Mapping Research on European Peace Missions

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Foreword: A Polyglot Miracle

There has never been any dearth of literature on the European Union and its external actions. Books, special features and articles on this exceedingly complex and unique organisation abound.

The novice and even the confirmed expert, who seek a better understanding of the challenges involved in a particular domain and an insight into how it works, frequently encounter an impressive profusion of written sources of an extremely variable quality and exasperating redundancy. How is it possible to make an informed choice from the thousands of pages displayed by the different search engines, when we submit a request for ‘EULEX’, which is apparently so unambiguously specific? How can one choose between a sterile press statement, an article from a Eurosceptic publication, a blog revealing the internal tensions at the Secretariat of the Council or an erudite compilation of improvements provided by the Lisbon Treaty?

The goal of this book is to guide the reader through this inextricable jungle towards quality publications that are either written by recognised and highly esteemed authors or which focus on original themes, whilst demonstrating a novel approach. Despite the apparent plethora of sources, the authors achieve the unexpected result of identifying four areas where reference sources are sorely lacking.
This thankless but passionate task was accomplished by a team of five European researchers under the shrewd and energetic editorship of Maria Raquel Freire and Paula Duarte Lopes, senior lecturers at the University of Coimbra (Portugal). The authors also succeed in the rare feat of not succumbing to customary but egregious Anglophile sectarianism. As well as the admittedly majority quota of English-speaking documentation, Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Italian and Finnish articles are also included. The only criteria guiding this choice were quality and the pertinence of the subject.

This publication is supported by COST, an intergovernmental scientific funding body set up under the European Union’s 7th Framework Research Programme, helped to make this polyglot miracle possible. This funding enabled EU-PAX, a network of 35 senior researchers, mainly European, to be set up, who provided assistance to the authors through a process of critical re-reading. Many scientific reviews would be envious of this extraordinary editorial committee.

The work of our network, however, does not stop there, quite to the contrary. This is only the first step in a more ambitious adventure that should help us to develop a possible European vision for peacekeeping. This may be perceived as a rather madcap challenge, which many political decision-makers have advised us to abandon, but is it not the role of intellectuals to question all taboos that have been set in stone?

This book seeks to provide the first markers for a trail ahead that is strewn with potential pitfalls.

Xavier Zeebroek,
Chair of COST EU-PAX Action
Director of GRIP (Brussels)
Introduction

This paper aims at mapping research on European peace missions since 1992, starting with the early debates on European security and defence. The research builds on the thematic focuses defined by the COST Action ‘New Challenges of Peacekeeping and European Union’s Role in Multilateral Crisis Management’, which is structured around three main topics:

a) European Union (EU) cooperation with other international organisations in crisis management;
b) decisions and planning; and
c) the evaluation of missions.

The literature up until 1992 is analysed focusing on the early debates on this topic and highlighting the national perspectives and inter-institutional issues that were given salience by the authors. From 1999 onwards, the literature is systematised according to these broad thematic lines, thereby identifying core issues addressed in the bibliography and the main trends associated therewith. As a result of this mapping process, the researchers also identified emerging as well as underdeveloped or neglected issues associated with the study of European peace missions.

One of the biggest challenges of this exercise was the decision on ‘where to draw the line’ regarding the definition of the scope of the literature reviewed. The result was a selective exercise focused specifically on EU peace missions literature, following the above-mentioned topics. Nevertheless, the issues
identified are not necessarily exclusive to EU peace missions nor are the EU’s
dynamics insulated from other ongoing debates. This paper does not address
these parallel debates, such as those on United Nations missions, even when
these have implications for EU peace missions. Additionally, this paper does
not include a mapping of CSDP missions or an analysis of any of their
particular issues. It however draws on various examples to illustrate the
dynamics that the literature reviewed identifies. Finally, it should be noted
that this paper reflects the main issues and trends identified in the literature
reviewed.

The research conducted was initiated by a collaborative definition and the
harmonisation of search keywords to guide the overall mapping exercise. This
study was conducted during a five-month period, although most of the
collecting effort was concentrated during Short Term Scientific Missions
(STSMs) associated with the COST Action. The STSMs took place at the
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (the
Netherlands), the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security
(Belgium), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sweden)
and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP (Germany). Additional
research was facilitated by the Academy of Finland. The added value in
including intensive periods of research in various internationally renowned
institutions, which facilitated access to differentiated sources in distinct
languages, resides in the possibility of developing a broadened and intensified
research.

Specifically, the researchers accessed several bibliographical databases,
including ARTO (Reference Database of Finnish Articles), B-on (Biblioteca do
Conhecimento Online), Dialnet (Difusión de Alertas en la Red), EBSCOhost,
ECLAS (European Commission Library Catalogue), google books, google
scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge (Institute for Scientific Information), JSTOR,
LINDA (Finnish University Libraries), PAIS International, Persée (Portail de
revues scientifiques en sciences humaines et sociales), PiCarta (Dutch Union
Catalogue), redalyc (Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina y el Caribe,
España y Portugal), RESDAL (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina),
SAGE, SciELO (Scientific Electronic Library Online), Wiley-Blackwell,
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, and various libraries, such as the
Archivio Disarmo Library, the Biblioteca Geral da Universidade de Coimbra, the
CES Norte-Sul Library, the Clingendael Library, the DG RELEX Library, the
European Commission’s Central Library, the GRIP Library, the Instituto de
Ciências Sociais Library, the Instituto de Defesa Nacional Library, the
Österreichische Militärbibliothek, the Peace Palace Library, the Radboud
Universiteit Nijmegen Library, the Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de
Coimbra Library, the SIPRI Library, the Sveriges Nationalbibliotek, the SWP
Library, the University of Tampere Library, and the Utrecht University Library.

The research effort was complemented by the support of experts both from these institutions and from the COST network. The identification of relevant bibliographical references started with the keywords initially defined and evolved through snowball sampling regarding sources and cross-referencing among researchers. An added layer of diversity was adopted by including references in Finnish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. In this mapping, the bibliographical references include books, book chapters, journal articles, think-tank reports, and policy papers.

This constitutes an innovative exercise of collecting, systematising and reviewing the core bibliographical references on this topic. It should be noted that the objective of this mapping was not just the mere identification of the existing literature on European peace missions, nor was it limited to its review. Rather, this paper is a result of a group reflection on the issues and dynamics identified, which informed the structure and contents of this exercise. Additionally, the research team felt the need to identify underdeveloped and neglected areas of research as eventually constituting interesting avenues for future research. In a nutshell, the project is an exercise in the collection and revision of a significant and diverse number of bibliographical references on European peace missions. The results include an extensive bibliographical database and an intensive revision of the main literature. These results are both a useful research tool and a valuable resource for policy-oriented actors, providing an overview of issues concerning and trends in European peace missions.¹

The paper starts by identifying the early debates related to European peace missions. This first section focuses on contextual factors, member states’ perspectives, and the institutional dynamics in Europe between 1992 and 1999. The second section addresses the role of the EU as an international actor, with a special focus on the EU’s cooperation with other international organisations, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU). Decision-making and planning processes within the EU are the focus of section three, which highlights as fundamental aspects identified in the literature the institutional framework

¹ The use of the terms ‘mission’ and ‘operation’ throughout the paper follows as far as possible the original use given by the authors reviewed, although they are sometimes used interchangeably. There is an ongoing debate surrounding this terminology, but the paper does not seek to conceptually engage in this discussion.
and interactions, the political will, strategic culture and development, and the capability and expectations associated with these processes. The literature on the evaluation of missions is reviewed in section four. It looks at the conceptualisation of evaluation, at content and methodological aspects, with a specific focus on their limitations. The concluding remarks identify the possible avenues for future research, based on a critical assessment of emerging trends, underdeveloped issues and neglected aspects that the team has identified throughout the project’s development. This section builds on the previous mapping, reflecting a joint analytical exercise regarding the literature reviewed, and it should therefore be read as an add-on to the project’s findings.
1. Early debates

This section provides an overview of the early debates on European security and defence. The literature reviewed covers the period from the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 1992 to the EU Cologne European Council in 1999, in which the Western European Union (WEU) was subsumed within the European integration process regarding defence and security issues. The main issues identified while reviewing the literature include the contextualisation of developments concerning ESDP, national perspectives within the EU, and inter-institutional dynamics in Europe. It ends with a critical assessment of implementation challenges. It should be noted that the literature reviewed for this period focuses essentially on the role of the WEU in European defence and security dynamics, which is directly reflected in this section.

1.1 Setting the context

Until the end of the cold war, the focus on security and defence issues was centred on the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, the European Economic Communities (EEC), anchored mainly in an economic integration process, did not prominently address security matters. Consequently, peace missions were not on the agenda. In fact, the term ‘crisis management’, even among scholars, was a new term in the security vocabulary.
The UN was, and still is, the main guarantor of international peace and security. In effect, peacekeeping missions became a central instrument in the UN’s peace and security strategy. The end of the cold war intensified the UN’s role in the deployment of peace missions. On the one hand, the two former superpowers were receptive to a more cooperative international environment, thereby consenting to a more concerted positioning in the UN Security Council. On the other hand, the end of the bipolar world and the consequent emergence of different violent conflicts became more visible (Kaldor, 1999). Some of the most violent conflicts took place in the Balkans, in the very heart of Europe.

In the early 1990s, the need for and the lack of action in the Balkans was one of the central debates among scholars concerning security in Europe (Conry, 1995; David, 1993; Dean, 1994c). There was also a concern for defining which crisis should be tackled (Freedman et al., 1993) and where it was legitimate to intervene, with a particular concern regarding the post-Soviet space where the ‘Soviet pole, or even Russian’ did not offer an effective response to crisis situations (David, 1993: 80; Dehousse, 1998). Pond (1999) highlighted that deciding where to intervene was a major strategic issue, since waging a war just across EEC borders could spread to neighbouring countries (Heisbourg, 1994; Heuven, 1994; Pond, 1999), some of them NATO members, such as Italy, Greece and Turkey (Freedman et al., 1993; Heisbourg, 1994).

The violent conflicts in Yugoslavia were a challenge to European security structures. Early on, academic debates highlighted that the EEC diplomatic engagement, the only approach envisaged in their constitutive treaty, was ineffective (Gnesotto, 1996). Additionally, although there was the political will to take the initiative, there was no will to apply force (Burwell, 1998). The EEC ended up proving its inability to cope with the Balkan wars (Freedman et al., 1993; Freire, 2008; Gnesotto, 1994; Serfaty, 1996) and therefore a new framework and instruments for action were in demand (Salmon, 1992). The challenge was enormous, requiring a multinational security response and structures which would have to include keywords such as ‘complementarity’, ‘compatibility’ and ‘solidarity’ (Fricaud-Chagnaud, 1992).

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2 The international response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 is a paradigmatic example of the kind of cooperation that, at that time, was hoped would be the way towards a new world order based on the UN Charter and a new-found supremacy of the Security Council as the legitimate agent of the use of military force.
Additionally, as the response to the Yugoslav crisis was a major challenge, most of the literature reviewed from the early 1990s dealt with the strategic uncertainty and the sense of a void left behind with the disappearance of the strategic opponent in Europe (David, 1993; Dehousse, 1998; Freedman et al., 1993; Gnesotto, 1992). A post-cold war international and European order was being discussed (Bozo, 1993) and many wondered whether NATO was still useful and, if so, for what purpose (Bailes, 1997; Conry, 1995; Dehousse, 1998; Gnesotto, 1992; Joffe, 1992; Moïsi and Mertes, 1995), what it was meant to represent (Heisbourg, 1992), and whether NATO should enlarge (Conry, 1995). Wright (1999) argued that a flexible alliance agreement instead of the existing binding commitment would be better suited to the changing environment. Pond (1999) even advanced a return to the balance of power with loose alliances and no permanent commitments.

In the literature analysed, some authors considered that the Balkan wars strengthened the EU (Art, 1996; Pond, 1999; Remacle and Dumoulin, 1998); others that the European Union proved itself to be capable of responding to the challenges outside the WEU’s framework (Barry, 1997a); still others that the EU’s intervention was a failure (Duke, 1996), had a limited range (Pagani, 1998) and delivered unsatisfactory results (Bailes, 1999b; Goldstein, 1992-3). International expectations were built around European institutions, even without a European written commitment on international crisis management (David, 1993), implying that the EU was recognised as an important actor in crisis management (Heuven, 1994; Rummel, 1994; Salmon, 1992).

NATO had been established as a ‘collective defence’ organisation, which gave rise to the issue of what the dividing line should be between ‘security’ and ‘defence’ (Bozo, 1993; Champenois, 1992; Joffe, 1992) and whether ‘collective security’ should replace ‘collective defence’ (Deighton, 1997a; Nerlich, 1995; Orden, 1997). If NATO decided not to become involved in new security challenges, the WEU seemed to be a viable option, although there was no consensus among scholars on whether they would be partners or competitors (Cornish, 1996; Gnesotto, 1995; Jopp, 1997), or what their respective tasks would be (Deighton, 1997a). Several different scenarios were addressed in the literature consulted, ranging from proposals for a stronger NATO to proposals for stronger European structures, with a varying role for the United States of America (Bailes, 1999b; Gnesotto, 1992; Guéhenno, 1995).

One last main issue identified was that of the ‘renationalisation’ of defence and security after the break up of the Soviet Union, a concern which several academics expressed (Art, 1996; Conry, 1995; d’Oleon and Jopp, 1995; Dean, 1994a; Duke, 1996; Gnesotto, 1992; Heisbourg, 1992; Kupchan,
1996; Mahncke, 1993; Wright, 1999). Associated with this issue, there was concern regarding the role of a reunified Germany in these dynamics (Art, 1996; Menon, 1995).

