Bancada del Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista, sino también del Partido Nacional. Hubo Senadores de este Partido que se retiraron de Sala diciendo "Feliz Navidad".

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA. No es así.

SEÑOR GARGANO. No diga que no, señor Senador García Costa, porque lo principal es la verdad, es una sola y no se la puede dar vuelta.

También se le preguntó al señor Ministro sobre el tema de las vacunas. Voy a repetir esto porque es asombroso lo que ha ocurrido. En el país hay una larga polémica acerca de si hay que utilizar una vacuna que procede de Cuba o no. Recuerdo que esto fue planteado en la interpelación que le hicimos al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores hace varios meses -no sé si fue en marzo, abril o mayo- y se nos dijo que no se sabía qué iba a pasar con la vacuna, porque se rompían las relaciones. Sin embargo, la vacuna vino como donación. Después se dijo que se iba a pagar, aunque nunca se llevó a cabo el pago, por supuesto.

(Ocupa la Presidencia el señor Senador doctor Correa Freitas)

Es más, se pidieron más vacunas para completar la dosis. Varias veces he preguntado a la señora Senadora Xavier y al señor Senador Cid si los jóvenes que recibieron una sola dosis estaban inmunizados y me dijeron que no. Es decir que pueden haber nuevos casos -esto es de tremenda gravedad para el país- porque hay varias decenas de miles de muchachos que recibieron una sola dosis y pueden contraer la enfermedad, ya que no están inmunizados. Y resulta que el Ministro nos dice que no se fabrica más, no se compra más; no se entiende nada. Parece que también se fabrica en Estados Unidos que compró la patente, pero el señor Ministro de Salud Pública no entiende nada de eso y necesita tener a 70 asesores en una sala proveyéndolo de notas para poder responder. Esto es insólito y si esto es inasible, no entiendo absolutamente nada.

Esto es muy bien atable; el Ministro vino a desarrollar una táctica de distracción y, diría, de desprecio al Cuerpo. Pertenezco a este Senado desde hace 18 años y nunca he visto algo así. He visto discusiones duras, violentas, de intercambio de epítetos, pero nunca algo de este tipo. No se puede tratar a un Cuerpo legislativo de esta manera, ni se puede utilizar una táctica de cansar a la gente y no responder absolutamente nada. Entonces, después de aceptar un cuarto intermedio planteado por la Bancada de Gobierno, dijimos que a esa altura, luego de los hechos ocurridos, dábamos por terminada la interpelación. Dijimos eso porque se había visto confirmado por el silencio del Ministro y su elusión de los temas principales, leyendo la cuarta parte de los seis tomos que tenía para leer. Eso sí que es inasible, señor Senador García Costa. Ate eso, señor Senador, átelo a la conducta. Usted sabe muy bien lo que pasa en el Ministerio de Salud Pública, porque estuvo a cargo de esa Cartera. Puede quedarse tranquilo, señor Senador, porque no voy a examinar su gestión; no es la oportunidad. A lo mejor algún día podemos conversar de eso. Su Partido sabe muy bien lo que sucede en el Ministerio de Salud Pública, porque muchos mandos medios de ese Ministerio pertenecen al Partido Nacional. Ustedes no necesitaban la interpelación, porque ya tenían información de lo que estaba ocurriendo allí.

¿Qué respuesta se nos dio al desabastecimiento, a la crisis del sector privado, a los varios miles de trabajadores que han perdido sus puestos de trabajo en ese sistema, a la incapacidad absoluta para resolver esos temas? El Sindicato Médico del Uruguay, la Federación Médica del Interior y las Instituciones de Asistencia Médica Colectiva piden colectivamente la renuncia del Ministro por el descalabro y el caos que hay en materia de salud pública y privada. Entonces, frente a la actitud despectiva, desconsiderada e insólita del Ministro de Salud Pública, decidimos que el tiempo de la interpelación había acabado y venía el de la censura. Por eso, vamos a votar la censura. Sin embargo, comprendo muy bien que el Partido Nacional no la vote, no ha votado nada en contra del Gobierno y forma parte de él. Tenemos una lista de todo lo que ha votado en estos tres años y medio. Además, ha tenido participación en el Ministerio de Salud Pública y muchos de los problemas de los que hay ahora, vienen de antes. Ha habido muchos Ministros blancos en el Ministerio de Salud Pública y no sólo el señor Senador García Costa. Además, han tenido cargos en los otros Ministerios y han colaborado para mantener a este Ministro, no desde hace dos meses -

cuando sacaron a los Ministros del Gobierno- sino durante toda la gestión. Esto que está ocurriendo hoy en el Uruguay en materia de salud no es de ahora. Entonces, está perfectamente justificada la actitud del Frente Amplio de actuar como lo hizo, con responsabilidad y diciendo que no vamos a tolerar esto que aparece como una falta de respeto al Senado de la República.

Por lo tanto, vamos a proceder a hacer lo que corresponde en estos casos, que es votar la censura del Ministro.

No quiero dar recomendaciones a nadie, pero no auguro que el señor Ministro de Salud Pública permanezca mucho tiempo en su cargo, no porque el Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio vaya a sacarlo del mismo, sino porque los hechos lo van a hacer, ya que no tiene competencia ni sensibilidad para afrontar la situación que se vive en esa Cartera e intentar resolver por lo menos uno de los cincuenta problemas que se han generado durante su gestión y la de los que lo antecedieron en el cargo.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Pido la palabra para contestar varias alusiones.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Como sorpresivamente en algún momento parecía que el señor Senador Gargano dirigía el tema a la actitud del Partido Nacional -creí que era una interpelación del Frente Amplio y el Ministro pertenecía al Gobierno y al Partido Colorado- da la impresión de que nosotros tenemos que absolver posiciones.

He planteado nuestro enfoque del tema con todo cuidado, precisando los términos, evitando entrar en cuestiones polémicas y en un enfrentamiento que todos descontábamos era entre el Gobierno y el Frente Amplio, pero resulta que ahora es con el Partido Nacional. Dije, señor Presidente -pero no hay peor sordo que el que no quiere oír- que consideraba que los sucesos del otro día no le hacen ningún bien al Senado ni al país ni dan solución a ninguno de los problemas de la salud pública. Este hecho nadie me lo puede discutir. Échense la culpa recíprocamente, pero lo claro es que nadie dio solución a nada. Además, di las razones de ello. Traté de no limitarme a un concepto subjetivo: "a nosotros nos parece inasible" por varias razones. ¡Cómo no va a ser inasible cuando se quieren plantear tantos temas! Ahora el señor Senador Gargano se refiere de pasada a varios temas concretos y muy importantes de la salud pública y privada del país, pero el pedido de informes dice: "Estado actual de la Salud Pública y Privada del país y elementos de política que procure el Ministerio para corregirlo".

(Murmullos en Sala)

(Campana de orden)

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Correa Freitas).- Puede continuar en el uso de la palabra el señor Senador García Cos-ta.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Dije que es inasible. ¡Cómo no lo va a ser! Es necesariamente inasible. De otra manera no funciona.

En cuanto a que el Ministro estuvo mal e hizo esto o aquello, señalé que según el criterio de la Bancada del Partido Nacional, el Ministro no cumplió adecuadamente el objetivo de un pedido de informes y de una interpelación. ¿Quieren que además proclamemos nuestro odio eterno? Ni contra uno ni contra otro. No compartimos lo que se hizo; indicamos las razones. ¿No son suficientes? No lo serán, pero son las nuestras, señor Presidente. Si el Ministro estuvo mal, lo estamos diciendo. Sin embargo, también expresamos que no volver cuando la interpelación estaba en pleno, nos parecía un absurdo. Al final, la teoría del "Miren que pedimos la interpelación porque hay costumbre, pero en realidad es el 147 que deberíamos haberlo puesto sin ponerlo", no la entiendo.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- No dije eso.

SEÑOR GARCIA COSTA.- Pero no dije que lo haya dicho el señor Senador Korzeniak. ¿Por qué se siente aludido si no dije que fue él? Señor Senador Korzeniak: usted no es el único que habla.

(Campana de orden)

- No tengo por costumbre el revelar charlas que se tienen acá y ponerlas como un elemento de juicio para los compañeros del Senado. Es algo que aprendí en veinte y tantos años en esta Casa. Pero si se quiere se usa: "Juan me dijo, Pedro me avisó, el otro me dijo en el Ambulatorio, el de más allá me lo conversó y vino un periodista...". En general, en eso hay un estilo de discreción. Parece que eso es lo normal. Hubo otras personas que también me hablaron del 147, ¿por qué sólo lo haría el señor Senador Korzeniak?

Repito que el tema no es el Partido Nacional, sino que el otro día el Senado se negara en los hechos -obviamente, no en la intención- a cumplir con la necesidad nacional, que es atender los graves problemas de la salud en este país y se dedicó, de un lado y otros, tirios y troyanos, a no entrar nunca al tema. Se entró por el reproche, pero la respuesta no la pudimos oír. Ahora se nos dice: "Quédense ustedes para oírla", pero yo no hice el pedido de informes ni pedí que viniera el Ministro. Si el Partido Nacional lo hubiera solicitado, alguno de sus representantes hubiera formulado las preguntas concretas del caso. Resulta que no lo hicimos nosotros, pero tenemos que quedarnos para escuchar lo que contesta el Ministro al requerimiento del Frente Amplio. Eso no es racional ni lógico.

SEÑOR GARGANO.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión política.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GARGANO.- Quiero decir, señor Presidente, que la polémica no es con el Partido Nacional. Lo que ocurre es que éste, por intermedio de su portavoz, ha enjuiciado la conducta del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio y le explicamos cuál era nuestra opinión. Nosotros sabíamos que el Partido Nacional iba a votar en contra de la censura. Personalmente, me atrevería a decir que estaba seguro de que, aunque hubiéramos llegado en absoluta paz al final de la sesión, iba a votar en contra de la censura, como lo va a hacer con todas las censuras, ahora y hasta que termine el período de Gobierno, porque son el Gobierno y lo han sido desde la salida democrática, junto con el Partido Colorado. Me parece bien que actúen así, en bloque y férreamente unidos, porque tienen una misma concepción y desarrollan una misma práctica. Esto tampoco es un reproche. Si están convencidos de ello, me parece perfecto. Creo que es elogiable una conducta transparente ante la opinión pública para que ésta esté totalmente enterada de la unidad de criterios del Partido Colorado y del Partido Nacional.

Si alguna sorpresa me llevo ahora, es que el Partido Nacional ha recibido las respuestas del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, mientras que el Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio, no las recibió. Quiere decir que el Ministro, de alguna manera, está agradeciendo la actitud del Partido Nacional al entregarle las respuestas y ni siquiera hacerle llegar al Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio la notificación de que dichas respuestas están elaboradas. Es otra demostración de desprecio a las instituciones. Creo que se está insistiendo mucho en esto del desprecio a las instituciones y, aquí sí, convendría rectificar el camino. Este no es el único episodio que ha ocurrido; ha habido varios en los últimos meses que muestran la actitud que se toma. Por ejemplo, se aprecia cuando al estallar el sistema financiero, por encima de la Constitución y de la ley se adoptan determinadas decisiones o cuando ocurre un episodio como el de la integración de los organismos de contralor y se sigue para adelante. Ahora tenemos esta actitud: acercar una respuesta al Partido Nacional mediante un documento voluminoso, casi tanto como uno de aquellos seis tomos que tenía el señor Ministro en Sala, que espero no sea nuevamente una síntesis de la Rendición de Cuentas anual del Ministerio de Salud Pública, sino la contestación a las preguntas formuladas en la interpelación, porque por lo menos el Partido Nacional se va a enterar.

SEÑOR CID.- Pido la palabra.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR CID.- Creo que para analizar esta circunstancia que se está atravesando hoy con respecto al Ministro de Salud Pública, habría que ver cuál fue la conducta de la Bancada del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio con las autoridades del Ministerio de Salud Pública.

Estamos hablando del tercer Ministro de Salud Pública de esta Legislatura.

Quiero señalar algunos elementos fundamentales con respecto a este hecho, y voy a marcar, entonces, cuál fue nuestra actitud con el primer Ministro de Salud Pública, el contador Fernández Ameglio, que hizo un diagnóstico de situación y una propuesta de trabajo y creó un ámbito de trabajo multiinstitucional, con la elaboración de planes que permitían una expectativa cierta para poner proa a los problemas que atravesaba, en primer lugar, el sistema privado y, en segundo término, el sistema público. Esta Bancada los apoyó y aprobó, e incluso en conflictos que dieron lugar a situaciones críticas como las que ocurrieron con el cierre de instituciones mutuales, compañeros nuestros actuaron mediando, tratando de minimizar un hecho de extrema gravedad, pues se dejaba a cientos de trabajadores sin cobertura asistencial, así como a miles de afiliados al sistema mutual en una total incertidumbre, porque luego de los cierres del año 1989 -es decir, doce años después- se procesaban los primeros cierres de instituciones de asistencia médica colectiva, lo cual es absolutamente negativo para la calidad de la asistencia médica.

Luego de la renuncia del contador Fernández Ameglio -que, bueno es reiterarlo, elaboró una estrategia para poner proa a la solución de los problemas de la asistencia médica colectiva-, asume el doctor Luis Fraschini, a quien en su momento dimos nuestro apoyo público y notorio en condiciones muy adversas para pronunciarse favorablemente y darle el apoyo cuando se le acusaba de ser responsable de muertes por meningitis. Recordemos ese hecho con respecto al cual, reitero, dimos públicamente nuestro apoyo, porque de ninguna manera podíamos aceptar que se encarara como responsable al doctor Luis Fraschini de muertes de niños por meningitis. Otros eran los responsables, y no precisamente el Ministro; lo eran otros que tergiversaron la información.

Dimos nuestro apoyo, entonces, al doctor Luis Fraschini, con quien tuvimos almuerzos de trabajo para tratar, entre todos, de dar solución a los problemas de la salud; de poner un norte e ir colaborando en un tema que merece una política de Estado, como es -así lo entendemos personalmente- el que tiene que ver con la salud. Creemos que debe ser un elemento esencial y no de politización, como se puede interpretar.

Nuestro compañero, el señor Representante Luis Gallo, cuando reconoció que se había tergiversado información sobre la tipificación de cepas de meningococo que demostraban que la vacuna cubana era efectiva para prevenir la meningitis en nuestro país, se encargó públicamente de decir a todos los medios de difusión que el interés no era proponer una interpelación al doctor Fraschini, sino promover la destitución del doctor Touyá, quien, en conocimiento de ese error de tipificación, había ocultado los datos al señor Ministro.

Hasta ese grado ha llegado nuestra lealtad como Legisladores del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio, tratando de defender a los Ministros que se han designado, al tema de la salud como un asunto prioritario y rumbear en las soluciones más consensuadas o factibles para la salud pública y la mutual. Desgraciadamente, por razones políticas, el doctor Fraschini fue destituido. Digo "desgraciadamente", porque considero que fue un buen Ministro, y así lo demostró, no sólo ocupando esa Cartera, sino también

como Subsecretario de ese Ministerio y como Director de ASSE. Desgraciadamente, vuelvo a decir, fue destituido el doctor Fraschini. Lo digo con los alcances que tiene el término.

Se puede atribuir que no hubo tiempo de analizar 94 preguntas, pero si un Ministro de Salud Pública no tiene motivos suficientes para contestar la interrogante número 1 que hizo la señora Senadora Mónica Xavier después de un análisis absolutamente exacto, preciso y completo, es un Ministro incompetente. La pregunta número 1 dice: "¿Cuál es el enfoque o modelo de sistema de salud que se persigue como vía para la toma de decisiones de su Cartera?". Si el doctor Varela no tiene dos horas y media para hablar de este tema, es un Ministro incompetente.

Entonces, comparto algunas de las afirmaciones que se han hecho en este ámbito por parte de algún compañero en el sentido de que no era necesaria la interpelación para promover la destitución o censura de este Ministro. Han sido muchos los episodios que, incluso, hemos compartido por los medios de difusión, que nos hacen llegar al descrédito del señor Ministro. En primer lugar, hay uno esencial. Luego de hechos gravísimos que se estaban dando en todos los niveles de salud, el Ministro demoró más de un mes en asistir a la Comisión de Salud Pública del Senado. El señor Senador Correa Freitas, que ocupa la Presidencia del Senado en este momento, integra esa Comisión y, si bien no le pido que avale lo que estoy señalando, conoce que ese hecho fue real. Reitero que ese es un primer elemento esencial. No había consideración al Parlamento Nacional, y el señor Ministro tampoco sentía necesidad de darle explicaciones, incluso olvidando lo que había sido nuestra posición histórica de colaboración, de apoyo, de tratar de dar una mano en temas tan esenciales.

