
By

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES
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By Aamer Taj

The chaotic political history of Pakistan is riddled with frequent changes in government that includes three major military regimes. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s civil-military bureaucracy has been at the forefront in administering most of the state’s institutions. Decentralisation of political and administrative authority is reckoned as one of the most effective political strategies for dealing with the predominant ethnic identity problems as well as issues related to the over-centralised administration. In Pakistan, various programmes of decentralisation have been implemented by authoritarian regimes. Concealed under the façade of democratising local governance, the core objective of those military regimes was the quest for securing a local collaborative political base. In such context, the local governments’ functional autonomy and political influence has largely been nominal.

With a particular focus on the local government reforms implemented in year 2001, this thesis investigates a range of political and administrative issues in Pakistan’s local governance. The study elaborates Pakistan’s post-independence political history to explain why the process of democratisation in general and decentralisation in particular has not been successful. Besides, international political economy perspectives are also evaluated in order to identify the hurdles that have obstructed the process of institution-building in Pakistan. In order to examine the factors that affect the inter-institutional and inter-governmental working relationships, the study is divided into two main analytical spheres. First, the organisational character and behaviour of civil bureaucracy is evaluated as one of the main reasons affecting the performance of local governments. Secondly, the thesis investigates the extent to which political clientelism is ingrained in the local political organisation of Pakistan. More specifically, it probes to find out how the nature of citizen-politician relationships, voting behaviour, and electoral mechanisms explain the failure of local government reforms.
For my whole beloved family
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Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorships

I, Aamer Taj, declare that this thesis entitled ‘Inter-Institutional Relationships, Clientelism, and Determinants of Voting Behaviour: A Case Study of Local Government Reforms (2001-2009) in Pakistan’ and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what have I contributed myself;
- Parts of this work has been published as


Signed: ……………………………………………………………………

Date: ……………………………………………………………………
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<td>AC</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Assistant Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>ACR</td>
<td>Annual Confidential Report</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Annual Development Plan</td>
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<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>Appointment, Promotion &amp; Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Building Control Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Basic Democracy</td>
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<td>BDO</td>
<td>Basic Democracy Order</td>
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<td>BDC</td>
<td>Budget and Development Committee</td>
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<td>BHU</td>
<td>Basic Health Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>C &amp; W</td>
<td>Communication and Works (Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDMD</td>
<td>City Development and Municipal Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI (M)</td>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist)</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAS</td>
<td>Chief of Army Staff</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Civil Services of Pakistan</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>District Coordination Officer</td>
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<td>DDC</td>
<td>District Development Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>District Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>District Police Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDO</td>
<td>Executive District Officer</td>
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<td>ERRA</td>
<td>Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Political Party in Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGO</td>
<td>Local Government Ordinance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Leftist Democratic Front</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (Political parties’ colition in Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of National Assembly (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member of Provincial Assembly (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly (India)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NHA</td>
<td>National Highway Authority</td>
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<td>NRB</td>
<td>National Reconstruction Bureau</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCHD</td>
<td>National Commission for Human Development</td>
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<td>NRSP</td>
<td>National Rural Support Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>No Objection Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Provisional Constitutional Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Provincial Civil Service</td>
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<td>P&amp;D</td>
<td>Planning and Development (Department)</td>
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<td>PFC</td>
<td>Provincial Finance Commission</td>
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<td>MPL (Q)</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Group)</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>People’s Plan Campaign</td>
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<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<td>Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Scheduled Caste</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Scheduled Tribe</td>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>Town/Tehsil Officer</td>
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<td>TMO</td>
<td>Tehsil/Town Municipal Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>UC</td>
<td>Union Council</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>WAPDA</td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Section 1
Introduction and Background
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the Study
This study is about decentralisation as a process and the prospects for developing effective local government in post-colonial societies. In the developing countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, highly centralised planning and execution of public policies were dominant practices in order to run the affairs of government until 1950s. In his investigation of the decentralisation reforms in Asia, Mathur (1983) noticed that after the Second World War, the Soviet Union styled centralised planning was generally accepted and prevalent in the countries that had recently emerged from the colonial rule. With the culmination of cold war, the concepts of decentralised forms of government evolved gradually which upholds, among many other principles, the grass-root level participation of citizens in local political affairs thereby directing the stream of political power from bottom to the top rather than the other way round. ‘Decentralisation involves the delegation of powers to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large scale organisation’ (Smith, 1985:1). Decentralisation of government thus involves the creation of smaller territorial establishments of political and administrative institutions of the state.

The rationale for pursuing decentralisation reforms includes laudable objectives like self-government, improved articulation of local political interests, citizen-state proximity, and therefore better accessibility of citizens to their respective local governments. ‘The closer a government is to its citizens, polls show, the more they trust it. The closer it is, the more accountable its officials tend to be and the more likely they are to handcraft solutions rather than create one-size fits-all programs’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992:277). There is a wide agreement on the idea that public policy can be best devised and implemented where the effective political participation by all stakeholder groups of the society is ensured. Decentralisation reforms are reckoned as the foremost solution to the problems of highly centralised and bureaucratic civil administration systems. Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) believe that decentralisation reforms are essential for flexible, innovative and creative administration, political stability and national unity as local governments can
overcome the limitations of central control. According to them, decentralisation helps in several ways for instance, decentralised governments tailor development plans in accordance with the local needs of heterogeneous social groups; reduce red tape; are more sensitive and responsive to the local problems; facilitate close contact between public officials and citizens; enhance citizens’ information; improve political, religious, ethnic, and tribal representation; institutionalise political participation; and finally, neutralise the capture of public goods and services by the locally established elites. In addition, decentralisation reforms are positively associated with economic efficiency, reduced public spending and improved public services, better human resource management, enhanced public accountability, political liberty, equality in service provision, and improved social welfare (Smith, 1985).

Decentralisation is also reckoned to have a pro-poor impact as it is argued that decentralisation reforms help develop the economic and political status of the marginalised groups in a society by improving citizens’ access to the public provisions. Given that large public sectors are hard to administer by the central government, exquisite structuring and effective execution of decentralisation reforms help reduce the burden of administrative responsibilities of the central government. Local governments not only involve citizens in self-governance but also help in enhancing the political and administrative decision-making skills of the locally elected representatives. Other potential payoffs of democratic decentralisation process include the consolidation of civil and political society by proffering political and civic education and political stability. In the contemporary era, effective decentralisation reforms have thus become an extremely essential element of public management systems around the world. According to Manor (1999), decentralisation reforms strengthen the local governments as a bridge between the state and civil society. The proponents of decentralisation strategies advocate the usefulness of localisation policies in the development of an effective and efficient system of local governance. However, as is the case with any other governance model, there are associated pitfalls in decentralisation policies especially when delved deep in the cases of developing countries.

Due to the higher degrees of predominant social and ethnic heterogeneities, the independence of most of the South Asian countries brought with it the problems of
national and territorial integration in the post-independence era. One response to this problem was seen as states’ increasing tendencies towards further centralisation of the affairs of government and hesitation to allow political and administrative autonomy to the peripheral regions (Mathur, 1983). The highly centralised and distant state structures were left as legacies by the colonial administrations and such state hierarchies are still entrenched ubiquitously in almost all post-colonial states. However, after the culmination of cold war - in response to the pressures from international community, global monetary regulatory organisations, and domestic uprisings - many regimes in the developing world are now being compelled directly or indirectly for allowing political autonomy to regions in one form or the other.

It is nonetheless important to note that the associations between democratisation and decentralisation have often been misconstrued as straightforward. Political decentralisation does not necessarily lead to democracy (Smith, 1985) which means that although political decentralisation is a necessary element in the process of democratisation, it is certainly not a sufficient condition. It is primarily the element of unconstrained political participation that serves as a stepping stone towards the development of a democratic polity. At the local level, democratic practices lead to the development of individuals, facilitation of accountability, civil liberty and defence against arbitrary power (Ylvisaker, 1959) but in many cases, democracy at national level precedes democracy a local level (Sharpe, 1981) suggesting that a democratic polity at centre may be well be reckoned as a foremost pre-requisite for the local governments to function and deliver effectively. Smith (1988) argues that public participation is seen as beneficial in terms of political mobilisation and activism, awareness of local priorities, government’s sensitivity to local interests, raised political consciousness of dependant groups, better communication between bureaucracy and citizens, and improved accessibility of citizens to public officials. On the other hand, however, political participation often appears to be not more than a tokenistic approach when it incorporates illegitimate practices into safe channels and legitimise the existing illegitimate structures of arbitrary political power.

The mere transfer of power from central to the local government cannot guarantee benevolent political participation. For instance, in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Kenya, the local government elites were actually facilitated by the central government in order to
create and sustain a power base in countryside and to prevent opposition forces from forming political alliances (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Such underlying political motivations behind allowing some political and administrative autonomy in order to establish a local collaborative political base may prove to be useful for the retention of national integration in the short-term but on the other hand, it certainly does not serve the higher objectives of decentralisation. Indeed the central governments use their coercive powers and state institutions to contain other social and political groups, which in turn reinforces the central command that undermines the grass-root political participation.

Litvack et al. (1998) note that the functional capacity of local governments is determined by the extent to which political institutions accommodate the multiplicity of citizen interests in policy decisions. To have an impact on policy, the political and social interests of the groups in society must be mobilised, organised and articulated through institutions that carry their interests to the state (Berger, 1983). Unless the state is fully committed to devolve political powers to the local level, it is not reasonable to expect that those local establishments will deliver effectively. It is quite evident that decentralisation reforms are always politically motivated, positively or otherwise. Arguing about whether to decentralise the government or not is largely irrelevant; the way decentralisation reforms are implemented determines how successful they are (The World Bank, 1999). Since various levels of government are stakeholders in quest for political powers and administrative authority, the power structures of various institutions of the state are critically important in understanding the political motivations behind any public policy and strategy. In an ideal scenario, Heymans et al. (2004) propose that at the outset, government should have a firm conception of its ultimate decentralisation aims. It should then focus initially on those functions and services for which success is more likely. This includes tasks, which do not threaten the central power base, and at the same time do not overwhelm the local capacity. Decentralisation does not entail central government stepping back from a role in service delivery, rather it entails defining a new supportive, enabling and monitoring role for which new skills are required (Tendler, 1997).

As per the theory of decentralisation, a decentralised government is endowed with two major functions: to serve the democratic objectives of participation, (civic) education,
discussion and consent; and to provide services under such political direction in an efficient manner (Wilson, 1948). Nevertheless, combinations of a wide range of complexities hinder the process of institutionalising a balance of power among levels of government and other state institutions. For instance, issues in local public finance, staffing, revenue collection, information availability, shortages of trained and qualified personnel, difficulties in inter-governmental relationships and lack of managerial and professional capability amalgamate to minimise the effectiveness of local governance institutions (Rondinelli and Mandell, 1981; Reilly, 1981). Besides that, haphazard decentralisation reforms – or what Manuguid (2004:3, cited in Brillantes, 2004) refers to as ‘half baked decentralisation’ results in wastage of resources, further fragmentation of the civil society, regional inequities, economies of scale losses and domination by the local elites (Heymans et al., 2004). All major types of reforms in the administrative and political organisation of a state thus need to thoroughly take into account the ground realities of issues that are to be addressed with reforms; in this way the reforms are likely to be effective in the long-run otherwise, the misjudgement of problems and/or imprudent practice of the theory will naturally jeopardise the outcomes of reforms.

1.2 Background and Significance of the Case Study

The core objective of this research study is to explore and explain the factors that have been actively obstructing the possibilities of democratisation process at the local levels of government in the post-independence Pakistan. An attempt is made to delve deep into the identification and explanations of underlying factors that have had an enormous impact in undermining the process of effective democratisation not only at the state level but also in the affairs of local governance. The political history of Pakistan after the independence and other associated contextual factors highly differentiate her contemporary political organisation from other comparable countries in South Asia. For instance, India and Pakistan emerged as independent states from the colonial rule on the same day and both states inherited the almost similar administrative setups from the British rule nonetheless, the subsequent development of democratic credentials and the establishment of local governments as a regular third tier of government in India unequivocally distinguishes her case from that of Pakistan’s. The investigation of key factors of this study thus begins with the
narration of Pakistan’s political history that shows that the country has been frequently oscillating between the status of a complete authoritarian state and a competitive authoritarian state. Authoritarianism in Pakistan is not only explained by the political history of the state’s independence in 1947 but also in the context of post-independence geo-strategic and international political circumstances.

