The truth norm of belief
The truth norm of belief
I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. I propose an evaluative account according to which the goodness of true belief is, in Geach’s sense, attributive rather than predicative.
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McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
March 2012
McHugh, Conor
0b73a7bf-51bf-4883-b62e-f6071f25194d
Abstract
I argue that, if belief is subject to a norm of truth, then that norm is evaluative rather than prescriptive in character. No prescriptive norm of truth is both plausible as a norm that we are subject to, and also capable of explaining what the truth norm of belief is supposed to explain. Candidate prescriptive norms also have implausible consequences for the normative status of withholding belief. An evaluative norm fares better in all of these respects. I propose an evaluative account according to which the goodness of true belief is, in Geach’s sense, attributive rather than predicative.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 4 March 2012
Published date: March 2012
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 196343
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/196343
ISSN: 0279-0750
PURE UUID: 99beac6d-c683-46bc-aa66-1a5db1955b2b
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Date deposited: 06 Sep 2011 16:06
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:07
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