In sum, before 1999, debates on defence and security were focused on political and identity issues and were discussed in a lively fashion among North-Atlantic partners. Institutions, political decision processes, procedural mechanisms and the division of tasks among the different international institutions (UN, NATO, EU, WEU) were under discussion.

1.2 National perspectives within the EU

The fact that there was a lack of a common vision or a minimum common ground on security and defence issues (Duke, 1996) was a determining factor in shaping the evolution of a European security and defence policy. Several scholars stressed the lack of a European strategy or security doctrine (David, 1993; Dumoulin, 1998; Jopp, 1997; Keukeleire, 1994; Puig, 1998) that could have united the European partners. The literature reviewed included many studies on the relation between the EU and individual states regarding security. The most cited include the United Kingdom, France and Germany, then Denmark and the neutral countries (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden). The USA is also recurrently cited due to its strategic role in European security dynamics. According to some authors, the different perspectives of security among European countries might have been a reason for their inability to cope with the Balkan wars (Bozo, 1993; Freedman et al., 1993; Gnesotto, 1994; Mahncke, 1993; Puig, 1998).

The particular role of the USA was assumed by many scholars to be fundamental to understanding the evolution of European security and defence policy in this period, due to its central position within NATO (Champenois, 1992; Heisbourg, 1992; Joffe, 1992). On the one hand, although the USA never intended to withdraw its troops completely, it disinvested and reassessed its presence in Europe (Dean, 1994c; Dehousse, 1998; Guéhenno, 1995). This was the result of the abrupt decrease in Eastern Europe’s nuclear threat and a reduction in the US military budget (David, 1993; Heisbourg, 1992). Several authors considered the possibility of a US withdrawal from Europe (Art, 1996; David, 1993; Dehousse, 1998; Gnesotto, 1992; Gordon, 1996; Guéhenno, 1995; Mahncke, 1993; Menon, 1995). Within this scenario, Europe would be on its own in shouldering its security and defence responsibilities (Bailes, 1997). Another related issue raised by scholars has to do with ‘burden sharing’ (Bailes, 1998; Burwell, 1998; Heisbourg, 1992) and with ‘an insistence that the Europeans must look after themselves ‘ready or not,’ and an implication that Washington will not care how they do it’ –
‘burden shedding’ (Bailes, 1997). A clear example was the US positioning when faced with a hypothetical military involvement in the Balkans, which was assumed to be ‘Europe’s area of responsibility’ (Goldstein, 1992-3: 127; Menon et al., 1992).

On the other hand, the literature consulted presents different factors explaining the American scepticism about European autonomy in security issues (Art, 1996; David, 1993; Schake et al., 1999; Wilson, 1998b) given that several possibilities never came to fruition. An example put forward was the possibility of a ‘caucus’ among Europeans in NATO meetings, which could contribute to European concerted positions outside NATO (Art, 1996; Dean, 1994c; Menon et al., 1992; Remacle and Dumoulin, 1998; Schake et al., 1999). However, and despite the fact that this inter-institutional competition between NATO and WEU/EU did not completely fade, the Balkan wars ended up re-engaging the USA in Europe (Art, 1996; Pond, 1999) as European countries did not have the means to intervene on their own (Art, 1996; Gnesotto, 1996; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999). The analysed literature reflects this changing position by pointing out that the ‘burden sharing’ ultimately turned into ‘responsibility sharing’ (Paganon, 1997; Verbeke, 1998). In 1994, at the NATO Brussels Meeting, the USA welcomed an attempt to create a ‘European Security and Defence Identity’ within NATO, which was to be adopted by the WEU (Gnesotto, 1995; Robles Carrillo, 1998).

Also, a significant number of authors stressed the fact that some EU members were reluctant to commit themselves to a common defence policy. Denmark was not in favour of the EU having a defence role (Gordon, 1996) or any kind of engagement in common military activities (Fink-Hooijer, 1994). As for Ireland, it was not willing to risk its neutrality status (Keatinge, 1998; Wilson, 1998a). The neutrality issue within the EU was further emphasised in 1995 with the admission of neutral Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU (Hafner and Schulz, 1994; Luif, 1993).

The literature consulted also highlighted the role of different national views concerning a common security and defence policy with implications for a definition of a single and effective policy. One of the members which was extremely averse to this policy was the United Kingdom, remaining faithful to its transatlantic partner and concerned that the development of this policy would lead to a disengagement of the USA from Europe (Barry, 1997a; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999). The British refused any kind of political subordination of the WEU to the European Council or a common defence policy within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Gnesotto, 1996). Additionally, they argued for keeping and reinforcing NATO, since the European Security and Defence Policy would probably mean a duplication of
France, which was not part of the military structure of NATO, and which understood it to be a major limitation (Barry, 1997b; Mahncke, 1993), envisaged a European security and defence policy independent from the USA and as an alternative to NATO (Art, 1996; Gautier, 1999; Gnesotto, 1996; Gordon, 1997; Wilson, 1998a). The WEU would be the executive body of this policy (Gnesotto, 1996) and it would reflect European capabilities (Wilson, 1998b). Germany was caught in the middle of these opposing visions and tried to manage an in-between balanced position, keeping its transatlantic bond as well as its traditional commitment to European integration (Art, 1996; Mahncke, 1993; Menon et al., 1992; Pond, 1992). It should be noted that Germany had constitutional restraints concerning its active participation in military operations (Remacle, 1994; Salmon, 1992). Whereas Germany was fully engaged in the European integration process and was willing to accept security provisions under the Communitarian pillar (Joffe, 1992; Jopp, 1997; Menon et al., 1992), France preferred a more intergovernmental architecture to deal with these issues, which, to a certain extent, demonstrated a convergence with the British position on keeping security out of the Communitarian pillar (Art, 1996; Menon et al., 1992).

An illustration of these different approaches is visible in individual EU states’ positioning with regard to the Yugoslav dynamics. The literature reviewed shows a desynchronised chorus on Slovenian and Croatian independence processes, even though a European diplomatic approach had been drafted (Gnesotto, 1994) and the EU had initially taken the lead (which it gradually lost to the UN, the Contact Group3 and NATO) (Gnesotto, 1996). The Yugoslavian wars were a semantic misconception since, according to the classical rules of sovereignty and international order, the international intervention was not legitimate as long as international peace and stability were not threatened (UN Charter). Different alignments on this issue were pointed out in the literature considered. Whereas the United Kingdom and France pursued a more classical approach (Bozo, 1993; Freedman et al., 1993; Goldstein, 1992-3), Germany focused on the right to self-determination (a moral approach) (Art, 1996; Bozo, 1993) to base its unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence (Gnesotto, 1996; Goldstein, 1992-3; Joffe, 1992). The United Kingdom and France were historically and strategically close to Serbia (Duke, 1996; Joffe, 1992), as was Greece (Heuven, 1994), whereas Germany was perceived as pursuing political and economic influence both southwards and eastwards (Menon et

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3 An informal group composed of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the USA gathered especially to discuss issues related to the wars in the Balkans.
al., 1992; Moisi and Mertes, 1995). Although there had been plans for a common position on these independence processes (David, 1993; Salmon, 1992), Germany unilaterally recognised these new states, pressuring its partners and allies to do the same (Duke, 1996).

These different national alignments illustrate the difficulty in building an effective European security and defence policy. Further on during this decade, these national views were perceived by different authors as having changed and converged, thereby allowing for a European common ground (Art, 1996; Lenzi, 1998). In fact, some scholars suggested that the WEU should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security, since its members had many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly noticeable divergences with the USA (Conry, 1995).

The end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 was, however, the result of NATO’s intervention. At this time, the literature consulted stressed that French suspicion towards NATO faded given that Europe had not been able to commit to an effective crisis management in the Balkans (Gnesotto, 1996). The shift from competition to greater cooperation (Aniol, 1997) represented a significant evolution in the French positioning, being politically isolated in its hard-core defence of the WEU (Jopp, 1997), which had limited capabilities (Gnesotto, 1996). This fact paved the way towards a French rapprochement to NATO (Art, 1996; Cornish, 1996; Gautier, 1999; Gnesotto, 1995, 1996), allowed a rethinking about the full reintegration of France in NATO’s military structures in the future (Gnesotto, 1996; Jopp, 1997; Wilson, 1998a) and represented a fundamental step towards a more coherent collective security policy (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999; Schake et al., 1999).

The literature analysed also refers to the emergence of a new generation of political leaders as a factor influencing the development of national views on European security and defence issues. This is exemplified by the policies of the new governments in France (1993) (Jopp, 1997) and the United Kingdom (1997) (Missiroli, 1998, 1999b; Whitman, 1999) which were visible at the Saint Malo bilateral Summit, where the United Kingdom ‘slaughtered a sacred cow’ (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999). At that time, the United Kingdom acknowledged the need to be an active partner in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU could not afford to fail once again (the violent events in Kosovo at that time could become as dramatic as they had been in Bosnia-Herzegovina) and needed to match words with capabilities (Bailes, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999). This seemed to provide a new impetus to a more effective European security and defence policy (Spiegeleire, 1999). Finally, the new German government (1998) pushed for a match of the ‘no more war’ principle with the ‘no more genocide’ one (Miskimmon, 2009), enabling it to
pursue its engaged foreign policy (Pond, 1999). Moreover, after the 1994 Constitutional Court decision, Germany was able to deploy troops outside its territory for defensive purposes (Duke, 1996).

Regarding the neutral countries, the literature reviewed underlines their convergence towards EU security and defence policies. With the end of the cold war, neutrality became ‘instrumental’ (Pond, 1999) and the recognition of their share of the responsibility in the international security system was acknowledged (Dehousse, 1998; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). Despite retaining their neutrality status, they became observer members of the WEU, participating in meetings and even contributing to some peace operations as long as this involvement did not contradict their neutrality (Ortega Carcelén, 1998). The Petersberg tasks, by definition, did not contradict neutrality; as such, at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Finland and Sweden pushed for their inclusion in the revised Treaty (Bailes, 1997; Ortega Carcelén, 1998), which eventually occurred.

1.3 Inter-institutional dynamics in Europe

The WEU became a central actor in the new European institutional architecture and therefore a major object of analyses on defence and security issues in the 1990s. First, it was simultaneously seen as ‘NATO’s European pillar’ and as the EU’s ‘defence or security or military arm’ (Bailes, 1998; Champenois, 1992; Conry, 1995; Eeckelen, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Wilson, 1998b). Second, it became the natural link between NATO and the EU, with the advantage of coinciding membership without the presence of the USA or the Russian Federation (Gordon, 1997). Third, it became an integral part of the development of the EU, providing the EU with the means to intervene in international crises (Gnesotto, 1992). Finally, an out of area operation in the post-Soviet area would be more acceptable to Russia if it were led by a more ‘European’ WEU than a more ‘American’ NATO (Conry, 1995; Gordon, 1996; Wilson, 1998b).

Most of the literature reviewed addresses the division of tasks between NATO and the WEU/EU, which has always been controversial. The logical dividing line has been the ‘Article V/5’ operations and ‘non-Article V/5’ operations (Barry, 1996; Deighton, 1997b, 1997c; Gnesotto, 1995). This specific article of both the NATO Washington Treaty and the WEU Brussels modified

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4 The Petersberg tasks included humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

5 Article V corresponding to the Brussels Treaty on the WEU and Article 5 to the Washington Treaty on NATO.
Treaty determines mutual assistance and collective self-defence among member states in the case of an armed attack against one or more of them (Gordon, 1997). The WEU seemed to be better placed to implement ‘non-Article V’ operations, since Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty refers to ‘consult[ations] with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise’ (Mahncke, 1993), not requiring an external threat or adversary (Conry, 1995) nor being confined to a specific geographical area, unlike NATO (Aniol, 1997).

In this sense, it was acknowledged in the literature that NATO would maintain its role regarding European collective defence and protection in the case of aggression under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Art, 1996; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999; Nerlich, 1995), leaving the management of a ‘lighter’ crisis, with a more security role (Deighton, 1997b, 1997c; Gnesotto, 1995), to the WEU. Nevertheless, this division of tasks remained blurred, since the USA, increasingly unsatisfied with this simplistic division (Heisbourg, 1999), did not want NATO to retain an exclusive defence or hard power role envisaging the possibility of out of area operations (Art, 1996; Cornish, 1996; Gnesotto, 1992; Gordon, 1996; Schake et al., 1999; Taylor, 1997). In addition, it left it to the Europeans to establish ‘non-Article 5’ peace missions in which the Americans did not have an interest in becoming involved (Gnesotto, 1996).

Furthermore, it was argued that a strict limitational boundary between security or soft power policies and defence issues would not be possible (Gnesotto, 1995; Nerlich, 1995; Schake et al., 1999) and that, consequently, the EU would have to extend its scope to defence matters (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999). Gordon (1996) even argued that the WEU’s existence did not make sense, because the USA would have to intervene in any large crisis and the European regional powers, without a collective structure, would only be able to cope with smaller crises.