The tragic history of Pakistan reveals that the country’s independence incited the embedded regional and local identity problems and therefore her national unity and territorial integration was at stake from the beginning. The case study of decentralisation in Pakistan is critically significant as it argued that a comprehensive and effective strategy for the delegation of political and administrative authority to the regional levels of the state could have proved to be a long-term solution to centrifugal forces that threatened the national unity and territorial integration of the state. The case study of decentralisation in Pakistan is also significant because the state can potentially address the diversified issues associated with social services delivery in a society that is geographically scattered and fragmented across social, political and economical divisions. Considering the extreme levels of complexities involved in the assessment of underlying causes, the approach adopted in this study takes into account the exogenous factors like international political economy perspectives and endogenous factors like post-independence political history, inter-institutional relationships and the dynamics of citizen-politician civic relationships. The case study attempts to address a rather complex question: why despite several attempts of decentralisation reforms, local government system could not be effectively established in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s six decades of chaotic history has seen frequent changes in government including three major military regimes. The politically centralising factors have led Pakistan to become a security state where the apex twin institution i.e. the civil-military bureaucracy takes the lead in running the government and state’s affairs at all levels (Talbot, 2005; Jalal, 1995; Ali, 2008; Synnott, 2009). In such a context, the process of democratisation has remained precarious at large. During the three major authoritarian regimes, the military created a new class of competing, collaborative local politicians (Jalal, 1995) and local governments have invariably been used to secure the reins of political and administrative power in centre, provinces and regional
levels. Pakistan continued to function as an extension of colonial viceregal state where the military has encouraged authoritarianism in an environment of political opportunism and weak institutionalisation (Talbot, 2005). Put simply, the domination by the executive over the democratically elected institutions has been the order of the day. The civil administration and public sector organisations under the central command of military establishments have generally failed to meet the social services demands from a growing population that is socially heterogeneous and economically polarised.

Localisation of government is an effective strategy for overcoming the entrenched ethnic identity issues and over-centralised administration. However, in case of Pakistan, all programmes for decentralisation were initiated and thoroughly controlled by authoritarian regimes. Civil-military bureaucracy’s dominance in political power and administrative authority was catalytic in confining the elected governments not only at the federal and provincial level but also in diminishing the local government’s spheres of functions and influence. Although, the entrenchment of the dominant civil bureaucracy has proved to be a constant obstruction to the establishment of local governments as an institution of local governance, the sporadic experiments of local government reforms also resulted in another predicament i.e. the inter-governmental tensions. The local governments’ sharing of stakes with the provincial governments has eventually led to a situation where the local governments are viewed as political rivals in patronage delivery and power spoils.

It is therefore not surprising that in a weak political organisation of Pakistan, the value of citizens’ votes is highly affected by the nature of institutional power structure. In addition, emancipation of voter from socio-political, cultural and economic constraints is an essential question that needs to be addressed while assessing the local democracy in terms of her meaningfulness. The electoral competition in local governance of Pakistan is dependant on the developmental needs of voters and hence an election-winning formula requires wealthy candidates that have the ability to deliver patronage (Wilder, 1999). Therefore, the absence of issue-based politics and the use of elections as a source of seeking legitimacy by political elites (Waseem, 2006) have been the core features of Pakistani politics where the diminishing credibility of politicians compels them to prefer narrowly targeted public policies to
secure their incumbency in election (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). Such narrowly focused targeting of public goods and services under the clientelistic obligations exclude the socially underprivileged groups who find it hard to collectivise and organise into entities that would enable them to articulate their interests via effective political channels. On the other hand, the lack of power to offer social and economic protection to the citizens and opportunity costs of engaging in organisational activism impair the emergence of capable, fresh and non-elite candidates in local political arenas (Cheema & Mohmand, 2008). The preliminary literature review indicates a multitude of interrelated and complex issues in the local governance of Pakistan. Although several empirical studies have been conducted over the last decade that explore some of these major issues, research lacunae are still evident in this regard. This study attempts to elaborate the local governance complexities which have either been superficially addressed or not explored at all.

1.3 Research Questions

This research study investigates how the outcomes of devolution reforms were affected by the inter-institutional and inter-governmental working relationships in the case of Pakistan. In order to address the main question of this study, a holistic and context-specific approach is adopted that examines not only the historical perspectives but also investigates the contemporary social phenomena. Based on the preliminary literature review of theory and empirical studies, the following set of questions has been formulated which will collectively address the main question of the study.

1. How did the history of authoritarianism in the post-independence Pakistan affect the process and prospects of democratisation and undermined the possibilities of institutionalisation of local government reforms?

2. How did the dynamics of international political economy relations influence the process of democratisation, institution building and national governance structures in Pakistan?

3. How has the organisational character and behaviour of civil bureaucracy in post-independence Pakistan affected the performance of local governments?
4. To what extent is political clientelism embedded in the local political organisation of Pakistan and how much do the nature of citizen-politician relationships, voting behaviour, and electoral mechanisms explain the failure of local governments’ reforms?

The methodological course and design of any research study is inevitably shaped up by the type of research questions. Considering the nature of the above-mentioned questions, an apt methodology i.e. a qualitative case study approach is adopted which will facilitate an in-depth exploration and explanation of the interrelated and complex themes in this study.

1.4 Research Methodology and Design

Developing a case study is one of the strategies for conducting qualitative research. One of the most prominent features of this strategy is that it is theory-laden and that is why a case study research can be clearly distinguished from other similar strategies like the grounded theory. In addition to the primary empirical evidence, a comprehensive and relevant theoretical framework based, at times, on normative discourse is one of the important elements of a case study. Baubock (2008) explains that in normative theory, prescriptive or evaluative statements are treated as sets of propositions that must be internally consistent and must be defended against opposing views, rather than subjective opinions whose validity cannot be established through arguments. Normative discourse is unavoidable in studying social phenomena as Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006) argue that empirical study in social sciences is meaningless if it is not based on clearly stated normative framework. It is nonetheless important to note that normative discourse always remains contestable when it comes to explaining social behaviour. A qualitative case study evaluates a particular case within the parameters delineated in the analytical framework that is based on normative and explanatory arguments. The above-mentioned research questions facilitated the formulation of analytical framework, which is used as a scale in order to assess the empirical data; the framework is therefore confined to the themes that are relevant to the social phenomena in question. For the analysis of two major thematic spheres in this study (inter-institutional relationships and the dynamics of voter-
politician relationships in the context of political clientelism), the broader theoretical framework in this research study is based on new institutionalism.

1.4.1 The Institutionalist Approach

Public choice theorists focus on individual as a unit of analysis and assume that an individual’s behaviour is driven by their self-interest. This assumption is indicative of public choice proposition that individuals’ self-interest and utility maximising objectives are phenomena that do not vary in different geographical boundaries and institutional circumstances (Peters, 1998). This notion claims (like scholars in natural sciences do) a law-like generalisation of social behaviour that does not take into account the significant differences among the political and social aggregates. In response to the public choice theorists, new institutionalism prescribes a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of social behaviour. Comparing the new institutionalism with old institutionalism, Lowndes (2010) argues that in order to explain social and political behaviour, new institutionalism changed the focus from organisation to rules; from formal to informal conceptions of institutions; from static to dynamic conception of institutions; from holistic to differentiated conception of institutions; and from independence to embeddedness of institutions which means that political institutions are no more considered as entities existing out of time and space.

According to the new institutionalists, political institutions are no longer equated with political organisations rather they are ‘stable recurring patterns of behaviour’ (Goodin, 1996: 22) for example North (1990) reckons traditions, customs, culture, and habits as informal institutions that are equally significant in shaping up the political and social behaviour. Put simply, the new institutionalists not only examine the impact of organisational structure on individuals’ behaviour (old institutionalism) but also incorporate the self-interest, social values, power structures and relationships between individuals and social aggregates as explanatory factors of social behaviour. ‘Political scientists no longer think in ‘either/or’ terms of agency or structure, interests or institutions as driving forces: now virtually all serious students of the discipline would say it is a matter of judicious blend of both …. It is a matter of analysing behaviour within the parameters set by institutional facts and opportunity structures’ (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996:10-11).
Keeping in view the complexities of Pakistan’s political organisation and its embedded structures, an institutionalist approach is espoused in this study because it takes into account the public choice dimension (individual and groups’ pursuit of self-interest) as well as the structural factors that influence the social and political behaviour. Another strength of new institutionalism lies in its multi-theoretical character (Lowndes, 2010), which helps in building a comprehensive analytical framework from the normative discourse. For the assessment of empirical evidence gathered for this study, a theoretical framework is built on competing propositions that are drawn from various micro-level theories. Since the core focus of this study is on the analysis of political institutions, it is essential to understand the behaviour of political aggregates. New institutionalist do not dichotomise agency and structure as political behaviour’s driving factors rather they reckon that institutions are political entities. ‘The bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, the appellate court are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own right’ (March and Olsen, 1984: 738).

New institutionalism is a macro theoretical approach that encompasses a range of theoretical perspectives. Historical institutionalism is one of the approaches that comes under the broader umbrella of new institutionalism. Steinmo (2008) explains that historical institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor a method; it is an approach to studying politics and social change that posits that human beings are norm-abiding followers (formal and informal structures influence behaviour) and self-interested rational actors simultaneously. Historical institutionalist approach undertaken in this study will be useful in explaining 1) how Pakistan’s civil-military bureaucracy became deeply embedded institutions, 2) how public institutions behave as political aggregates and 3) how voter groups’ rationality and extra-rational values amalgamate to determine their voting behaviour.

1.4.2 Qualitative Methodology
Most of the research questions that are going to be addressed in this study are ‘how’ questions. This indicates that the historical context, events, processes, and causal mechanisms are critical for explaining the phenomena under investigation. Vromen (2010) argues that when we seek to understand why or how a political institution,
event, or process came about, we are necessarily asking questions that can be answered with the help of qualitative methods; the focus of qualitative methodology is on detailed explanations that are often based on historical context and include personal reflections from participants in political institutions, events, and processes, often referred to as thick description. Generally, the research methods (ways of acquiring data) used in qualitative methodology are unstructured or semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, textual/documentary analysis, and content analysis. Techniques and methods for data collection are usually combined which is often referred to as triangulation. In addition to the triangulation of competing micro level theories for developing the analytical framework, this study also triangulates the methods and sources for primary and secondary data collection i.e. interviews and documentary analysis respectively. The multiple sources of secondary evidence used in this study are textbooks, journal articles, organisation reports, constitutions, and government planning documents. For primary evidence, interviews are conducted which are guided conversations rather than structured queries (Yin, 2009).

della Porta and Keating (2008) note that qualitative researchers’ methodological approach is holistic in a sense that it reckons the cases (individuals, communities or social aggregates) as complex entities while simultaneously emphasising on the importance of their context. However, the assumption of mutual influence among many factors within the cases does not provide a logical ground for claiming the generalisability of the findings in qualitative research. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) argue that qualitative methods seek to explain the outcomes in individual cases and these methods help explain how and why an event in a particular place, at a particular time occurred. They call it as ‘causes of effect’ form of explanation in contrast with ‘effects of the causes’ approach adopted by the quantitative methodologists. Similarly, Bennett and Elman (2006) explain that mainstream qualitative methodologists do not look for the net effect of a cause over a large number of cases, but rather how causes interact in the context of a particular case(s) to produce an outcome. This research study adopts qualitative methodology because it attempts to explore and explain the interrelated factors having mutual influence as causes of an outcome – the failure of local governance reforms. Qualitative methodology is the most suitable option for the analysis in this study because the aim of this study is to explore the causal mechanisms with a stress on the particularity rather than causal effects or broader
generalisation. Gerring (2004) and Vromen (2010) note that research designs invariably face a trade-off between knowing more about less (depth in qualitative analysis) and knowing less about more (breadth in quantitative analysis). The peculiar nature of the research questions in this study can therefore be more appropriately handled with qualitative analysis as one of the major strengths of qualitative methodology is its capacity to delve deep into the complex social phenomena that are interrelated and mutually influencing.

