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Judging as a non-voluntary action

Judging as a non-voluntary action
Judging as a non-voluntary action
Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.
judgment, mental action, epistemic goals, epistemic normativity
0031-8116
245-269
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d

McHugh, Conor (2011) Judging as a non-voluntary action. Philosophical Studies, 152 (2), 245-269. (doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9478-3).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.

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More information

Published date: January 2011
Keywords: judgment, mental action, epistemic goals, epistemic normativity
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 196329
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/196329
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 77335508-ac25-4785-80a1-ac838ea79683

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Date deposited: 06 Sep 2011 11:06
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:06

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