One acknowledged achievement in reinforcing the WEU’s capabilities was the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) at the Berlin NATO Meeting in 1996 (Aniol, 1997; Deighton, 1997b, 1997c). These were operational temporary forces from NATO which were made available to specific WEU rapid deployment and limited duration missions (Cragg, 1996), thereby providing WEU with separate but not separable military capabilities (Art, 1996; Cornish, 1996; Paganon, 1997). However, this cooperation was

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6 Even though their provisions were similar, the Brussels Treaty stated that members ‘will afford all the military and other aid and assistance in their power’, but, according to the Washington Treaty, each state ‘will assist by taking forthwith such action as it deems necessary’.
limited by the fact that NATO did not assign significant capabilities and forces to this end (Gordon, 1996; Gordon, 1997), and that any CJTF operation led by the WEU would in practical terms require previous NATO/American acquiescence (Burwell, 1998; Deighton, 1997a; Deighton, 1997b; Gordon, 1996).

A specific analysis of the results of these missions was not found in the literature consulted; however, some authors included brief assessments thereof. The first mission in which the WEU participated was Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, led by NATO (Dean, 1994a; Dean, 1994b; Gnesotto, 1994; Holthoff, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Rosengarten, 1997; Vierucci, 1998). Whereas some authors concluded that this mission was a success since it proved that institutional co-operation was possible (Duke, 1996), others perceived it as a failure, given that the WEU was overshadowed by NATO (Gnesotto, 1996; Remacle and Dumoulin, 1998) and institutional rivalry between NATO and the WEU at the initial stages of the implementation was also addressed (Dean, 1994a; Jopp, 1997; Rosengarten, 1997). Regarding its second mission, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the WEU was responsible for the organisation and recruitment of local police forces (Holthoff, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Paganon, 1997; Politi, 1997; Rosengarten, 1997; Vierucci, 1998). This was the first time that the EU had requested the WEU to organise a civilian operation (Dehousse, 1998), which some described as successful (Politi, 1997).

The future of WEU became a central issue in the analysed literature from the mid-1990s (Aniol, 1997; David, 1993; Ortega Carcelén, 1998). The Brussels Treaty was due to expire in 1998 (Duke, 1996), fifty years after its creation. The discussion centred on whether to simply renew the Brussels Treaty (Duke, 1996), to merge the WEU with the EU (Schake et al., 1999), or to find an intermediate solution (Bailes, 1997; Dehousse, 1998; Gordon, 1996; Jorgensen, 1998; Lankowski and Serfaty, 1999; Marauhn, 1996; Orden, 1997; Pagani, 1998; Paganon, 1997; Schake, 1998; Silvestri et al., 1995). For some, the WEU would be strengthened by having closer links with the EU (Huntington, 1996; Marauhn, 1996), others argued that its autonomy made it more flexible and attractive (Deighton, 1997c; Gordon, 1996), and some even discussed its incorporation in the EU as a fourth pillar (Gnesotto, 1995; Jopp, 1997; Missiroli, 1999b; Pagani, 1998; Serre, 1999). If the Brussels Treaty were to be dissolved, some authors discussed the possibility of including a collective defence guarantee in the EU Treaty (Ortega Carcelén, 1998; Remacle, 1994; Schake et al., 1999; Silvestri et al., 1995).

Other options raised by the literature reviewed include the possibility of creating groups with flexible levels of commitment towards security. This was discussed as opting-out, Europe à la carte, enhanced cooperation, core groups
in specific policies, constructive abstention, variable geometry, multi-speed levels, a two-speed Europe, and coalitions of willing and concentric European circles (Deighton, 1997c; Ehlermann, 1995; Gnesotto, 1996; Janning and Weidenfeld, 1996; Missirolı, 1998, 1999a; Moïsi and Mertes, 1995; Serre, 1999; Silvestri et al., 1995; Wessels, 1996). These were conceptualised in order to overcome blockages in security issues among the EU members and to enable the EU to move on with the integration process even after an enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries (Silvestri et al., 1995). One further idea which was also raised was the possibility of defining ‘convergence criteria’ for security issues, in the same way as the Economic Monetary Union was drafted (Bailes, 1999a; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999).

Moreover, the varying memberships of the WEU, the EU (and even NATO) were identified by some authors as an institutional obstacle to cooperation (Paganon, 1997; Silvestri et al., 1995). The question of whether first joining the EU or NATO became central, mainly due to the existing WEU/EU commitments towards the Atlantic Alliance (Aniol, 1997; Deighton, 1997a; Deighton, 1997b; Heisbourg, 1994).

Out of area operations became another issue which was addressed in the literature consulted, raising questions concerning the institutional legitimacy of these operations. During the cold war, this would not even have been an issue (Bozo, 1993). In the 1990s, the UN and the CSCE/OSCE were seen as the proper legitimate actors to authorise these operations (Bozo, 1993; Eekelen, 1992b; Mahuccke, 1993; Nerlich, 1995; Wilson, 1998a, 1998b), although not without controversy. Some authors argued that the UN Charter is the basis for this legitimacy (Nerlich, 1995), others stated that WEU or NATO should be allowed to intervene in exceptional cases without UN sanctioning (Eekelen, 1992b). The argument went that expecting a UN Security Council Resolution where some states seek a droit de regard, including on European matters, such as China and Russia, does not make much sense (Gnesotto, 1994; Huntington, 1996; Menon et al., 1992).

In this context, the UN and the OSCE were recognised as primary but not exclusive sources of legitimacy (Nerlich, 1995; Wilson, 1998b). Nevertheless, the OSCE failed to meet expectations and to exercise its role as a source of legitimacy for peace operations (Freire, 2003; Guéhenno, 1995; Nerlich, 1995; Wilson, 1998a, 1998b). As for the UN, it did not recognise the WEU’s autonomy to intervene, including its participation in the broad formulation of ‘countries and (...) agencies they decide to rely on’ (Vierucci, 1993).
1.4. Critical assessment: implementation challenges

Even though the individual moves of each one of these actors were acknowledged and extensively studied, it was not possible to find any academic paper which proposed a comprehensive interpretation of this convergence of wills, something like a common input to explain this gradual convergence among the EU members. The political consensus achieved in 1999 with regard to Kosovo (which was even considered to be a catalyst for a European common will by many authors (Bailes, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999; Pond, 1992, 1999)) would hardly have been possible in 1992 for example, although this does not mean that forthcoming political crises will be dealt in a consensual way. It is considered that the persistent, continuous and ongoing set-up of new institutions, standards, procedures, and political and military instruments have pushed towards a more common perception of international challenges. Although many of these new features did not have the opportunity to be tested or have even failed, this definition of common tools has been important in outlining a CFSP. This means that there is a lack of more panoramic research into this possible collective trend of convergence, instead of a merely individualistic analysis.

As for the Petersberg tasks, although this definition may seem to be a very important step towards an integrated collective crisis management response, the reality has been much more tortuous. On the one hand, even though WEU was present in some missions during this decade, a ‘Petersberg mission’ was never deployed as such. On the other hand, their content and geographical scope, size, characteristics and composition had only been lately defined either politically or academically (Aniol, 1997; Gordon, 1996; Kühne et al., 1995; Nooy, 1995).
2. EU cooperation with international organisations in crisis management

A plethora of actors, ranging from individuals and small non-governmental organisations to major international organisations (IOs), are involved in crisis management worldwide. Among such actors, international organisations have been actively involved in EU peace missions. Indeed, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, according to the EU itself, lies in the United Nations Security Council (see, e.g., EU, 1999: para. 26; UN and EU, 2003). In this context, cooperation issues between the EU and other international organisations have been extensively addressed by scholars during the time span of this research.

When addressing EU cooperation with other international organisations, most of the reviewed literature discusses the Union’s relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU). These organisations have provided not only close political and institutional support, but also personnel for several EU peace missions. Moreover, according to Gowan et al. (2009: 115), the EU’s close relations with those organisations, though based on different operational and political principles, and with a varying degree of effectiveness, greatly contributed to ESDP development in the last decade. Tardy (2009) also discusses these actors’ interactions and the challenges they face in a ‘new
strategic environment’ after the end of the cold war. This section presents an overview of how EU cooperation with other international organisations has been addressed in the relevant academic literature, including the issues most frequently studied.

2.1. EU-NATO relations

Peace missions have been a recurrent issue in the literature on EU-NATO relations. This is reflected in the quantity and quality of the official and academic texts published. The main topics addressed in official documents usually refer to initiatives and plans to create and/or strengthen the EU’s military capacity, such as the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1997), the Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (St. Malo, 1998) and the Presidency conclusions of the European Council (Helsinki, 1999). The academic literature focused on a broader range of issues. Amongst them, the most recurrent in the references reviewed were:

- the EU and NATO institutional structures and military capacities regarding crisis management (Acosta Sánchez, 2008; Dobbins, 2008; Enseñat y Berea, 2006; Fatjó and Colom, 2005; Hunter, 2002; Lachowski, 2002; Missiroli, 2002; Moens, 2003; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; Yost, 2000). The discussion on military capacities is vast and diverse (Andréani et al., 2001; Föhrenbach, 2002; Hagman, 2003; Herz, 2009; James, 2005; Missiroli and Quille, 2004; Montojo, 2004; Nooy, 1995; Schake, 2003).
- the historical antecedents and the developments of both EU and NATO regarding security and defence issues (Duke, 2000; Fatjó and Colom, 2005; Howorth, 2000; Neumann and Williams, 2000; Núñez, 2004; Ortega Carcelén, 2002; Ruiz, 2008);
- the relationship between the military aspirations of the EU and NATO’s traditional role as the primary European military organisation (Anderson and Seitz, 2006; Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Dunay and Lachowski, 2004; Moens, 2003; Takle, 2000);
- and EU and European identity and cultural issues (Burgess and Tunander, 2000; García Cantalapiedra, 2004; Tank, 2000). Regarding this last issue, an interesting contribution is Keohane’s chapter in the volume organised by Gowan et al. (2009), wherein he argues that the ESDP has managed to develop its own identity separated from NATO,

7 All such documents are available in the Chaillot Paper issue compiled by Rutten (2001).
besides forging a close partnership with the transatlantic organisation on issues such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo.

This mapping exercise also identified the fact that EU-NATO relations are also discussed in the context of transatlantic relations, framing these within the EU-US security and defence agendas (Anthony et al., 2003; Brenner, 2002; Brimmer, 2002b; Dobbins, 2005; Dunay and Lachowski, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Föhrenbach, 2002; Foxley, 2009a; García Izquierdo, 2002; Gordon, 1998; Haine et al., 2008; Otte, 2002). García Izquierdo (2002) made a comparative analysis of the EU and US perspectives on crisis management policies. His main findings suggest that EU policies, as opposed to their US counterparts, include a more general framework to act preventively. Also Brimmer (2002a) highlights the different US and EU security views on international armed conflict. The US focuses on preemptive military action whereas the EU focuses on conflict prevention and peacekeeping. According to the author, the EU’s ability to combine civilian and military resources to manage violent conflicts makes it a potentially significant contributor to international security. These transatlantic differences, however, may be detrimental to common Western interests, as Gordon argues, in the case of the Middle East, ‘because they limit the effectiveness of transatlantic policy towards the region, undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and threaten transatlantic commercial relations’ (1998: 73).

Another issue identified refers to conceptual aspects of EU-NATO relations. Varwick and Koops, for instance, argue that this relationship is not characterised by effective multilateralism, which ‘affirms the European Union’s goal of strengthening other major international organizations and of equipping them with the necessary tools for fulfilling their respective roles and responsibilities in the international system’ (2009: 117). Rather, they argue, EU-NATO relations are defined by an instrumental approach. According to them, by applying the nearly 50-year experience of ‘structured separation and complex coexistence’ with NATO (Varwick and Koops, 2009: 101), the EU is taking advantage of such a relationship to strengthen and advance its own profile as a visible actor in international crisis management. In this sense, the authors conclude that the emergence of an EU-led ‘shrewd interorganizationalism’ is in the making (Varwick and Koops, 2009: 102).

Looking at the EU-NATO relationship from a more theoretical perspective, Anderson and Seitz (2006) analyse the dynamics between both organisations in the making of the ESDP. They argue that the creation of ESDP was not an EU attempt to duplicate or supplant NATO, but rather to promote a European political identity that differs from US foreign and security policy. According to their markedly constructivist analysis, the formation of ESDP
was a fundamental step in the success of the EU, necessary for ‘Europe to be European’, moving beyond more traditional strategic and security analyses, wherein ESDP is seen mainly as the result of a cost-benefit calculation for Europe.

Finally, some references were identified discussing EU-NATO relations after the end of the cold war (Gärtner et al., 2001; Holte, 2000; Schmidt, 2001; Varwick and Koops, 2009), as well as the impacts and consequences of EU and NATO enlargements in European security and defence issues (Anthony et al., 2003; Chalmers, 2001; Dunay and Lachowski, 2004; García Cantalapiedra, 2004; Missiroli, 2002; Quinlan, 2002; Schmidt, 2001; SIPRI, 2001). Regarding the latter issue, a valuable contribution was the report of the international conference on *The New Security Dimensions: Europe after the NATO and EU Enlargements*, organised by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College and the Warsaw Centre for International Relations (SIPRI, 2001). Although from very different backgrounds, the conference participants agreed that one of the most pressing security challenges for Europe was to forge a cooperative and non-confrontational approach to enlarge the membership of its organisations without creating internal antagonisms. Moreover, they also agreed that the launch of the ESDP represented a logical step in the European integration process and that it contributed to changing the terms of US engagement in Europe.