Luego se desencadenan una serie de situaciones, que las sintetizo en que estamos asistiendo al cierre, durante este Gobierno, de la sexta institución de asistencia médica colectiva. Es más; estamos asistiendo al cierre de instituciones históricas creadas por Maestros de la medicina nacional. Se cierra el Sanatorio Larghero, en donde nuestro Profesor de Cirugía desarrolló la actividad quirúrgica al más alto nivel, colaborando con la asistencia pública. Debemos recordar que cuando los pacientes no podían ser asistidos en el Hospital Pasteur, el Profesor Larghero, con generosidad y desprendimiento, llevaba a los pacientes a su Sanatorio y los asistía bajo su costo. Precisamente ese es el último de los sanatorios que se está cerrando. Digo esto con gran dolor y con profundo sentimiento, porque fui alumno del Profesor Larghero, quien me enseñó muchas cosas además de Medicina.

En ese entorno se desarrolla un conflicto con los médicos contratados. Ahí realmente se actuó -lo digo con franqueza y si molesta lo siento mucho- con irresponsabilidad. Se rescindieron los contratos de los médicos contratados. Desde 1991, el Ministerio de Salud Pública no tenía un avance significativo en la calidad de asistencia como cuando se resolvió incentivar a grupos de médicos para implementar coberturas asistenciales que en ese momento debía contratar Salud Pública en los servicios privados. Bajo el Gobierno del doctor Lacalle se implementa este sistema que permite transformar la asistencia en los CTI desde el

sector privado al público. Ese fue un elemento fundamental que permitió al Ministerio de Salud Pública abaratar la cobertura asistencial de una manera muy significativa. Luego eso se fue ampliando en círculos concén-tricos; se contrataron cirujanos, anestesistas y médicos psiquiatras que permitieron implementar el Plan de Salud Mental. Todo esto se hizo mejorando radicalmente -debemos decirlo enfáticamente- la calidad de la asistencia y de la cobertura de Salud Pública.

Y este señor Ministro, a quien el señor Presidente Jorge Batlle ha señalado como un ejemplo de ahorro en el área de la Salud Pública -diciendo que había que tomar como ejemplo esa Cartera como organismo que había hecho los máximos ahorros-, pretende desprenderse de los médicos contratados. Rescinde el contrato, y el señor Subsecretario, supuestamente con el aval del señor Ministro, sale a la conquista de la opinión pública. ¿Qué se le ocurre decir al señor Subsecretario? Se le ocurre decir que los médicos contratados cobran un 300% más que los presupuestados. Por supuesto que se omitió decir que los médicos presupuestados ganan $ 3.500; es una verdadera vergüenza lo que Salud Pública abona a sus médicos y, en fin, a los profesionales que trabajan en esa área. Esa conquista por la opinión pública resultó indignante, porque se refirió a un hecho absolutamente tramposo en cuanto a su argumentación, pues señalaba claramente un ánimo de desprestigiar a los médicos que estaban en conflicto.

Pero, además, cuando uno dice "irresponsable", está señalando que el núcleo central del conflicto era el Hospital Pereira Rossell. En ese Hospital se asisten 9.000 partos al año, es decir que estábamos poniendo en riesgo al binomio materno-fetal, desencadenando un conflicto que podía desembocar en lo que finalmente desembocó: el traslado de prematuros a sanatorios privados y la declaración de la Facultad de Medicina de que no podía dar cobertura a los partos, el día 4 de diciembre, por la pérdida de calidad de asistencia. Esto significa que se sometió a miles de uruguayas a un riesgo, situación desencadenada por las propias autoridades del Ministerio de Salud Pública quienes, además, se negaron a dialogar y a buscar un ámbito de acuerdo.

En ese entorno -de las características que estamos señalando- de lo que significó esta contratación de médicos -que fue hecha durante el Gobierno del Partido Nacional y que reconozco como algo trascendente-, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública dice públicamente, ante los medios de difusión, que está dispuesto a estudiar alternativas de privatización de los CTI, cuando nosotros, como médicos intensivistas, vimos cómo se expoliaba al propio Ministerio por su incapacidad de control, debido a su tamaño o a su dimensión. Lo cierto es que se retenían enfermos o se pasaba a los CTI a pacientes cuando ello no era realmente necesario, con lo cual se incrementaba el costo de la asistencia en terapia intensiva, en una forma exorbitante.

Entonces, esos anuncios hechos por el señor Ministro a la ligera demuestran que, en realidad, no maneja muy bien la situación. Cabe agregar que poco después de las manifestaciones públicas a las que aludíamos antes, señaló -también públicamente- que los CTI privados son mucho más baratos que los CTI

públicos, porque la cotización es de U$S 200 los primeros, contra U$S 700 los segundos. Todos sabemos que esa cifra no es real y que no tiene consistencia. En definitiva, vemos que hay un manejo tan superficial de todas estas situaciones que no podemos salir de nuestro asombro para catalogar la actitud del señor Ministro.

¿Cómo se destraba este conflicto de los médicos contratados? En base a una denuncia que ellos mismos hacen sobre las contrataciones de las Comisiones de Apoyo. Estas últimas contratan servicios que son absolutamente desconcertantes -por utilizar un término benevolente- como, por ejemplo, los de pintores, caseros, choferes que no están asignados -justamente- al manejo de ambulancias, o treinta arquitectos; y en muchos casos ni siquiera existe asignación presupuestal o un área dónde desarrollar sus actividades. Cuando los médicos que estudian esa planilla denuncian esa situación, se destraba el conflicto y se otorga una parte de los beneficios que los médicos estaban dispuestos a recibir.

Entonces, todo esto resulta muy sorprendente, porque habla de un manejo muy a la ligera de esta situación.

Por mi parte, me gustaría poder decir en mi discurso que este Ministro de Salud Pública es excepcional y que le puso proa a los problemas. Pero no puedo hacerlo, señor Presidente, porque lo que él ha hecho ha sido crear un ámbito de incertidumbre tanto en el sistema público como en el privado. En lo que refiere a este último, no fue implementada ninguna de las medidas consensuadas en el ámbito de la Comisión Multisectorial -en la que participó prácticamente el 100% de los actores vinculados al tema de la salud- que fueron apoyadas, en forma casi unánime, en el mes de abril de 2002. Y lo cierto es que algunas de ellas son instrumentales, es decir, no precisan recursos económicos para poder ser puestas en práctica, sino que ello depende de la voluntad política. Sin embargo, reitero que ninguna de esas medidas se ha implementado.

A continuación, me gustaría hacer referencia a una de las medidas inmediatas, que era absolutamente imprescindible. Se trata, concretamente, del préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, que inicialmente era de U$S 70 por afiliado. Sin embargo, hace muy poco tiempo se transformó en U$S 35 por afiliado, argumentándose también que las deudas que tiene el sistema mutual no son en dólares. Decir esto es desconocer la realidad. Personalmente, conozco decenas de instituciones mutuales que tienen deudas en dólares. De cualquier modo, supongamos por un momento que esa afirmación que he mencionado, que no es exacta, se corresponde con la realidad; en ese caso, tampoco esa cifra de U$S 35 comprometida por el señor Ministro de Economía y Finanzas y ratificada por el de Salud Pública, se repartió. Personalmente, sé que las instituciones mutuales hicieron un gasto; por mi parte, conozco el caso concreto -porque fue publicado en la prensa- de la Sociedad Médica Universal, que gastó U$S 70.000 en auditoría con sus recursos, apostando a que el préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo le daría después un poco de oxígeno, tanto a ella como a los proveedores, recomponiéndose en parte la cadena de pagos. Sin embargo, no han recibido un solo peso y hace meses que el plan de fortalecimiento mutual de estas

instituciones ha sido aceptado por el Ministerio de Salud Pública, a través de la Comisión que evaluó esos programas.

A todo esto, agregamos que en el mes de mayo el señor Ministro afirmó que el préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo estaba disponible. Sin embargo, en diciembre expresa que, probablemente, en el mes de enero se otorgará parte de dicho préstamo. Ya no se habla de todo el préstamo, sino de la cifra de U$S 20 por afiliado, y el resto, luego se verá.

Entonces, un Ministro que se maneja con afirmaciones tan radicales, que luego no se condicen con la realidad, no puede resultar creíble. No se puede creer en un Ministro que tiene distintos discursos para diferentes situaciones.

Podemos agregar, también, que el día 7 de noviembre de este año, un periodista del diario "Ultimas Noticias", frente a la declaración hecha por el Sindicato Médico del Uruguay, le pregunta al señor Ministro si hay emergencia en la salud. El señor Ministro responde que no la hay e, incluso, alude a las inversiones que han hecho algunas instituciones mutuales, las que han construido -dice- salas asistenciales, salas de Gerentes, etcétera, a todo lujo, lo que indica -a su juicio- que ha habido un rendimiento económico. Evidentemente, el Ministro no sabe nada sobre cómo se financian las inversiones en el área mutual. No sabe que hay una sobrecuota para equipamiento médico y edificaciones, y también desconoce que esa sobrecuota financia ese tipo de desarrollos, lo que no significa que eso tenga un carácter lucrativo. Quiere decir que estamos hablando de un Ministro que no conoce nada del sistema mutual y, además, dice cosas que son realmente inaceptables para los que estamos involucrados en este tema desde hace muchos años.

Quisiera referirme a otro tema vinculado también con esta materia. Se trata del préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo con relación a la Federación Médica del Interior. En cierta oportunidad, en la Comisión de Salud Pública -el señor Senador Correa Freitas, en ejercicio de la Presidencia en este momento, y la señora Senadora Xavier lo recordarán muy bien-, recibimos la afirmación categórica del señor Ministro de que una parte del préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo sería destinada a la Federación Médica del Interior. Muy poco tiempo después, afirma que a dicha Federación no destinará nada, cuando el Estado le debe U$S 15:000.000 a todas las Instituciones de Asistencia Médica Colectiva del Interior, colocándolas así en una situación de inviabilidad. Estamos, pues, ante otra afirmación ligera, liviana, que no se condice con la realidad.

En este mismo orden de afirmaciones, el señor Ministro dijo hace muy pocos días en el seno de la Comisión de Salud Pública -y la señora Senadora Mónica Xavier lo señaló en su excelente informe- que, si había alguna carencia, en más o menos 24 horas sería resuelta. Palabras más, palabras menos, eso fue lo que afirmó. Sin embargo, todos sabemos que el aprovisionamiento de las áreas públicas del Ministerio de Salud Pública es, realmente, un caos. Tanto es así, que en oportunidad de asistir a la Comisión de Salud Pública

una delegación de usuarios y médicos del departamento de Florida -pocos días después de haberse hecho presente el señor Ministro-, se manifestó que el Hospital de Florida se encontraba en una situación de omisión de asistencia.

Si algo faltaba para enriquecer ese concepto de omisión de asistencia, tenemos los informes que remitieran a la señora Senadora Xavier los colegas del Hospital Pasteur y del Hospital Pereira Rossell, con un listado de enfermos con cánceres que no son operados por falta de insumos en el área pública. A todo esto, el señor Ministro nos dice que en 24 horas se resuelven los temas.

Por otro lado, los acuerdos que hizo el Ministerio de Salud Pública con la Cámara de Especialidades Farmacéuticas y Afines, CEFA, no fueron respetados ya que de las 24 cuotas pactadas sólo se pagaron 8, la última de las cuales se hizo efectiva en el mes de abril. Si con ese nivel de cumplimiento se aspira a que el aprovisionamiento de Salud Pública sea normal, realmente se constata que hay una gran irrealidad en el análisis que hace el señor Ministro de Salud Pública.

A su vez, cuando la señora Senadora Xavier realizó el informe sobre la Meningitis -que fue mucho más preciso que el que diera Salud Pública en la Comisión respectiva del Senado- señaló el porcentaje de niños y adolescentes no vacunados con la segunda dosis, a quienes se colocó en riesgo de contraer dicha enfermedad. El Ministro no reiteró lo que explicó en la Comisión en el sentido de que habían faltado vacunas porque algunos pediatras habían recomendado vacunar por debajo de los cuatro años. Se trata de una explicación asombrosa porque según tengo entendido el Ministerio de Salud Pública, históricamente, ha tenido criterios que deben ser aplicados en la vacunación de aquellos casos estrictamente necesarios. No puedo entender que los médicos por su cuenta hayan decidido vacunar a niños por debajo de esa edad y ese haya sido el factor de carencia de vacunas. Me parece que hubo un gran desorden con la vacunación antimeningocóccica, tal como está sucediendo en el Ministerio. No existieron criterios ni factores que permitieran anticiparse a las necesidades que la propia vacunación exigía.

Quiero hacer mención al tema de Biofarma con la famosa intoxicación con litio de pacientes sometidos a hemodiálisis mediante la provisión de un medicamento elaborado en forma errónea. Pregunto al Cuerpo si es aceptable que el laboratorio Biofarma -que es de propiedad de la familia del doctor Lasalvia, integrante del Partido Colorado- haya estado cuatro años sin ser fiscalizado por el Ministerio de Salud Pública. El propio Ministro reconoció que no se lo inspeccionaba desde 1999 y que cuando se realizó la inspección, una vez detectado el problema, se encontraron errores metodológicos de las buenas prácticas de producción, todo lo cual obligó a la suspensión de la elaboración de medicamentos, pero no a la clausura que demoró tres semanas. Tengamos en cuenta que se trata de un laboratorio que engañó a las autoridades del Ministerio ocultando que había detectado un error en la producción y no lo había denunciado. Sin embargo, con esos antecedentes, el Ministerio de Salud Pública demoró tres semanas en clausurarlo. La Comisión de Control de Calidad de los medicamentos nos informó que en un año se

fiscalizan 2000 especialidades terapéuticas. Qué llamativo es que el laboratorio Biofarma no haya sido examinado y que no se hayan detectado esos errores. Una explicación que dio la doctora Carolina Seade por los medios de difusión fue desmentida por el señor Ministro. Esta doctora, que está al frente de la Comisión de Control de Medicamentos, manifestó que faltaba personal para realizar las fiscalizaciones, pero el Ministro dijo que eso no era así. Entonces, si no faltaba personal, ¿por qué no se fiscalizó el laboratorio Biofarma? ¿Cuáles fueron las razones que llevaron a que no se lo fiscalizara? Personalmente no lo puedo contestar, pero todo esto me resulta sumamente sospechoso.

En lo que tiene que ver con las propuestas del Ministerio, quisiera saber qué es lo que ha planteado como hecho concreto y tangible, cuando lo que ha sucedido es que ha generado más conflicto en la sociedad. Por ejemplo, tenemos el caso del cambio de estatus del Instituto Nacional de Oncología que provocó una suspensión de algunas de sus funciones, cuando en este Plenario los Legisladores del Partido Colorado nos habían asegurado que ese cambio de denominación no iba a tener ningún efecto sobre la calidad asistencial. Sin embargo, se suspendió el block operatorio hasta el día de la interpelación y tampoco funcionaba la policlínica de atención primaria. A su vez, se traspasó la responsabilidad del Registro Nacional de Cáncer a una esfera que no corresponde al Instituto Nacional de Oncología. Lo digo con todo respeto, señor Presidente, pero es una realidad incontrastable: aquí se nos mintió, y con un agravante que es que en la Comisión de Salud Pública nosotros dijimos a las pacientes con cáncer que el cambio de denominación no iba a tener ninguna consecuencia en la calidad de asistencia. Se nos mintió rotundamente y eso provocó que nosotros, aunque sin querer, también mintiéramos, cuando una vez más tratamos de mitigar, amortiguar y tratar de ser agentes de trasmisión de confiabilidad. A su vez, en la Rendición de Cuentas el señor Ministro propuso traspasar la Escuela de Enfermería Scosería a la Universidad del Trabajo del Uruguay, sabiendo que esta no tiene capacidad, ni instrumental, ni historia para formar enfermeras. Cuando la señora Senadora Pou propuso que fuera llevada al ámbito de la Universidad de la República, las decisiones no se tomaron con tanta celeridad. En este mismo sentido, a través de un decreto existe una propuesta para desregularizar la ubicación de las farmacias en el país, propiciando la instalación en los barrios más poblados y de mayor capacidad económica de empresas internacionales que van a destruir la farmacia uruguaya, que ha sido histórica en la capacidad de cobertura, asistencia y consejo a la población del Uruguay. Quiere decir que en unas áreas ha sido muy rápido, pero en otras no. Esto también estaba vinculado a las preguntas que formulara la señora Senadora Xavier en este largo cuestionario que alguien competente podría haber contestado con mucha agilidad.

