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Can Wittgenstein help free the mind from rules? The philosophical foundations of connectionism

Can Wittgenstein help free the mind from rules? The philosophical foundations of connectionism
Can Wittgenstein help free the mind from rules? The philosophical foundations of connectionism
The question whether the construct 'rule' is essential or not for cognition is one of the main divisions between connectionist and rival approaches in cognitive science. In this paper, the philosophical significance of this division is examined, and its implications for cognitive research, in the light of several possible interpretations of Wittgenstein's paradox of following a rule are considered. The conclusion is that the rejection of rules by connectionism makes it philosophically incompatible with the symbolic rule-governed approach; however, the rejection of rules does not necessarily lead, on its own, to a single way of conceptualizing the mind and its place in nature. Wittgenstein's notions of 'form of life' and 'language games' are used as an aid in forming the philosophical foundations of connectionism.
9780195103342
293-305
Oxford University Press
Dror, Itiel E.
4d907da2-0a2e-41ed-b927-770a70a35c71
Dascal, Marcelo
51bf2f00-12f9-4e89-a964-67c5813c48b7
Johnson, David
Erneling, Christina
Dror, Itiel E.
4d907da2-0a2e-41ed-b927-770a70a35c71
Dascal, Marcelo
51bf2f00-12f9-4e89-a964-67c5813c48b7
Johnson, David
Erneling, Christina

Dror, Itiel E. and Dascal, Marcelo (1997) Can Wittgenstein help free the mind from rules? The philosophical foundations of connectionism. In, Johnson, David and Erneling, Christina (eds.) The Future of the Cognitive Revolution. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press, pp. 293-305.

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Abstract

The question whether the construct 'rule' is essential or not for cognition is one of the main divisions between connectionist and rival approaches in cognitive science. In this paper, the philosophical significance of this division is examined, and its implications for cognitive research, in the light of several possible interpretations of Wittgenstein's paradox of following a rule are considered. The conclusion is that the rejection of rules by connectionism makes it philosophically incompatible with the symbolic rule-governed approach; however, the rejection of rules does not necessarily lead, on its own, to a single way of conceptualizing the mind and its place in nature. Wittgenstein's notions of 'form of life' and 'language games' are used as an aid in forming the philosophical foundations of connectionism.

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Published date: 1997

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Local EPrints ID: 18336
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/18336
ISBN: 9780195103342
PURE UUID: a2139bed-05b9-4c05-b009-508364be7141

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Date deposited: 11 Jan 2006
Last modified: 12 Sep 2024 17:12

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Contributors

Author: Itiel E. Dror
Author: Marcelo Dascal
Editor: David Johnson
Editor: Christina Erneling

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