### 2.2. EU-UN relations

On different occasions the EU officially recognised the partnership with the UN as an important element of international crisis management and of ESDP (EU, 2007, 2009; UN and EU, 2003). Such partnership has provided both legitimacy (Græger and Novosseloff, 2003) and a framework for most ESDP operations, besides offering mutual benefits, especially in the operations carried out in Africa (Gowan et al., 2009). Accordingly, many of the reviewed authors devoted their attention to identifying problems and to discussing how to improve coordination between the EU and the UN (Biscop, 2005; Biscop and Drieskens, 2006; Dobbins, 2005; Morsut, 2009; Ojanen, 2006a; Otte, 2002; Tardy, 2005). Morsut (2009), for instance, argues that it is possible to establish a ‘partner model’ for EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. According to her proposal, when authorised by a UNSC resolution with clear rules of engagement, the EU could intervene as a supporting organisation whenever the UN so required. This model, she continues, would enable the UN to maintain its primary role as the leading organisation in crisis management, whilst the EU would continue to offer its capabilities whenever the UN needed additional support or could not act effectively. According to
Dobbins (2005), however, the issue of coordination is not only about institutional differences and challenges, but also about more substantial matters such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

When discussing the issue of coordination between the EU and the UN, a few authors within the reviewed references discussed the necessity of political and institutional reforms in both organisations. Except for Ojanen’s text (2006a) – wherein the author claims that the EU position regarding the UN reform is based on support from international norms and the UN system, and on the advocacy of the EU’s own international role – all other references were found in the Chaillot Paper edited by Ortega Carcelén. In this publication, the authors discuss how the EU contributes to UN reform in aspects such as human rights, the Security Council and crisis management (Ortega Carcelén, 2005). Whereas Biscop’s contribution is of a rather conceptual nature and proposes a revision of the UN framework that guides its discussions on security and development (Biscop, 2005), Graham and Felício (2005) review issues related to regional organisations in the contemporary system of collective security. Focusing on the issue of peacekeeping, Tardy (2005) argues that there has been an inter-institutional rapprochement between the EU and the UN in the last five years given that both converged in crisis management issues. He argues that, on the one hand, the UN has increasingly sought support from regional organisations due to the continued demand for peacekeeping, and, on the other hand, the EU has also been supportive of the UN with the recent establishment of the ESDP. However, Tardy argues, the agenda of the EU-UN relationship is mainly set and defined by the former, thus contributing to the production of asymmetries. At the same time, by reviewing the EU policy in security and defence issues, the authors in this Chaillot Paper also analyse shortcomings and limits in the EU political and institutional structure itself.

Another issue found in the literature reviewed concerns the theoretical approaches used to analyse the EU-UN relationship itself. It should be noted that most of these studies were not carried out in only general and abstract terms, but they rather illustrated their theoretical discussions with case studies – especially the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see, e.g., Gegout, 2009; Morsut, 2009; Tardy, 2005) and Chad (see, e.g., Charbonneau, 2009). For the most part, these authors adopt a realist-institutionalist approach in which the European Union is understood as a unitary actor of international politics.

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8 Dobbins et al. (2008) provides a review of cooperation between the UN and the EU in seven case studies: Albania, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DR Congo, Bosnia and the Solomon Islands. See Dobbins (2008) for a research note published in Survival. For further detail on specific case studies, section 4. Evaluation.
According to such an approach, EU actions in crisis management are mainly understood as a result of power politics within the EU, disregarding to a great extent differences in culture, values and traditions within and among the member states (see Dobbins, 2005, 2008; Gegout, 2009; Gowan et al., 2009; Graham and Felicio, 2005; Howorth, 2000; Morsut, 2009; Ojanen, 2006a; Tardy, 2005; Yost, 2002).

It has to be highlighted, however, that this realist-institutionalist view of EU-UN relations as a simple cost-benefit calculation is not shared by all. Indeed, in a recent article in International Peacekeeping, Gegout reminds us that a ‘realist paradigm not only takes interests into consideration, but also includes prestige and even, under certain conditions, morality, as factors that impact upon foreign policy decisions’ (2009: 231). Hence, by carefully reviewing the works of realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger, she analyses the interplay between different Western actors’ interests – individual countries, or the UN and the EU – in the specific case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), thus shedding light on why they cooperate or not under different circumstances. According to Gegout, the EU has acted in accordance with its own interests towards the DR Congo: at first to promote its own prestige and then to prove ‘to other powers the existence and efficacy of the EU as a viable, unitary and proactive international actor’ (2009: 239). At the other end of the ‘realist-institutionalist’ spectrum, Morsut (2009) takes a mainly institutionalist approach. As mentioned above, she argues for a ‘partner model’ based on the experience of EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo as a means to better frame their cooperative approach in the field.

The realist-institutionalist paradigm would not be followed without criticism. By adopting a pluralist perspective, Brantner and Gowan (2009) briefly review how the most relevant theoretical frameworks (realism, institutionalism and constructivism) deal with EU-UN relations, arguing that one could better understand this relationship using different theoretical models to explain the EU’s engagement with the UN according to specific actors within the UN system and issues, such as crisis management. Similarly, Charbonneau (2009) questions traditional analyses by arguing that the ways in which EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management is framed does not discuss issues of authority and legitimacy. The author shows that the discourse of the EU-UN cooperation is a practice of knowledge that is supported by unquestioned principles and normative claims about the ‘greater capacity, efficiency and legitimacy that the EU brings to global crisis management’ (Charbonneau, 2009: 546). The author ‘opposes EU-UN cooperation to other practical forms of cooperation, crisis management and political life, thus instituting a hierarchy of practices’ concerning the EU approach to crisis management (Charbonneau, 2009: 547). Accordingly, this enables the EU to contribute
with a ‘powerful, meaningful, significant and more legitimate and desirable proposition’ in matters of military crisis management (Charbonneau, 2009: 547).

2.3. EU-OSCE relations

Based on the references reviewed in this mapping exercise, the topic of EU-OSCE cooperation received far less attention than EU relations with NATO or the UN. In a co-authored chapter, Lynch argues that the EU-OSCE relationship has been crucial in the ‘non-EU Europe’, especially in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus, since the OSCE represents the only forum wherein security issues are debated by all countries in the ‘wider Europe’, including Russia (Gowan et al., 2009). According to the author, therefore, in the context of ESDP, EU-OSCE cooperation plays a crucial role in the stability of EU’s neighbourhood and in the development of the legal and political architecture of European security. The relevance of the EU-OSCE relationship, however, contrasts with the scarce references found in the reviewed literature.

In one of the few texts identified addressing EU-OSCE cooperation, Græger and Novosseloff (2003) focus on the issue of regionalisation. According to them, regional cooperation would allow for the strengthening of the activities related to the maintenance of universal peace and security. Hence, they argue that whereas it is through the UN framework that the EU could obtain legitimacy for its own actions, they predict that the OSCE could become a subcontractor of the Union in civilian tasks. Consequently, the development of the ESDP will tend to bring to the fore the goal of achieving comparative advantages: NATO dealing with military issues, the EU with economic matters and the OSCE with democracy and human rights. Otte (2002) argues instead that EU-OSCE cooperation will tend to focus on the methods and instruments adopted and the compatibility of crisis management tools, the harmonisation of recruitment and training standards, the promotion of joint training activities, and the assistance in the planning and establishment of OSCE missions.

Departing from a historical discussion of the relationship between the EU and the OSCE, Peter van Ham (2009) provides an interesting account of how the former has gradually influenced the latter since the 1970s. He argues that such influence occurred through two distinct mechanisms: knowledge and commitment. Regarding knowledge, van Ham affirms that ‘cognitive interaction suggests that the European Union, as the source institution, changes the order of preference of actors relevant to the OSCE (as the target institution), not by political pressure per se, but by new information, insights,
reports, initiatives, and so on’ (van Ham, 2009: 132). As for commitment, EU-OSCE interaction ‘is premised on the reality that EU member states coordinate their preferences, policy stances and decisions within OSCE fora. If EU member states are bound by a commitment made within the EU framework, politically or otherwise, interaction through commitment has a serious and noticeable impact on the OSCE as a target institution’ (van Ham, 2009: 132). One of the main consequences for the OSCE was its actual marginalisation in the realm of conflict management, since the EU widened its scope regarding security issues and operations (Freire, 2003: 54-69). Another issue suggested in the reviewed literature concerns the impact of EU enlargement on the OSCE (as well as NATO) with a particular focus on field missions (see Wohlfeld, 2003).

2.4. EU-AU relations

The literature on EU-AU cooperation on crisis management is almost non-existent. Most of the reviewed texts discuss the role of the EU in Africa (see Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008; Tardy, 2005), especially analysing particular missions such as those in the DR Congo (see Dobbins, 2008; Gegout, 2009; Morsut, 2009; Olsen, 2009) or in the Central African Republic (see Charbonneau, 2009; Olsen, 2009). However, very few authors have actually engaged in exploring the politico-institutional aspects of such cooperation. According to Damien Helly, in a co-authored chapter, EU cooperation in the ESDP context with the AU is, in fact, relatively new (Gowan et al., 2009). The author points out, nevertheless, that this cooperation is not only about ESDP operations, but also about supporting Africa in developing its own crisis management capabilities.

Malan’s paper is a notable exception. He suggests ways ‘in which the emergent partnership between the AU and the EU (and other actors) can prove more effective in building actual, rather than virtual, peace operations capabilities at the continental level’ (Malan, 2006: 2). Some of his suggestions relate, for instance, to capacity-building in Africa and to the strengthening of the African Standby Force. Møller (2004) points to the fact that when it comes to applying the EU model to its own context, the African Union should not uncritically adopt or emulate ‘the European experience’.

If one accepts Helly’s view (Gowan et al., 2009) that EU cooperation with the AU is not only about ESDP operations, but also about providing assistance in fostering Africa’s own capacities in crisis management, then one should also have to consider the EU’s motivations and interests. This perspective is discussed in Olsen’s recent article (2009), wherein the author presents a model of how the EU foreign policy on conflict management towards Africa
has been influenced by both ‘European’ and ‘national’ interests and preferences. In analysing two concrete initiatives of that policy, Operation Artemis (DR Congo) and the African Peace Facility, Olsen finds that the EU concerns and interests are formed by both EU and French interests. The former are more or less closely related to the Union’s identity, which is assumed to entail values and principles, whilst the latter are related to the particular interests of the colonial powers in the region (including Great Britain). In this context, Olsen finds that the European concerns and interests were, and still are, the most relevant factors motivating the EU’s military conflict management policy towards Africa, whereas African concerns are only considered on a secondary basis.

2.5. Critical assessment: the EU and other IOs

This mapping exercise identified transversal issues in the literature on EU relations with various IOs, namely the possibilities and prospects for political and institutional coordination, models of cooperation and partnerships, and the theoretical approaches adopted. These issues include, for instance, the enlargement of the EU as a relevant issue in EU-NATO cooperation; the impact of institutional reforms in EU-UN relations; and the EU’s role concerning assistance and development in its relationship with the AU.

The realist-institutionalist theoretical framework prevailed, implicitly or explicitly, in the majority of the references reviewed (see Agüera, 2001; Dobbins, 2005; Dunay and Lachowskí, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Fatjó and Colom, 2005; García Cantalapiedra, 2004; García Izquierdo, 2002; Gärtner et al., 2001; Gegout, 2009; Giegerich et al., 2006; Gowan et al., 2009; Heisbourg, 2000; Missiroli, 2002; Ojanen, 2006a; Ruiz, 2006, 2008; Ryter, 2001; Sarotte, 2001; Sloan, 2000; van Ham, 2009). In these analyses, the IOs were usually understood as a single and unitary actor of international politics, with minimal differences in terms of interests, capabilities, identities and traditions. For the most part, they analysed IOs’ decisions, actions and outcomes in crisis management as mainly the result of power politics among IOs’ member states. Studies on how such issues affect the EU’s role in crisis management constitute a potential opportunity for future research.

The lack of research on EU-OSCE and EU-AU relations can be seen as a window of opportunity for further research. Additionally, EU cooperation with other regional organisations involved in crisis management, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), has not been discussed in the literature reviewed. This alleged lack of attention is due to the non-existence of EU cooperation with these
organisations in the field. Regarding, for instance, EU-ASEAN cooperation, Schulze affirms that the ASEAN contribution of monitors to the Aceh Monitoring Mission ‘was the first such cooperation between the EU and another [Asian] regional organisation and it was as successful as it was groundbreaking’ (Schulze, 2009: 267). The future development of the EU’s relations with these regional actors is an issue to be followed.

During this mapping exercise, a number of references were identified, discussing the way particular states engage with the EU in security and defence issues and the impacts of CSFP/ESDP on these dynamics. While discussing such issues, recurrent non-EU member states analysed included the Russian Federation (see Alonso, 2006; Giegerich et al., 2006; Haukkala and Medvedev, 2001; Rontoyanni, 2002; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002), the United States of America (Alonso, 2006; see Giegerich et al., 2006; Moens, 2003; Schake, 2003; Sloan, 2000; Vanhoonacker, 2001) and Turkey (see Missiroli, 2002; Porto, 2005). However, according to the goals and focus of this section, such references were not discussed in this mapping exercise.
3. Crisis management decision-making

This section illustrates the main trends on which the academic community focuses when debating crisis management decision-making within ESDP. First, it looks at the political institutional framework for decision-making and at intergovernmental versus Communitarian issues in the ESDP decision-making process. Second, the role of political willingness is highlighted, as a fundamental factor in shaping and making decisions. Third, the developments in strategic culture are analysed since they constitute an important element of the ESDP decision-making framework. And finally, the debates concerned with EU (especially military) capability development are highlighted.