En consecuencia, señor Presidente, soy mucho más estricto que la Senadora Xavier, quien abrió una expectativa de respuesta al Ministro. Personalmente venía con la composición intelectual de que el Ministro no podía seguir al frente de la Cartera por todos estos hechos que hemos relatado y por todas estas situaciones que muestran una falta de Norte, de conducción, contradicciones y la ruptura de líneas de trabajo aceptadas universalmente por todos los actores. Entonces, a pesar de que exista alguna crítica por

no haber escuchado al Ministro, lo que este ha contestado públicamente al país ha sido suficiente como para concluir que no puede seguir al frente de la Cartera.

Muchas gracias.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa debe informar que hay varios oradores anotados para hacer uso de la palabra. El Reglamento no establece ningún criterio con respecto a esta sesión especial y si nos atuviéramos a la letra del artículo 147 de la Constitución, concluiríamos que esta reunión ha sido convocada para resolver y no para analizar otra vez el tema. De todas formas, la Mesa va a amparar el derecho de los señores Senadores a expresarse y solamente los exhorta a que sean lo más breves posible.

SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Señor Presidente: no salgo de mi asombro, porque no alcanzo a comprender los dichos ni la conducta de los integrantes del Frente Amplio, quienes convocan a una interpelación al señor Ministro de Salud Pública para considerar un tema de la vastedad que se señaló, relativo a la salud pública, a la salud privada, al estado actual de la misma y a las políticas instrumentadas al efecto, y cuando el señor Ministro concurre a la sesión del lunes pasado y contesta el interrogatorio que se le hace, el Frente Amplio presenta una moción de censura y se retira de Sala. Dicha moción de censura alude expresamente al artículo 147 de la Constitución de la República y como consecuencia de ella hoy el Senado, como corresponde, es convocado a efectos de considerar la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y resolver sobre su curso, según consta en la citación. Voy a ahorrar al Senado la lectura del inciso segundo del artículo 147 de la Constitución, haciendo honor a la exhortación hecha por el señor Presidente del Cuerpo en el sentido de que tratemos de ser breves. Lo cierto es que en lugar de estar en este momento considerando el motivo concreto de la convocatoria, que es resolver sobre el curso de la censura, el Senado está reiterando -en realidad lo están haciendo los señores Senadores integrantes del Frente Amplio- la interpelación de la sesión pasada, pero reformulándola, como es obvio, sin la presencia del señor Ministro, que no tiene por qué estar presente en esta oportunidad. Quiere decir que el Frente Amplio no aprovechó la presencia del señor Ministro para escuchar las respuestas y ahora replantea la interpelación en su ausencia. Sinceramente, me parece que esta situación es totalmente insólita, que carece de precedentes y que motiva, precisamente, el asombro a que hice referencia al principio de mi exposición.

Razones de hecho y de derecho fundamentan las afirmaciones que estoy realizando. Antes de reseñar y fundamentar las causas que me motivan, deseo expresar de la manera más enfática y afirmativa posible, de la manera más enfática y radical, mi rechazo a las adjetivaciones que se han vertido con relación al señor Ministro de Salud Pública. Las rechazo, por cuanto se le ha tratado de insolente y de que es una calamidad. Rechazo radical y enfáticamente adjetivaciones de esa naturaleza. También se aludió a que el señor Ministro de Salud Pública mintió a la opinión pública, que es incompetente e insensible a la situación de la salud. Reitero que rechazo enfática y radicalmente afirmaciones de esa naturaleza que, a mi modo de ver,

en ausencia del señor Ministro, no sólo demuestran que no se está actuando a la altura de las circunstancias, sino que además es una gran falta de respeto hacia quien está ausente en este momento.

SEÑOR SINGER.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador?

SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Con mucho gusto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador.

SEÑOR SINGER.- Señor Presidente: deseo hacer algunas precisiones que me parecen importantes en cuanto a los procedimientos seguidos desde el punto de vista político, dado que el señor Senador Brause se está internando en una cuestión más de fondo.

En primer lugar, esta interpelación fue formulada por la totalidad de los integrantes de la Bancada del Frente Amplio. Luego de solicitar dicha interpelación anunciaron a la Mesa que quien iba a realizarla, al solo efecto del tiempo que el Reglamento del Senado otorga, era la señora Senadora Xavier.

En segundo término, me parece importante recordar en esta sesión el tema por el cual el Frente Amplio convocó al señor Ministro de Salud Pública: la situación de la salud, tanto en el ámbito público como privado, y las políticas implementadas por el Poder Ejecutivo en el área de la salud. Me pregunto si esta no era una exhortación para que el señor Ministro no hablara seis horas, sino veinte. ¿De qué estamos hablando, señor Presidente? En el día de hoy varios señores Senadores del Frente Amplio señalaron una serie de puntos concretos. Me pregunto por qué no los pusieron como tema de la interpelación y dijeron concretamente que querían interpelar al señor Ministro por tal y cual asunto. Esta es la metodología habitual e histórica de las interpelaciones. Debo aclarar que en mi larga vida parlamentaria nunca he asistido en el Senado ni en la Cámara de Representantes a una interpelación de esta naturaleza, y me refiero a la forma cómo se planteó. Además, después que se plantea el tema de esta manera, se hace un escándalo porque el señor Ministro vino con dos, tres, veinte o cien tomos para contestar el interrogatorio. Si el señor Ministro hubiera contestado rápidamente sobre este tema tan vasto, también se le podría haber reprochado que no es atento con el Senado, que no es respetuoso con las instituciones porque contestaba rápidamente sobre un tema tan importante y trascendente, que abarca nada menos que la totalidad de la salud pública y privada, además de las políticas que instrumenta el Poder Ejecutivo en la materia. Realmente, no me parece desconcertante porque todos sabemos cuál ha sido la motivación de todo esto, está relacionada con el tema de la fecha. Cuando pregunté al señor Presidente por qué se había acordado la interpelación para el día 23, se me informó que de conformidad con lo estatuido en el Reglamento, el señor Presidente la concertó con el señor Ministro y la señora Senadora interpelante. No era una buena fecha...

VARIOS SEÑORES SENADORES.- Fue mal informado, señor Senador.

SEÑOR SINGER.- Quiere decir que la fecha no se fijó luego de un acuerdo.

(Campana de orden)

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Efectivamente, la fecha fue concertada entre el señor Ministro, el Presidente del Cuerpo y la señora Senadora interpelante.

Puede continuar el señor Senador Singer.

(Dialogados)

SEÑOR SINGER.- Vamos a no interrumpirnos y a escucharnos como corresponde. Simplemente estoy trasmitiendo información que me dio el señor Presidente. Si los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio hubieran estado totalmente en desacuerdo con la fecha -en la hipótesis de que no hubiera sido así, tal como acaba de afirmar el señor Presidente del Cuerpo-, bien podrían haber planteado no realizar la interpelación en esa fecha porque preferían otra. Todo parece indicar que luego de una exposición de dos horas de la señora Senadora interpelante, habiendo comenzado la interpelación a las cuatro de la tarde y siendo vísperas de Nochebuena, había ánimo de irse. Cabe recordar aquí que en la historia de este Senado y de la Cámara de Representantes hubo interpelaciones en las que los Ministros no hablaron seis horas sino que hablaron doce.

SEÑOR RUBIO.- Pero hablaron sobre el tema de la interpelación.

SEÑOR SINGER.- No importa el tema.

(Dialogados)

(Campana de orden)

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa exhorta a los señores Senadores a evitar los dialogados. Está en uso de la palabra el señor Senador Singer, que le pidió una interrupción al señor Senador Brause.

SEÑOR SINGER.- El señor Ministro tiene legítimo derecho de manejar su tiempo en una interpelación. Eso es indiscutible; se podrá decir -como en su momento señaló el señor Senador García Costa- que era preferible que fuera más ágil. Muy bien; ese es su criterio. Pero el derecho del señor Ministro a contestar "in extenso" es incuestionable, y mucho más lo es cuando se plantea una interpelación en los términos en que fue redactada ésta. Reitero el tema por el cual fue convocada: la situación de la salud, tanto en el ámbito público como privado, y las políticas implementadas por el Poder Ejecutivo en el área de la salud.

(Suena el timbre indicador del tiempo)

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Ha finalizado el tiempo de la interrupción, señor Senador.

SEÑOR SINGER.- ¿Me permite otra interrupción, señor Senador Brause?

SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Con mucho gusto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador.

SEÑOR SINGER.- Quiere decir que en la convocatoria de la interpelación no se planteó ninguno de los temas que hoy señalaron los señores Senadores del Frente Amplio.

(Interrupciones)

- Se podrían haber planteado concretamente en la interpelación. La tradición parlamentaria indica que una interpelación se hace por motivos concretos y no por una cuestión genérica que abarca una totalidad. Aquí se hizo de esta manera y luego se reprochó al señor Ministro que estaba hablando en detalle sobre muchas cuestiones.

Señor Presidente: la metodología que se siguió, políticamente, ya desde el comienzo, no le hace bien a la institucionalidad, porque esta no es una forma de decir "Señores, estamos interesados en que venga aquí el señor Ministro de Salud Pública para que informe al Senado sobre tales y cuales aspectos".

Desde el punto de vista institucional, se ha dicho "Nosotros ya veníamos preparados para censurar al señor Ministro". Pero si estaban preparados para censurarlo, no hubieran hecho el pedido de informe que establece el artículo 119 de la Constitución de la República. El mecanismo del artículo 119 se emplea para pedir y recibir los informes del señor Ministro; pero la interpelación no se hizo en base al artículo 147 de la Constitución, sino directamente por el artículo 119. De modo tal que el señor Ministro concurrió al Senado para responder a este pedido de informes que le hace la Bancada del Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista. Me parece que no es serio -para decirlo en el tono más respetuoso y considerado posible- que después se le reproche al señor Ministro que haya venido con 2, 3, 4 ó 5 tomos para hacer un informe absolutamente completo y total sobre todo lo que está involucrado con el manejo de su Cartera. Aquí se dijo "No vi que el señor Ministro sacara apuntes de las preguntas", pero tenía su equipo de asesores y estaba preparándose para responder. Como Ministro, puedo sacar apuntes si quiero, pero si no se me antoja, no lo hago; para ello tengo un equipo de asesores. El señor Ministro vino a esta interpelación con la mejor disposición de contestar, y no cualquier tema en concreto, sino el genérico que abarcaba la totalidad de los asuntos involucrados en el Ministerio. Reitero que estaba dispuesto a contestar puntualmente todas y cada

una de las preguntas que le iba a hacer la señora Senadora interpelante. Me parece que es importante que eso quede claro.

Muchas gracias.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Brause.

SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Señor Presidente: la argumentación del señor Senador Singer no hace más que avalar la expresión de asombro que yo señalaba al inicio de mi exposición sobre la conducta y los dichos de los integrantes del Frente Amplio a propósito de esta interpelación.

SEÑORA XAVIER.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador?

SEÑOR BRAUSE.- Disculpe, señora Senadora, pero quisiera terminar con mi exposición y hacer honor a la exhortación que hizo el señor Presidente a todos los miembros del Cuerpo.

En este momento, quiero afirmar lo que ya comencé diciendo en mi exposición. Es realmente insólito que se convoque a un Ministro, se le someta a dos horas y media de una tediosa lectura, que encierra 98 preguntas formuladas por la señora Senadora interpelante, y no se le dé la oportunidad de responder. Todavía se agrega que ya tenían preparada la moción de censura, como bien señalaba el señor Senador Singer. Además, se dice que el señor Ministro ni siquiera tomó apuntes, siendo que para eso tiene a sus asesores quienes, justamente, estaban preparando las respuestas a las 98 preguntas, para lo cual hubo que solicitar el cuarto intermedio del caso en momentos en que el señor Ministro todavía llevaba un tiempo de respuesta mucho menor que el que le insumió a la señora Senadora interpelante para hacer la lectura que acabo de señalar del texto que incluía las 98 preguntas que ya mencioné.

De manera tal que decir que el señor Ministro no actuó con seriedad no refleja de ninguna manera la realidad política y consideramos que ello tiene que ser rechazado desde todo punto de vista. El señor Ministro vino acompañado por un equipo de asesores para responder en forma conjunta a la vastedad del temario al cual fue sometido. Reitero que es absolutamente insólito que se diga que el señor Ministro tendría que haber imaginado cuáles eran las preguntas, para poder estar en condiciones de responder de forma inmediata. Como no lo hizo, entonces, se le califica negativamente, aun cuando aquí bien se ha dicho que la experiencia del Parlamento es que los señores Ministros dispongan del tiempo necesario para poder hacer su afirmación inicial respecto del motivo de la convocatoria de la interpelación y, además, para poder responder a cada una de las preguntas contando con el asesoramiento de sus técnicos. Aquí, la señora Senadora interpelante y los integrantes del Frente Amplio no le dieron esa oportunidad al señor Ministro de Salud Pública. Es insólito, pero no se le dio la oportunidad de contestar. Increíblemente, se presentó la moción de censura cuando el señor Ministro tenía las respuestas prontas.

Señor Presidente: imaginarse preguntas y, por tanto, las condignas respuestas en un tema tan vasto como es el de la salud pública y privada y las políticas al efecto, me parece que es ingresar en un curso de intenciones que no es el que la experiencia y los precedentes en esta materia aconsejan. Lo que ocurre es que la impresión que uno saca es que no se actuó correctamente por parte de los integrantes del Frente Amplio en la sesión en que se convocó al señor Ministro de Salud Pública y, ahora, se procura hacer una explicación de lo que se debió haber hecho. Además, se pretende que en esta ocasión esté presente el señor Ministro, cuando la interpelación ya terminó, aun cuando el Frente Amplio la quiera reiterar. Aquí lo que corresponde es que el Senado de la República diga sí o no a la moción de censura.

La seriedad y la importancia de la salud pública para el Senado de la República, pero también para la opinión pública, no mereció ni merece el tratamiento que le da el Frente Amplio. Entiendo que este tema tan importante debió ser considerado con la seriedad correspondiente, contando con la presencia del señor Ministro de Salud Pública, dándole la oportunidad de responder y, además, a la hora de contestar debió estar presente no sólo la Bancada del Frente Amplio, sino también la señora Senadora interpelante. La actitud de retirarse de Sala sin escuchar las respuestas, a nuestro modo de ver, dio por terminada la interpelación y frustró claramente a la opinión pública -que había sido convocada en este Senado que, sin duda, es un ámbito de repercusión pública- que se quedó sin poder escuchar las respuestas en el ámbito correspondiente. La responsabilidad por esa ausencia le corresponde, sin duda, a la Bancada del Frente Amplio y a la señora Senadora interpelante que se retiró en ese momento. Las respuestas del caso las hará conocer el señor Ministro, como corresponde y por los medios pertinentes, a fin de que la opinión pública no se vea defraudada ante actitudes y conductas como las puestas de manifiesto por el Frente Amplio.

En tal sentido, señor Presidente, mediante estas breves palabras, quería dejar señalado mi asombro frente a la conducta y los dichos que hoy en día uno tiene que escuchar por parte del Frente Amplio. Al mismo tiempo, deseo señalar que lo que hoy convoca al Senado es responder, en definitiva, sobre si corresponde o no la censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública de acuerdo con el artículo 147 de la Constitución. En ese momento, cuando realmente ingresemos a la consideración de la convocatoria -sin continuar con el tema de la interpelación al señor Ministro, que ya se acabó en la sesión pasada- el Partido Colorado habrá de votar negativamente la censura que aquí se está proponiendo.

SEÑORA XAVIER.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora.

SEÑORA XAVIER.- Señor Presidente: realmente creo que se están trayendo cuestiones irrelevantes de procedimiento y nuevamente entramos en el tema de hacer tiempo, tirando para adelante la votación de la censura. No sé por qué se hace esto, puesto que si no estuvieran los votos para censurar no habría ningún tipo de inconveniente.

Por otra parte, quiero indicar al señor Senador Singer -que si mal no recuerdo no estaba presente durante la interpelación y había un suplente en su lugar- que cuando la nota fue remitida iba con la temática que el señor Senador ha señalado y con la designación de miembro interpelante con que mi Bancada me había honrado.

Si el señor Ministro -como lo he dicho y lo reitero y no usted, señor Senador, que sabe de muchísimos temas pero no tiene por qué saber de todo, porque "todólogo" no hay necesidad de que sea- no sabía por qué motivos se lo llamaba a Sala, lo lamento porque tendrá un problema de memoria, porque ha tomado nota sistemáticamente cuando ha concurrido a la Comisión de Salud Pública y no ha respondido nada; incluso, ha recibido pedidos de informes y tampoco los ha contestado. Entonces, lo que ocurre es que el señor Ministro tiene un problema de memoria y habrá que ver dónde se va a atender. Pero lo que aquí queda claro es que no hay una sola respuesta, quizás las tengan algunos, será una cuestión secreta o puede ser que sea tranquilizador lo que acaba de decir el señor Senador, en cuanto a que le va a llegar a la opinión pública. Aquí habemos doce floreros y quiero recordarle que detrás de ellos hay algunos que otros miles de votos y me parece que el tratamiento es bastante despectivo, por ser suave en la caracterización.

