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Self-knowledge and the KK principle

Self-knowledge and the KK principle
Self-knowledge and the KK principle
I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.
epistemology, kk principle, self-knowledge
0039-7857
231-257
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d

McHugh, Conor (2010) Self-knowledge and the KK principle. Synthese, 173 (3), 231-257. (doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9404-9).

Record type: Article

Abstract

I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.

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More information

Published date: April 2010
Keywords: epistemology, kk principle, self-knowledge
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 196299
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/196299
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: cea143e2-443d-43a9-8e8b-695cca270461

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Date deposited: 06 Sep 2011 10:10
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:06

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