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Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility

Record type: Monograph (Working Paper)

Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze a particular market failure that leads to inefficiently low fertility in equilibrium. The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no claim on their children’s income, the private benefit from producing a child can be smaller than the social benefit. We analyze an overlapping-generations model with fertility choice and parental altruism. Ownership is modeled as a minimum constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using the efficiency concepts proposed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), we find that whenever the transfer floor is binding, fertility choices are inefficient. Second, we show that the usual conditions for efficiency are not sufficient in this context. Third, in contrast to settings with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to implement efficient allocations. To achieve an efficient outcome, government transfers need to be tied to fertility choice.

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Citation

Schoonbroodt, Alice and Tertilt, Michele (2010) Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility , Southampton, GB University of Southampton 42pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1020).

More information

Published date: December 2010
Keywords: overlapping generations, fertility, efficiency

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 169601
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/169601
ISSN: 0966-4246
PURE UUID: f6e68e8f-0f50-4ad5-99ed-aeeb3367c275

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 17 Dec 2010 12:56
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 12:19

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Contributors

Author: Alice Schoonbroodt
Author: Michele Tertilt

University divisions


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