The issue of decision-making was central in the reviewed literature on EU peace missions. Some of the reasons raised by authors to justify their interest in this issue are the fact that ESDP is a recent policy (Grevi, 2009; Karlas, 2005); that it deals with extremely politically sensitive issues, such as military or civilian force deployment (Menon, 2009); that it is the only policy which is still highly dependent on inter-governmental consensus (Björkdahl and Strömvik, 2008b); that it is a highly complex decision-making structure and process (Ehrhart, 2005); that it is central to defining the EU’s position as a global security actor (Biscop, 2007; Rasmussen, 2006); that it is a threat to the claimed EU strengths as a civilian power (Youngs, 2002); that it has to respond to new threat scenarios/security systems (Boin and Rhinard, 2008; Krahmann, 2003; Tardy, 2007); and due to the fact that the institutional
frameworks of CFSP and ESDP broadly overlap (D'Urso, 2008; Gourlay, 2006a; Grevi, 2009; Rasmussen, 2006).

3.1. Institutional framework and interactions

The literature reviewed concerning the institutional framework focuses on actors and institutional relations. The centrality of the actors in these processes is discussed by Bjorkdahl and Stromvik (2008a, 2008b) and Grevi, Helly and Keohane (2009). Institutional relations address coordination and cooperation issues. For example, Weiss and Dalféth (2009) and Mounier (2009) articulate difficulties in the internal-external divide, to which problems tend to converge, whereas Ehrhart (2006) focuses on the complexities of institutional jurisdiction overlap. Bocquet (2002) identifies the principles of the CFSP/ESDP and examines their relative importance in the decision-making process regarding foreign policy.

It should be noted that EU member states take the final decisions in ESDP based on the unanimity rule (with a few specific exceptions, see below), thus emphasising the importance of inter-governmental decision-making. However, from an institutional perspective, these decisions are achieved 'following a complex process of decision-making that normally entails extensive, institutions-based intergovernmental interaction' (Björkdahl and Strömvik, 2008b; Grevi, 2009: 19). Discussions of the institutional actors of ESDP are often used to tie authors' analyses to the institutional framework (Björkdahl and Strömvik, 2008a; Gourlay, 2006a; Grevi, 2009), namely the following are acknowledged:

a) European Council, GAERC and the Presidency of the Council
b) Political and Security Committee (PSC)
c) EU Military Committee, Political Military Group, Committee for Civilian Crisis Management and Foreign Relations (RELEX) Counsellors
d) Secretary General/High Representative for CFSP, Policy Unit and Directorate General for External Relations and Political-Military Affairs
e) EU Military Staff and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
f) European Commission
g) European Parliament

Bjorkdahl and Stromvik (2008a) also offer a discussion on three institutional structures, articulating the interplay between the Intergovernmental Council structure, the support structure of the Council General Secretariat, and the supranational Commission structure. Similarly, Grevi (2009) discusses the
analogous nature of the Council Secretariat and the inter-governmental committees dealing with CFSP and ESDP.

The European Parliament (EP) should not be left out of the analyses on ESDP decision-making. The reviewed literature highlights its growing relevance, due to its budgetary authority concerning CFSP/ESDP and its co-decisional authority in home and foreign affairs, with impacts on CFSP/ESDP (Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Grevi, 2009: 51). However, according to Wagner (2006), the national parliaments’ capacity to control executive decisions to use military force have been weakened by ESDP, and neither the European Parliament nor the former WEU Assembly have been able to compensate for this loss of parliamentary control. The democratic deficit in security and defence remains troubling in its own right (Wagner, 2006). Further, the sheer complexity of the decision-making processes (Ehrhart, 2005) and the lack of proper transparency in the policy-making culture (Youngs, 2002) add to the concerns of the democracy deficit implicit in ESDP with regard to which some observers now speak about the ‘double democratic deficit’ of multinational military operations (Lundin and Revelas, 2006). Coughlan sees that the principle of internationalism is given priority over nationalism and nation states. Thus, the European Union is fundamentally undemocratic and incapable of realizing democratisation. Coughlan asserts that the European Union’s notion of ‘pooling sovereignty’ only veils larger member states’ dominance over smaller ones. This pooling leads to a violation of democratic principles (Coughlan, 2002).

The pillar structure and the issue management between the pillars’ jurisdictions is also the focus of attention in the literature considered. Gourlay (2006b) focuses on the internal EU civil-civil coordination challenges and argues for complementarity between the first and second pillars. The author recognises that the challenge derives from the fact that the Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external activities, especially in civilian crisis management where there is no ‘unity of command’ and the tasks can be supported by the instruments from both pillars (Gourlay, 2006b). This is also demonstrated by Korhonen and Peltola (2005), who discuss the complexities of financing civilian crisis management operations within the first and second pillars. Ojanen (2006b) takes this statement further by noticing, when examining ESDP in relation to Africa, that the coordination of finances between the pillars can be seen as an obstacle to civil-military operations (i.e. comprehensive crisis management). Still, institutional financial issues are not the only concern for Häikiö (2005), who identifies that the EU, and especially Finland, lack resources with proper skills for civilian crisis management. Korski and Gowan (2009: 13-14) however point out that some member states, including Finland, are actually
performing quite well in this regard as they categorise the performances and commitments of member states.

Civil-civil coordination challenges (or a subset of these) are also addressed by other authors, stressing the importance of policy coherence for effective peacebuilding, and arguing that the EU has a broad set of tools available for developing inter-pillar coherence (Beger and Bartholme, 2007). Moreover, the lack of coherence in EU operations has been addressed by Martti Ahtisaari (2001), who argues that civilian crisis management is an inseparable part of the EU’s crisis management and that the inclusion of the military, as expected, ended up making it more rigid. Further, as Knutsen argues, concerning planning and coordination between EU actors (inter and intra-pillar), the ‘focus of international crisis management is shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status-quo, to peace building which has to do with managing transitions’, with implications on the definition of the EU’s capability as an actor and, a step further, of its effectiveness in the field (2008: 25).

Other authors also introduce the third pillar into the debates. Mounier (2009) underlines the growing similarities which arise between the European Union’s civilian crisis management activities and the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). He emphasises the fact that civilian crisis management and the JHA external dimension not only share ‘functional similarities’ but also a common ‘functional frame’, that of protecting the EU’s internal security regime (Mounier, 2009). However, Weiss and Dalferth (2009), although agreeing that there are problems in pillar-to-pillar coordination, argue that the ESDP and the JHA security policy are pursued according to different systems of rules.

Recognising the internal complexities of EU decision-making processes, some authors, such as Ehrhart (2005), caution that the institutional cross-linkages advocated should not add to these. Ehrhart (2006) also points out that the EU must forge a better internal security governance to be a capable international actor. This is linked to the democratic legitimacy of ESDP operations. Lundin and Revelas (2006) examine this issue with regard to the EU’s external policy by comparing the first and second pillars and they conclude that, despite complexities, synergies are possible.

Indeed, the European Union’s institutional structure and limited approach to developing crisis management capabilities within the intergovernmental decision-making context of ESDP means that its response to crises is neither integrated nor coherent. EU military operations and the deployment of civilian experts are institutionally and practically divorced from activities supported by the Commission; and this division presents serious obstacles to
the EU’s ambitions to become a capable, active, and coherent actor in crisis management (Gourlay, 2004).

With regard to decision-making within the Council, although unanimity is the rule for CFSP and ESDP (Björkdahl and Strömvik, 2008a), ‘constructive abstention of Member States representing up to one third of the weighted votes in the Council is foreseen to allow the adoption of a decision committing the Union while excluding the countries abstaining from the obligation to apply it (Article 23.1 TEU). The Treaty envisages minor exceptions to the unanimity rule and provides for majority voting to adopt acts implementing previous decisions as well as to appoint EUSRs. However, consensual decision-making is predominant. In the particular case of ESDP, when a decision is taken to launch an operation, an original form of permissive consent often applies in practice when Member States agree on undertaking a mission in the context of ESDP but decide not to contribute to it’ (Grevi, 2009: 25-26).

In examining the role of individual states in ESDP, it can be noted that some authors tend to focus their analysis strictly on the ESDP process itself, without going into detail about policies that individual countries have towards this issue (Grevi, 2009). Others articulate the possibilities that individual states or groups of smaller states have in influencing ESDP (Björkdahl, 2008; Jakobsen, 2009) or in shaping operations, such as the case of France regarding operation ARTEMIS (Ulriksen et al., 2004). Björkdahl, highlighting collaboration between Finland and Sweden with regard to conflict prevention, argues that smaller states have the possibility to be at the forefront in advocating normative power, which she defines as ‘norm-generating and norm-spreading capability exercised in order to change normative convictions and to set normative standards through processes of norm advocacy’ (2008: 135-143).

Within this context, the Presidency (and the individual state holding it) cannot be left out of the analysis as it is directly and closely involved in the proceedings of ESDP (Grevi, 2009: 26). Moreover, as Ferreira-Pereira (2007) points out, the ESDP can also influence state behaviour itself, thus highlighting the bi-directional nature of these dynamics, illustrated by the Portuguese case. Similarly, Niskanen (2006) illustrates this with the case of Finland. When discussing the next steps for ESDP, Grevi, Helly and Keohane recognise the need for stronger institutions to achieve greater coherence. Moreover, these authors recognise the necessity of political backing from the member states as a prerequisite for the ESDP’s future success (Grevi et al., 2009).
3.2. Political will

When looking at CFSP/ESDP institutions and their development, the focus is on how political decisions are shaped in the interplay between the European and national levels of governance (Grevi, 2009: 20). In this context, ‘the capacity to decide can be defined as the ability to formulate, adopt and implement decisions’ (Grevi, 2009: 20). All of these prerequisite political will. There exists some debate and analysis on who conjures this will in ESDP. Some authors look at the role of states in this process, especially articulating the role of the larger member states, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but the influence of small states is also addressed by other authors (Jakobsen, 2009; Molis, 2006).

Political will has been identified in the literature reviewed as the key for the EU’s commitment to crisis management (Grevi et al., 2009; Penska and Mason, 2003), especially when force is needed (Tardy, 2007). According to Toje (2008), political will has in fact constituted a prerequisite for the development of ESDP itself. Nevertheless, the author argues that for the consolidation of ESDP, an attitude shift is needed between participating members in addition to overcoming structural hurdles. Crowe (2003) agrees with this reasoning, describing how states are in fact the biggest obstacles to smooth security administration. Somewhat differently, Gowan (2007) explores the question of the existence of a common political will in the first place.

Adding to the discussion, Biscop (2007) focuses on determining whether the ESDP capability-building process is sufficient to generate more deployable capabilities in the future, and whether member states demonstrate the ambition and can rally the political will required to actually use them to their fullest effect. Also, Eichenberg (2003) points out that political commitment has been crucial in the pace and scope of the development of ESDP.

Focusing on a softer side of crisis management, when addressing human security, Kaldor and Salmon (2006) identify the need for considerable political will in order to coordinate the prerequisites for human security operations. These include the primacy of human rights, legality, an appropriate military response, clear political authority, civil, police and military coordination, and adequate intelligence and information. When discussing conflict prevention issues, political will is also identified as a prerequisite for an effective plan to become operational (Menkhaus, 2004). In addition, conflict prevention is also used to mediate political will; it is assumed that a strong involvement in conflict prevention also reflects the political will to render the EU a significant international actor (Olsen, 2008).
The different perspectives and interests of EU member states are very important factors in driving institutional reform in the field of ESDP as discussed by Grevi (2009: 22). ‘France has consistently pushed for an enhancement of the military dimension, and therefore the military expertise, decision-making structures and capabilities of ESDP, so as to make the Union a credible and autonomous actor in this domain. The UK, while sharing France’s emphasis on enhancing the military capabilities of EU Member States, has been keen on preserving the central role of the Atlantic Alliance as the main forum for European defence, and has been wary of duplicating at EU level institutional structures, such as permanent Headquarters already available to NATO and to individual countries. Some Nordic countries and Germany have, on the other hand insisted on fostering the civilian dimension and resources of ESDP, building on the comprehensive approach of the EU to crisis management.’ (Grevi, 2009: 22)

The political will of states and institutions is also influenced by other actors. King (2006) argues that ESDP also depends on the relations among the armed forces of European countries and their ability to cooperate with one another. The author points out that the political will of the militaries is especially important in developing a common European military culture, which, in King’s view, will shape the design of ESDP (2006). This is echoed by Alafuzzoff (2006), Chief of Intelligence of the Finnish Defence Forces, who highlights the institutional problems and the dovetailing of different military cultures in the field in DR Congo. Moreover, the role of the media is also addressed (Rioux and Van Belle, 2005) as well as the public opinions in EU member states (Oppermann and Hose, 2007).

3.3. Strategic culture development

Cornish and Edwards define strategic culture as ‘the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited)’ (2001: 587). The development of a strategic culture in Europe is seen as a requirement for the success of ESDP (Cornish and Edwards, 2001, 2005). The authors highlight how political commitment at the highest levels has been crucial for the recognition of the importance of military solutions, arguing, however, that these need to be developed within an EU strategic culture.

Rynning (2003) takes this statement further by claiming that a strategic culture, reflecting common interests, constitutes a precondition for a successful security and defence policy. Moreover, his article investigates the
EU’s positioning concerning the legitimate use of military force, an issue also addressed by other authors such as Hakanen (1999), and he weighs this political potential of the security and defence policy against what he sees as obstacles to unity. These obstacles include the complexity of multilevel governance coupled with the necessity to undertake military action. Rynning (2003) concludes that the EU does not in fact have the potential to construct a strong strategic culture.