Por otro lado, quiero decirle al señor Senador Singer que aunque él no sepa de cuestiones médicas -insisto en que no tiene por qué conocerlas-, aquí hubo un problema grave el año pasado, que fue el de la meningitis. No estuvo planteado el virus del Nilo porque por suerte no tenemos ese problema, aunque está bien que alguno lo estudie por si surgiera.

El señor Ministro durante más de dos horas habló de determinados puntos -y prometía tres libros más- pero ninguno de ellos tenía que ver con los temas acuciantes. Esos son los que usted escucha por la prensa todos los días y los que se nos plantean a quienes trabajamos en la salud. Por otro lado, esas insólitas preguntas que formulamos están a su disposición, son las mismas preguntas sobre los mismos capítulos de los que se habló; no son un invento ni una cosa salida de atrás de un camión, sino que se trata de los temas que hoy están planteados en la salud pública y están presentados de forma tal que el señor Ministro no tuviera ninguna duda de para dónde arrancar en un tema tan vasto. Inclusive, algunas de esas interrogantes se responden con un sí o con un no.

Creo que lo que aquí importa es que no ha habido ni una sola respuesta por parte del Ministro para la Bancada del Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio y de parte de la Bancada de Gobierno hay referencias a cuestiones de metodología.

(Dialogados)

-Señor Presidente: en varias oportunidades le dijimos que no estábamos de acuerdo con que la interpelación se hiciera en vísperas de Navidad y que entendíamos que no se podía anteponer el tema de

los Bancos al de la salud pública, pero si usted y el señor Ministro estuvieron de acuerdo en una fecha, nosotros no podíamos revertirlo. Aclaro que nunca le dimos el consentimiento en ese sentido, sino que simplemente lo aceptamos por la vía de los hechos.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Por una cuestión de procedimiento corresponde aclarar que el criterio con respecto a la fecha de interpelación fue asumido en la reunión de los coordinadores del Senado, a la que fue invitado el coordinador del Frente Amplio, pero no pudo concurrir. En esa reunión se estableció el criterio de que la interpelación se iba a hacer después de votada la ley de Bancos, lo cual se le comunicó al señor coordinador del Frente Amplio de inmediato y luego discutimos la hora con la señora Senadora interpelante, en cuanto a si era a las 10 de la mañana o a las 16. Si la señora interpelante creía que no era conveniente el día 23 alcanzaba con decirlo.

SEÑORA XAVIER.- Ya era 22 y estábamos discutiendo el tema de los Bancos.

SEÑORA ARISMENDI.- Podría haber sido antes.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- En una reunión de coordinación habíamos resuelto que se haría después.

SEÑOR COURIEL.- ¿Quién lo había resuelto?

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Los coordinadores de Bancada, señor Senador, como se hace habitualmente. El Presidente actuó de acuerdo con lo que indica el Reglamento, que establece que antes de los quince días debe fijarse la fecha de la interpelación. Es decir que la fecha se determina en la coordinación, a la que no concurrió el señor Senador Núñez, por lo que el Presidente le informó de inmediato el criterio, porque otra cosa no se podía hacer. Además, se había resuelto que la interpelación se haría luego de aprobada la ley de Bancos.

SEÑOR SINGER.- Pido la palabra para contestar una alusión.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR SINGER.- No hice un cuestionamiento de las noventa y ocho, doscientas, trescientas o quinientas preguntas que hizo la señora Senadora interpelante, porque me parece muy bien que las haga, ya que está en todo su derecho. Lo que dije fue que el tema por el cual se convocó al señor Ministro está escrito aquí y no contiene ninguna cuestión concreta, sino que abarca la totalidad de todo. Este procedimiento no tiene antecedentes en la historia de las interpelaciones en este Senado ni en la Cámara de Representantes, porque siempre que se interpela se hace por una, dos o tres cuestiones concretas. Esto no se hizo a pesar de que siempre se procedió de esa forma. Es decir que nunca hubo una interpelación que abarcara un tema

genérico y si se hace de ese modo después no se le puede reprochar a un Ministro que venga a informar en detalle sobre la totalidad de lo que se le ha preguntado, sin perjuicio de que al final respondiera las preguntas puntuales formuladas por la señora Senadora. Otra cosa no dije.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- La Mesa aclara que se le va a dar precedencia a quienes se han anotado para hacer uso de la palabra, por lo cual tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Pou.

SEÑORA POU.- Quiero hacer algunas reflexiones que habrían sido apropiadas para el día de la interpelación y otras que son más adecuadas para el día después.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señora Senadora?

SEÑORA POU.- Con mucho gusto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador Korzeniak.

SEÑOR KORZENIAK.- Pido disculpas a la señora Senadora Pou, pero me he quedado con una preocupación académica muy grande por la exposición del señor Senador Singer y desearía incorporarla a mis fichas de la historia parlamentaria. Me gustaría saber cuál fue el Ministro que habló doce horas en una interpelación. En mis registros tengo que la única persona que habló doce horas fue el señor Renán Rodríguez cuando se discutía la reforma constitucional, pero no era Ministro, sino parlamentario. Reitero que no conozco ningún caso de un Ministro que haya hablado doce horas.

Por una preocupación, me permito dejar planteado esto para que me lo aclaren para mi cosecha personal.

Muchas gracias.

(Dialogados)

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar la señora Senadora Pou.

SEÑORA POU.- El señor Presidente puede tener la certeza de que no voy a hablar doce horas, sino que más bien voy a ceñirme a lo solicitado por el señor Presidente.

El motivo y el objetivo del llamado a Sala fue analizar las dificultades y las políticas de salud que se están desarrollando en el país. Honestamente, creo que la sesión del 23 fue una reunión de autistas en la que no fuimos capaces de comunicarnos y, por lo tanto, quizá no estuvimos a la altura de nuestras obligaciones con y para la gente. No quiero volver atrás, a la sesión del 23, sino mirar hacia adelante. Creo que si no

logramos comunicarnos, comprendernos y compartir nuestras ideas y actitudes, de nada van a servir esas instancias.

Con esto no pierde el Ministro interpelado del Partido Colorado -ya que nosotros no formamos parte del Gobierno- ni pierde el Frente Amplio, que es el interpelante, sino que aquí claramente pierde el país y pierde su gente. Asimismo el Senado, como Cuerpo, pierde la oportunidad de hablar francamente con espíritu constructivo, aun en el disenso, de la salud del país, de los problemas y de las soluciones. Creo que a la altura de la vida en que está el país no tenemos ningún derecho de defraudar a la gente. Si nos preguntáramos cómo deberíamos actuar, diríamos que priorizando el diálogo, enriqueciendo nuestro caudal informativo para ver con más claridad y transparencia, siendo este último término muy utilizado en todos los ámbitos.

El señor Senador Astori hace unos días en un seminario sobre el Estado -allí dijo algo que anoté y no es la primera vez que lo utilizo- habló de la comunicación para intercambiar información y conocimiento, estando los interlocutores dispuestos desde el inicio a modificar los puntos de vista con los cuales se inicia el diálogo. Creo que esta es la esencia del espíritu parlamentario que deberíamos tener, ya que estamos perdiendo la capacidad de tenerlo.

Venir a defender a ultranza cada uno su verdad como si de esta dependiera la estabilidad o el futuro de un gobierno o de la sociedad, me parece un agravio a la inteligencia y al derecho de la gente. La salud es un tema fundamental de la Nación y, como tal, deberíamos tender a encararla como política de Estado, para lo que la instancia del otro día y las futuras son de un valor y una trascendencia que no deberíamos desperdiciar.

Las condiciones para que así sea, por supuesto, son dejar de lado la intransigencia, el autoritarismo y la soberbia, y actuar con franqueza, comunicando, informando y haciendo participar, a través de cada uno de nosotros, a la sociedad.

Los señores Senadores Cid y Xavier mencionaban -y otros señores Senadores que están en Sala saben que fue así- el espíritu de la Comisión de Salud Pública en estos casi dos años y medio de trabajo: ha sido, justamente, el de ser una caja de resonancia de los problemas de los distintos actores de la salud, incluyendo -naturalmente, y sin olvidarlos- a los usuarios que, muchas veces, representando comisiones de barrio o de vecinos de apoyo a los hospitales, han visitado nuestra Comisión para plantearnos los problemas que han citado los señores Senadores -y también los que se pueden imaginar- que conocen por sus recorridas en contacto con la sociedad.

Hay consenso, pues, en que la salud atraviesa por serias dificultades; por suerte, ello se complementa diciendo que está en crisis. Digo "por suerte" porque, en definitiva, el ideograma chino que dice que crisis quiere decir cambio y oportunidad, implicaría que tenemos alguna chance de poder aprovecharla.

Los problemas son multifactoriales. No queremos entrar ahora en su análisis, pero sí convenir en que se plantean temas de intereses empresariales, gremiales, políticos y otros que son contrapuestos o, por lo menos, no coincidentes con el interés general. Hay corporativismos, hay grupos de poder, hay falta de rumbos e inercias que agravan los problemas. El panorama es, decididamente, complejo.

Según quienes los miren, los problemas serán prioritariamente económicos, financieros, de gestión, de administración, de modelo de atención, de medicamentos, de tecnología, de calidad, de acceso, de equidad, y podríamos seguir enumerando. Todos y cada uno seguramente tengan algo que ver, pero lo que nos debe importar no es dedicarnos a rever los fragmentos de una colcha de retazos, sino rehacer el conjunto en forma coordinada y armónica.

Al enumerar esta serie de abordajes al tema, vemos que en el análisis que de ellos se hace raramente se jerarquiza al usuario o a la comunidad. Diría que el gran ausente en estos planteos ha sido el usuario y la comunidad. O hablamos del interés de la comunidad, o seguimos en la misma, atendiendo los problemas en función de intereses particulares, corporativos y sectoriales.

La salud fue tradicionalmente analizada por enfoques que priorizaron el saber médico, y en las últimas décadas han incursionado los economistas y los administradores. Resultado: sigue siendo un problema que manejan los médicos, en detrimento de la opinión de los otros profesionales del quehacer sanitario, en colaboración con administradores y economistas que defienden a las empresas. Estamos en una etapa en donde los problemas de la salud se analizan desde el punto de vista de la oferta y la demanda. La oferta es por parte profesional, sobre todo médica, y debemos decir, una vez más, con carencias del personal de enfermería en esta ecuación en la que es tan importante, porque es algo que sostiene la salud, al punto que más adelante vamos a ver. Por lo tanto, la demanda corresponde al ámbito empresarial, público y del sector mutual y privado. Esa es la realidad de la salud en nuestro país, hoy.

Se comete el error de pensar que la demanda de servicios de las instituciones públicas o privadas, muchas veces condicionada y presionada por la oferta, representa a las necesidades de la gente. Yo considero que estamos equivocados, señor Presidente: la correcta atención de las necesidades en salud de los uruguayos no necesariamente se corresponde con la realidad dada por el juego de la demanda y la oferta del mercado actual. Vayan dos ejemplos de leyes económicas que avalan lo anterior: la primera, la Ley de Say, que dice que "toda oferta crea su propia demanda". En la salud de nuestro país esto es evidente: hay exceso de médicos y esto termina en demanda inducida. La segunda ley es la llamada de "rendimientos decrecientes" y expresa que "si un factor o grupo de factores aumenta y el otro factor o grupo de factores se conserva fijo,

la producción total tenderá a aumentar al principio, pero llegará un momento en que alcance un punto donde la tasa de crecimiento comience a disminuir; este es el punto de los rendimientos decrecientes". A esta situación se ha llegado en algunos aspectos de la salud en nuestro país, sobre todo, en Montevideo. Tenemos rendimientos decrecientes al aumentar, año a año, el número de médicos y de especialistas.

Señor Presidente: considero que estamos embretados y seguimos por inercia políticas destinadas al fracaso. Vaya como ejemplo un fragmento de un reportaje que la periodista Gamio, del diario "El Observador", le formulara a la señora Decana de la Facultad de Medicina, doctora Ana Ferrari, en julio de este año. Ante la pregunta de si creía que había que aplicar algún mecanismo para reducir la cantidad de alumnos y egresados de Medicina que se vuelcan a un mercado deprimido, la Decana responde: "Este es un tema real, pero creo que la Facultad de Medicina no puede ser la que regule este tema, ni tampoco la Universidad. Creo en la necesidad de que la Universidad tenga sus puertas abiertas, que sea accesible al mayor número de personas posible. Sin embargo, admito que la cantidad de alumnos que está entrando a la Facultad de Medicina es muy elevada."

Para rematar el tema, el Boletín del Sindicato Médico del Uruguay de marzo de 2001, hablando sobre el número de médicos y su distribución en el país, nos dice: "Esta es una de las materias pendientes que tiene la sociedad uruguaya y que el gremio médico ya laudó, tanto a nivel del Sindicato Médico del Uruguay como de la FEMI, a través de sendos plebiscitos en 1995, en donde se aprobó por amplia mayoría, apoyar medidas que regularan el ingreso." Este es un típico tema en torno al cual el Ministerio de Salud Pública debería asumir responsabilidad y, eventualmente, fijar posición. Ni una cosa ni la otra se han hecho hasta ahora.

(Ocupa la Presidencia el doctor Guillermo García Costa)

- En octubre del año 2000 hicimos una extensa exposición planteando interrogantes al Ministerio de Salud Pública, y al día de hoy no hemos recibido respuesta, quizá, porque ésta no se haya encontrado.

Señor Presidente: al Partido Nacional no le interesa defender, ni sugerir, ni pedir la renuncia del Ministro del Partido Colorado; para nada. Al Partido Nacional le interesa que el país tenga la mejor gestión posible de la política definida para alcanzar los objetivos superiores de políticas de salud que atiendan las necesidades de su población, con este o con otro Ministro y su equipo de colaboradores. El país lo sabe: nuestra convicción es que lo que es bueno para el país, es bueno para nosotros, por encima de intereses electorales, sectoriales o personales. Que nadie tenga dudas acerca de que si entendemos que lo mejor para alcanzar los objetivos superiores de la salud de los ciudadanos es un cambio de persona o de políticas, vamos a actuar en consecuencia. Pedir renuncias o censurar no es nuestra vocación, pero puede llegar a ser nuestra obligación. Que no quepa la menor duda de que, en caso de ser necesario, lo haremos, primero sugiriendo, luego solicitando y, finalmente, poniendo toda nuestra energía en lograr ese objetivo

que sabemos, de antemano, que no será más que el inicio de una nueva gestión de la cual mucho debemos esperar.

Hecha esta introducción, señor Presidente, quería referirme a algunos aspectos de la interpelación.

Las preguntas estaban formuladas; la mayoría de ellas habían estado consignadas en las distintas comparecencias y en las versiones taquigráficas de las sesiones de las Comisiones de Salud Pública del Parlamento. Las preguntas podían responderse con justificaciones, con excusas, con fundamentaciones, con evasivas o con distracciones. No estamos hablando, en particular, de las respuestas del señor Ministro, pero sí queremos decir que, más importantes que las respuestas, son las soluciones, o sea, las acciones correctivas cuando éstas puedan corresponder.

Hace instantes, minutos antes de la hora fijada para reunirnos, recibimos por escrito las respuestas del señor Ministro. Por cierto que su volumen no nos permitió leerlas y pensamos, entonces, dedicar los primeros días de nuestras vacaciones a hacerlo. De todas maneras, insisto en definir esta instancia como un diálogo de sordos, en donde se nos niega la oportunidad de intercambiar información y conocimientos. Realmente, creo que errar es humano, pero persistir en el error es diabólico.

Hoy queremos agregar algo más a lo ya expresado por la señora Senadora Xavier; son tres breves titulares: en primer lugar, con respecto al marco conceptual; en segundo término, unos pocos ejemplos puntuales de la gestión del actual Ministerio y, finalmente, algunas condiciones que creemos que las gestiones Ministeriales siempre deberían tener.

En el ámbito conceptual entendemos que los problemas de la salud del país requieren un enfoque que contemple los siguientes puntos. Por un lado, el análisis y la formulación de propuestas para iniciar un proceso coordinado de reformas que nos lleven definitivamente a un Sistema Nacional de Salud, integrado o no, con diferentes sectores o no, pero sistema al fin. Sobre estos temas nos comprometemos a seguir trabajando en 2003, teniendo como meta lograr políticas de Estado centradas en la calidad de vida de todos los ciudadanos del país.