1.4.3 Case Study and Process Tracing as Research Strategy
Process tracing is a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependant variable of a particular case in a particular historical context (George and Bennett, 2005) and is therefore it is an important and indispensable element of the case study research. The strength of process tracing as described by Vennesson (2008) is to help the researcher to flesh out causal mechanisms. However, it is important to note that the causal mechanisms inferred by qualitative methodologists from a process tracing strategy should not be confused with the causal effects typically inferred by the quantitative methodologists (George and Bennett, 2005). This research solely adopts qualitative methodology and therefore it focuses on the explanation of causal mechanisms. Yin’s (2009) elaborate compendium describes case study as a research strategy that usually deals with many variables of interests. According to Yin (2009), a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The role of theory is of critical nature in a case study; this strategy benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions that guide the data collection process and analysis (ibid).

The extent of generalisability, quality and validity of case study research depends mainly on how the case or unit of analysis is defined. The unit of analysis, according to Yin (2009) is the case which can be an event or entity, decisions, programmes, processes, and organisational change. To Yin, the unit of analysis and case are the same which needs to be in line with the initial research questions. He also points out that the case study is time bound i.e. there is a beginning and end of a case in terms of timeframe. Keeping in view that the case study helps investigates complex and
interrelated social phenomena, the parameters pertaining to the phenomena under investigation i.e. the spatial, geographical, institutional and time period boundaries need to be delineated. There is no specific rule of thumb to define these parameters however it is always essential to demarcate and define them in terms of the specific context in which the case study is being designed and conducted. The core phenomenon under investigation in this study is the complexity of inter-institutional relationships in the context of local government reforms in Pakistan. This broader phenomenon is subdivided into the several questions /themes / sub-phenomena that will collectively address the major research question. The main unit of analysis is the local governance structure of Pakistan whereas the embedded units (or sub-units) of analysis are the two major institutions of local governance i.e. the civil bureaucracy and local government.

Contrary to Yin’s argument, who sees no difference between the unit of analysis and case, VanWynsberghe and Khan (2007) opine that the unit of analysis is distinguishable from the case(s) itself because the unit of analysis is defined by 1) providing detailed descriptions obtained from immersion in the context of the case, 2) bounding the case temporally and spatially, and 3) frequent engagement between the case itself and the unit of analysis. Considering their new conceptualisation, the case for this research study refers to the geographical confines of the NWFP province of Pakistan (North West Frontier Province, officially renamed as ‘Khyber Pukhtunkhwa’ in year 2010). The sub-cases are the four districts selected from within the main case i.e. NWFP province and the units of data collection are the appointed and elected public officials from the two institutions – civil bureaucracy and local governments respectively. The timeframe covered in the study are the two terms served by the local governments (year 2001-2005 and 2005-2009). Thus the design of this study is clearly demarcated in terms of the phenomena for investigation, the institutional boundaries defined as subunits of analysis, spatial boundaries defined in terms of geographical location, the time frame for investigation and finally the units of data collection that are the public officials from the two institutions.

1.4.4 Validity of Research
Depending on the many approaches adopted in a case study, there are several ways to test the quality and validity of findings generated from the research. The following are
some of the guidelines provided by Yin (2009) for evaluating the validity of qualitative research findings. One of the ways in which, construct validity can be established is to identify the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied e.g. the use multiple sources of evidence and establishing a chain of evidence. With the triangulation of data sources, the problems of construct validity can be addressed because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the assessment of the same phenomenon. For internal validity of the case findings (claimed in explanatory or causal case studies only), pattern matching and explanation building techniques are deployed. This study uses both – pattern matching and explanation building procedures for establishing the internal validity. In pattern matching, Yin (2009) suggests two techniques for comparing empirically based patterns with the predicted one(s): comparing the expected outcomes as patterns (comparing if the initially predicted results have been found and alternative patterns are missing) and comparing rival explanations as patterns (whether some of the theoretically prominent explanatory factors are evident in the empirical findings). For explanation building, the role of theory is essential because theoretically significant propositions add validity to the empirical findings.

This is a single case study with multiple units of analysis and sub-cases under investigation. Based on the criteria set for testing the quality of research findings, this study tests the findings for construct validity and internal validity. Almost all the requirements for establishing construct validity are met in the research process therefore construct validity is confidently claimed in this study. The grounds for claiming internal and external validity are stronger in the study of multiple cases whereas this study primarily focuses on sub-cases within a single case. In order to overcome this limitation, the study is concluded with cross-case comparative analysis. For corroboration of the study’s findings, not only the outcomes of the sub-cases are compared with each other but the broader lessons learnt from the case study of NWFP province are also reviewed in comparison with those of other contextually similar cases from developing countries in general and Kerala (India) in particular. However, since ceteris is not always paribus, the study’s empirical generalisability is only claimed for Pakistan. Cross-case comparison (within case) and comparative review is only aimed at enhancing the construct and internal validity. The main contribution of this study to the body of knowledge is thus primarily going to be of empirical nature.
With the explanation of empirical evidence, it is also anticipated that some of the concepts in micro-level theories will be refined.

1.4.5 Scope of the Study

This research study categorically attempts to assess the performance of the local governments in two terms i.e. between 2001 - 2005 and 2005 – 2009. The local governments established under the ‘Devolution of Power’ plan (2000) by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf were eventually abolished in December 2009. After winning the general elections, PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) formed a federal government in March 2008 and the local government representatives that were elected in the second term (2005) continued to serve until December 2009. The local governments were functional for around 22 months under the democratically elected federal government of PPP. However, since the devolution reforms were not enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan by the military regime, local elections for the third term were not held and thus the third tier of government was completely brought an end in December 2009.

The study is primarily based on empirical evidence (qualitative data) from four districts i.e. Peshawar, Swabi, Abbottabad and Mansehra of NWFP province of Pakistan with specific reference to the local government reforms. The rationale for selection of the province and the districts within the province is based on contextual reasons. The province’s political history (elaborated in Chapter 2) is peculiar as compared with the rest of the provinces of Pakistan. Historically, this region was a part of Afghanistan until 1893 and that is what makes the study of political and social organisation of this region relatively different from the rest of provinces in Pakistan. Any research that probes into the social and political phenomena needs an extensive literature review however in addition to that, the awareness of local culture, social norms and language provides a great deal of advantage to the researcher. Being a native, the author of this thesis had the advantage of examining the factors under investigation in a more comprehensive and discerning manner. In addition, having been born and lived the province, the author had a relatively easy access to the local communities and interviewees.
Some of the factors/themes involved in the study are of sensitive nature. It is usually difficult to discuss such issues with interviewees if the researcher is an outsider. The author is well-versed with the social and political milieu, which is a great advantage for any researcher to capitalise on. Personal contacts with officials in most of the districts were also a major help to the author. Finally, the researcher is highly proficient in most of the languages spoken in the province. The understanding of culture and fluency of the languages are valuable attributes because they not only help in transcribing and translating the interviews conducted in the local language but it also helps in formulation of the easily understood interview questions. Besides, the cognizance of social and linguistic intricacies enabled the author to be considerate towards the social norms and practices and concentrating on the investigation of major issues at the same time. The use of personal contacts and then building on snowballing techniques for getting access to the interviewees was also easier and advantageous for the author in NWFP province. Finally, since the traditional feudalism is relatively less ingrained in the regional political organisation of the NWFP province, it is anticipated that the impact assessment of decentralisation reforms would yield different outcomes. Considering the abovementioned arguments, NWFP province was selected for this case study.

The next crucial step in the process was to select the districts and their rural administrative peripheries to be included in the sample. Four districts, their respective towns and union councils from rural and urban areas within the province were deliberately selected for the study in order to grasp the impact of variations in terms of social diversity, multi-ethnicity, economic development indicators, political organisation and orientation, geography and other demographic features. Since the prime objective of the study was to assess the impact of local government reforms in the diverse localities, socio-political and economic diversity of the regions within the province was sought as a benchmark so that a more representative sample could be selected that would unveil not only the similarities but also the differences in the outcomes of reforms.

Keeping in view that several factors (such as the political history, the composition of ethnic diversity, linguistic divisions, economic development, political parties’ presence, inter-party competition, region-central administrative and political
relationships) shape up the dynamics of local and regional political organisation, diverse districts were selected so that the inter-district comparative analysis could spell out the outcomes of reforms in more elaborate manner. Peshawar is the provincial capital and the largest city of the province. The geographical location of Peshawar makes it a gateway into South Asia from Pakistan’s western border. During the soviet-afghan war, a huge number of Afghan refugees came over to Peshawar and have since settled there. Apart from that, within Peshawar, there is a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups for instance, Pushto speaking Pushtuns and Hindko speaking old city dwellers. Since Peshawar is the provincial capital, its level of economic development and social infrastructure is much greater than the other cities of the province. All mainstream political parties have a fair degree of representation and interest in Peshawar, including the ones based on religious ideologies.

District Swabi, on the other hand, is much different from Peshawar in terms of its demographic architecture. The major ethnic group living in this part of the province is Yusufzai tribe of Pushtuns. They speak a similar dialect of Pushto language and therefore the ethno-linguistic diversity is minimal throughout the district. The District lags behind in terms of its economic development and social infrastructure when compared with other districts included in the sample. The major source of income of citizens of Swabi comes from agriculture, as the land in the areas surrounding the district is highly fertile. Among other profitable crops, tobacco production is the backbone of the regional economy. Nonetheless, it is observed that the representation of Swabi’s Pushtuns in Pakistan army, civil bureaucracy and government’s educational institutions is proportionately greater when compared with other districts of the province. In terms of political orientation, Swabi has been a stronghold of a nationalist political party however, this trend has changed considerably and lately some of the mainstream political parties have shown a remarkable presence in the District.

Abbottabad is the urban hub of Hazara region; the city was developed as a summer resort during the colonial times and is known for its elite schools and colleges. Pakistan’s apex military academy is also situated in Abbottabad. Although the major ethnic group living in Abbottabad comprises of Hindko speaking factions, due to the presence of military academy and numerous schools and colleges, a considerable
proportion of people from other parts of Pakistan, primarily Punjab and Sindh are also long-term residents. The whole of Hazara region is different in terms of its political composition in a sense that most of the major political parties have a considerable representation here. Unlike other districts where the religious and Pushtun nationalist parties have visible strongholds, Abbottabad hosts a variety of political parties. In terms of social infrastructure, Abbottabad is relatively well-developed as compared to Swabi and Mansehra. Finally, Mansehra is a geographically burgeoning district - in the neighbourhood of Abbottabad - where other than the Hindko speaking locals, there is also a large population of Afghan refugees. Factional politics and political allegiances based on family lineage and castes make Mansehra a demographically diverse District. Like Abbottabad, the mainstream national political parties have a greater representation in Mansehra nonetheless the social infrastructure of Mansehra is not as well-developed as that of Abbottabad. Apart from the variation in social, economic, and political composition of these districts, their geographical and administrative organisation also varies. Peshawar is the largest urban capital city of the province with some of her union councils located in the rural suburbs. Abbottabad is an urban hill station and a gateway to the northern areas of Pakistan. Mansehra herself is an urban district however Tehsils\(^1\) (towns) included in district Mansehra are rural at large. District Swabi’s Tehsils and union councils also comprise mostly of rural areas. It is anticipated that the dynamics of inter-institutional relationships and the political behaviour of politicians and voters would be vividly indicated by examining these districts that signify a variety of social, political, and economic commonalities and dissimilarities.

For empirical evidence, a total of 45 semi structured interviews were conducted in two phases during June-August 2008 and December 2009. Public officials from the two institutions i.e. civil bureaucracy and local governments in almost equal proportion were selected for interviews. The list of interviewees and the interview questions are included in the appendices. Following the University of Southampton’s Research Ethics Guidelines, throughout the thesis as well as in the list of interviewees, the anonymity of the participants is thoroughly ensured and public officials are made

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\(^1\) There is no precise English translation for Tehsil. In Pakistan Districts are divided in to administrative units called Tehsils that represents the middle tier of local government. Tehsils are further divided into Unions Councils (Williamson et al., 2005).
recognisable to the reader with reference to their designation, department/government office and geographical location only. Appointed employees from the civil administration and other public sector departments were included in one group of interviewees. In order to enhance the representativeness of the units of primary data collection, officials from federal and provincial pool of civil servants were deliberately selected from almost all echelons - ranging from the provincial Secretary of Local Government Department to the subordinate clerical staff in each department. Keeping in view the frequency and importance of official interaction with local government representatives, the appointed public sector employees were selected from the departments of basic health, primary and secondary education, municipal services, finance and planning, and civil administration. The second group of interviewees consisted of elected representatives from the local governments; likewise, they too were selected with intent from all three tiers of local government, which included District Nazim (Mayor), District Naib Nazim (Deputy Mayor), Tehsil (Town) Nazim and Naib Nazim, Union Council Nazim and Naib Nazim, and Councillors (Members of Union Councils).