Meyer (2005) argues that the creation of a European strategic culture does not have to be an impossible task, as he finds that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought. In this context, he identifies three types of pressures that have forced a learning process nationally: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialisation, and mediatised crisis learning. When discussing the European Security Strategy, Grevi, Helly and Keohane (2009), among their findings, highlight the need to identify and collectively act upon European interests, framing strategic thinking in European terms and thus advancing the need for the creation of a pan-European strategic culture. Differently, Cornish (2006) debates the process of defence transformation and the dual effect it has on organisations and culture. Interestingly, Matlary (2006) discusses how the concept of ‘human security’ could constitute the basis for the creation of a strategic culture. Despite understanding that creating a common strategic culture is a sensitive issue, Matlary argues that ‘the ideological basis for a post-national strategic culture based on human security provides a window of opportunity for the EU’ (2006: 107).

3.4. Capabilities and expectations

Putting it simply and bluntly, Shepherd (2003) crystallises the debate around gaps in capability and expectations when he argues that without investing in critical military capabilities and without a clear direction, ESDP will become a policy without substance. Clarke and Cornish (2002) agree, arguing that there was a lack in progress in the development of military capabilities. Despite this situation, Duke (2002) calls attention to the fact that European leaders keep making political pronouncements without matching these with resources, namely armed forces, creating a gap between expectations and capabilities.

This discussion often includes a comparison with US military capabilities. Gärtner (2003) finds that the gap between the military capabilities of the USA and the rest of the world is huge and growing. The author believes that the financial difficulties of many European governments and the absence of a direct threat question the possibility of the European replication of US
capabilities. He discusses the issue of a division of labour, suggesting that European militaries should stick to their designed tasks of peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of large forces over long distances. Piiparinen (2007: 371-378) discusses the ‘division of labour’ between international peacekeeping agents, especially in the case of Darfur, where he discusses the EU’s economic and operational roles in relation to other actors.

According to Biscop (2008), capability gaps at the aggregate EU and NATO levels are being ignored, due to national focuses of defence planning, which explains, to a certain extent and despite some progress, the failure of the EU to perform according to expectations. The author illustrates the question of whether the existing mechanisms for capability development in ESDP are actually sufficient to achieve the required transformation from static to expeditionary forces in the first place. With national thinking dominating defence spending, the result is fragmentation, duplication, and low-cost effectiveness, making a shift from bottom-up thinking to top-down coordination a necessity. This, in Biscop’s (2007) understanding, requires deeper integration.

Jakobsen (2006a, 2006b) demonstrates that the expectations-capability gap does not only exist in the military domain. The author points out that, despite popular belief that the ESDP capacity-building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field, civilian capacity building is actually harder than military capacity building. Moreover, according to him, the EU’s civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed. Furthermore, there is a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EU’s reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management. Korski and Gowan (2009) articulate how the commitment of different member states varies with regard to building civilian crisis management capabilities. Moreover, they contend that Brussels has not been too successful either and advance various suggestions to overcome this situation, including qualified staff with adequate training (Korski and Gowan, 2009).

Toje (2006) identifies the consensus-expectations gap as a reason why the EU is a partial and inconsistent foreign policy actor, and which lacks proper decision-making procedures capable of overcoming disagreements amongst member states. This results in a discrepancy between ‘what the member-states are expected to agree on and on what they are actually able to consent on’ (Toje, 2008: 122). The lack of available civilian and military personnel and equipment for ESDP operations persists (Björkdahl and Strømvik, 2008a), confirming the capability gap in relation to the USA and NATO (de Haas, 2007; Laakso, 2006). Whereas Menon (2009) concludes that the
ESDP failed to enhance European military capabilities, Biscop (2008) draws on the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new mechanism for capability development established by the Lisbon Treaty, as a means to overcome the above-discussed gap.

As a prescription for Europe the ‘sick man’, several authors raise the issue of pooling. Missiroli (2003) calls for the mutual interoperability of capabilities that remain under national control; Biscop (2008) recognises pooling (leading to task specialisation) as a method to reduce the intra-European duplication of capabilities and to provide more deployable capabilities within a combined defence budget; and Keohane and Valasek (2008) call for a defence transformation, which can be achieved through pooling. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been tasked with contributing to the member states’ capability objectives (van Eekelen, 2006: 199-206). Still, Witney (2009) calls for a re-energised ESDP with clear ‘hard power’ capabilities, recognising that the issue of pooling, although widely endorsed, has been widely ignored. Furthermore, he observes how the European Rapid Reaction Force remains a hypothetical entity and is likely to stay that way as the discussion of Battlegroups has been brought to the fore. Interestingly, the Battlegroup concept includes participation by European non-EU states that are NATO members, such as Norway (Lindstrom, 2007: 14).
4. Evaluation efforts

Despite the growing interest in ESDP (renamed CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy – with the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009) in the last decade, along with the growth in the number of missions, the issue of scientific evaluation has not been central to the debate. The increasing complexity of CSDP has brought more pressure regarding the need to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the EU’s external engagements. For this reason it makes sense to assess the current standing of evaluation efforts made in the literature in past and ongoing CSDP missions. This should shed some light on the EU’s planning and execution of missions in its growing role as an international security actor.

The aim of this section is to understand if and how the evaluation has been conceptualised and carried out through an overview of existing literature. Special attention is dedicated to the ways in which evaluation is conceptualised and to the objects of the evaluation, such as the missions’ mandates, implementation, output, outcome and impact. This section ends by addressing the main findings and the limitations of CSDP evaluation efforts that have been identified and the reasons that lie behind the relative

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9 Although this section is a result of joint work, the initial sub-section as well as sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5 are the responsibility of Markus Gauster. Sub-sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are the responsibility of Livia Fay Lucianetti. The final sub-section was co-authored.
underdevelopment of systematic evaluation approaches. The literature reviewed on CSDP missions’ evaluation is primarily focused on the Balkans and Africa, although references dealing with other geographical contexts are also considered (i.e. Afghanistan, the Middle East).

Regarding methodological aspects, the literature reviewed based its analyses on official EU documents, including fact sheets, interviews and secondary sources. Face-to-face interviews are considered by several authors as a privileged research tool, conducted to a great extent with missions’ field staff, officials of the EU and its member states, and officials of host nations (Flessenkemper, 2008; Foxley, 2009b; Gross, 2007a; Ioannides, 2007; Juncos, 2007; Richter, 2009). Some authors refer directly to the first-hand experience of mission participants (Bertin, 2008; Flessenkemper, 2008; Klaiber, 2007; Muehlmann, 2008a). Case studies are additionally identified as a recurrent instrument of analysis: single CDSP missions are often included in reports aiming at presenting the state of development of CSDP in a comprehensive manner (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Feichtinger and Hainzl, 2009; Grevi et al., 2009; Hauser, 2009; Heise, 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Nyamaa and Munteanu, 2008; Rehrl, 2009). However, scientifically-based comparative research on various missions has not yet been carried out.

4.1. Conceptualisations of evaluation

A first result of the literature reviewed on CSDP evaluation is that the conceptualisation of the evaluation process appears to be highly subjected to individual interpretations. Various ways of understanding the concept of evaluation were found through analysing the use of the word ‘evaluation’ in the different contributions under study. Some authors stress the difference between (EU) internal and external evaluation. D’Urso (2008) analysed methodologies and techniques adopted by the Council Secretariat and refers to these as internal evaluation tools. Overall, he concludes that EU evaluation procedures addressing CSDP missions\(^{10}\) have undergone a very low level of formalisation and that Council structures have adopted a rather non-systematic approach to evaluation. Moreover, the author examines what he defines as external evaluation, meaning the evaluation that is carried out by think-tanks, universities, national governments, among others. According to D’Urso, external evaluation has not used formal procedures, such as benchmarking, grids and indicators, in a systematic way. Evaluation is more

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\(^{10}\) See Section 3 on decision-making for further detail.
likely to be an informal exercise of a political and organizational type (D’Urso, 2008: 11).

The reviewed literature on CSDP missions is to a great extent policy-oriented. As a result, it focuses its attention primarily on lessons learnt and policy recommendations. A more systematic engagement on an overall assessment of CSDP missions, for instance through the development of specific indicators, is lacking (Emerson and Gross, 2006). Moreover, an external evaluation has been carried out mainly as an administrative exercise. This type of evaluation is very much focused on the decision-making mechanisms which are internal to the Council and is developed around the analysis of administrative efficiency (Duke and Ojanen, 2006; Gourlay et al., 2006).

A recurrent evaluation focus is that of impact evaluation (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Gegout, 2009; Gourlay et al., 2006; Grevi et al., 2009; Helly, 2009; Ioannides, 2007; Juncos, 2007; Klaiber, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005b, 2006, 2008; Nyamaa and Munteanu, 2008; Penska, 2006; Rehrl, 2009; Seibert, 2008; Tull, 2009a; Vircoulon, 2009). Divergent uses of the concept of impact were identified. For example, operational impact (i.e. rapid deployment of a mission, activities carried out, the number of border crossings) was distinguished from symbolic and political impact (Bulut, 2009). The symbolic dimension of missions’ achievements has been explicitly recognised, especially in relation to the EU’s capacity as an international security actor (Major, 2009a). Eva Gross (2009b) also refers to the categories of operative and political impact. In her analysis of EUPOL Afghanistan, she observes that the fulfilment of a significant political impact is one of the mission’s strategic objectives. A further example of individual readings of evaluation is represented by Flessenkemper (2008) and Ioannides (2006). The former evaluates mainly the capacity of EUPOL Proxima to increase local policing skills and to change attitudes, whereas the latter focuses on the evaluation of ‘effective multilateralism’, based on the analysis of the inter-institutional coherence of the EU in relation to specific missions.

Overall, the way of conceptualising the evaluation process is generally implicit throughout the literature reviewed. Nevertheless, it can be derived from the objects, methods and sources of evaluation used. With regard to the evaluation objects, the literature pays particular attention to the characteristics of missions’ development (Heise, 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009), decision-making (Gourlay et al., 2006; Juncos, 2007; Koops, 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Penska, 2006), mandate, mandate implementation, and impact (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Clément, 2009; Emerson and Gross, 2006; Gourlay et al., 2006; Gross, 2009b; Helly, 2009; Koltso-Rivera et al., 2004; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005b;
Nyamaa and Munteanu, 2008; O’Neill and Rees, 2005; Rehrl, 2009; Seibert, 2008; Shusta et al., 2005; Vainio, 2008b; Vircoulon, 2009). A large number of the reviewed references focus on the Balkans, which according to some authors (D’Urso, 2008; Emerson and Gross, 2006) is justified by the fact that the stabilisation of the Balkans constitutes a strategic priority for the EU in the wider context of its integration efforts (European Union, 2004; Gross, 2007a; Ioannides, 2006; Juncos, 2007; Merlingen, 2009; Penska, 2006; Serafino, 2005). Concerning evaluation methods, authors such as Flessenkemper (2008) distinguish between qualitative and quantitative evaluation, referring to the use of qualitative or quantitative research tools.

The purpose of the following sections is to analyse the above-mentioned objects of evaluation emerging from the literature consulted, which represent a good indicator of both the intentions that are behind the evaluation work as well as of the ways in which the authors conceive the evaluation process (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Gourlay et al., 2006; Grevi et al., 2009; Ioannides, 2007; Juncos, 2007; Klaiber, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005a; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006, 2008; Penska, 2006; Tull, 2009b).

4.2. Mission development and mandates

Authors such as Pirozzi and Sandawi (2009) identify the main developments that CSDP missions and operations have undergone. Even though, as previously mentioned, the Balkans represent the most important region where CSDP missions are deployed (both in quantitative and qualitative terms), the geographical scope of CSDP is increasing. This can be observed in the commitment of the EU in Africa and also in the Middle East. However, a lack of overall EU strategy has been identified by various authors (Berg, 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009; Tull, 2009a). This has led to a ‘hot-spot’ approach, characterised by the deployment of short-term missions without the capacity to address political ambiguities or to fulfil the whole range of the Petersberg tasks (Berg, 2009; Flechtner, 2006; Major, 2009a; Tull, 2009a).

A further trend identified is the expansion of the operational spectrum covered by the CSDP missions (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009). The spectrum of EU tasks has become wider and more complex, especially in the civilian sector, following international trends. Traditional EU tasks, such as policing, now range from monitoring, consulting, and training to advising local authorities on how to bring about police reform (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009). Moreover, CSDP missions have been assigned a new set of tasks in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Other recurrent trends identified in the literature are the growing intertwining of the first and second pillars (Gross, 2009b; Pirozzi
and Sandawi, 2009); the increasing importance of the EU Special Representatives (Gross, 2009b; Juncos, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009); the multinational character and high level of participation by non-EU states (European Union, 2004; Ioannides, 2006; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009); and unsatisfactory exit strategies (Ioannides, 2006, 2007).

The literature consulted also concentrates on the driving forces behind the decision-making for EU missions. In the context of military operations, these can be geostrategic interests (Foxley, 2009a; International Crisis Group, 2008) and economic drivers (Weber, 2009). With operation ‘Artemis’, the EU passed its first (expeditionary) test in 2003, although this was more of a French operation under the aegis of the EU (Homan, 2007). EUFOR Tchad/RCA had the same rationale as Artemis. The main driver behind EUFOR was also France, to whom EUFOR served as an ‘agent’ for its geostrategic interests (Berg, 2009; Helly, 2009). EUFOR RD Congo (2006) was only possible because of France and Germany, who envisaged the EU as a capable and visible military actor and as an instrument of power (Gegout, 2009). Trade interests have also been highlighted as a driving force. An example is EU NAVFOR (2008) in the context of securing waterways for international trade routes (Weber, 2009). In addition, some authors state that there are no military EU missions deployed in Africa without the general perception that the EU acts on behalf of former colonial powers (Olsen, 2009).