Y aquí una acotación: ¡cuidado con tomar indicadores numéricos para evaluar la salud en el país! Decir que tenemos una expectativa de vida promedio de 75 años no nos dice nada sobre qué calidad de vida estamos alcanzando, y eso es lo que importa. Decir que el Ministerio de Salud Pública ha distribuido unos cuantos preservativos más e implantado varios dispositivos intrauterinos más, no nos aclara qué clase de salud demográfica reproductiva se está llevando a cabo, qué objetivos tiene y cuáles son sus fundamentos. En un país con una tasa de crecimiento demográfico que comienza a ser negativa y con tasas de nacimiento y fecundidad muy bajas, estos temas interesan y nos deben preocupar, y mucho.

El segundo planteo se refiere a algunos ejemplos. En el ámbito de las resoluciones del Ministerio del último año, quisiera analizar tres -coincidentemente, el señor Senador Cid se ha referido a alguna de ellas, pero quiero dejarlas aunque sea para la versión taquigráfica-: las relativas a la Escuela de Auxiliares de Enfermería Doctor Scosería, el Registro Nacional de Cáncer y el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, no por la importancia cuantitativa de los temas, sino por la forma de encararlos y de dictar resoluciones. Me parece que son ejemplos paradigmáticos de errores que se repiten en la actual administración del Ministerio de Salud Pública. Estos temas tienen un común denominador: las resoluciones no se tomaron con la debida y necesaria fundamentación, análisis y coordinación. Sobra discrecionalidad y falta responsabilidad. Los temas de salud no deben ser manejados con improvisaciones, falta de estudio y reflexión, ni atendiendo intereses subalternos o sectoriales.

Sobre la decisión de pasar la Escuela Scosería a la UTU -votada en la Rendición de Cuentas- ya en otra oportunidad fundamentamos en esta Sala los argumentos por los cuales consideramos que se cometió un error importante al no haberla derivado al Instituto Nacional de Enfermería. En su redacción no se tomó en cuenta el sentido común, la racionalidad, la integración profesional, la proporción, la coherencia y, sobre todo, la finalidad de su propuesta. Baste como aval de esto la respuesta del señor Ministro en la Comisión de Salud Pública. Ante este planteo, nos decía lo siguiente: "En lo que respecta a la Escuela de Enfermería, lo que tenemos claro es que no tiene que estar en el ámbito de Salud Pública. Nos pareció, teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias actuales del país, de la Universidad del Trabajo, de la Universidad de la República y del mercado, que era mejor que estuviera en el ámbito de la UTU. Pero si tiene que estar en la órbita de la Universidad de la República y ella está en condiciones de manejarla y de darle el nivel que el país necesita, para nosotros no hay mayor problema."

Señor Presidente: consideramos que se actuó con discrecionalidad y ligereza, modificando no sólo la estructura y la gestión de una Escuela sino, sobre todo, la formación académica de las futuras generaciones.

Me quiero referir ahora, señor Presidente, al Registro Nacional del Cáncer, que mencionaba como uno de los episodios erráticos recientemente efectuados por el Ministerio de Salud Pública.

Por el Decreto Nº 194/2002, el Ministerio de Salud Pública dispuso eliminar el Registro Nacional del Cáncer y encargar sus funciones a la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. Llama la atención que la redacción del referido Decreto no haga mención a la actuación del Registro Nacional del Cáncer en el ámbito del Instituto Nacional de Oncología, Unidad Ejecutora de ASSE dentro del Ministerio. Las mismas consideraciones del Decreto podrían ser dichas para el Registro Nacional del Cáncer y no para la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. La conclusión sería que el Registro Nacional del Cáncer puede y debe quedar en el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, vinculado a ASSE o a la Dirección General de la Salud. Como consecuencia del referido Decreto y teniendo observaciones al mismo por parte de gente que trabaja

en el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, se realizaron desde mi despacho tres consultas al Ministerio de Salud Pública, a aquellas jerarquías que razonablemente podían y debían estar al tanto de las razones y fundamentos de la resolución. Ellas fueron: el Director de ASSE, el Subdirector de la Dirección General de la Salud y un destacado asesor médico del señor Ministro. ¡Cuál sería nuestra sorpresa, y también desconcierto, señor Presidente, cuando los tres informaron que desconocían el Decreto y, por supuesto, las razones y fundamentos del mismo!

Razón le asiste al señor Senador Cid cuando dice que ante una consulta nuestra, como sólo iba a ser un tema semántico, sólo iba a cambiar la denominación, nosotros nos comprometimos con usuarios y comisiones interesadas en este tema de la salud a que, efectivamente, sería así. Sin embargo, no lo fue.

En este punto se entiende ineludible, necesario y conveniente hacer un planteo formal al señor Ministro de Salud Pública para recabar las razones que determinaron el referido Decreto. Como no tuvimos oportunidad de hacerlo el otro día, aunque sea por vía del escrito y a efectos clarificar el tema, queríamos formular las siguientes interrogantes. ¿Cómo funcionó el Registro Nacional del Cáncer en el ámbito del INO -es decir, del Instituto Nacional de Oncología-, de ASSE y del Ministerio de Salud Pública? ¿Qué informes hay sobre el desempeño del mismo en los últimos 5 años? Quisiéramos saber si algo funcionaba mal, si había observaciones, quejas y reclamos, y en tal caso, qué medidas se tomaron. En segundo lugar, ¿por qué razones se entendió que podía funcionar mejor en la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer? En tal caso, ¿en qué se basaron, qué consultas se hicieron con el Ministerio de Salud Pública, con la Secretaría General u otras reparticiones? Si se hicieron consultas con el Registro Nacional del Cáncer, ¿con quiénes se hicieron y qué se informó? Además, ¿cuáles fueron las consultas con la Comisión Honoraria de Lucha Contra el Cáncer, con quiénes, y qué se informó? Y las consultas en el Instituto Nacional de Oncología, en ASSE, en la Dirección General de la Salud, ¿con quiénes se efectuaron y qué se informó? ¿En qué otros lugares y con qué otras personas que puedan ser pertinentes se plantean las mismas interrogantes? También quisiéramos tener información acerca de si hubo otras razones o intereses, aparte de los anteriores. Finalmente, consultamos cómo se constituye la Mesa Ejecutiva de la Comisión Honoraria de la Lucha Contra el Cáncer. Son siete los cargos que representan al Poder Ejecutivo, a la Federación Médica del Interior, al Sindicato Médico, a la ANEP, al Instituto Nacional de Oncología y al Registro Nacional de Cáncer; sin embargo, ¿los Directores del Instituto Nacional de Oncología y del Registro Nacional del Cáncer han concurrido regularmente en los últimos meses? Si no estaban concurriendo, ¿esto constituye una casualidad o puede haber una cierta causalidad?

Nos gustaría conocer estas respuestas, porque en este tipo de resoluciones que suspenden y transfieren la actividad en áreas tan sensibles del Ministerio, creo que se debe exigir que se fundamenten y se expliciten las razones que las determinaron. Aceptar el Decreto tal como está redactado es aceptar una argumentación que impresiona, por lo menos, como sesgada e insuficientemente fundada. No se debe

repetir el mismo tipo de error cometido recientemente al transferir la Escuela de Auxiliares de Enfermería a la UTU, descartando al Instituto Nacional de Enfermería de la Universidad de la República. Estos errores, si no hay intereses subalternos no explicitados, son producto del apresuramiento y la falta de consulta con la gente que sabe y tiene conocimiento de causa. Creemos que en el caso del Registro Nacional del Cáncer, lamentablemente, podemos estar ante una de estas situaciones y, hasta tanto no se den los pasos necesarios para arribar a una resolución bien fundamentada, pudiendo entonces responder a estas interrogantes, se entiende necesario, además de conveniente, dejar en suspenso la aplicación del referido Decreto.

(Ocupa la Presidencia don Luis Hierro López)

- Finalmente, señor Presidente, quisiéramos hablar de lo que algunas gestiones Ministeriales deberían tener, siempre, como condiciones. Parecería de Perogrullo, pero hoy siento la necesidad de ser redundante. Entendemos que en política de salud se debe actuar dialogando, sin soberbia, sin autoritarismos, escuchando, analizando y consultando, comunicando a los interesados y a la población el porqué de las resoluciones tomadas, no teniendo temor al disenso, reconociendo los errores cuando ellos puedan existir, con apertura del espíritu y del intelecto, mejorando permanentemente, y siempre, siempre, teniendo claro que se debe actuar en función de los superiores objetivos de priorizar las necesidades de la gente, de ésta y de las generaciones que vendrán. Los Ministros no deben actuar dejándose llevar por grupos de presión, a veces interesados en lograr sus objetivos particulares o sectoriales.

En función de estos principios básicos, me consta que en la actual gestión del Ministerio de Salud Pública hay cosas que se han hecho bien, otras regular, otras mal y otras que, directamente, no se han hecho. Hay muchísimas cosas por mejorar y me refiero a lograr determinados objetivos, pero, sobre todo, a la forma de encarar y de resolver los problemas. Quizás haya en el Ministerio de Salud Pública un problema de actitud. El diálogo a tiempo, interactivo y amplio, constituye el inicio de las soluciones para muchas de las dificultades a enfrentar.

Me permito recordar que en una de las situaciones difíciles que tuvo el Ministerio de Salud Pública cuando estaba a su frente al doctor Fraschini, todos los miembros de la Comisión de Salud Pública del Senado que estuvimos allí presentes apoyamos al señor Ministro y al señor Subsecretario -incluida la señora Senadora Arismendi, que no pertenecía a nuestra Comisión- en la instancia del cierre de unas mutualistas.

Por todo lo expuesto, creo que es un buen momento para decir que actuar con menos discrecionalidad, más responsabilidad y más capacidad de diálogo puede, realmente, mejorar mucho las cosas, algunas de las cuales no implican un desembolso económico y financiero, elemento que, como todos sabemos, en esta etapa de la vida del país es tan importante tener en cuenta.

Para finalizar, señor Presidente, diría que esta interpelación termina sin censura. Afirmo que este llamado a Sala culmina con el señor Ministro y la gestión de su Ministerio cuestionados. Por cierto, todo ha sido respondido por escrito y no hemos tenido la posibilidad de construir en el disenso, pero ha sido cuestionado al fin. Entonces, que no se repita el error de un Ministro que, al terminar su interpelación, a mediados de año, en declaraciones a la prensa concluyó que, como no había una censura ni una moción mayoritaria, tenía el apoyo político. Todos sabemos cómo se terminó de saldar esa errática interpretación.

Frente a la falta de respuestas, de aclaraciones y de posibilidades -que hemos tenido- de hablar de temas muy sensibles -por lo menos, para quienes sentimos estos problemas y, por suerte, seguimos teniendo la piel fina ante las respuestas que nos exige la gente, que muchas veces no podemos dar-, hoy venía pensando que no puedo discernir si estamos en algunas de esas situaciones que tan brillantemente describieron Cervantes y Shakespeare. Me pregunto si no estaremos cabalgando en el campo donde hay molinos de viento y, como Quijote, pensamos que son gigantes a los que hay que combatir. ¿Será que nos equivocamos al pensar que hay cosas que no se están haciendo bien, a las cuales debiéramos enfrentar y, en realidad, está todo bien y estamos errados? ¿O no estaremos como en aquella escena de Hamlet en la que resuena la frase de que "algo huele mal en Dinamarca"? No creo que sea bueno ni conducente para la gestión del Ministerio de Salud Pública y del Partido de Gobierno que nos quedemos sin respuestas y sin diálogo sobre tantas interrogantes que se formularon y donde, seguramente, muchos señores Senadores y señoras Senadoras podíamos tener buenas ideas y buen espíritu para tratar de incorporarlas a éste, que debe ser el problema más difícil que tiene el país.

Señor Presidente: se supone que los que estamos en esta Sala trabajamos representando a la gente y tratamos de buscar la equidad, ya que no la igualdad, y si esta es difícil cuando uno tiene salud, es prácticamente imposible en situación de enfermedad. Y de eso se trata.

Entonces, nos parece que la posibilidad de sugerir respuestas y no dejar cuestiones pendientes sería de muy buena política. Desgraciadamente, los tiempos que se manejan actualmente no son los que el país y su gente requieren y merecen. Si tuviéramos un metrónomo para medir los tiempos políticos en lugar de los musicales, diríamos que los tiempos actuales del Gobierno serían "lentissimo" o quizá una pausa silenciosa. En mi opinión, la situación del país reclama un tiempo "prestissimo" o "vivace".

Muchas gracias.

SEÑOR RUBIO.- Pido la palabra.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE (Dr. García Costa).- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR RUBIO.- Señor Presidente: a esta altura, lo que debemos hacer es votar pero, simplemente, en unas breves palabras voy a decir cuál es nuestra actitud política.

Después de las expresiones de la señora Senadora Pou concluyo en que, en primer lugar, el señor Ministro en el fondo no tiene apoyo, pero tampoco lo tiene en la forma. Está claro, entonces, que este Ministro no tiene respaldo político. Lo que sucede es que, no sé por qué razones y consideraciones, los Partidos de la coalición de Gobierno no están dispuestos a sacarlo, pero lo cierto es que no tiene apoyo político.

Por otro lado, deberíamos agradecer a la señora Senadora Xavier las preguntas que formuló porque en ellas están contemplados todo el sistema y los problemas relevantes de la salud. En verdad, me parece una picardía de parte de algunos señores Senadores, cuando dicen que nunca se ha discutido la política de un Ministerio. ¿Qué hemos hecho cuando discutimos la política económica y agropecuaria? Debatimos sobre la política general y su implementación. De esto, el Parlamento tiene abundante historia y basta consultar a quien tenga experiencia parlamentaria.

Por su parte, el señor Ministro podría haber dicho qué piensa sobre el modelo de salud, si va a haber privatizaciones o no, si va a existir o no un impulso a los seguros privados, cuál es la calidad de la información, qué sucede con las prestaciones, etcétera. Podría haber repasado y tomado las situaciones más importantes y haber contestado las preguntas correspondientes, tal como lo haría cualquier Ministro en una interpelación. En mi opinión, no tenía capacidad para hacerlo. Es un Ministro abiertamente incompetente, pues estaba esperando que sus asesores le prepararan por escrito las respuestas para, después, darles lectura. Nos introdujo en una lectura de ocho horas para hacer tiempo con la idea de dar, luego, lectura a las respuestas que prepararían los asesores. En verdad, puedo entender que discrepemos, pero no puedo hacer la afrenta a la inteligencia de mis colegas, de suponer que ellos piensan que el señor Ministro es competente para el lugar que ocupa, porque es abiertamente incompetente. Hay un refrán clásico que dice: "Lo que Natura non da, Salamanca non presta". Aparentemente, para el Ministerio de Salud Pública no hay Natura ni Salamanca, porque no puede confundirse el artículo 118 de la Constitución de la República con el 119. Este último nos habilita a pedir todos los informes que queramos sobre las políticas de los Ministerios, mientras que el artículo 118 posibilita los pedidos de informes. No se puede responder en el marco de una convocatoria a interpelación habilitada por el artículo 119 como si se tratara de la aplicación del artículo 118 y, de esa manera, tomarse no sé cuántas horas para que los asesores preparen las respuestas a las preguntas formuladas por un señor Senador de la República. En verdad, no se puede. Por ello, pienso que es absolutamente defendible que nos hayamos molestado -quizás con la excepción de algún señor Senador que no estaba presente-, porque se molestó el Senado entero. No resiste el menor análisis que un Ministro venga y haga, durante horas, una lectura como la que hizo el titular de Salud Pública, que no tenía nada que ver con aquello que se le estaba preguntando.

Entonces, quedan pendientes diez o trece preguntas -que tienen la virtud de estar bien articuladas- relacionadas con el sistema de salud, sobre el préstamo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, la política de medicamentos, el tema de la vacuna contra la meningitis, etcétera, etcétera. La problemática quedó planteada pero el Ministro fue incompetente para ensayar, siquiera, un comentario de respuesta. Después podría haber agregado, con los asesores, información cuantitativa y detalles, pero, antes, tendría que haber mostrado en el Senado que tenía capacidad y solvencia para encarar todo lo relacionado con su Ministerio. Si no las tiene, no puedo creer que algún miembro de este Senado, con la experiencia que tiene la mayor parte de sus integrantes, piense y diga que este Ministro tiene capacidad para el ejercicio de la función y que lo demostró en la interpelación en la cual habló dos horas y media de temas que no tenían el menor relieve e importancia con relación al tema de fondo.