1.4.6 Limitations in the Fieldwork

The number of interviews conducted for this study was limited due to several constraints. At the time of data collection for this study, the security situation in NWFP in general and Peshawar in particular was worse than ever. Particularly during the second phase of interviews that were conducted in December 2009, extreme levels of security threats limited the process of data collection. During the month of November 2009, there were 17 bomb blasts in the city of Peshawar alone, which caused hundreds of casualties and countless injuries. An unprecedented level of chaotic fear was widespread and a daunting feeling of insecurity thus severely affected the process of data collection. It was therefore impossible to increase the number of interviews beyond 45. The security threats could not be circumvented mainly because the interviews had to be conducted in public offices located in the government buildings, which were the main target of suicide bombers.

Secondly, getting access to the appointed public officials was a hard task. Senior bureaucrats in particular were almost inaccessible and those who agreed to be
interviewed did not respond quite openly about the organisational politics and informal institutional practices. Using personal contacts, the researcher however managed to approach some of the relevant senior bureaucrats and requested references for other interviewees. Snowballing technique was thus utilised for getting access to appointed public officials. It is essential to note that appointed officials working in the lower grades were relatively easier to access for interviews. Most of them, however, needed prior permissions from their senior officers for interview. In general, the elected local government officials did not show any hesitation to agree for a detailed interview.

Third, the inquiry of delicate and sensitive issues like corruption, clientelism and the practice of pork barrel approach was another major obstruction in interviews. Since such issues were the main factors to be investigated in the second analytical sphere of the study, relevant interview questions needed to be handled with great vigilance. One of the most important precautions prescribed by Leech (2002) is that in case of questions that the respondent would try to avoid for instance an inquiry into the matters that have a stigma attached to it or questions that are sensitive for ethical reasons, asking a presuming question may be the only option. The ‘are you corrupt’ type of question was therefore transformed into a presuming question such as ‘is the menace of corruption more pervasive in your department as compared to the institution of local government?’ Similarly, while inquiring about the nature and extent of clientelism in local politics, the researcher always tried to break the ice by having the interviewee’s views on the same issues in the neighbouring districts, Tehsils and Union Councils. Nevertheless, the elected local officials generally responded to all the questions quite openly and elaborately.

Finally, during the second phase of interviews in December 2009, it was obvious that the response from the elected public officials was greatly influenced by an increasing realisation that the Local Government setup was about to be abolished. Most of the elected local government officials could anticipate the revival of old bureaucratic structure by the provincial government led by ANP (Awami National Party). In fact, Commissioners and Administrators were already appointed before the formal abolition of the local governments. It was evidently understood that the elections for local governments would not be held by the end of year 2009. An association of
members of the local government representatives struggled to reinstate local government setup but to no avail. Considering that such administrative and political upheaval was taking place at the time when interviews were being conducted, the disenchantment and dismay of elected officials remarkably influenced their views about the inter-institutional and inert-governmental relationships. Presumably, the data would have shown slightly different trends, had the interviews of the second phase (December 2009) been conducted earlier on.

1.4.7 Standard Procedure Followed in Interviews
As suggested by Leech (2002), the following techniques were used to make the conversation with interviewees as effective as possible. Rapport was established in the beginning of each interview, which refers to putting the respondents at ease and convincing them through the conversation and gestures that the interviewer is listening, understanding and is interested in respondent’s response and views. The interviewees were approached with a positive, friendly and curious manner. Rephrasing interviewee’s response, at times, before moving on to the next question was useful for confirming his/her views. The order of question makes a considerable difference. Simple, easy, non-threatening and rapport-building questions were asked first e.g. questions about educational background and job description were helpful in providing a comfortable start.

Aberbach and Rockman (2002) explain that elite interviewees and other highly educated respondents do not like to be asked close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate and express their views in detail. In addition, open-ended questions enable the respondents to organise their response in accordance with their own understanding. The validity of information gained through open-ended questions is therefore greater and such questions are more useful for exploratory and in-depth analysis. Given that this is a case-oriented in-depth study of complex phenomena, open-ended and semi-structured questions were asked in the interviews.

All the interviews were conducted in the national and regional language i.e. Urdu and Pushto respectively. Most of the interviews were recorded with an audio recording device to minimise the information loss however, a few respondents refused to be tape-recorded. In that case, notes were taken during the interview and transcribed.
immediately after the interview. All the interviews were transcribed into English language. For ethical reasons, anonymity of respondents has been vigilantly ensured throughout the course of this research.

### 1.5 Organisation of the Study

The study is divided into three sections composed of ten chapters in total. Section 1 includes three chapters that introduces the study and addresses the first two research questions. Section 2 also comprises of three chapters and provides the theoretical and analytical framework for the study. Four chapters of the case study and conclusion are included in section 3.

Chapter 1 highlights the core argument of the study and covers the background, research questions, methodology, design, scope and organisation of the study. The deep-rooted historical institutional factors that have been obstructing the possibilities of democratisation process in Pakistan are reviewed in Chapter 2, which addresses the first research question of the study. The chapter narrates the chronological account of critical events that have been catalytic in the entrenchment of a highly centralised state and the civil-military bureaucracy. The chapter also compares the pre and post-partition political history of India and Pakistan to explain why the process of democratisation has been more successful in India than in Pakistan. The debate is then followed in chapter 3, which explains how a multitude of exogenous factors and international political economy dynamics collectively affected the process of democratisation and institution building in Pakistan. Chapter 3 addresses the second research question.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 collectively serve as an analytical framework for the analysis of evidence collected for the case study. Research gaps were identified and questions formulated during the preliminary literature review. The core research questions were then used as guidelines for establishing the analytical framework. The theoretical/analytical framework eventually guided the process of primary data collection and analysis. The interviews questions for the case study were formulated, keeping in view the themes and theoretical concepts identified in the literature review (section 2). The problems associated with inter-institutional working relationships and
the cascading malfeasance of political clientelism were selected as the two broader themes for investigation from among a range of research lacunae identified during the literature review.

Chapter 4 is based on literature review of theories and perspectives in decentralisation, which reflect that decentralisation reforms are undermined by factors like the lack of official capacity and managerial skills of local government representatives; the lack of political activism and civic engagement; asymmetries and coordination issues in inter-governmental and inter-institutional relationships; limitations in fiscal decentralisation; and finally the corruption in localised governance. Since local governments have to work in close collaboration with the local administration and civil bureaucracy, the effectiveness of local governments is highly contingent upon their functional autonomy on one hand and administrative compatibility with local bureaucracy on the other.

Chapter 5 therefore assesses the organisational parameters of Pakistan’s civil administration system with reference to the doctrine of classical Weberian theory of bureaucracy. The chapter is based on literature review of the theoretical perspectives pertaining to the theory of bureaucracy followed by an analytical review of Pakistan civil administration’s structural and capacity limitations. Chapter 6 explores theoretical discourse with regards to political clientelism in context of local governance. The chapter examines the nature of voter-politician relationships and voting behaviours by critically evaluating the public choice explanations and other concepts that go beyond the public choice rationale.

Chapter 7 of the case study serves as a descriptive prelude to the subsequent chapters. In order to guide the reader, political, administrative and financial structure of devolution of power reforms in Pakistan is illustrated. The chapter also includes a brief analysis of some of the devolution reforms’ core outcomes. A case-specific literature based on secondary yet empirical sources i.e. impact assessment studies conducted over the last decade, has been critically evaluated to begin assessment of local governance reforms. Apart from providing a descriptive orientation to the reader, the purpose of incorporating the secondary sources of evidence in chapter 7 is to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’ in terms of research findings.
The empirical evidence is explained in chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 8 explains the causes of the observed friction in relationships between public sector departments (Health, Education, Municipal Services, Finance and Planning, and District Management Group) and local governments. The chapter delves deep into the causes of inter-institutional and inter-governmental friction and associated complexities of local governance in post-devolution reforms (2001) decade. These complexities are multifaceted and inter-twined however, the discussion is focused upon the identification of real bones of contention that are imputed as perpetrating and perpetuating the imbalance of power and legal authority among these institutions. Various institutional and organisational dimensions like issues of official capacity, legal authority and administrative skills; provincial-local tensions; rifts between local government and civil administration; lack of inter-organisational coordination; impact of political party affiliation; appointment, promotion, and transfer matters of appointed officials; and fiscal affairs are assessed.

Chapter 9 extends the understanding of causes of Pakistani local governments’ failure beyond the explanation of structural, organisational and administrative issues by undertaking the examination of clientelistic exchanges between the local politicians and voters. Evidence assessed in chapter 9 identifies and explains the factors that obstruct effective self-government at the grass-root level despite the existence of ballot box. Local politicians’ perceptions are evaluated to explain the substantial impact of underlying factors that shape up the voting patterns in local government elections. Voters’ and politicians’ rationality, social values, group identities, politicians’ understanding of voting preferences and eventually their subsequent response to those preferences are assessed in the light of public choice theory and new institutionalist approach. A good deal of secondary empirical studies conducted recently has also been referred to in order to supplement and enhance the main line of argument in chapter 9.

The gist of arguments emanating from the understanding and explanation of evidence in case study is included in chapter 10. The final chapter is divided into three parts. First, it presents the summary of the main argument and concludes the study. Secondly, the research findings of this case study are compared with the outcomes of decentralisation programmes implemented in other developing countries. The
decentralisation programme of Indian state of Kerala has been categorically compared with the case study of NWFP, Pakistan. Finally, based on lessons learnt from the case study and comparative review, some policy implications are also documented in chapter 10.
Chapter 2
History of Authoritarianism and the Local Governments in Pakistan

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the founder of Pakistan who got involved in the politics of Indian subcontinent as an active member of the Indian National Congress. However, later he joined and led Pakistan’s movement, upholding the ideology that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations and therefore demanded a separate nation state for the Muslims of subcontinent. Muslim League (Pakistan’s founding political party) and Indian National Congress (INC) failed to reach a consensus on the arrangements for political power sharing in the government of united India. Consequently, the British Indian government, Muslim League and Indian National Congress had to agree for the separation of Pakistan in 1947. In 1947, ‘although Pakistan emerged as a state with a new identity, its political culture and characteristics were profoundly influenced by historical inheritances from the colonial era’ (Talbot, 2005:12). According to Talbot (2005), Muslim League, was poorly institutionalised ab anitio as compared to her counterpart, the Indian National Congress. Whereas the hallmark of Indian National congress was her earned political capital in the form of popular regional support and a comprehensive political organisation, the Muslim League, on the other hand, was more of an elite group that lacked intrinsic democratic principles. In fact, the centralisation of power within the Muslim League was her core feature and was one of the reasons that led to conflicts between regional and Pakistani identities in the post-independence era.

Talbot (2005) relates that provincialism became a barrier to the nation building immediately after Pakistan’s independence. Besides that, the level of political activism in Muslim majority areas of united India was relatively low. Therefore, to begin with, the Muslim League had to deal with higher degrees of factionalism and violence in the newly established state. The League was left with limited options; it became inevitable for the League to accommodate the centrifugal factional interests and other associated crude realities in order to be able to extend the influence of Pakistan’s movement into the socially and geographically diverse peripheries. Equally important is the fact that the founding leaders of Pakistan remained equivocal about the nature of future Pakistani state i.e. whether an Islamic state was to be the objective
of Pakistan’s movement (an agenda that was earlier pursued for manufacturing a populist demand for Pakistan and eventually for mobilising the political support of the Muslim population) or was it a pluralist secular society as it was proposed later by Jinnah (ibid). Such unfavourable legacies were just the beginning of stumbling blocks that were to follow in the post-independence Pakistan. The inherited conflicts and bewilderments between Pakistani, regional and Islamic identity remains one of the core reasons for the political and social mayhem in contemporary Pakistan. Shaikh (2009) for instance, believes that other than the external influences and domestic issues, the political trajectories of Pakistan have also been influenced by the fact that there is still a widespread ambiguity in the minds of Pakistanis about their national identity as a ‘Pakistani’. According to her, such confusions have undermined the establishment of a coherent civil and political society.

