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Two accounts of the normativity of rationality

Two accounts of the normativity of rationality
Two accounts of the normativity of rationality
Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative.
1559-3061
1-9
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48

Way, Jonathan (2009) Two accounts of the normativity of rationality. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 1-9.

Record type: Article

Abstract

Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative.

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Published date: December 2009

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 177915
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/177915
ISSN: 1559-3061
PURE UUID: 61ace585-a07f-46e2-a6d5-ca13d950050e

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Date deposited: 23 Mar 2011 12:09
Last modified: 18 Jul 2017 12:05

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