Por consiguiente, reitero que debemos agradecer su esfuerzo a la señora Senadora Xavier, destacar que los señores Senadores que se han referido al tema de fondo han pronunciado su discrepancia y señalar que este Ministro, más allá del resultado de esta votación, no tiene respaldo político. Aun si la coalición de Gobierno hoy evita la censura, está claro que, si se sigue por el camino en que vamos, dentro de unos meses vamos a estar interpelando nuevamente al señor Ministro de Salud Pública para saber si es verdad o no que se mantienen las diferencias que se han planteado y expuesto ante la opinión pública, pues los problemas son absolutamente graves.

Entonces, si se habla de seriedad, creo que la seriedad de la crisis que hay en la salud del Uruguay no se merece este Ministro de Salud Pública. Por consiguiente, entiendo que a esta altura debemos pasar a votar y dar por concluida esta cuestión, después que terminen de hablar los señores Senadores que están anotados.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra la señora Senadora Arismendi.

SEÑOR ARISMENDI.- Voy a ser muy breve. En primer lugar, quiero destacar algo que le he dicho a mis compañeros y en estas horas he comentado, aunado a una preocupación. Considero que la interpelación que llevó adelante la señora Senadora Xavier no era típica y lo digo en el sentido positivo. No era típica porque, en lugar de hacer una argumentación o descripción política, tal como ha ocurrido a lo largo de la historia -en el fondo todo es político, incluso, lo fue la selección de los temas y la investigación que llevó adelante- en lugar de un discurso -para decirlo aun más claramente- hizo una demoledora descripción sustentada en datos sobre la emergencia sanitaria que vive el país y en los elementos fundamentales, tanto del sector de la salud pública como de la privada. Nos explicó a todos -incluso, al Ministro- cuál era la realidad que existía, departamento por departamento y localidad por localidad, con datos serios. Y así como decía que todo eso era político, de cada una de las afirmaciones que fueron quedando claramente expuestas ante la opinión pública, de manera rotunda, había una sola conclusión o se podría haber hecho una sola pregunta: ¿qué piensa hacer con todo esto el Ministro de Salud Pública? ¿Qué medidas va a

tomar cuando se señala que no hay recursos en determinado lugar, que no se vacunó en otro, que tampoco hay insumos en tal lado ni se pagan los salarios? Cuando se habla de la situación sanitaria en general, ¿tenía argumentos o no tenía ninguno? ¿Iba a contestar? De hecho, lo que hizo fue contestarle a la Senadora interpelante lo mismo que a los medios de comunicación. Cuando los periodistas le dicen que los hospitales no tienen medios con qué atender y que esa noche, si llegan heridos de arma blanca o de bala, no hay insumos para asistirlos, responde que se está enterando por ellos. Por lo visto, también se estaba enterando por la señora Senadora Xavier de un conjunto de elementos que aquí se estaban planteando. Entiendo fundamentalmente a la Bancada Quincista porque, después del papelón que hizo el Ministro, hoy tenía que venir a sacar un poco de pecho y tratar de tirar la pelota para otro lado. Políticamente, es lo que le quedaba hacer cuando nadie le había soplado antes al oído -y, si alguien se lo sopló, por favor, sáquenlo ustedes- que no se le puede tomar el pelo al Parlamento. Veinticuatro horas antes, cuando en los corredores se decía que iba a leer 700 páginas, nadie le sopló al oído que eso no se podía hacer y que, por lo menos, tal como ha ocurrido en otros casos, le echara la culpa a la aftosa, a la Argentina, al Brasil, al Efecto Tequila, a la devaluación, en fin, todas estas causas que nos explican que fueron las culpables. Lo único de lo cual yo tomé nota fue que los diez casos del dengue son importados. Si bien mencionó cosas graves, cuando habló de los diez departamentos del país que tienen el vector presente sin enfermedad, lo leyó al pasar. Tampoco supimos qué iban a hacer con eso. Estoy hablando del dengue -además del Virus del Nilo- que fue uno de los temas que planteó la señora Senadora Xavier. Más allá de lo que se dijo aquí, en Sala, que no voy a repetir -como, por ejemplo, las veces que se lo convocó a la Comisión y no concurrió o, incluso, aquellas que sí vino y no supo qué contestar- y de las discusiones reglamentarias -el Presidente tiene razón cuando habla del Reglamento pues, si bien se caminó sobre el filo del Reglamento, al fin se estaba dentro de él, con sus quince días- el hecho concreto es que en el país hay una emergencia sanitaria y los quince días que se tomaron y que dicen que marca el Reglamento no admitían espera, no se podía esperar para responder. El señor Ministro no viene en cualquier momento, no aterrizó en un trineo sino que viene en el momento en que se cierran las mutualistas, en que los hospitales no tienen con qué atender, en medio de un conflicto médico, en problemas con las IAMC, con todas las gremiales habidas y por haber, con el Sindicato Médico, con la FUS, con la Federación de Funcionarios de Salud Pública, con el Plenario de Instituciones, con la FEMI, etcétera. Es decir que no debe haber un sector que involucre salud pública con el que el señor Ministro no haya tenido problemas. Es peor aún. A la media noche, en los informativos que por lo menos nosotros vimos cuando nos fuimos del Palacio Legislativo, el Ministro dice que la FUS lo apoya. Me hubiera gustado que dijera acá cuándo va a cumplir los compromisos que ha asumido con ella porque desde el 4 de abril -desde que se firmó el acuerdo de la Multisectorial- ya pasaron tres Ministros, y en lo que me es personal no me pongo el sayo de lo que dicen acá en cuanto a que estábamos prontos para votar la censura a priori. Eso no es verdad, en mi caso, aspiraba a que viniera y, sobre eso que estuvo piando a media noche en los medios de comunicación, en cuanto a que la FUS lo apoyaba, dijera en concreto cuándo y cómo. Pretendía que entre tantas propuestas y diagnósticos que seriamente se le ha proporcionado, nos dijera cuándo iba a empezar a actuar o a instrumentar las medidas.

Tampoco es cierto lo que se dice en cuanto a que no hay propuestas porque se señalaron las de la Multisectorial. Aquí hay propuestas concretas con las que se puede no estar de acuerdo -pero, de ser así, por lo menos que se diga que no se comparten- con distintos escenarios, estudios serios y datos que nadie ha desmentido, con sugerencias claras para resolver algunos temas. La señora Senadora Xavier mencionó dos o tres para quien quiso escuchar, cuando se refirió a qué pasa con la compra de medicamentos, con el control de precios. Hablar de esto es meterse con los laboratorios y, por cierto, no con los nacionales. Qué pasa cuando la Directora del Hospital de Clínicas viene y nos dice cuánto le cuesta un medicamento fundamental si lo compra bajo determinadas condiciones que imponen los laboratorios internacionales y cuánto cuando se compra con precios que se pueden controlar. ¿Cuál es la respuesta?

A mí, que me creo muy maledicente, muy mal pensada, me mató, me superó con creces. Pensé que el día antes iba a tirar algunos pesos al Hospital de Clínicas; está haciendo tiempo para venir y decir que tiene media respuesta para la situación de la salud pública o un cuarto de respuesta para el ámbito de la salud privada y mutual. Sin embargo, sacó un papelito y leyó: "no voy a conceder interrupciones para no perder el hilo" y, después, empezó a leer los tomos. Creo que es la actitud de quien no escucha. A mí no me interesa que venga un Ministro y se vaya otro, y que la política siga siendo la misma. Lo que queremos es que cambie la política de ese Ministerio. En lo que va de esta Administración han pasado tres Ministros y no voy a contar los líos que tuvimos en la anterior Legislatura.

Acá todo está mal pero al Ministro no le importa. Hay una realidad gravísima que comentaba todo el mundo. No voy a decir -como el señor Senador García Costa- qué y quiénes comentaban en los corredores, pero todos tenemos conciencia de que hay gente que se va a atender en Salud Pública y no puede, y que otros tienen mutualista pero no pueden concurrir, porque no pueden pagar los tiques y las órdenes, como decía la señora Senadora Xavier.

Hay preguntas que venimos formulando desde la Rendición de Cuentas, cuando se habilitó el desmantelamiento de los servicios asistenciales de ANCAP, del Banco Hipotecario, etcétera. Queremos saber qué va a pasar con ellos, porque se supone que cuando establecieron el artículo, ya sabían lo que iban a hacer. Se reglamenta la disposición para todos los funcionarios públicos, pero esto ¿sirve o no sirve? ¿Se ha discutido? Podría servir para algún sector de la salud privada pero, ¿es esa la solución para la Administración Central? Hay un conjunto de problemas que no admiten ni quince días de espera para recibir una respuesta del señor Ministro, ni que se entreguen esas cosas que parece se hicieron llegar a Senadores que no pertenecen al Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio, lo que también me parece una barbaridad.

Entonces, vemos que no se escucha a la Multisectorial ni se pide su concurso en este tema, porque hay contradicciones, y esto lo decía muy bien la señora Senadora Pou. ¡Cómo no va a haber contradicciones entre los dueños de las mutualistas, entre determinados sectores de médicos o entre determinados

funcionarios de la salud pública y de la privada! Hay contradicciones, pero también hay una enorme disposición a estudiar, a aportar, a elaborar y a proponer dos, tres, cuatro o cinco cosas que responden a emergencias asistenciales de carácter nacional.

Algo conocemos de la realidad del país porque, aunque más no sea, medimos estadísticamente cómo ha venido votando la coalición. El tema concreto es que tenemos frente al Ministerio de Salud Pública a una persona que es una especie de versión dos de aquél que siempre decía: "No tengo conocimiento". Hay distintas maneras de decir "no tengo conocimiento", y una es expresar a los periodistas que se entera por ellos de sucesos que competen a su Cartera. Confieso que no sería Ministra de Salud Pública porque no tengo las condiciones y porque no es mi especialidad -como decía la señora Senadora Xavier, no hay por qué ser todólogo- pero, si por alguna razón inexplicable llegara a ese cargo y me comunicaran determinada situación, lo que debería hacer es ir al lugar de los hechos a ver lo que está pasando. Como señalaba la señora Senadora Xavier, el señor Ministro Varela pasea por las farmacias de los hospitales públicos y dice que están repletos de medicamentos y que está todo bien.

Creo que, en nuestro caso, se fuerza un pronunciamiento porque, insisto, se va este Ministro, viene otro, y el hecho concreto es que aquellas cosas que están pautadas -y, en muchos casos, acordadas- siguen sin respuesta y sin resolverse. Y se dijo, con toda claridad, que los dineros van a parar todos "al agujero negro". A propósito de otro tema, en el día de hoy comentábamos que lo que, supuestamente, se iba a destinar para la asistencia médica de los maestros durante seis meses fue a parar a ese agujero negro, así como también terminan en ese destino los préstamos del BID. Para el que quiso oír -y para el que estaba en Sala-, se relataron todos los pasos que dimos y que llegaron hasta el cambio de estatuto para las instituciones a efectos de adecuarlas a la posibilidad de recibir el préstamo, así como otra serie de medidas que se tomaron, pero seguimos en la misma. Sin embargo, el Ministro no sabe o no contesta, o ambas.

Por lo tanto, además de ser un Ministro que no tiene respaldo parlamentario -lo que es muy grave-, es un Ministro que no fue, ni es capaz, en estos momentos tan graves que estamos viviendo -por más que ahora reparta esas respuestas a la población-, de dar una respuesta por lo menos, a la situación que atraviesa el país. De comisiones, diagnósticos, consultoras y trabajos escritos está lleno, pero también de propuestas. Hay propuestas de todo tipo, pero de los sucesivos Ministros que han desfilado por esta Cartera, algunos dejaron las cosas a medio hacer, otros contrariaron lo que hicieron los anteriores y otros, mal aconsejados, se plantaron en una tesitura que llegó a irritar al Parlamento Nacional.

Por último, quiero decir que hay una pradera seca, muy seca, de gente que trabajaba en la salud, que se quedó sin trabajo y que no tiene para comer. Sobre los hombros de estas personas se sostenía la asistencia sanitaria pública, y cualquiera sabe que cuando se acude a una dependencia de salud pública, de una cosa no se puede quejar, y es del esfuerzo denodado que estos funcionarios hacen para atenderlo. No tendrán los elementos suficientes, pero estos seres humanos que trabajan en la salud pública y privada

de nuestro país realmente sostienen -como todas las cosas en este paisito- el funcionamiento de esa asistencia. Hay gente que todavía está haciendo duelo por las mutualistas que cerraron y a las que dedicaron sus esfuerzos y su vida, porque estaban vinculados a ellas vocacionalmente. Estoy hablando tanto de los técnicos como de los no técnicos que volcaron sus horas, su entusiasmo y su amor a determinada institución y que hoy están en la calle.

En consecuencia, ante tantas dificultades, ante tanto dolor y ante tanta incapacidad para resolver el problema de fondo -que es el problema de la salud de la población-, la frivolidad con la que actúa el señor Ministro amerita que sea sustituido por otro.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador Pereyra.

SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Deseo dejar una constancia en homenaje a la brevedad con que se ha exhortado a tratar es-te tema, que ya está prácticamente muerto, pero es absolutamente necesario por el futuro que digamos algo sobre esta insólita interpelación a la que nos tocó asistir esta semana.

Haciendo memoria a través de los muchos años que llevo en el Parlamento, no recuerdo que haya ocurrido nada parecido. El instituto de la interpelación está establecido en una disposición que tiene mucho valor en la Constitución de la República: es la que le garantiza a los Legisladores el derecho de interiorizarse y de informarse sobre la gestión de la Administración. Tanto el artículo 119 -que refiere al simple pedido de informes- como el 147 y el 148, que implementan la acusación del Ministro y su posible sustitución, son garantía del carácter esencial del cumplimiento de la labor parlamentaria. Por ese motivo, si algo no se puede tomar con falta de seriedad es una interpelación. En este caso, lamentablemente, faltó seriedad; fundamentalmente, faltó seriedad en la respuesta del señor Ministro. Puedo compartir o no toda la exposición que realizó la señora Senadora Xavier, pero, por otra parte, la mayoría de los hechos son de pública notoriedad: las carencias, los errores, las ineficacias, los abusos y también la corrupción, que existen en la salud pública.

Además de la importancia del instituto de la interpelación, que tenemos la obligación de vigilar, custodiar y prestigiar, debemos tener presente que esta vez funcionaba en torno al más esencial de los derechos, que es el derecho a la vida. La Constitución garantiza una serie de derechos a los ciudadanos, y el primero de todos es el derecho a la vida, que es el único que no tiene limitaciones; todos los demás están sujetos a razones de interés general, como lo establece la expresión constitucional, pero no el derecho a la vida.

Naturalmente, en un tiempo se creyó que esa disposición estaba establecida a los efectos de garantizar que no existiría en el país la pena de muerte, que por otra parte figura en otra norma constitucional. El derecho a la vida en su amplitud no consiste solamente en que no puede quitarse la vida a nadie, sino también en dar los medios necesarios para conservar la vida. El Estado tiene la obligación de aplicar integralmente el

derecho a la vida, es decir, asistir a los ciudadanos, a los habitantes del país, en la conservación de la salud que, en definitiva, es la forma de conservar la vida. Entonces, por la importancia del instituto de la interpelación y del tema que se trató, creo que la interpelación merecía otra suerte.

Quiero decir que comparto lo que señalaba nuestro compañero, el señor Senador García Costa, en cuanto a que este Ministro no merece mantenerse en el cargo y, por lo tanto, es absolutamente necesario que abandone la titularidad de la Cartera. Hay que tener en cuenta que estamos hablando de un Ministerio de una enorme importancia; no soy de los que creen que para ser Ministro de Salud Pública haya que ser médico, porque hemos tenido excelentes Ministros que no lo eran, como el señor Senador García Costa. Pero por lo menos debe tener una trayectoria política, un conocimiento de la función del Estado y una práctica política del país que le permitan resolver con alguna eficiencia temas tan delicados como estos.

Entonces, señor Presidente, no voy a votar que se siga el procedimiento ante la Asamblea General. No lo hago para defender al Ministro, que creo que debe irse; simplemente, pienso que no vale la pena desencadenar una crisis política a esta altura de las circunstancias que pueda llevar, incluso, a la disolución de las Cámaras y embarcar al país en una campaña electoral. El señor Ministro, reitero, ha demostrado muy poco o nulo conocimiento de la Cartera que tiene a su cargo y, además -no quiero molestar a nadie, pero como lo siento, lo digo- creo que no actuó con la necesaria seriedad con que debe actuar un Ministro en el Parlamento Nacional. A mi juicio, la estrategia que trazó fue una verdadera burla al Poder Legislativo y, por lo tanto, la defensa del prestigio de esta Institución, que es el alma de la democracia nacional, nos lleva a decir que es absolutamente necesario que abandone el cargo. El país necesita ese gesto del señor Ministro, pero no vamos a recorrer el camino de una crisis política para destituir a un funcionario que ha mostrado ineptitud para el cumplimiento de sus funciones.