The legacies of colonialism and Pakistan’s freedom movement had a significant impact on the political organisation of pre and post independence NWFP. Talbot (2009) narrates that the foundation of Pakistan’s movement was unstable in NWFP and it was not easy for the Muslim League to reconcile the Pushtuns’ political identity with the demand of Pakistan. It is essential to examine the social nomenclature of Pushtuns who are the politically and socially dominant ethnic group of the province. Talbot relates that the British patronage of large Khans began to mould the political and social developments in that region. In order to broaden their political base in the Muslim majority areas, the Muslim League primarily relied on inducing the large landowner elites in to Pakistan’s movement. In rivalry, the small Khans offered their allegiances to the Congress led Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) movement led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The leaders of Congress heavily supported Khudai Khidmatgar Movement as it provided impetus to their claim of being a secular and multi-communal political party. The Pushtun nationalist movement benefited from smaller landowners as they challenged the large Khans in the 1920s (Jansson 1981; Rittenberg, 1998). Their main objective was to protect the political and social interests of Pushtuns, however, the leaders of Khudai Khidmatgar movement were also great proponents of Hindu-Muslim unity. This was exactly in contradiction with Muslim League’s two-nation ideology whereby the Hindus and Muslims of the sub-continent

2 A landowner, a wealthy nobleman who is socially and politically influential
were propagated as two different nations. To begin with, the hold of Muslim League in the Frontier province was therefore very limited and their strongholds mainly remained confined to the urban areas (ibid).

Talbot (2009) accounts that the Muslim League in NWFP was an internally divided and poorly organised party and that is why in the provincial elections of 1937, Congress emerged a majority party. The Congress also won 19 out of 36 seats that were reserved for Muslims. However, during the term of the Congress led Ministry between 1937 and 1939, some governmental policies by Dr. Khan Sahib disenchanted the large Khans and they switched over to the Muslim League. The Muslim League also took advantage from the imprisonment of Congress MLA’s (Members of Legislative Assembly) in 1943 however the League’s allegiances were primarily based on kickbacks and not on loyalty to the party’s ideologies. Opportunism and corruption thus began to spread in League’s ministry in NWFP. The party had become polarised as the gulf between the organisational and ministerial factions of the League began to widen. Although the Muslim league held office between 1943 and 1945, it only won seventeen seats against Congress’ thirty in the provincial elections of 1946. Nonetheless in the 1947 referendum, the Muslims of the province voted heavily in favour of Pakistan’s demand. Talbot (2009) believes that one of the reasons why the Muslims of NWFP voted for Muslim League in the Referendum was the clamorous approach adopted by the League in which the Unionists of Punjab and Khudai Khidmatgars of NWFP were portrayed as traitors of Islam and of Indian Muslims.

The communal violence of Partition in 1947, however, led the Pashtuns in British India (NWFP) to forget their rivalries with Punjab dominated Pakistan and they shifted their support from India to the pro-Pakistan Muslim League (Rittenberg, 1998). The refugees from Kashmir inspired a greater Jihad\(^3\), which was primarily fought initially by the Pushtuns of the allied princely states of Swat and Dir, and later, from the tribal agencies of Khyber and Waziristan (ibid). Before the partition, the gradual entrenchment of religious factions also provides another perspective to the dynamics of political history of the region. The religious mobilisation in the NWFP province’s

\(^3\) Muslims use the word ‘Jihad’ to describe three different kinds of struggle: 1) A believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible, 2) The struggle to build a good Muslim society, and 3) a Holy war i.e. the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary (Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml)
tribal areas - a non-administered territory between Pakistan and Afghanistan - is contextually significant as these tribal areas were conceived as a strategic buffer zone by the government of British India. This region was socially distinct from the rest of India and was excluded from the jurisdictions of judicial, legislative and social institutions. Haroon (2007) explains that since the region was not directly administered and controlled by the British Raj, the importance of the Mullahs (Clergymen) in the region was galvanised well before the partition. However, despite being distant from political and administrative centres of British India and Afghanistan, this region functioned as a military organisation ground for both Indian and Afghan anti-colonial activists until the independence in 1947. Consequently, these tribal areas maintained their status of an administratively and socially autonomous region in Afghanistan and in post-independence Pakistan. The regional religious groups continued to control the armed mobilisations both in Pakistan and Afghanistan thereafter. In return, Pakistani army and state establishment supported these groups in order to retain their hegemonic control in the region. This region thus became the focal point of successive contradictory Jihads in support of Pashtun ethnicism, anti-colonial nationalism, Pakistani territorialism, anti-Soviet resistance, and recently anti-Americanism (ibid).

Jalal (1995) recounts that after the independence, assets inherited by Pakistan were extremely scarce and hence for the sake of survival, the centre began extracting resources from the provinces. At the very onset of the country’s birth, the top-level central executives of the country inevitably relied on administrative bureaucracy to offset the mounting resentment in the provinces. Tensions in terms of resource allocation between Punjab (province) dominated civil-military bureaucracy and the rest of the provinces were therefore the first blow to the political stability of the infant state. The consequences of such critical events were later seen in the form of weak civil society and handicapped political institutions. ‘Poverty, regional, linguistic and religious group conflicts do not of themselves create instability. It only occurs when institutions are too weak to cope up with the conflict over scarce resources which results from increased social and political mobilisation. In this situation, newly emerging groups are not socialised into the system nor are their demands absorbed. Instead they enter it on their own terms and civic politics are replaced by disorder which in turn results in praetorianism’ (Huntington, 1968 cited in Talbot, 2005:8).
Many historians consider Pakistan as a praetorian state because the reins of
government have largely remained under the command and control of civil-military
bureaucracy. It is mainly the protection of institutional interests of the army that
triggered military interventions (Aziz, 2008). Pakistan’s centralised administrative
and political organisation had a long-term profound impact on fuelling authoritarian
tendencies, thereby undermining the political and democratic institutions.

During the exchange of migrating population between India and Pakistan in 1947,
violent massacres, pumped by the centuries’ old hatred and bigotry among various
ethnic, religious and social groups led to further aggravating the arch-rivalry between
the two emerging states of India and Pakistan. India, rattling her sabre, was a constant
and substantial threat for the survival of independent yet weak Pakistan and this
provided the ruling executive of Pakistan with a reasonably valid reason for nurturing
Pakistan’s army at the stake of building other civil institutions. Malik (1996) explains
that after the partition, Pakistan opted for maintaining the pre-partition status quo and
preferred administrative divisions instead of accommodating regional identities. He
argues that the predominant structure of ethnic heterogeneity severely obstructed the
possibilities of national integration, which were further aggravated by cross-border
migration, urbanisation, weakening of the civil society and prioritisation of scarce
resources for non-developmental sectors like national defence. The colonial legacy of
erratic development in diverse regions, preference of administration over the
consociational governance, repressive public policies and preference of individuals
over institutions fuelled the ethnic tension in post-independence Pakistan.

The trajectories during the first decade of Pakistan’s history depicted a continuation of
political instability with increasing centralisation in terms of policy-making and
execution. The centre was dominated by the civil and military bureaucracy at large
(Jalal, 1995; Callard, 1957; Talbot, 2005). Cheema and Sayeed (2006) relate that like
India, Pakistan also inherited one of the most developed civil service systems from the
British Indian government. Political instability in Pakistan’s initial decade, owed to
the devastating events during partition, further contributed to 1) undermining the
political institutions and 2) the superiority of the executive / bureaucracy over the
legislatures. It was obvious that the task of state building was thoroughly pursued at
the cost forgone alternative – nation building. The army did not take over directly till
1958 however Pakistan’s army increased her influence in the national policy affairs during the initial decade of independence, especially when Pakistan joined the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) military alliances. Khan (2010) accounts that in early 1950s, Pakistan, under the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, had joined the US-backed alliances - SEATO in 1954 and Baghdad Pact in 1955. Baghdad Pact was subsequently renamed as CENTO. One of the major reasons for Pakistan’s participation in these pacts was propounded as the need to strengthen her defence against India.

2.1 Trajectories of Democratisation Process in Pakistan and India

In spite of the fact that India and Pakistan emerged as independent states from the same colonial rule, their post independence political trajectories reveals a remarkable difference in terms of democratisation process and outcomes. To explain the factors that led to authoritarianism in Pakistan and gradual yet effective democratisation in India, Jaffrelot’s (2002) analysis is referred to as follows. The transfer of political powers from the British Raj gradually began with the elections of municipalities in 1882 and finally the Government of India Act of 1935 established a parliamentary democracy at the provincial levels in the pre-partition India. Although the British Viceroy and provincial Governors still held the reins of power, most of the ministerial responsibilities were devolved to the provincial ministers. Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 and by 1947, it had acquired the status of a mass based political party. Gandhi mobilised the INC into the rural peripheries and was successful in making inroads to the masses of population living in the rural India. The party was secular by nature and democratic internally. Even after the partition, the INC was popular among the majority of Indian citizenry.

Muslim League was on the other hand, more like a defence movement that portrayed herself as the saviour of Islam in order to mobilise the popular support of Muslims in the subcontinent. Muslim League was never as organised as INC and was largely dominated by a small group of leaders belonging to the intelligentsia and aristocracy. After the partition, most of articles from the government of India Act of 1935 were incorporated in the Indian constitution that was enacted in 1950. It took Pakistan almost a decade to frame the first constitution in 1956. Since New Dehli remained the
political and administrative centre of India, her political and administrative machinery remained intact. Indian stake in the treasury was also greater than that of seceding Pakistan. The First Prime Minister of India - Nehru was successful in maintaining good terms with both US and USSR and that is why India was not threatened with external insecurity. On the contrary, the establishment of Pakistan’s political and administrative set up was a hard task. Leaders of Pakistan felt extremely vulnerable militarily, economically and politically due to war with India over the Kashmir dispute in 1947.

Pardesi and Ganguly (2010) narrate that in the provincial elections of 1946 (before the partition), Muslim League could only form a government in the provinces of Bengal and Sindh. Muslim league was opposed by the elected governments in Punjab and NWFP, where, in coalition with the Indian National Congress, the Unionist party and Khudai Khidmatgar party had formed governments respectively. Consequently, in March 1947, Jinnah who chose to be the Governor General of prospective Pakistan, abolished the government of Punjab and NWFP and the provinces were brought under the direct control of Governor General of Pakistan. By doing so, Jinnah himself set the anti-democratic tradition for the future governors of Pakistan. Jaffrelot (2002) believes that the continued anti-democratic attitude of the Muslim League’s leaders, during the first decade after independence, diminished the hopes for democratic Pakistan. In response to the Pakistani states’ efforts to centralise the government, the civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy - apprehensive of the local opposing political groups’ access to power - adopted a predatory approach towards the local political uprising (Samad, 1995). Similarly, Pakistani judiciary remained under an enormous pressure from the civil-military nexus especially for indemnifying the military coups and associated abrogation of the constitution. The INC on the other hand continued to consolidate the political institutions. India’s well-organised army and civil administration did not intervene in the domain of parliament. The Indian judiciary has also been more independent despite pressures from the democratic governments and this, according to Jaffrelot (2002), was owed to the protection provided by the Indian Constitution and free press.

According to Jaffrelot (2002), Pakistan diversity in ethno-linguistic terms was lesser than India’s however, Indian leaders (Prime Ministers) utilised that ethno-linguistic
diversity to form a pluralist political society; the central political powers effectively negotiated with the uprising regional voices. The inclusion of marginalised groups e.g. the untouchables castes and other backward classes into the political mainstream and the linguistic reorganisation also played an important role in meeting the challenges of ethnic diversity and democratic consolidations in India. Before the partition, religion Islam was used as a monolithic identity by Muslim League; the Muslims of the subcontinent were projected as a nation instead of a religious minority. This primordial factor (Islam) was superimposed on the ethno-linguistic cleavages that resurfaced immediately after the partition when the ethno-linguistic diversity posed a real threat to the ruling elites of Muslim League. Ever since, the regional political uprising has been consistently suppressed with the help of Punjab dominated civil and military bureaucracy. Similarly, Mukherjee (2010) observes that in India, landlordism, or the Zamindari\(^4\) system, was abolished soon after independence that ultimately helped secure the social foundation of Indian democracy. On the other hand, the situation in Pakistan was quite the opposite wherein the rhetoric of land and agrarian reforms could hardly affect the clientelistic relationships in rural politics. Adeney and Wyatt (2004) opine that before and after the partition, the politically weak Muslim League had to appease the landlords and elites of rural areas. The party was soon split into factions as the party leaders prioritised to consolidate their regional position rather than working for national integration. Bengalis, the majority of the population and the largest ethnic group residing in the Bengal Province of Pakistan (now Bangladesh), were not represented proportionately in Pakistan’s army, bureaucracy and political institutions. In fact, the government of Pakistan heavily capitalised on Bengal’s natural resources (mainly jute) in order to consolidate West Pakistan’s (Now Pakistan) economy and feed the civil-military bureaucracy.

