Does belief aim (only) at the truth?
Does belief aim (only) at the truth?
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief’s aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative
279-300
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
June 2012
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Abstract
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief’s aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative
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Published date: June 2012
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Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 201119
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/201119
ISSN: 0279-0750
PURE UUID: 26d832cd-995f-4601-b28e-7e2a10339bd6
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Date deposited: 28 Oct 2011 09:15
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:21
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