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Private provision of discrete public goods

Private provision of discrete public goods
Private provision of discrete public goods
We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.

discrete public goods, warm-glow altruism, poisson games
0899-8256
292-299
Makris, Matiadis
966df0dc-9caf-409e-9cbe-f2a800cdffda
Makris, Matiadis
966df0dc-9caf-409e-9cbe-f2a800cdffda

Makris, Matiadis (2009) Private provision of discrete public goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (1), 292-299. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.003).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.

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More information

Published date: September 2009
Keywords: discrete public goods, warm-glow altruism, poisson games
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 173923
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/173923
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: 66108d82-727a-42b7-a3db-552e210f30d5

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Date deposited: 09 Feb 2011 09:33
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 02:32

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Author: Matiadis Makris

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