India and Pakistan had the same colonial history nonetheless both countries diverged remarkably in terms of their political trajectories mainly because their political experiences at the time of independence differed a lot. For Pakistan, national security and territorial integration was the top priority that eventually made her a security state while India was relatively less concerned with external threats therefore political

\(^4\) Zamindar literally means the land-owner in most of the Indian States - an aristocrat that owned a vast area of cultivable land and taxed the peasants who lived on it. Zamindars held enormous powers within their territories for instance, magisterial powers, influence in army recruitment, revenue collection and taxation. (www.wikipedia.org)
institutions nurtured gradually in India. The nomenclature of ethnic diversity severely hindered the growth of democracy in Pakistan, whereas the same factor strengthened plurality of the political actors in India. The composition of founding political parties of India and Pakistan was different in both countries i.e. INC had a broader mandate from masses of citizens and the party’s credentials were democratic whereas Muslim League lacked internal organisation and political representation in areas that were to become a part of independent Pakistan. The following part of the chapter highlights the history of major local governance reforms undertaken in Pakistan.

2.2 General Ayub’s Basic Democracies (BD) Reforms

General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law and assumed power as the first military ruler in 1958. Pakistan’s first constitution of 1956 was suspended and national and provincial governments were dissolved. In order to legitimise the regime, Ayub needed some form of democratic representation at some level of the government. Local Governments in the form of Basic Democracies (BD) was the idea that was instigated and operationalised by General Ayub Khan and this approach was later used as a time-tested strategy by all succeeding military dictators. The rationale presented by Ayub for proposing Basic Democracies at local level was that Western type of parliamentary democracy was not suitable for a country like Pakistan and hence it could not be ‘imposed’ on the people of Pakistan but some sort of progress towards democracy could be achieved. Ayub believed that the requirements essential for the western type of democracy - social and political awareness, universal education, and advance system of mass communication - were lacking in Pakistan (Khan, 1967). In Ayub’s own words, ‘it is too much to expect a man sick and illiterate, and worried about his next meal, to think in terms of national policies’ (Khan, 1967:233). Ayub wrote in his autobiography that asking people to join in a ‘mass ritual’ of voting for candidates whom they had never seen or known really meant depriving them of their right to vote either by inducement or intimidation. He was convinced that under such (a democratic) system, people would find their power being really used against themselves.

Consequently, the military regime of General Ayub Khan introduced the system of local governments called the Basic Democracy (BD) Plan in October 1959. The
elected members were referred to as Basic Democrats. Elections for the Basic Democrats were held after two months of the introduction of the Basic Democracies Order (BDO). The BD set up was established in Ayub’s regime at four levels i.e. at the Union, Tehsil (Town), District and Division levels. At the lowest level in the system, local governments were established in the form of Union Councils in the rural areas, Town Committees in towns with a population of less than 14000 inhabitants and Union Committees in towns with more than 14000 inhabitants (Siddiqui, 1992). Tehsil was the next higher tier in the system, where local governments were set up in the form of Tehsil Councils in rural areas and Municipal Committees and Cantonment Boards in the urban areas. The next higher tier was the District Council, followed by the Divisional Councils (Zaidi, 2005). Under the BD system, the country was divided into 80,000 wards. A single ward had a population of around 1000 to 1200 people. These elections were held on the ward basis (ICG, 2004). Earlier in October 1955, the federal structure of the state was radically transformed by abolishing the four provinces in West Pakistan. Instead, the West Pakistan became one unit or province, East Pakistan being another.

Zaidi (2005) describes the electoral mechanism of the BD plan as follows. Members of the Union Councils, Town Committees and Union Committees were elected on the basis of adult franchise. These elected members, from amongst themselves, indirectly elected the Chairman. For the higher tiers, the directly elected members from the lowest tier were to indirectly elect some members, while the rest of the members were appointed by the government. For example, the Chairmen who were the most important figures in all three higher tiers were nominated and appointed by the government. In case of Tehsil Councils, either the Assistant Commissioner (AC) or the Tehsildar\(^5\) was appointed as the Chairman. Similarly, at the District and the Division levels, the Deputy Commissioners (DC) and the Commissioners headed these councils respectively. According to ICG (2004), half of the members of the local councils were officially nominated and appointed rather than being directly elected. The councils were virtually controlled by the district administrative bureaucracy who had the power to override the councils’ decisions and to suspend any bills passed by them (ICG, 2004; Siddiqui, 1992). In simple words, the local government set up

\(^5\) Administrator of a Tehsil (Town)
called BD was nothing more than mere window dressing that was conceived in order to mask the realities of a highly centralised command at the centre. Cheema et al. (2005) comment that the electoral function of the BD System, based on Ayub’s concept of ‘controlled democracy’, was a legacy of the paternalistic colonial concept of ‘guardianship’ whereby the colonial bureaucracy was supposed to guide the local politicians.

A study by Cheema and Sayeed (2006) relates that Ayub’s military takeover of 1958 provided the bureaucracy enough space to take over the control of the policy-making process. The bureaucracy was able to insulate herself from political interference by acquiring protection in the 1962 constitution. The Basic Democracies system was structured in order to enhance bureaucrats’ powers at the local level over the local politicians; senior bureaucrats - the CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan) cadre - could easily manipulate the political process and policy formation at the local level (Nadvi and Sayeed, 2004). On a similar note, Sayeed (1980) mentions that in the late 1960s the civil bureaucracy was also seen as having acquired tremendous social and economic power through linking relationships with other elite groups in society notably the military and the business circles.

Basic Democrats served as an electoral college for the election of the president. Ayub Khan effectively got himself validated as the president by getting an ironically high percentage i.e. 96.6 % (ICG, 2004) in the presidential referendum held in 1960. ‘Elections to the Basic Democracies councils were held at the lowest tier, called the Union Councils, but at that time martial law extended over the country and elected representatives were usually people who were not active in national political affairs and who, because they owed their very existence to the national government, supported the martial law regime in a plebiscite’ (Friedman, 1983:37-38). This asymmetrical amalgamation of political and bureaucratic system was used for patronage delivery in return for securing a mandate in presidential referendum (Gauhar, 1996) and for building a dependable constituency for Ayub’s military regime (Burki, 1980).

Friedman’s (1960, 1961) assessment of the BD setup indicates some of the intrinsic weaknesses of the system. Insufficient training programmes for the basic democrats,
inexperienced councils; limited availability of resources, communication gaps, inter-departmental liaison and coordination issues among the administrative departments, lack of prestige of local councils, and executive’s control of the local councils were the main features of BD system. Eventually, the system lost its support in peripheries owing to the rigid hierarchical structures, corruption and clientelistic resource allocation. On the other hand however, Friedman (1960, 1961) notes that the BD reforms aroused enthusiasm in the communities; helped institution building to a certain extent, politically educated people and finally the reforms improved the turnout for example in the BD elections, the turnout went up as high as 75% of eligible voters. This, according to him, was a successful display of political activism in a country where 80% of the population was illiterate.

Although the central executive command of the country was authoritarian and hierarchical in its formation, the idea of formalising the informal and traditional social institutions (like communal dispute settlements usually headed by the village elders and notables) in the rural areas with setting up of a local government, was a ray of hope for the marginalised social groups. Irrespective of the political motivation behind the introduction of BD reforms, the establishment of local government system was a critical step in streamlining the informal institutional affairs of local governance. For instance, Friedman (1983) believes that these local governments had very little influence in terms of resources and (administrative) authority yet they were able to perform as arbitrators among the villagers, which was a traditional need of the society.

2.3 Civil Service Reforms (1973)

General Ayub Khan’s regime was succeeded by General Yahya Khan in 1969. After the fall of Dhaka to India and subsequent secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from the West Pakistan in 1971, Z. A. Bhutto took over two positions from General Yahya Khan: as the President and the other as the (First Civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. After the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, the elections for the President, Prime Minister, Chairman of Senate, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly were held. The 1973 Constitution had adopted a federal parliamentary system for the country in which the President was only a symbolic head of the state whereas the de facto governing authority was vested in the
office of the Prime Minister. Bhutto was sworn in as the Prime Minister of the country on August 14, 1973. The first democratically elected government of Bhutto found it more useful to exploit the established civil administration setup for consolidating his control of the government and delivering patronage. Local governments were also neglected because Bhutto’s regime did not have to seek political legitimacy as he was a civilian head of the government, elected into the office via ballot box. On the face of it, Bhutto’s civil service reforms introduced and implemented in 1973 were intended to make the civil bureaucracy more efficient and accountable to the elected governments however, the impact of the reforms was quite different. Cheema and Sayeed (2006) account the features and consequences of Bhutto’s 1973 Civil Administrative Reforms as follows.

Bhutto created the ‘All Pakistan Unified Grade System’ which ended the distinction between Civil Services, Police Services and others civil services cadres. Such provisions enhanced the political institutions’ control over the bureaucracy and curtailed the influence of the CSP cadre within the central bureaucracy. The well-structured hierarchy of the CSP cadre was also broken by the new provisions that allowed lateral entry system and vertical and horizontal movements of civil employees between cadres (Cheema, 2003). These changes fragmented the internal cohesion of the bureaucracy and ensured that bureaucracy was no longer an insulated and exclusive arm of the state (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006). General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) later used these provisions to institutionalise the induction of armed forces personnel in to the civil service by setting up a 20 % quota for armed forces in the Civil Services (Shafqat, 1999). Cheema and Sayeed (2006) believe that the strategy of ‘militarisation’ of the bureaucracy by General Zia not only intensified the fragmentation of the bureaucracy but also significantly affected the criterion of merit-based recruitment that used to be the hallmark of Pakistan’s CSP cadre.

Bhutto’s populist strategies resulted in expanding the role of the state significantly, which in turn increased the total public expenditure to GDP ratio (Pasha and Fatima, 1999). Main beneficiaries of public sector expansion (referring to the nationalisation of major private sector industries in Bhutto’s government) were the civil bureaucrats in the higher echelons (Jalal, 1995). Also, those populist approaches made the bureaucracy an employment agency through which patronage was delivered to party
stalwarts (Noman, 1988). Such clientelistic tendencies which used the public sector employment for patronage delivery helped prolong Bhutto’s tenure as prime minister because of the expansion in the size and purview of the administrative machinery (Haque and Montiel, 1992). Bhutto’s massive nationalisation of the industries that were developed in the economic boom during Ayub’s era stretched the scope of civil service far beyond the social service delivery as now a large public sector was to be run and administered by the civil servants. In a nutshell, the civil administration reforms of 1973 did not bring about any noteworthy changes in the procedures of bureaucratic conduct and bureaucracy remained large in size, non-transparent, and discretionary (World Bank, 1998).

2.4 General Zia’s Local Government Reforms (1979-84)

General Zia-ul-Haq took control of the country in 1977 as a result of a military coup. With the imposition of Martial Law, all political activities were banned once again. Ziring (1988) accounts that Zia reckoned political parties as divisive, counterproductive and useless in an Islamic state which thwarted the maturation of political organisations. However, applying the same strategy as that of his predecessor - General Ayub - General Zia-Ul-Haq revived the local governments through the promulgation of LGO (Local Government Ordinance) in 1979 and 1980. Zaidi (2005) describes that according to the LGO 1979, there were three tiers of local governments in rural areas: Union Councils, Tehsil Councils and District Councils. These local governments were mainly organised at the Union Councils and District Councils levels. The existence of the middle tier i.e. the Tehsil Councils was just nominal. In urban areas, local governments were established at four levels: Town Committees, Municipal Committees, Municipal Corporations, and the Metropolitan Corporations. One of the major changes in Zia’s local government reform was the direct election of the chairmen who acted as executive heads of these local councils. ‘Zia consciously adopted populist measures introduced by Bhutto’s unimplemented Local Government legislations (1972 and 1975), which abolished the direct representation of the bureaucracy in local governments as members and chairmen, and instead stipulated that all members (including chairmen) of all tiers of local government were to be directly elected through adult franchise’ [(Sections 12 and 13 of LGO 1979) cited in
Cheema et al. (2005:9))]. Khan and Shah (2007) highlighting the features of local governance in 1980s, describe that there was centralisation in terms of services delivery and lack of coordination between the Union Council and District Councils as well as with the other public sector departments like agriculture, health and education etc. The Union and District Councils were incapacitated in terms of finances, project planning and implementation. Therefore, the local governments in Zia’s regime could not be essentially institutionalised. There was also a continuous intervention on behalf of the state institutions in the domain of local government system. Quite similar to the BD system utilised by General Ayub, the cosmetic set up of Zia’s local governments was also not anything more than a strategy for securing a local supportive political base as Cheema et al. (2005:24) very rightly argue: ‘legitimacy has been sought by creating a localised patronage structure that produces a class of ‘collaborative politicians’ who act as conduit between local constituencies and the non representative centres’.

