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Group Payoffs as Public Signals

Record type: Article

We study experimentally the effect on individual behavior of comparative, but payoff-irrelevant, information in a near-minimal group setting. Specifically, in each round, group members see the groups' cumulative payoffs, which consist of an aggregation of the earnings of each member of the group in the round. Our novel experimental design incorporates two games (the Trust game and the Dictator game) whose payoffs are carefully chosen to ensure cross-game comparability. In the baseline, no comparative information is displayed; the sessions are otherwise identical. Our first set of results shows that the display is sufficient to induce an in-group bias, which can neither be attributed to mere categorization of subjects into groups nor to a stronger sense of group identity as a result of the display. Moreover, we corroborate existing results, which find that, relative to the baseline, the display is welfare reducing in the Trust game. Our second set of results shows that when comparing the allocators' decisions across the two games, a first mover's trust is reciprocated by the second mover independently of group identity.

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Citation

Ioannou, Christos A., Qi, Shi and Rustichini, Aldo (2015) Group Payoffs as Public Signals Journal of Economic Psychology (doi:10.1016/j.joep.2015.03.003).

More information

Published date: June 2015
Keywords: Groups, Trust Game, Dictator Game, Focal Point Effects, Reciprocity
Organisations: Economics

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 174997
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/174997
ISSN: 0167-4870
PURE UUID: 73c5cf1e-59ea-48fa-939e-b09fa6b660ef

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 21 Feb 2011 09:58
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 12:10

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Contributors

Author: Shi Qi
Author: Aldo Rustichini

University divisions


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