The ambiguities of CSDP mandates, together with their generic character and their generally limited duration, constitute elements of weakness in CSDP missions with negative effects on implementation and success (Bertin, 2008; Gross, 2007a; Ioannides, 2006, 2007; Juncos, 2007; Kempin and Steinicke, 2008; Muehlmann, 2008b). An example of an ambiguous mandate was that of the civilian mission EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia. Ioannides (2006) describes the mission’s mandate as a very broad one, centred on generic tasks, such as enabling the Macedonian authorities to consolidate law and order, supporting the reform of the Ministry of Interior, police and border police, building confidence with the local populations, and enhancing cooperation with neighbouring countries. On the one hand, EUPOL Proxima was mandated to strengthen the rule of law, democratisation and public administration reform. On the other hand, the mandate also suggested that the mission was just the civilian continuation of the military operation Concordia. This caused the mission to be interpreted as a ‘reassurance instrument’ rather than an instrument for reforming the police sector (Flessenkemper, 2008). A further example is that of EUFOR RD Congo, where the mandate focused more on an ‘end date’ rather than an ‘end state’, reflecting the lack of commitment from Germany (Tull, 2009a).
4.3. Mission implementation

Frequently quoted problems are those concerning the number and quality of personnel (Gross, 2009b; Helly, 2006, 2009; Kempin and Steinicke, 2008; Merlingen, 2009; Penska, 2006; Vircoulo, 2009). Member states’ resistance to second a sufficient number of staff is often cited (Flessenkemper, 2008; Kempin and Steinicke, 2008). For example, this was a major shortfall in EUPOL Proxima, where member states failed to second a sufficient number of qualified police experts (Flessenkemper, 2008) and the overall number of staff was quite limited (200 EU police officers and civilian experts). Another example is that of EUPOL Afghanistan, which has also suffered from understaffing (Gross, 2009b; Kempin and Steinicke, 2008). The same problem applied to EUFOR RD Congo, which eventually managed to fulfil its mandate even with limited forces (Helly, 2009; Vircoulo, 2009). The main issue, according to Tull (2009a), lies in national caveats of troop contributors that are not obliged to provide sufficient resources in accordance with the operations’ plans.

Some missions faced problems not only regarding the staff available, but also regarding their quality, as in the case of EUPOL Proxima (Flessenkemper, 2008). In some situations police officers did not have the required level of policing skills. This problem is greatly due to the unwillingness of member states to second highly skilled staff and also to the low propensity of police officers to engage in expeditionary missions (Kempin and Steinicke, 2008). According to Gross (2007b), the EU requires experts with specialised knowledge as well as field expertise for its operations.

Additionally, the issue of leadership has been referred to as a problem. The personalities of decision-makers influence implementation processes and have, in some cases, created internal obstacles to the fulfilment of a mission’s mandate (Juncos, 2007). As Juncos (2007: 55) points out clearly, problems with the leadership of the mission were repeatedly raised by EU Police Mission (EUPM) officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Field research has shown that the Head of Mission did not accept advice from lower-ranking officials, barely communicated with them and undertook independent initiatives without consultation. Juncos links these problems to the issue of ‘personalities’ or ‘personality’ rather than to the organisational design of the mission. This can be detrimental not only for the overall effectiveness of the mission, but also regarding the mission’s credibility and influence with local authorities.

Problems with procurement and the logistical policies of civilian missions have also been a matter of concern in the reviewed literature. Major shortfalls have been attributed to the fact that these agendas are delegated to the Head
of Mission or the EU Special Representative, whereas overall financial responsibility is retained by the Commission. The complexity of the administration of such issues makes the processes inefficient (Gourlay et al., 2006). The Heads of Mission efforts, especially in start-up phases of an operation, are directed towards tackling bureaucratic and logistical challenges. Long delays in the procurement of essential equipment have been identified extensively during CSDP missions (Gourlay et al., 2006), as in the cases of EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia (Flessenkemper, 2008) and EUIJUST Themis in Georgia (Helly, 2006). This kind of problem is also present in military operations. For example, logistical shortcomings have negatively impacted operation Artemis in RD Congo (‘mission spoilers’), due to the lack of strategic airlift capacities, communication systems and strategic reserves (Homan, 2007).

The lack of funds provided by the EU member states was also widely acknowledged, especially when compared with US contributions (Gourlay, 2006b; Korski, 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). This situation is seen as a result of the unwillingness of member states to pool more money from their military resources to underpin the emerging EU identity as a security actor. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2008) underlined that the progress concerning this issue has been slow. However, progress is being made in tackling the funding challenge regarding civilian CSDP. Unlike military expenditures, civilian CSDP deployments are financed from the CFSP budget line of the European Community budget. Even if these resources are small when compared to the military expenditures, the CFSP budget has risen consistently in recent years (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). Moreover, the size of the defence budgets is not the only factor inhibiting the development of military capabilities; the way in which money is spent is another. Since the demand for military resources is greatly determined by national armed forces, one faces multiple national markets and procurement policies, meaning that the Europeans, in comparison to the USA, get less capability for each euro spent (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008).

The EU internal and external coordination has also been addressed as a major concern. Internal coordination of the EU has been analysed at the level of decision-making, planning and implementation, in particular in the form of inter-pillar relationships (Gourlay et al., 2006) and has drawn the attention of several authors (Flessenkemper, 2008; Gourlay, 2006b; Gross, 2007a; Ioannides, 2006, 2007; Juncos, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006, 2008; Overhaus, 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009; Zehetner, 2007). It has often been evaluated in the context of civil-military relations (Aprile and Marco, 2005; Kohl, 2006; Mölling, 2010). With the European Council Declaration on strengthening capabilities (2008), the EU has acknowledged
the need for developing both civilian and military capabilities. The EU’s internal civil-military coordination (CMCO) at the strategic level – still at an early stage – represents a crucial prerequisite for coherent external engagement (Aprile and Marco, 2005; Kohl, 2006; Penska, 2006; Peral, 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009). This weakness undermines the overall implementation of EU policies (Gross, 2009). Experience from missions has highlighted the limits of CMCO. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a large number of EU missions were deployed (for example, EUPM, EUFOR, EUMM, EUSR), coordination has mostly taken place in Brussels and to a lesser extent on the ground (Kohl, 2006). What has emerged from missions such as EUPOL Proxima is the importance of how capabilities are managed rather than merely the capabilities made available (Ioannides, 2006).

The EU’s external relations, especially with international organisations (i.e. NATO, OSCE), are a consistent object of interest in the revised literature (Ammendola, 2003; European Commission’s External Relations, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2008; Ioannides, 2006; Koops... 2009; Penska, 2006; Peters, 2010; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009). The presence of a wide variety of actors in conflict and post-conflict scenarios provides CSDP missions with both opportunities and challenges (Ioannides, 2006). Shortfalls in the coordination among international actors represent one of the major challenges for the implementation and success of CSDP missions. In some cases the issue is addressed as one of external coordination (Gross, 2009a). An example can be drawn from EU-NATO relations in FYROM. The continued NATO presence in Skopje generated an overlap between NATO and CSDP missions (especially with regard to border security), and prevented the EU from being recognised as a leading security provider and a political actor by the respective authorities (Gross, 2009a). A lack of coordination could also be observed at the level of intelligence sharing between the EU and NATO, as well as on broader political issues (Gross, 2009a).

In certain cases EU relations with third countries have also been problematic (Mace, 2003; Tanner, 2004). For example, in the case of Afghanistan the divergence of investments and approaches to police reform sustained by the EU and the USA led to a fragmentation of the international efforts (Foxley, 2009b; Gross, 2009b). Established principles such as the ‘lead nation concept’ (determining a division of competencies among EU member states) may have similar effects."

11 In other cases, EU-US cooperation has been highly positive. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, the USA participated in a civilian CSDP mission for the first time (Richter, 2009; The Council of the European Union, 2009).
Some of the reviewed literature includes critical analyses of EU interaction with local actors and its effects on missions’ implementation. According to authors such as Olsen (2007: 18), EU missions were more beneficial to the EU identity process than regarding their field impact, as demonstrated by EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Helly, 2009). Along the same lines, Pirozzi and Sandawi (2009) stress that the EU and its member states seem to be more interested in bolstering the credibility of CSDP missions than focusing on its local outcomes and impacts. Some authors underline the need for a better understanding of local political contingencies (Battistelli, 1996, 2007, 2009; Górka-Winter, 2007; Klaiber, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Peters, 2010; Serafino, 2005; Shusta et al., 2005). Resistance from local administrations towards external transformation efforts were also identified (Juncos, 2007), which were perceived as depending on specific organisation cultures and mentalities (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005a). To address this resistance, some authors recommend the involvement of local authorities in the planning process (Flessenkemper, 2008).

The weakness of local government institutions represents an obstacle to an effective implementation of CSDP missions’ mandates, particularly of those engaged in SSR. Problems with local politicians include, for example, political interference in reform programmes (e.g. EUPOL Proxima) and a lack of consensus by local political elites in achieving missions’ objectives (Gross, 2007a). As Gross argues, the lack of local political consensus has been a particularly severe problem for EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has been exacerbated by corruption and a culture of nepotism. What emerges as a trend is the EU’s underestimation of the political context, which crucially affects the success or failure of a mission (Gross, 2007a).

A further aspect of the local dimension refers to the under-representation in the literature of local populations’ needs (Ammendola, 1999, 2003; Battistelli, 1996, 2009; Bertin, 2008; Ioannides, 2006, 2007; Keohane, 2009; Korski, 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Vainio, 2008b). The objectives contained in the missions’ mandates may not coincide with the real needs of the population. As Klaiber states with reference to lessons identified from Afghanistan, it is the ‘misguided conviction of donor nations, as well as NGOs, that they knew perfectly well what the Afghans really wanted and needed to rebuild their country. The Afghans were quite often overwhelmed by the numerous recommendations and suggestions which did not necessarily meet the real wishes of the people who are still so deeply rooted in their own ethnic and religious traditions’ (2007: 10).
4.4. Mission impact

Concerning CSDP missions' impact, authors refer to different terms such as outputs, results or achievements (Bulut, 2009; Ehrhart, 2008; Major, 2009a, 2009b; Seibert, 2008) (see also sub-section 4.1.). Outputs generated by CSDP may be observed at both material and symbolic levels (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). According to the reviewed literature, CSDP missions had a significant external political impact (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). Looking at EUPOL in FYROM and both EUPM and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that these have made an indispensable contribution to peacebuilding by transforming and creating institutions, policies, practices and attitudes (Merlingen, 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Overhaus, 2009). Along with other achievements, the respective missions contributed to the Europeanisation of local police forces, to build trust and reassure the public, and to the process of DDR (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008).

The enhancement of the EU's legitimacy and reputation was perceived by several authors as an important CSDP outcome. For example, operation Concordia in FYROM only had 400 soldiers and only lasted for nine months. Nevertheless, it was important not only because it prevented new forms of inter-ethnic violence, but also, at a strategic-political level, because it demonstrated the willingness and capacity of the EU to embrace a different role than that of the 1990s (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). Similarly, the willingness of Brussels to become actively involved in the promotion of democracy can be observed in missions deployed in Georgia (Helly, 2006) and RD Congo (Hoebeke, 2007). Flessenkemper (2008) points to the results of EUPOL Proxima and emphasises the stabilising effect of the mission and its achievements with regard to the improvement of local administrative skills. One of its main innovations was the decentralisation of the police decision-making and management processes, crucial for the modernisation of the police apparatus and key to the Ohrid peace accord. Positive results were also achieved in the field of internal control, with local authorities revealing their willingness to become engaged in taking action towards police misconduct.

Concerning EU missions' impact in Africa, negative and positive aspects were identified (Gegout, 2009). When discussing the cases of Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, Gegout (2009) states very critically that EU missions in RD Congo are counter-productive interventions in internal politics. NAVFOR Atalanta has also been highly criticised due to the lack of impact on the situation of the local population (Strickmann, 2009; Vainio, 2008a; Weber, 2009). However, some authors identified positive impacts regarding this operation. It is considered to be a main driving force to enhance coherence in communication and coordination between military fleets of different nations,
organisations, merchant vessels and shipping companies (Helly, 2009). Furthermore, NAVFOR increased cooperation and comprehensive actions in the field of the rule of law, bringing participating EU member states and third parties closer together (Helly, 2009). This was also demonstrated during the operations of Chinese military vessels and US warships in the area of operation.

4.5. Critical assessment: approaches and shortfalls of CSDP evaluation efforts

From a critical perspective, the evaluation of CSDP missions in the literature reviewed concerning conceptualisation and methodological aspects appears to be underdeveloped, lacking formalisation and standardisation of procedures (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; D’Urso, 2008; Emerson and Gross, 2006; Grevi et al., 2009) and has even been described as ‘largely anecdotal’ (Korski, 2009: 237). The core concepts of evaluation such as input, output, outcome or impact (of a mission) are often used inappropriately and with different meanings if compared to evaluation criteria and indicators developed by institutional literature (e.g. the training manual on evaluation developed for the European Commission by the French company Demos) and scientific literature (e.g. Rossi et al., 2004). As a consequence, in several cases, authors appear not to be sufficiently clear on the different meanings of these concepts. For example, the term ‘impact’, which scientifically refers to longer-term achievements of a mission, is often used when referring to straight outputs.