Cheema et al. (2005) point out that Zia’s local government legislation retained suspension powers in the hands of the provincial government, which could overrule any proposal by the local governments. This also meant that the military had significant control over local governments because the military officers appointed as provincial governors headed the administration of provinces. Zia’s Era is critically important in this discussion because it is reckoned as one of the most tyrant regimes in the history of Pakistan. Blatant use of state’s police and military force to suppress the simmering resentments and regional surging political voices was one of the core features of Zia’s regime. Rhetoric of the local government was just an instrument that Zia thought would ease off the steam that was cumulating across liberal and democratic factions in the whole country against his ruthless dictatorship. Talbot (2005) accounts that ‘Islamisation’ programme was initiated by Zia in 1979 which implicated judicial reforms, implementation of Islamic penal code, economic reforms, and new educational policies. Islamisation thus became the most distinguished feature of Zia’s regime but it never provided cohesion for Pakistani society partly because of the predominant conflicts between modernists and the reformists who wanted the incorporation of Islamic laws into the modern state’s framework and partly because the state sponsored Islamisation process intensified the ethnic divisions within the sects of Islam in Pakistan (ibid).
General Zia pursued the strategy of Islamisation of Pakistan’s civil society to appease the hardcore religious factions and some ethnic groups and consequently used them in suppressing the uprising regional political forces. Islamisation of the civil society was also a core factor that inculcated the Jihadist sentiments and ideologies (against the USSR and India) among religious factions of Pakistan. Pakistan’s indirect yet active involvement and alliance with US against the then USSR in Afghanistan’s war was crucially helpful for Gen. Zia in order to protract his regime under the auspices of Washington DC. His twin strategies of militarisation of the state and Islamisation of the civil society were thus effective bulwarks against any indigenous and foreign threat for the survival of his regime however, Rizvi (n.d.) writes that his policies spurred religious extremism and militancy and undermined the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes.

Rizvi (1986) narrates that in an attempt to secure his political future, Zia also manipulated the Islamic sentiment in his dubious presidential referendum in 1984 and despite the visible absence of popular enthusiasm on the day of referendum, the official results showed a turnout of 62.15% with 97.71% voting in favour of Zia’s retention of presidential office. In order to exclude the political parties from electoral process, the general elections under Zia’s regime were held in February 1985 on a non-party basis. Rizvi (1986) argues that this strategy discouraged the interaction among politicians at the national levels which led to fragmentation and regionalisation of political forces. The tradition of excluding the political parties from elections was set earlier as Jalal (1995:103) quotes that ‘the holding of non-party elections to local bodies in September 1979 (was) aimed at driving a wedge between different levels of political system, making the twin task of militarisation and Islamisation of society much easier to accomplish’. Ziring (1988) describing the long term consequences of holding the elections on non party basis, cites that since the conventional parties and regional interests were not permitted to function, parochialism and sub-national identities became more emboldened, better organised and funded, and more aggressive.

Even after the withdrawal of martial law in 1985, Zia made it extremely difficult for the political parties to register for elections (Rizvi, 1986). Despite the fact that Zia’s patronage was mainly limited to those directly engaged with martial law
administration, Cheema and Sayeed (2006) relate that the local election results represented a critical backlash; mass-based popular political parties had emerged as important players in the electoral arenas including the PPP (the party that was overthrown from the government by Zia with a military coup in 1977). Zia’s decision to exclude political parties from the federal and provincial elections of 1985 enabled these local political forces to raise to the higher tiers of the state where these networks eventually captured significant electoral positions at the provincial and federal assemblies later (ibid).

The revival of elected national and provincial governments in 1985 extended the political culture of Pakistan’s local politics to the national and provincial levels (Wilder, 1999) and consequently, the legislators at provincial and federal level took over the functions, that used to be performed by local representatives and officials earlier (Zaidi, 1999). The trends of patronage delivery gained momentum after 1985 when the then prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, in his attempts to consolidate the political institutions, devised a policy of disbursement of annual development funds to all members of the provincial and national assemblies. Seeds of clientelistic patronage delivery and the associated institutional rivalry between the provincial and local governments were sown then. Wilder (1999) reports that MNAs (members of national Assembly) and MPAs (Members of Provincial Assembly) began to view the local politicians as their competitors in allocation of development funds and execution of local development projects. This provincial-local institutional rivalry had a two-pronged impact. Firstly, it diminished the stature and domain of local governments and secondly, it adversely affected the effectiveness of legislative bodies on national and regional level as they began to get involved in the domain that was never supposed to be theirs in the first place. Not surprisingly, the national and provincial assemblies became the institutions known for clientelistic social service delivery by involving in the micromanagement rather than their primary role - the making of legislation. Consequently, these tensions between provincial and local tiers resulted in the total suspension of local governments between 1993 and 1998” (Cheema et al., 2005). The advocates of local governments now had to wait for yet another military junta that would take over the reins of the country and then would reckon the establishment of local democracy ‘useful’ for the regime’s survival.
Rizvi (n.d) relates that in the post Zia period i.e. between 1988 and 1999, the elected civilian governments were functional but only under the vigilant surveillance of the military heads who kept on calling the shots in political and security matters. During the 1990s, the high command of army acted like praetorian guards in order to protect their professional and corporate interests. Rizvi argues that the four terms of government of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif between 1988 and 1999 signifies crucial and delicate relationships between the civilian governments and the top military command as the autonomy and survival of the civilian governments was highly constrained and mainly dependant on their ability to maintain amiable relations with the high command of Pakistan’s army. In addition, Zaidi (n.d) cites that the intervening establishment and the army were quite successful in creating and sponsoring political candidates, parties and alliances for example in 1991, the civil-military agencies - mainly the ISI - orchestrated an alliance of political parties called the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance), which led to the election of Nawaz Sharif as a Prime Minister. During the 1990s, the so called democracy in Pakistan was an outcome of civil-military agencies’ involvement in manipulation of political actors and processes therefore Zaidi (n.d) argues that such type of democratic institutions certainly did not reflect the ‘will of the people’.

2.5 Pakistan in General Musharraf’s Regime

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf took over the reins of government in a bloodless coup in October 1999 by overthrowing the government of Nawaz Sharif. Several court petitions were filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the constitutional legitimacy of Musharraf’s military coup however, Musharraf issued the ‘Oath of Judges Order 2000’ which required the judges of Supreme Court to take a revised oath for the office, swearing allegiance to his military rule and to state that they would give no verdicts against his military regime. Many judges of the Supreme Court refused and resigned in protest. In May 2000, the Supreme Court of Pakistan summoned Musharraf to hold the National and Provincial Assemblies’ elections by October 2002. In order to legitimise and secure his presidency, Musharraf held a highly dubious referendum (Ansari, 2003) in April 2002

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6 Zaidi (n.d.) notes that one of the most innovative inventions of Pakistan’s military governments is the creation of ‘Praetorian Democracy’ or more precisely ‘Praetorian Electioneering’ where some form of participation has been allowed by the military regime when in power.

7 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) is Pakistan’s premier military intelligence agency.
that extended his term as the President of Pakistan for five years after the October 2002 general elections. The referendum’s results announced by Election Commission of Pakistan declared that turnout was 71% in which 97.5% of the voters expressed their consent for the continuation of Musharraf’s presidency.

Talbot (2005) explains that this referendum actually diminished Musharraf’s stature in which multiple voting and coercive use of local government officials were clearly evident. Voters were marshalled by the local councillors who got elected in the 2001 local government elections. Orchestration of his referendum was made easier by mobilisation of voters via the elected local government representatives at District, Town and Union Council levels as they owed their very existence to the military junta. After the referendum, parliamentary elections in 2002 were also manipulated and eventually won by the King’s party\(^8\), PML (Q) that was fully backed up by the powerful regime at the Centre. Musharraf reckoned that the constitutional role of army was critically essential for the internal political stability of the country and during his regime, the army expanded her non-professional role and took over majority of the civilian institutions. After the October 1999 military takeover, 104 serving and retired Lieutenant Generals, Major Generals (or equivalent ranks) among 1027 other military officers were inducted on civilian posts in various government ministries and public sector divisions (Dawn, 2003 cited in Zaidi, n.d.). Besides that, Shah (2003) argues that Musharraf’s military regime was responsible for the forceful de-politicisation of the political institutions, unlawful jailing of political figures and arbitrary bans on public/political rallies. In academia, civilian intelligence agencies, public utility corporations, and the civil services departments, the military gradually took over in the name of fighting corruption and promoting accountability (ibid).

Immediately after the coup, General Musharraf, tried to convey a message that his regime’s priorities were economic revival, accountability, national integration and democratic consolidation. Talbot (2002; 2009) explains that Musharraf’s wave of

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\(^8\) The terms King’s party denotes Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) or PML(Q) that was formed with the support of General Pervez Musharraf before the general elections of 2002. Musharraf wanted to create a broad-based political party that will support his regime. Under the pressures from National Accountability Bureau (NAB), some of the key political figures from Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) party switched their loyalties and joined PML(Q) which was led by Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhary Pervez Elahi.
reforms for accountability and containing corruption were intended to pave the way for guided democracy by disqualifying the top political leadership in the country. Musharraf claimed that the devolution of power reforms were essential for transforming the ‘sham democracy’ into a ‘true democracy’. On the face of it, the plan was designed to establish grass root democracy by making the district administration accountable to the locally elected officials and by integrating the previously marginalised social groups of the society into the political mainstream e.g. women and religious minorities. The plan also linked local democratisation policy with economic development and poverty alleviation. However, in the absence of land reforms, the outcomes of decentralisation plan were doubtful right from the beginning.

Talbot (2002; 2009) argues that among other reasons, the plan was designed in order to attract international donors and make them believe that his reforms could potentially alleviate poverty that was increased to unprecedented levels during the 1990s. By doing so, Musharraf not only secured economic assistance from international donors like the World Bank, DfID and ADB but also attempted to seek legitimacy for his regime under the garb of local democratisation. Nonetheless, it was anticipated that in the absence of land reform, the Devolution plan would, in fact, limit political participation and deliver the public funds into the hands of local elites. Despite significantly reported cases of violence and electoral rigging, the participation in local elections of year 2001 gradually increased however, the elections did not transform the political organisation along the lines that were envisaged in the plan. For instance, the embedded social conservatism particularly in rural peripheries obstructed genuine participation of women. In addition, the traditional political figures, party allegiances and elite networks reappeared on the local political scene (ibid). In a nutshell, the whole localisation scheme seemed like a repetition of Zia’s strategy whereby Musharraf orchestrated to capitalise on the local government setup as a collaborative political base that would help him legitimise and protract his authoritarian regime.

There are however, two prominent exceptions in the phenomenal development of civil society groups during last few years of Musharraf’s regime. First, it was the electronic and print media revolution initiated by Musharraf himself; a plethora of independent media groups and news channels were allowed to register and function with
substantial degree of freedom unprecedented in the history of Pakistan. Since the independence of Pakistan, the electronic and print media had worked under the extreme pressure of the establishment. However, during Musharraf’s rule, the press and independent TV news channel groups suddenly found themselves unexpectedly free to publish and broadcast the realities of social life under the regime. The free press and electronic media soon turned out to be Frankenstein's monster for Musharraf’s regime as they provided a platform for the opposition political parties to express their dissent against his regime.

