Unawareness of theorems


Galanis, Spyros (2013) Unawareness of theorems Economic Theory, 52, (1), pp. 41-73. (doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0683-x).

Download

[img] PDF new_unawareness.pdf - Author's Original
Download (407kB)

Description/Abstract

This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent’s knowledge, but also can impair his reasoning about what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li (J Econ Theory 144:977–993, 2009), Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory 130:78–94, 25 2006) and the standard model of knowledge, it is possible that two agents disagree on whether another agent knows a particular event. The model follows Aumann (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) in defining common knowledge and characterizing it in terms of a self-evident event, but departs in showing that no-trade theorems do not hold.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0683-x
Additional Information: This is a heavily revised version of the 2007 Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics paper.
ISSNs: 0938-2259 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects:
Organisations: Economics
ePrint ID: 203275
Date :
Date Event
14 January 2013Published
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2011 10:02
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 01:17
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/203275

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item