Quería dejar estas constancias a manera de fundamento de voto, para quedar tranquilo con mi conciencia y para tener la autoridad en el futuro de, en cada circunstancia en que un Ministro no se aleje, exigirle las correspondientes responsabilidades.

SEÑOR GALLINAL.- ¿Me permite una interrupción, señor Senador?

SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Con mucho gusto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede interrumpir el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Señor Presidente: además de señalar que comparto lo expresado por el señor Senador Pereyra, quiero dejar de manifiesto -porque no se ha hecho en la tarde de hoy- que fue a iniciativa del Partido Nacional que, en la jornada de la interpelación, se logró evitar que las cosas siguieran el curso en que venían, que seguramente nos iba a deparar muchas horas más, no solamente de interpelación sino,

en particular, de lectura cansina del tomo que en aquel momento el señor Ministro venía utilizando y de los otros que, en forma amenazante, estaban colocados a la derecha de su Banca.

También estoy de acuerdo con el señor Senador García Costa en cuanto a que el Partido Nacional tuvo una actuación absolutamente inobjetable en la jornada de la interpelación, como la va a tener en el día de hoy. Ese día logramos, tras una conversación que tuvimos con los señores Senadores Riesgo y Brause -ya que el señor Ministro no concedía interrupciones-, que se accediera a pedir un cuarto intermedio a efectos de que se interrumpiera la lectura de esos documentos y se aceptara que los mismos fueran incorporados directamente a la versión taquigráfica, de modo tal de poder pasar de forma inmediata a la contestación de las preguntas. Esto también fue aceptado y, de no haber mediado la actitud de los interpelantes de retirarse de Sala, hubiera dado la oportunidad de ir directamente a las respuestas de las preguntas que se habían formulado por parte de la señora Senador Xavier.

De manera que hubo una actitud por demás positiva de parte de la Bancada del Partido Nacional, que logró poner las cosas en su curso y centrar la atención del Senado a efectos de evitar una actitud que hubiera sido, en caso de haberse prolongado, francamente irrespetuosa. Incluso en algún momento señalamos a los señores Senadores del Partido Colorado que si el señor Ministro terminaba de leer todos los documentos que tenía arriba de la Mesa, inevitablemente habríamos tenido que votar que las respuestas del señor Ministro no eran satisfactorias, porque no es esa la actitud que corresponde tomar al Poder Ejecutivo o a un Ministro para con el Poder Legislativo. Es más, creo que le hace mal hasta al propio Gobierno, y mi deseo es que no se repita una circunstancia de estas características.

Además, en respaldo de las expresiones que venía pronunciando el señor Senador Pereyra sobre el futuro, que es lo más importante, quiero agregar que el artículo 174 de la Constitución de la República -que nunca ha tenido la reglamentación correspondiente- establece que el Presidente de la República designará a los Ministros entre aquellas personas que, contando con respaldo parlamentario, aseguren su permanencia en el cargo. La referencia al respaldo parlamentario quizás haya que interpretarla como una expresión tácita que se da a partir del momento en que el Presidente designa a los Ministros y luego no hay una objeción por parte del Parlamento con respecto a las personas elegidas. Pero es absolutamente claro que en estas circunstancias, teniendo en cuenta los problemas que tiene a su frente y su forma de relacionamiento con el Poder Legislativo, el señor Ministro no asegura su permanencia en el cargo.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Puede continuar el señor Senador Pereyra.

SEÑOR PEREYRA.- Señor Presidente: prometí ser muy breve y dejar simplemente una constancia, como lo he hecho. Pero el señor Senador Gallinal, en su interrupción, ha reiterado algo que está en nuestro espíritu: que esto no puede volver a suceder. Si volviera a darse, el compromiso que asumimos al terminar

nuestras palabras es el de incidir, en la medida de nuestras posibilidades, para que el Parlamento no tenga una noche tan desprestigiante como la de la interpelación mencionada.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- No hay más oradores inscriptos.

Dése lectura de la moción de censura.

(Se lee:)

"De conformidad con el artículo 147, inciso segundo, de la Constitución, presentamos una moción de censura respecto del señor Ministro de Salud Pública."

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Si no se hace uso de la palabra, se va a votar.

(Se vota:)

- 13 en 29. **Negativa.** UNANIMIDAD.

SEÑOR NIN NOVOA.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR NIN NOVOA.- Señor Presidente: hemos votado afirmativamente la moción de censura al señor Ministro de Salud Pública en el entendido o con la intención de censurar a la política de salud. Somos de los que creen -como aquí se ha dicho- que de nada vale cambiar a los Ministros cuando las políticas continúan; esto es una suerte de "gatopardismo", que implica cambiar algo para que todo siga como está.

A su vez, siguiendo un poco aquel consejo evangélico que dice "Por sus frutos los conocereis" -esto era lo que decía Jesús a sus apóstoles-, basta ver cuál es la situación de la salud tanto pública como privada, para advertir rápidamente que todo va de mal en peor.

Actualmente, en materia de salud privada, no hay una sola mutualista que no tenga graves problemas -gravísimos, algunas de ellas- y tal como decía el señor Senador Rubio, dentro de pocos meses, con toda seguridad, serán otra vez objeto de discusión en el Parlamento. En materia de salud pública, a lo largo de esta tarde y en oportunidad de realizarse la sesión de interpelación, se han dado innumerables ejemplos que ilustran la difícil situación.

Por otra parte, como en su oportunidad, el señor Ministro de Salud Pública hizo referencia a la política del uso de preservativos o anticonceptivos, quiero decir que en el interior del país estos elementos no están siendo utilizados. En un avance por tratar de sensibilizar a mujeres de bajos recursos sobre embarazos indeseados, éstas decían que no accedían a los preservativos porque el Ministerio no se los daba y porque el costo de uno de ellos es igual al de un litro de leche, es decir, $7; por lo tanto, era mucho más importante para ellas acceder a ese vital alimento que a un método anticonceptivo.

Tampoco quiero molestar a nadie, pero me parece que aquí hay una fuerte contradicción. Digo esto porque lo que hoy la mayoría del Senado ha hecho ha sido avalar la política del salud que hay en el Uruguay, más allá de los dichos y de las declamaciones. Este es un aval para que esto continúe de la misma manera en que está. Aquí había dos posiciones: por un lado, la censura, que implicaba un cambio, una luz amarilla, una alerta al Poder Ejecutivo, como modo de señalarle que por este camino vamos mal y exhortarlo a cambiar de política, empezando por cambiar al Ministro; y, por otro, la no censura, que significa, de alguna manera, aceptar resignadamente que todo esto siga tal como está.

Esta es la conclusión a la que he arribado y quería manifestarla por esta vía.

SEÑOR MUJICA.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador Mujica.

SEÑOR MUJICA.- Señor Presidente: este es un tema muy vasto, que apenas se ha insinuado y que, inevitable e inexorablemente, estará presente en los meses venideros.

Aquí, formalmente, se ha respaldado una política que todos sabemos está cuestionada. Quienes sean observadores políticos perspicaces, se tienen que dar cuenta de lo que ha pasado. No están los votos para censurar, más no hay un franco apoyo, sino un apoyo en la negativa, como rezongando. Y es bueno que en política las cosas se viabilicen y se anote que tal vez lo importante no es el Ministro, sino que tengamos la capacidad -en medio de las dificultades que hoy tiene el país- de empezar a encauzar otra política de salud.

SEÑOR MILLOR.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR MILLOR.- Señor Presidente: ante todo, aclaro que lo que voy a decir será a título estrictamente personal.

Por mi parte, no he avalado absolutamente nada. Una vez más -y no será la última-, a nadie tanto como a mí mismo, he dado una lección de disciplina partidaria. Soy colorado y estoy orgulloso de serlo. Según mi decálago de comportamiento, si se integra un Gobierno, se "banca", lo cual no quiere decir que se avale.

Pero, además, digo -sin pretender incurrir en ningún tipo de alusión- que, como pensábamos intervenir en la noche de la interpelación, también teníamos los tomos en cuestión aunque, claro está, no para leerlos.

Por otro lado, quisiera referirme a un tema que ha sido mencionado dentro del montón de asuntos que involucran una situación tan genérica, teniendo presente a todo el tema de la salud. Una cuestión que verdaderamente me preocupa en profundidad es la de cómo se mezcla lo confesional con algo tan delicado como es la salud. Evidentemente, aquí se ha mezclado el tema del preservativo, y yo les tengo terror a las corrientes confesionales cuando incursionan en asuntos que son políticos pero que tienen que ver, fundamentalmente, con toda la población del país. Esa misma corriente profesional que hace treinta años estaba en contra de la pastilla anticonceptiva porque era para evitar la vida, hoy está en contra del preservativo porque es para evitar la muerte. Así, se está haciendo un daño terrible -por motivos confesionales, que no deberían mezclarse con las cuestiones terrenales- a la salud del Uruguay, ante una de las peores plagas de los últimos tiempos, como es el SIDA. Quería dejar esta constancia porque se mencionó el tema del preservativo.

Antes de finalizar, reitero enfáticamente lo primero que mencioné: yo no avalé nada. Simplemente, como colorado que soy, "banco", aún lo que no comparto plenamente.

SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Pido la palabra para fundamentar el voto.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Tiene la palabra el señor Senador.

SEÑOR GALLINAL.- Simplemente, quisiera dejar constancia de que no he recibido las respuestas a las preguntas que le fueran formuladas al señor Ministro, a pesar de que permanecí en Sala hasta el término de la sesión.

5) SE LEVANTA LA SESION

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE.- Agotado el Orden del Día, se levanta la sesión.

(Así se hace a la hora 19 y 22 minutos, presidiendo el señor **Hierro López** y estando presentes los señores Senadores **Arismendi, Astori, Barrios Tassano, Brause, Cid, Correa Freitas, Couriel, de Boismenu, Fernández Huidobro, Gallinal, Garat, García Costa, Gargano, Heber, Herrera, Korzeniak, Michelini, Millor, Mujica, Nin Novoa, Nuñez, Pereyra, Pou, Riesgo, Rubio, Sanabria, Scarpa, Singer** y **Xavier.**)

SEÑOR LUIS HIERRO LOPEZ Presidente

Sr. Mario Farachio - **Arq. Hugo Rodríguez Filippini** Secretarios

Sr. Freddy A. Massimino Director General del Cuerpo de Taquígrafos

ANNEX 8

REFERENCES AT PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS

THEME	DATE	MP	PARTY
views about the use of the allocated funds,	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Fernández Faingold	COLORADO
	Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 DE OCTUBRE DE 2001	Garcia Costa	BLANCO
university autonomy with reference to funding model,			
	4 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1994	Gargano	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Sarthou	
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber.	BLANCO

		Couriel	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Sanabria	COLORADO
		Fernandez Faingold	COLORADO
	Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Arismendi	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 DE OCTUBRE DE 2001	Garcia Costa	BLANCO
funding allocation criteria	Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Iturralde	BLANCO
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
	Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Arismendi	FRENTE AMPLIO
	15 de setiembre de 2000, de la Comisión de Presupuesto integrada con la de Hacienda,	Penades	

	de la Cámara de Representantes, del Poder Legislativo		
		Diaz	COLORADO
		Gonzales Alvarez	COLORADO
		Gonzalez	BLANCO
		Gonzalez Alvarez	COLORADO
		Posada	COLORADO
		Pais	COLORADO
		Arrate	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Diaz	COLORADO
	Nro 87, 3 de setiembre de 2000 Comisión de Presupuesto integrada con la de Hacienda, de la Cámara de Senadores del Poder Legislativo	Baraibar	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Abdala	COLORADO
		Diaz	COLORADO
		Abdala	COLORADO
		Amorim Batlle	COLORADO
		Berois	BLANCO

		Vener	BLANCO
		Pais	COLORADO
		Ibarra	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Topolanski	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Cámara Senadoes Acta 6 set 2000	Michelini p.	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Garcia Costa	BLANCO
Tuition-fees at UdelaR	Nº 71 - TOMO 372 - 7 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
		Korzeniak	
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
		Gandini	
		Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 118 - TOMO 377 - 12 DE SETIEMBRE DE 1996	Hierro Lopez	COLORADO
	269 - TOMO 391 - 13 DE OCTUBRE DE 1998	Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO

	268 - TOMO 391 - 7 DE OCTUBRE DE 1998	Arismendi	FRENTE AMPLIO
	N° 2998 - 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2001	Pais	
Parliament-university relationship.	Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 DE MAYO DE 1994	Gargano	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Korzeniuak	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
		Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Sanabria	COLORADO
		Fernandez Faingold	COLORADO
	Nº 69 - TOMO 371 - 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Gargano	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 194 - TOMO 385 - 25 DE SETIEMBRE DE 1997	Couriel	FRENTE AMPLIO

	Nº 248 - TOMO 389 - 22 DE JULIO DE 1998	Korzeniak	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 52 - TOMO 404 - 4 DE OCTUBRE DE 2000	Pou	BLANCO
	N° 2998 - 5 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2001	Diaz Maynard	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Abdala	COLORADO
		Scavarelli	COLORADO
		Bergstein	COLORADO
	N° 3066 - 17 DE SETIEMBRE DE 2002	Da silva	BLANCO
	N° 3039 - 3 DE JULIO DE 2002	Silveira	COLORADO
	N° 3037 - 26 DE JUNIO DE 2002	Tourne	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 201 - TOMO 413 - 12 DE SETIEMBRE DE 2002	Gargano	FRENTE AMPLIO
	N° 3200 - 5 DE MAYO DE	Penades	COLORADO

	2004		
lack or scarcity of funds	Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 DE MAYO DE 1994	Korzeniak	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Arana	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 - 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
		Couriel	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Sanabria	COLORADO
	Nº 118 - TOMO 377 - 12 DE SETIEMBRE DE 1996	Couriel	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 249 - TOMO 389 - 23 DE JULIO DE 1998	Ponce de Leon	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 131 - TOMO 409 - 3 DE OCTUBRE DE 2001	Ponce de Leon	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 273 - TOMO 417 - 16 DE JULIO DE 2003	Pou	BLANCO

other	Nº 318 - TOMO 360 - 17 DE MAYO DE 1994	Korzeniak	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Gargano	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Arana	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 71 - TOMO 372 – 7 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Iturralde	BLANCO
		Korzeniak	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
	Nº 70 – TOMO 372 – 6 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1995	Heber	BLANCO
		Gandini	BLANCO
		Sarthou	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Korzeniak	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Couriel	FRENTE AMPLIO
		Sanabria	COLORADO
		Fernandez	COLORADO

		Faingold	

ANNEX 9

ANALYSIS OF CATEGORY TUITION

	ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION	ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION AT THE LEGISLATURE	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION AT THE LEGISLATURE	ARGUMENTS AGAINST TUITION AT UDELAR	ARGUMENTS PRO TUITION AT UDELAR
Social rationale	**Tuition may discourage university attendance** **Imposing tuition or increasing it at a rapid rate might exclude potential students from poor or rural or otherwise disadvantaged families.** **Enrollments might be**	**While tuition is charged the educational activities may be supported by offering financial assistance to individuals during their studies through loans (i.e., loans that do not depend on the creditworthiness—and thus the financial**		"We have to question if the tuition free system is a falacy. It has been instituted to serve as an instrument towards equity and democracy in our society. However we see that (in the university) enrollment there is no representation of all the sectors of our society" 09/21/1997 Mr L. Corbo. **Blanco Pa**	"A tuition-fee system affects severely the possibilities of low income students. A low income student within a loan system is severely affected, his real possibilities are very affected. Modest famlies are not	

	dampened for those whose access is already compromised by low income.	**worth—of the family), or means-tested student grants.**		r t y "I must say that I don´t agree with a tuition-fee system and my political Party has no position about it, either. Furthermore my Party has historically been placed against a tuition fee system. But… if the available resources are so scarce, why is the university so resistant to charge a tuition-fee? It (the tuition-fee) will not entail a major effort for a great majority of university students, those from higher and medium income levels?" 09/15/2000 Mr Ruben Diaz , Col o r a	able to send their children to the university. These determines a fragmented society." Rafael Guarga Rector Brecha, ed 1052 01/21/ 2006 **"As I see it, equity entails free education. I think that if we introduce a tuition fee in the public university**	

					d o P a r t y	we will be placed against equity. I think that those who do not agree with this concept are wrong. If we introduce a tuition fee those coming form wealthy families will not provide funds for the low income students... the only result of	

					such a system will be that low income students will feel discouraged to enrol in university studies." Mario Wschebor Member CDC Teachers union Voces del Frente 23/04/01 "We will not charge tuititon fees at the undergraduate	

					level. Those traditional university programmes... the undergraduate programmes.. will not be charged with tuititon fees...our traditional student is a non – assisted student, he is not supported at all... our society is not providing him any kind of support...” Rafael Guarga **Rector La Republica 09/04/2001**	

