Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation

Hammond, David and Beullens, Patrick (2007) Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under legislation European Journal of Operational Research, 183, (2), pp. 895-908. (doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.033).


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This paper expands previous work dealing with oligopolistic supply chains to the field of closed-loop supply chains. The model presented has been formulated with the intent of examining issues surrounding the recent European Union directive regarding waste of electric and electronic equipment (WEEE). The network modelled consists of manufacturers and consumer markets engaged in a Cournot pricing game with perfect information. Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium occurs when all players agree on volumes shipped and prices charged. Certain properties of the model are examined analytically. Numeric examples are included and have been solved using an extragradient method with constant step size. The equilibrium solution obtained provide interesting insights that lead into a number of areas for future research.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.033
ISSNs: 0377-2217 (print)
Related URLs:
Organisations: Operational Research
ePrint ID: 205837
Date :
Date Event
2 December 2007Published
Date Deposited: 14 Dec 2011 10:17
Last Modified: 18 Apr 2017 01:04
Further Information:Google Scholar

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