Similarly, when assessing EUPOL Proxima, Ioannides (2006) mentions that the mission’s evaluation was limited to assessing whether an activity was carried out (thus referring to output) rather than verifying whether the mandate’s objectives were attained or not. When present, considerations on mandates’ fulfilment are often quite generic, especially when they are used to support positive results (Bertin, 2008: 70). In addition, the concept of political impact is used without specifying its dimensions. However, CSDP missions’ impacts represent an important issue in the literature consulted (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Clément, 2009; Emerson and Gross, 2006; Gegout, 2009; Gourlay et al., 2006; Gross, 2009a; Helly, 2009; Homan, 2007; Koltho-Rivera et al., 2004; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005b, 2008; Nyamaa and Munteanu, 2008; O’Neill and Rees, 2005; Rehrl, 2009; Seibert, 2008; Shusta et al., 2005; Tardy, 2006; Vainio, 2008b; Vircoulon, 2009). In particular, the literature reviewed reflects the fact that the evaluation of CSDP missions is generally not based on a systematic approach. Primary sources were not often quoted and, when they were, generally referred to a limited number of interviews. These were mainly conducted with officials involved in the missions’ implementation or decision-making rather than with field
officers. Interviews with locals are generally scarce which indicates that in
general the population’s point of view is not sufficiently considered, either
before, during or after the mission’s implementation. Official documents and
secondary sources are frequently quoted and represent the main source of
information for evaluation. However, despite some methodological flaws and
the lack of empirical evidence, CSDP missions are being put to the test quite
critically (Gegout, 2009; Haine and Giegerich, 2006) and analysed in a
comprehensive (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009; Grevi et al., 2009) and
solution-orientated manner (Vlachos-Dengler, 2007).

Regarding the object of evaluation, the literature reviewed is highly concerned
with identifying the challenges to and the shortfalls of missions in order to
extract lessons for future engagement (D’Urso, 2008; Emerson and Gross,
2006; Gourlay et al., 2006; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008; Penska, 2006).
These are recognised in particular with regard to the mandate, the number
and quality of staff, procurement issues, and financial problems. Concerning
geographical focus, the Western Balkans is exemplary in this respect. In this
context, a clear literature focus on the military dimension of CSDP, as
compared with ‘civilian’ EU missions, can be identified. Great importance has
been given to the issues of internal and external challenges. While the former
refers to issues such as EU internal coordination, the latter deals with EU
relations with other international security actors (Gourlay, 2006b). Both
dimensions also refer to ambitions and realities of a prospective
comprehensive EU approach (Barnet, 2010) to make peace missions more
viable by increasing cooperation and coordination. In fact, great emphasis is
given to the coordination of the different EU actors carrying out peace
missions. However, by focusing to a large extent on the EU internal decision-
making processes, the evaluation of missions as analysed in the literature
consulted often has an ‘administrative’ character.

In relation to shortfalls in EU evaluation, most flaws regarding the
implementation of CSDP missions depend on problems of EU internal and
external coordination (Blair, 2009; Gourlay et al., 2006; Gross, 2008; Kohl,
2006; Tardy, 2006). That of inter-pillar coordination has been recognised as
a major internal coordination challenge (Gourlay et al., 2006). The issue of
coherence among different EU agencies and between the (former) EU pillars
with its differing approaches – the community integration method of the first
pillar vs. the intergovernmental cooperation method of second and third
pillars – has proved to be one of the main challenges for the development of
comprehensive CSDP capabilities. With the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon,
relevant crisis management issues like coherence, coordination and
complementarity (‘3Cs’) have gained more importance, stressing several
neglected fields of research and evaluation to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of future missions.
In this context, several neglected fields of research were identified. First, the focus on the dynamics which are internal to the EU decision-making process has led to the neglect of *ex ante* (pre-mission) and *ex post* evaluation. In particular, *ex post* evaluation has been limited to the assessment of short-term outcomes of missions, coinciding with concerns over mandates’ fulfilment. Research on the long-term impacts of missions on local dynamics is largely lacking in the reviewed literature. In addition, the often massive economic impact of missions on local socio-economic structures – referring, for example, to the impacts of missions’ hiring policies, procurement or to local needs and perspectives – and their influence on the local security situation have been to a large extent neglected (Feichtinger et al., 2010; Tardy, 2006; Vircoulon, 2009; Weber, 2009), with some exceptions, such as Nyamaa and Munteanu (2008).

A second shortfall in evaluation is represented by the fact that, whereas the literature often lists the functions and principles of peace missions, it does not often spell out causal arguments about how peace support and conflict management by the military and other actors is supposed to work. In addition, not much systematic empirical analysis exists as to whether crisis management on the ground ‘works or not’ (Fortna, 2004). A third neglected issue in the literature reviewed as well as in operation plans of missions is that of gender issues and the underestimated relevance and capabilities of women in peace support and crisis management. This is also confirmed in the 2006 Report by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), stating that gender mainstreaming in CSDP missions is lagging behind international standards (Clément, 2009).

A fourth major shortfall is the underestimated potential of strategic communication as a mission multiplier (Helly, 2006; Ioannides, 2006; Muehlmann, 2008a), which is in general understudied both in its internal and external dimensions (Peters, 2010). This acknowledgement assumes that every mission’s action sends a message, which might promote a mission’s credibility, dialogue, mutual understanding, or responsiveness driven by leadership. With regard to the external dimension, there is a lack of communication directed towards the local population, generating a transparency problem along with low levels of trust in the EU missions (Górka-Winter, 2007). Moreover, a lack of internal communication in CSDP missions between the troop/staff contributing nations was identified (Peters, 2010). As the public within member states is generally poorly informed, communication constitutes a strategic factor for fostering the legitimacy of governmental external engagements (Battistelli, 2009; Isernia and Everts, 2003). The low visibility of CSDP missions’ impacts calls for improvements in the diffusion of information for both the media and the EU population (Muehlmann, 2008a).
A fifth issue that is rarely present in the literature is the dimension of logistics as a crucial factor for the success of missions. Exceptions include Major (2009b), who focuses on the logistics of EUFOR RD Congo, and Vlachos-Dengler (2007), who focuses on the strategic airlift capacities of the EU. A sixth topic under-represented in the literature are the perceptions of local actors and populations in the area of EU operations. This may add to the ‘cosmetic’ impact of CSDP missions on the ground left after the termination of EUFOR RD Congo (Haine and Giegerich, 2006).

There are various reasons for the shortfalls emerging from the evaluation efforts of CSDP missions. Perhaps the most important factor is the political interference of member states. The constant presence of member states in CSDP decision-making and implementation processes has direct effects on evaluation. In many cases, their presence impedes the development of an explicit evaluation programme within EU structures (D’Urso, 2008). As D’Urso argues, on the basis of a set of interviews with EU administrators, it would be difficult for a document criticising the strategy of a member state to be approved at Council/PSC level (2008). According to D’Urso, the politically-driven nature of CSDP missions, and the complex context in which the European actors play a part, impedes too formal and fixed evaluation procedures (such as a cost-benefit analysis). Moreover, the bureaucratic processes within the Secretariat, challenged by the increasing number of missions, make it difficult to develop an in-depth analysis of the quality of the results achieved (D’Urso, 2008).

Other relevant obstacles to the development of evaluation procedures result from the complexity of the administrative apparatus behind CSDP decision-making, the presence of numerous actors and the continuous decision-making structures and the processes’ changes (D’Urso, 2008; Simón, 2010). These factors make it very difficult to build a shared and consented methodology for evaluation.

It is also stressed that a systematic evaluation does not take place because of the lack of staff and/or their capacities for conducting evaluation (Helly, 2009). The absence of a systematic collection of data is also mentioned as a fundamental limitation by Korski (2009). Further obstacles to the evaluation of CSDP missions include a lack of in-country analysis, leading to poor evaluation results, the limited time for mission planning (Helly, 2009) and the fact that it is too early to assess the overall political costs, benefits and long-term impacts of specific CSDP missions (Bulut, 2009).

Despite the growing number of obstacles compromising the evaluation of a mission, it seems that the Council is willing to draw more attention to this issue. The inclusion of the evaluation of needs as one of NAVFOR’s
objectives (The Council of the European Union, 2008) could be seen as a move in this direction. Another indicator of the growing importance of systematic evaluation has been highlighted by Kurowska (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009: 205), who pointed out the inclusion of a benchmarking system geared towards a comprehensive evaluation of the mission in the operations plan of EUJUST Themis in Georgia. More complex research designs could be functional to the integration of methodologies, to a diversification of the evaluation focus and to a more in-depth and comparative analysis of the issues under observation. In order to make this possible, it is necessary to promote what has been lacking until now: a long-term perspective applied to evaluation research.
Concluding remarks: future avenues for research

This mapping exercise allowed for an extensive and intensive identification of references to European peace missions. The issues mapped provided a general overview of the main dynamics associated with European missions, both within the EU and in relation to other actors. This constitutes a solid basis to advance possible future research avenues, which include the changes which the Lisbon Treaty envisages. Some of the issues the Treaty raises are linked to decision-making and inter-institutional coordination as well as the EU’s relation with other actors, with clear potential impacts on ESDP/CSDP. The replacement of ‘European’ by ‘Common’ is such an example of how the new institutional dynamics concerning CSDP will reflect an effective change in decision-making processes.

Some avenues have already been the object of analysis as reflected in this mapping exercise, such as the relation of the EU with other international organisations. Nevertheless, the relevance of this issue demands more in-depth research focusing on the conceptualisation and different possible scenarios for these relations. A more systematic research into the EU’s partnerships with other international organisations is needed, looking at burden-sharing, avoiding task duplication, improving coordination procedures, among other things. These aspects have been undertheorised, contributing to a limited understanding of those dynamics. The possibility of
expanding cooperation on a regular basis to other international organisations, such as the OSCE or the AU, require a strategic reflection to better understand the EU’s dealings and role, present and future, in the promotion of international peace and security.

Additionally, another issue already addressed in the reviewed literature is evaluation. It requires, nevertheless, a different focus of analysis and a more sound methodological approach. Beyond evaluating missions for the sake of the EU’s internal dynamics it is crucial to evaluate the mandates’ broader objectives on the ground. For this purpose, two methodological aspects are crucial: a common and adequate definition of evaluation criteria and a systematic comparative effort in the study of European peace missions. Associated with these different lanes in this broader research avenue is the issue of exit strategies. These are crucial for any serious assessment of peace interventions and are closely related to the results of evaluation and the impacts on local dynamics.

The local dimension of European peace missions has not been fully investigated. There are, at least, two dimensions worth pursuing. On the one hand, concerning organisational matters on the ground, it is crucial to include the perspective of missions’ staff in the implementation dynamics of each mission, since the interaction of the missions’ staff with the local population has the potential to influence the outcome of the actual mission. On the other hand, regarding the impact these missions have on local dynamics, including institutions, leadership and civil society, the study of the perceptions and reactions of local actors is essential to a better understanding of the missions’ impact in the field. This type of impact requires an understanding of the difference between short-term and long-term analyses, which have not been properly addressed in the literature.

Furthermore, in the literature reviewed gender concerns have been mainly neglected, not following the literature trend concerning military and gender issues. In fact, gender and armed forces constitutes a topic that has been the focus of attention in several studies. This has not been the case with regard to EU peace missions. Therefore, this seems to be yet another worthwhile research avenue.

The identification of these lines of research results from the mapping exercise conducted and reflects the combination of the team’s expertise and backgrounds. This paper contributes with a systematic analysis of the reviewed literature on European peace missions, presenting a consolidated framework for research and suggesting further possible lines of investigation. It constitutes, in this way, a useful reference tool for research on EU peace missions.
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COST – the acronym for European Cooperation in Science and Technology – is the oldest and widest European intergovernmental network for cooperation in research. Established by the Ministerial Conference in November 1971, COST is presently used by the scientific communities of 36 European countries to cooperate in common research projects supported by national funds.

The funds provided by COST – less than 1% of the total value of the projects - support the COST cooperation networks (COST Actions) through which, with EUR 30 million per year, more than 30,000 European scientists are involved in research having a total value which exceeds EUR 2 billion per year. This is the financial worth of the European added value which COST achieves.

A ‘bottom up approach’ (the initiative of launching a COST Action comes from the European scientists themselves), ‘à la carte participation’ (only countries interested in the Action participate), ‘equality of access’ (participation is open also to the scientific communities of countries not belonging to the European Union) and ‘flexible structure’ (easy implementation and light management of the research initiatives) are the main characteristics of COST.

As precursor of advanced multidisciplinary research COST has a very important role for the realisation of the European Research Area (ERA) anticipating and complementing the activities of the Framework Programmes, constituting a ‘bridge’ towards the scientific communities of emerging countries, increasing the mobility of researchers across Europe and fostering the establishment of ‘Networks of Excellence’ in many key scientific domains such as: Biomedicine and Molecular Biosciences; Food and Agriculture; Forests, their Products and Services; Materials, Physical and Nanosciences; Chemistry and Molecular Sciences and Technologies; Earth System Science and Environmental Management; Information and Communication Technologies; Transport and Urban Development; Individuals, Societies, Cultures and Health. It covers basic and more applied research and also addresses issues of pre-normative nature or of societal importance.