Rule-based verification of network protocol implementations using symbolic execution
Rule-based verification of network protocol implementations using symbolic execution
The secure and correct implementation of network protocols for resource discovery, device configuration and network management is complex and error-prone. Protocol specifications contain ambiguities, leading to implementation flaws and security vulnerabilities in network daemons. Such problems are hard to detect because they are often triggered by complex sequences of packets that occur only after prolonged operation. The goal of this work is to find semantic bugs in network daemons. Our approach is to replay a set of input packets that result in high source code coverage of the daemon and observe potential violations of rules derived from the protocol specification. We describe SYMNV, a practical verification tool that first symbolically executes a network daemon to generate high coverage input packets and then checks a set of rules constraining permitted input and output packets. We have applied SYMNV to three different implementations of the Zeroconf protocol and show that it is able to discover non-trivial bugs
1-8
Song, J.
e82ff981-9c67-4ff5-8971-cb518bd1b3db
Ma, Tiejun
1f591849-f17c-4209-9f42-e6587b499bae
Cadar, C.
f571ab43-49ec-4459-8655-7309f67a2c3e
Piezuch, P.
d56c9962-8d38-48dd-aa22-35123a550b1d
2011
Song, J.
e82ff981-9c67-4ff5-8971-cb518bd1b3db
Ma, Tiejun
1f591849-f17c-4209-9f42-e6587b499bae
Cadar, C.
f571ab43-49ec-4459-8655-7309f67a2c3e
Piezuch, P.
d56c9962-8d38-48dd-aa22-35123a550b1d
Song, J., Ma, Tiejun, Cadar, C. and Piezuch, P.
(2011)
Rule-based verification of network protocol implementations using symbolic execution.
20th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN 2011), Maui County, United States.
30 Jul - 04 Aug 2011.
.
(doi:10.1109/ICCCN.2011.6005945).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
The secure and correct implementation of network protocols for resource discovery, device configuration and network management is complex and error-prone. Protocol specifications contain ambiguities, leading to implementation flaws and security vulnerabilities in network daemons. Such problems are hard to detect because they are often triggered by complex sequences of packets that occur only after prolonged operation. The goal of this work is to find semantic bugs in network daemons. Our approach is to replay a set of input packets that result in high source code coverage of the daemon and observe potential violations of rules derived from the protocol specification. We describe SYMNV, a practical verification tool that first symbolically executes a network daemon to generate high coverage input packets and then checks a set of rules constraining permitted input and output packets. We have applied SYMNV to three different implementations of the Zeroconf protocol and show that it is able to discover non-trivial bugs
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Published date: 2011
Venue - Dates:
20th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN 2011), Maui County, United States, 2011-07-30 - 2011-08-04
Organisations:
Southampton Business School
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 204603
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/204603
PURE UUID: 37d79794-5a37-4d75-9ec7-3fcc60ba4292
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Date deposited: 01 Dec 2011 10:16
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 04:31
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Contributors
Author:
J. Song
Author:
C. Cadar
Author:
P. Piezuch
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