					"I think that the university (...) has to say "no" to a tuition fee, (...) it has to show that it can fight for matters that care, such as inequity or social affairs." **J Sutz** In ADUR Assembly Teachers union 05/26/2006.	
					I disagree with a tuition fee system,(...) it deepens inequity and	

					discourages the most. **Rodrigo Arocena Member ADUR Leadership** **Teachers union 22/04/01 Crónicas Economicas**	
Ideological rationale	**Higher Education Is a public service. Vossensteyn** **Higher Education**	**Higher Education has come to be regarded as a shared responsibility between students and society. Vossensteyn**	**"I think that the discussion .... has to be internal.... has to be developed by the own university within its own bodies. This matter does not belong to the political system"**	"I wonder why the university is not considering the possibility of charging a tuition fee considering that it has an authorisation to do so. According to our experience and to what we have heard, almost 80% or 90% of university students come from families that can afford a tuition-fee because the greatest majority or at least half of	**"In relation to a tuition fee system as we perceive Education as a human**	

	generates considerable positive externalities that justify high public subsidies. Vossensteyn	**Those who benefit should at least share in the costs. Johnstone** **Tuition free Higher Education is actually paid for by all citizens, whether or not they know that they have been taxed.** **Besides, most taxes are collected through regressive taxes .** **A very**	**09/21/1997.** Ms Silvana Charlone Frente Amplio **"The university is an autonomous institution and the only linkage with the Parliament is related to the budget allocation. The only discussion (about the university) is around the budget laws steps".** 09/21/1997. Ms Silvana Charlone Frente Amplio **"We all pay full respect to the autonomy, to the co-government system and to all what entails the Organic Law. I do not agree with (charging) a tuition fee"**	them had previously attended private (Primary ans Secondary) schools. Those families had payed more than 300 or 400 hundred (USA) dollars per month in private schools. But when they arrive to the university, the sistem is completely free. During twelve years the family is paying more than 4000 (USA) dollars at the private system but in the higher level … these is totally tuition-free" 15/09/ 2000, Mr Gonzalez Alvarez, Blanco Party "Indeed a university education provides a personal and a social benefit. Therefore … I think that it is fair for the society to receive some portion of the personal benefit to support the university education". **12/26(2001** **Mr H Garcia Costa, Blanco Party**	**right ... it is not a good in the market. That is why the access to education, which means access to knowledge, must be guaranteed to all and during all life. Therefore our defense of tuition free education covers all the**	

		disproportionate number of the beneficiaries of Higher Education are from middle, upper middle, and upper income families who could and would pay at least a portion of the costs of instruction if they had to.	08/21/1997 Mr Julio Aguiar **Colorado Party** "(Like) the Rector (I think) that this country has chosen a good formula which entails that those who have received a free education have to return some fraction to the society because when one receives a university education the society as a whole benefits of such education as well. That is why we support the Solidarity Fund". **12/26(2001** **Mr H Garcia Costa, Blanco Party**		**educational system, and includes postgraduate programmes and long life education."** **FEUU (students union) National Assembly, 1998 and 2005** **"I cannot accept a tuititon fee system or to limit the entrance to**	

					the university. This is an idea that has been introduced by IDB, together with the idea of creating other public universities, or other public HEIs. A tuition-fee will be a barrier to access, our institution has already expressed that we are against it." Graciela Ubach (teachers union) Director	

					University Hospital Voces del Frente 10/03/01	
Ideological rationale	**Society is the major beneficiary of Higher Education, Johnstone** **Tuition free**	**There are demonstrably high private benefits received by the graduates and their families. Johnstone** **There are private benefits that college students receive in the form of higher incomes by virtue of their**	"I must say that I don´t agree with a tuition-fee system and my political Party has no position about it, either. Furthermore my Party has historically been placed against a tuition fee system." 09/21/1997 Mr Ruben Díaz. **(Colorado Party)** "I am not a friend of a tuition fee system, either. But we have to consider some planning". 09/21/1997 Mr Washington Abdala **(Colorado Party)**		"FEUU (students union) only supports a complete tuition fee system with no exceptions" La Republica 06/27/2001	

	Higher Education provides equal chances to rich and poor for gaining a university place Psacharoupoulous	**college attendance and graduation Hauptman, año** **Benefits associated with education may accrue to individuals in the form of additional earnings, improved employment probability, stronger attachment to the labour market, better health and a range of other non-monetary**				

		benefits. **Blondal et al** **Notwithstanding the expansion of enrolments in tertiary education in recent decades, students in Higher Education still tend to come from relatively favoured background.** **Blondal et al** **Financing arrangements in post-**				

		compulsory education tend to be regressive. Those not participating in post-compulsory education -- typically people from disadvantaged backgrounds and with modest income prospects -- do not benefit at all from public funding in this area. **An accompanying expansion of students'**				

		access to loans to finance their education could offset such effects, and the experience of countries that have combined an increase in tuition fees and an increase in student loan facilities suggest that there are no significant adverse effects on participation.				
Practica						

I rationale	**Increases in tuition may not lead to more resources for the university and will not determine a shift in public resources to other socially worthwhile programs. It will determine a shift of taxpayer resources from Higher Education to some other claims that may be more politically forceful. Johnstone**	**Governments do not or cannot provide sufficient public revenue to Higher Education. Therefore, the continuing austerity will become damaging to the point of severe enrollment limitations and increasingly inadequate quality Johnstone** **Public funds are limited. As**	"We must begin to think about other mechanisms in order to obtain a democratic system inside the university without abandoning the tuition free system" 09/21/1997 Mr L. Corbo. **B** **I a n c o P a r t y**	"We know that the government cannot supply further funding, as said by the Minister of Finance. We cannot raise more taxes, actually we must reduce the tax burden in this country. Of course, the University of the Republic requests more funds because, according to its view, it has to grow… and it come here to our legilature and requests more funds …but if there are not more resources we cannot "create" them…"15/09/ 2000, Mr Gonzalez Alvarez, Blanco Party **"Certainly we recognise that the university has made a huge effort during the last years towards modernisation. But like the MP Gonzalez Alvarez I wonder about the tuition-fees. We are placed in a complicated economic**	**"I disagree with a tuition fee system, it provides few funds" Rodrigo Arocena Member ADUR Leadership Teachers union 21/02/02 Crónicas Economicas**	

		a result, Higher Education increasingly must compete for scarce public resources with other important public services, such as health care, infrastructure, and primary and secondary education. Vossensteyn		context, in particular we have a high public burden" 15/09/ 2000, Mr Gabriel Pais, Colorado Party		
The economic rationale		Tuition - as a price- brings to Higher Education some of the		"As I see it, the student constribution could be a very positive aspect, because the student will apreciate more for what he pays… if there is		

	Public financing of provision has been the traditional means in most countries to encourage post-compulsory education Blondal	virtues of the market : (i) greater efficiency: the payment of some tuition will make students more discerning consumers and the universities more cost-conscious providers. (ii) responsiveness: will make universities more responsive to individual and societal needs. Johnstone		some kind of individual or family financial effort the student will be more careful with his studies and his courses… he will attend classes because it will not be a societal burden." 09/15/ 2000, Mr Gabriel Pais, Colorado Party "I think that these (charging a fee) would entail a signal for the society, as it would mean a student contribution to the university cost and an individual and personal effort of those involved in the university matters. As I see it, the		

		Tuition tends to reinforce the inequities already existing in the country		student constribution could be a very positive aspect, because the student will apreciate more for what he pays… if there is some kind of individual or family financial effort the student will be more careful with his studies and his courses… he will attend classes because it will not be a societal burden. 09/15/2000, Mr Gabriel Pais, Colorado Party		

ANNEX 10

NEW BUDGET LAWS SINCE 2005

LEY DE PRESUPUESTO AÑO 2005
Nr 17.930

INCISO 26

UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPÚBLICA

Artículo 436.- Asígnanse al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" para los años y financiaciones que se indican, las siguientes partidas presupuestales anuales, en pesos uruguayos a valores del 1º de enero de 2005:

	2006	2007	2008	2009
FINANCIACIÓN				
RENTAS GENERALES	$	$	$	$
Retribuciones personales	1.800.636.000	1.836.648.720	1.895.081.694	1.955.949.328
Gastos de funcionamiento	352.608.000	380.817.000	411.282.000	452.411.000
Inversiones	24.016.029	26.417.632	26.306.640	26.912.250
SUBTOTAL:	2.177.260.029	2.243.883.352	2.332.670.334	2.435.272.578
FONDOS PROPIOS				
Retribuciones personales	49.398.000	50.386.000	51.393.000	52.421.000
Gastos de	177.398.000	191.590.000	206.917.000	227.609.000

funcionamiento				
Inversiones	66.075.619	72.683.181	71.125.360	72.762.750
SUBTOTAL:	292.871.619	314.659.181	329.435.360	352.792.750
TOTAL:	2.470.131.648	2.558.542.533	2.662.105.694	2.788.065.328

La distribución de los créditos presupuestales de inversión se encuentra incluida en el planillado adjunto a la presente ley.

En la distribución de los créditos presupuestales correspondientes a retribuciones personales, no se encuentran incluidos los aumentos otorgados durante el año 2005, debiéndose adicionar según lo establecido por el artículo 3º de la presente ley.

Artículo 437.- Distribución de las Partidas Presupuestales.- La Universidad de la República distribuirá los montos otorgados entre sus programas presupuestales, por grupo de gasto, todo lo cual comunicará al Tribunal de Cuentas, al Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas y a la Asamblea General dentro de los noventa días del inicio de cada Ejercicio.

Artículo 438.- Todos los créditos de la Universidad de la República se distribuirán entre los siguientes Programas Presupuestales:

Programa 101 - Programa Académico.

Programa 102 - Programa de Desarrollo Institucional.

Programa 103 - Programa de Bienestar Universitario.

Programa 104 - Programa de Atención a la Salud de la Universidad de la República.

Artículo 439.- Establécese que la Universidad de la República podrá celebrar convenios para la realización de pasantías laborales de sus estudiantes en el marco del sistema de pasantías laborales, creado como mecanismo regular de formación curricular por la Ley Nº 17.230, de 7 de enero de 2000, la que será aplicable en lo pertinente.

Publicada D.O. 7 set/007 - Nº 27317

Ley Nº 18.172
RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN PRESUPUESTAL EJERCICIO 2006

INCISO 26

UNIVERSIDAD DE LA REPÚBLICA

Artículo 281.- Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del ejercicio 2007, una partida anual de $ 36:325.306 (treinta y seis millones trescientos veinticinco mil trescientos seis pesos uruguayos) adicional al anticipo otorgado por lo dispuesto en el artículo 150 de la Ley Nº 18.046, de 24 de octubre de 2006, a efectos de completar el incremento de créditos presupuestales dispuesto por el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, referido a la variación de ingresos del ejercicio 2006.

Artículo 282.- Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del ejercicio 2008, una partida anual como adelanto a cuenta del incremento dispuesto en el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, de $ 50:000.000 (cincuenta millones de pesos uruguayos).

El Inciso deberá comunicar a la Contaduría General de la Nación la distribución de la referida partida, dentro de los treinta días de entrada en vigencia de la presente ley.

Artículo 283.- Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" para el ejercicio 2008 un monto de $ 97:920.000 (noventa y siete millones novecientos veinte mil pesos uruguayos), equivalente al 20% (veinte por ciento) de la partida dispuesta por el literal B) del artículo 476 de la Ley Nº 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, con Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", a valores de enero de 2007, con destino a la financiación de los siguientes proyectos de inversión:

A) Descentralización - Desarrollo Universitario en el interior del país: $ 20:459.082 (veinte millones cuatrocientos cincuenta y nueve mil ochenta y dos pesos uruguayos).

B) Proyectos conjuntos con la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública - Educación Tecnológica Terciaria: $ 13:166.736 (trece millones ciento sesenta y seis mil setecientos treinta y seis pesos uruguayos).

C) Inversión en infraestructura edilicia y no edilicia: $ 44:463.053 (cuarenta y cuatro millones cuatrocientos sesenta y tres mil cincuenta y tres pesos uruguayos).

D) Capacitación - Postgrados y capacitación para funcionarios no docentes: $ 7:363.244 (siete millones trescientos sesenta y tres mil doscientos cuarenta y cuatro pesos uruguayos).

E) Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de apoyo a los sectores productivos claves para la economía nacional: $ 12:467.886 (doce millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ochocientos ochenta y seis pesos uruguayos).

Artículo 284.- Facúltase al Poder Ejecutivo a exonerar al Inciso 26 Universidad de la República del pago de los aportes patronales a la seguridad social sobre las retribuciones financiadas con fondos de libre disponibilidad.

INCISO 27

- Rendición de Cuentas y Balance de Ejecución Presupuestal – Ejercicio 2007 – Publicada en el DiarioOficial el 15/10/008

RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS Y BALANCE DE EJECUCIÓN PRESUPUESTAL - EJERCICIO 2007

Artículo 435

Asígnase en el Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República" una partida de $ 55:483.252 (cincuenta y cinco millones cuatrocientos ochenta y tres mil doscientos cincuenta y dos pesos uruguayos) para el Ejercicio 2008, Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", a los efectos de alcanzar el monto dispuesto en el inciso segundo del artículo 301 de la Ley N° 18.172, de 31 de agosto de 2007.

Esta disposición entrará en vigencia a partir de la promulgación de la presente ley.

Artículo 436

Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del Ejercicio 2008, una partida anual de $ 47:000.000 (cuarenta y siete millones de pesos uruguayos) adicional a los anticipos otorgados por lo dispuesto en el artículo 272 de la Ley N° 18.172, de 31 de agosto de 2007, a efectos de completar el incremento de créditos presupuestales dispuesto por el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley N° 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, referido a la variación de ingresos del Ejercicio 2007.

Esta disposición entrará en vigencia a partir de la promulgación de la presente ley.

Artículo 437

Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", para el Ejercicio 2009, un monto de $ 97:920.000 (noventa y siete millones novecientos veinte mil pesos uruguayos), en el marco de la partida dispuesta por el literal B) del artículo 476 de la Ley N° 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, con cargo a la Financiación 1.1 "Rentas Generales", para los

siguientes proyectos de inversión:

A) Descentralización - Desarrollo Universitario en el interior del país: $ 20:459.082 (veinte millones cuatrocientos cincuenta y nueve mil ochenta y dos pesos uruguayos).

B) Proyectos conjuntos con la Administración Nacional de Educación Pública - Educación Tecnológica Terciaria: $ 13:166.736 (trece millones ciento sesenta y seis mil setecientos treinta y seis pesos uruguayos).

C) Inversión en infraestructura edilicia y no edilicia: $ 44:463.053 (cuarenta y cuatro millones cuatrocientos sesenta y tres mil cincuenta y tres pesos uruguayos).

D) Capacitación - Postgrados y capacitación para funcionarios no docentes: $ 7:363.244 (siete millones trescientos sesenta y tres mil doscientos cuarenta y cuatro pesos uruguayos).

E) Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de apoyo a los sectores productivos claves para la economía nacional: $ 12:467.886 (doce millones cuatrocientos sesenta y siete mil ochocientos ochenta y seis pesos uruguayos).

Los créditos que al 31 de diciembre de 2009 no se hubieran ejecutado por razones fundadas, podrán transferirse al ejercicio siguiente con igual destino al previsto, siempre que el monto transferido no supere el 20% (veinte por ciento) del crédito original.

Artículo 438

Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a partir del Ejercicio 2009, una partida anual de $ 293:000.000 (doscientos noventa y tres millones de pesos uruguayos).

La partida precedente incluye el monto que corresponda habilitar de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el literal A) del artículo 476 de la Ley N° 17.930, de 19 de diciembre de 2005, por la variación de ingresos del Ejercicio 2008 y del Ejercicio 2009.

La Universidad de la República comunicará a la Contaduría General de la Nación la distribución de la partida.

Artículo 439

Asígnase al Inciso 26 "Universidad de la República", a los efectos de completar la asignación en el año 2009 de un volumen de recursos equivalentes al 4,5% del producto bruto interno con destino a la educación pública, las partidas que se indican a continuación:

A) Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 56:000.000 (cincuenta y seis millones de pesos uruguayos) con destino a la recuperación salarial y la adecuación de las escalas de sueldos de sus funcionarios docentes y no docentes, en el marco de los proyectos institucionales de profesionalización de las carreras docente y no docente.

B) Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 13:000.000 (trece millones de pesos uruguayos) con destino al fortalecimiento del programa académico de los servicios.

C) Una partida anual de carácter permanente de $ 31:000.000 (treinta y un millones de pesos uruguayos) para la Reforma Universitaria y el Desarrollo Institucional a Largo Plazo.