Another civil society revolution was the lawyers’ movement organised by the members of federal and regional Bar councils of judicial courts against Musharraf which gained momentum during the last few years of his regime. Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was appointed as Chief Justice by General Pervez Musharraf in year 2005. Chaudhry was later suspended by Musharraf in 2007 when he refused to resign as the Chief Justice of Pakistan. In July 2007, Chaudhry was reinstated in a ruling by a bench comprising of thirteen judges of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. All the judges gave a verdict that Musharraf’s action against the Chief Justice was illegal, and ten of the thirteen judges ordered reinstating of Chaudhry. In November 2007, General Pervez Musharraf, who was then the President and Chief of Pakistan’s army, declared a state of emergency and suspended Pakistan’s constitution in anticipation of a backlash from Chaudhry. The lawyers’ movement that began against the suspension of Chief Justice in 2007, gained unprecedented momentum just after the general elections in February 2008. Lawyers’ movement ultimately pressurised the newly elected government of PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) to reinstate Chaudhry as the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The synergic coalition between media groups, lawyers’ movement and some of the leading political parties effectively forced Musharraf to resign as the chief of army staff in 2007 and as the president of Pakistan in 2008.

2.6 Consequential Impact of Pakistan’s Precarious Political History

Pakistan’s history of institutions, beliefs and political dynamics had a profound impact on the options and strategies available to the political actors in the present era (Cohen, 2004). A multitude of events and critical factors shaped up the orientation of governing machine in Pakistan. In the wake of above-mentioned historical events, Pakistan ended up as a country that is reckoned as least conducive for genuine
democratisation process in all levels of government. Militarisation of civilian society and civilianisation of military (Chengappa, 1999) resulted in weakening of institutions of governance on one hand and exacerbating the political opportunism on the other. In the absence of effective means of political interest articulation, masses of society that are caught in a day-to-day struggle for their economic subsistence remain unconcerned with politics. Since the political parties quite regularly failed to function effectively, the resultant frustration and social insecurity compelled people to look for support in their sub-national allegiances and in primordial group ecology (Weinbaum, 1996). At large, in the contemporary Pakistan, attitude of citizens towards the elections is that of indifference with feelings that political debate is irrelevant to their lives (ibid). The historical institutional hegemony of civil-military bureaucracy is one of the domestic reasons that is responsible for yielding many adverse outcomes. For instance, the general elections turnout is declining constantly since 1970s (Islam, 2001); practices like horse-trading (bargaining to switch political support), the use of executive power to intimidate the political opposition, and the politicisation and corruption of bureaucracy has been deeply embedded in post 1988 Pakistan (Talbot, 2005).

Similarly, the recent political culture in Pakistan is primarily characterised by humiliation of political opponents with personal attacks and the absence of constructive political dialogue (Weinbaum, 1996); organisationally weak political parties (Malik, 1996); a political structure that is more personality driven rather than ideology oriented (Talbot, 2005); electoral frauds and tampering of voters’ registration lists, violence, rubberstamp legislatures, rule by executive ordinances instead of legislation, dynastic political parties, factionalism, autocracy within the parties, parties driven by ethnic objectives, politicisation of public services, and a ‘Not so Civil Society’ (Islam, 2001). The spread of such deeply rooted socio-political menaces is highly alarming; most of these effects have their causes deeply rooted in the institutional weaknesses of the political organisation. The extremely complex and difficult task of redress needs to begin with strengthening of institutions of government and the state. Talbot (2005:292) suggests that ‘two critical tasks await Pakistan’s democratisers: first to further loyal opposition and responsible government through processes of institutionalisation and consociation; second to encourage wider political participation and re-establish civilian supremacy over the armed forces’.
Chapter 3
Democratisation and Governance in Pakistan: International Political Economy Perspectives

In the contemporary globalised world, the political and economic orientations of the dominant states have had a tremendous impact on endogenous governing capacities (pertaining to the formal and informal rules in use) of the states in developing world. With the fall of communist Russia in 1989, the dynamics of international relations took an entirely new shape; the globalised world has become almost uni-polar in terms of political and economic power concentration and influence. ‘The new international circumstances after 1990s meant that the West could attach explicit political and institutional conditions to aid without fear of losing its third world allies or clients to communism’ (Leftwich, 1994: 369). The twilight of cold war between USSR and US marked the beginning of an international paradigm shift and the impact of this transition in international political power relationships has drastically resulted in shaping up the new modalities and trajectories of the global and regional governance structures and practices around the globe.

The collapse of the communist regimes ostensibly connotes the triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm as the World Bank, (1991) notes that the failures of the former communist states signifies that for the political systems in the third world, elements of the Western political systems such as political liberalisation and administrative decentralisation are effective and efficient governance models. Consequently, large-scale changes and transitions began to unfold not only in the geopolitical and strategic relationships and alliances among the states of increasingly globalised world but also within those states’ domestic institutions of governance.

This chapter highlights the practical issues that have emerged from the Western concepts of democratisation and good governance reforms; it explains the incompatibility and structural incoherence of such dominant concepts, models and their practice in the countries that are plausibly considered to be going through a transitional phase in the process of democratisation. The chapter attempts to investigate the impact of developing countries’ linkages to the Western countries on the democratisation process. This impact is diverse and multifaceted depending on
many factors including the countries’ colonial histories, geopolitical and strategic
importance, ethnic composition, geographical location on the world map, economic
status, and natural resourcefulness. Given that such features, either in isolation or in a
combination, determine the countries’ footing and status in international political
economy arenas, extreme levels of complexities are involved in most of the present
day developing countries’ governance structures.

By the end of cold war, most of the third world countries were already decolonised. However, the Western dominated international bilateral and unilateral aid agencies were engaged in pressurising the third world states to expedite their democratisation process. Most of these states had been former colonies and, for centuries, they were administered by their respective colonial empire’s civil and military bureaucracies. Decolonisation of these states left the reins of governments with the indigenous civil-military bureaucracy and/or other native political elites that were nurtured, organised and empowered by their former colonial masters. With reference to Pakistan, it was argued in Chapter 2 that the hotchpotch and mayhem created by the coexistence of military and bureaucratic power has proven to be extremely counterproductive for the prospects of democracy and good governance. The history of authoritarianism in Pakistan tells a great deal about the uncertain prospects of genuine democratic institutions. This chapter will examine the extent to which Pakistan’s history of authoritarianism is influenced by the political, strategic and economic objectives of United States of America and other exogenous actors like IMF and the World Bank.

3.1 International Political Economy Perspectives

3.1.1 Geopolitical and Strategic Linkages

In order to explain the causes of ineffectiveness and failures of decentralisation reforms in Pakistan, it is critically essential to understand and assess the implications of wider international political economy perspectives. The argument therefore begins with the exploration of political economy implications of democratisation and a relatively novel concept - good governance - as a product of post cold war international political circumstances. Levitsky and Way (2002) in their study, that illuminates the dynamics of post cold war hybrid regimes, find that in the countries that have closer ties with the West (particularly the countries in Central Europe and
Latin America), the removal of autocratic governments has generally resulted in democratisation in the post-cold war period. By contrast, the outcomes in much of Africa are different. Levitsky and Way (2005) believe that the degree and nature of linkages (economic, geopolitical, social and communication) to the West are important factors in shaping up the trajectories of democratisation processes of developing countries in Africa and South Asia, which they refer to as ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’.

Levitsky and Way (2005:52) define the competitive authoritarian regime as follows. ‘In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.’ The pressure from the West for democratisation is spawning varied outcomes in form of such hybrid regimes therefore Levitsky and Way (2002) believe that such types of authoritarian regimes are certainly not embarked on transitional rails towards effective democratisation. However, the exogenous and endogenous political, social and economic costs and the limitations of resources make it difficult for the authoritarian regimes in order to be able to sustain patronage. In addition, Western pressures for democratisation are boosting the costs of co-opting with or repressing of political opponents to prohibitively high levels in competitive authoritarian regimes, nonetheless the mere removal of autocrats in these regimes does not essentially guarantee democratisation.

Levitsky and Way (2005) explain that Western leverage (authoritarian governments’ vulnerability to external pressures for democratisation) took many forms e.g. conditionalities, direct state to state pressures, behind the scene diplomacy and even direct military intervention. Besides that, during the post-cold war era, the absence of alternative military and economic aid compelled the elites of the third world countries to accept and adopt the liberal democratic models of governance in one form or the other. However, they conclude that the Western leverage over electoral authoritarian regimes is insufficient to convince them to democratise in effect because the Western international actors have focused merely on elections and neglected essential components of democracy such as civil liberties and level political playing fields. According to Diamond (2002), the pressure to adopt the democratic forms of
governments does not consolidate democracy, instead it leads to the creation of ‘pseudodemocracies’, or ‘electoral authoritarianism’ where the existence of formal democratic institutions for example multi-party electoral competition masks the reality of authoritarian domination. Even during the heydays of the liberal democratic paradigm in 1990s, the Western pressure for democratisation was inconsistent and often ineffective (Crawford, 2001). Levitsky and Way (2005) therefore suggest that leverage is most effective when combined with linkages to the West because linkages to the West also increases the costs of maintaining authoritarianism. However, it will be explained in this chapter that there are limitations to this proposition as well.

Levitsky and Way use a range of robust indicators to categorise a multitude of countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America and new Europe in terms of their leverage and linkages to the West. While explaining the levels of leverage, they take into account characteristics like states’ raw size and military and economic strength, the existence of competing issues on Western foreign policy agendas, and finally, the states’ access to political, economic, or military support from an alternative regional power. Levitsky and Way categorise the linkages to the West in terms of economic linkages, geopolitical linkages, social linkages, communication linkages, and transnational civil society linkages. Pakistan is not included in their study and therefore some of the indicators selected by Levitsky and Way are being used in this chapter to assess the complex and unique case of Pakistan. They propose that regimes are less vulnerable to external democratising pressure in countries where Western governments have important economic or security interests at stake. The case of Pakistan not only validates that proposition but also suffices to indicate that the priorities and objectives of Western foreign policy can actually consolidate authoritarianism and undermine the possibilities of transition to democracy. It is essential to note that the history of Pakistan’s linkages to the West primarily signifies her constrained attachment to the US and therefore this study takes into account the bilateral relations between US and Pakistan.

The case of Pakistan is different in terms of Western leverage and linkage. Using Levitsky and Way’s indicators (drivers of change) of democratic process and legitimacy in institutional arenas like elections, legislation, judiciary and the media, the case of Pakistan can confidently be referred to as a country that has been
repeatedly oscillating between the status of total authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. Contrary to the general thrust of Levitsky and Way’s argument, Pakistan’s linkage with the West (mainly US) has been extremely counterproductive for democracy instead, these linkages have quite deliberately nurtured authoritarian regimes. Pakistan’s geopolitical position and strategic location on the world map has galvanised her strategic importance during and after the cold war era. Therefore, her linkage to the US had different economic, strategic and political implications when compared to the other third world countries. Although the Western demands for democratisation were amplified during the post cold war era, authoritarianism remained embedded in Pakistan’s political organisation since the inception of the country in 1947 for several reasons. Indeed the three major military regimes, each of which lasted for about a decade, have been fully and overtly (with some exceptions of rhetorical stipulation for democratisation) backed up by the US administration. The following history of US-Pakistan’s bilateral relations determines the extent to which the linkages between Pakistan and US perpetuated authoritarianism in Pakistan.

The relations between Pakistan and India have always been characterised by extreme levels of distrust, antagonism and complex disputes over the regional political and ethnic matters. Since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have also been quite hostile; the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are rooted in the controversial history of Pakistan’s NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province). Khan (2010) describes that after the partition of Indian subcontinent in 1947, the then Afghan government denounced the 1893’s Anglo-Afghan treaty that was the basis of demarcation of an international boundary between Afghanistan and the British India. At the time of partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the delineation of the borderline called Durand line⁹ was not accepted by the Afghan government and she made a claim over the North Western Frontier Province of the newly established state of Pakistan. In attempts to integrate the NWFP Province

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⁹The Durand Line refers to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is approximately 2,640 kilometres long. In 1893, Durand Line Agreement between the Government of British India and Afghan ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan was agreed upon for demarcating the limit of their respective spheres of influence. It is named after Henry Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India at that time. This single-page agreement (that contained seven short articles) was signed in order to prevent mutual interference beyond this frontier line between Afghanistan and what was then the British India (now Pakistan). (Source: http://www.wikipedia.org/)
into Afghanistan, the Afghan government began to support secessionist elements in Pakistan and taking advantage of the circumstances. India also extended her full support on this issue to Afghanistan in order to destabilise Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistan was caught between the two hostile neighbours on her Eastern and Western borders and she desperately needed a strong and well-equipped army in order to secure her national security and territorial integrity. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the civil military bureaucracy has always held sway in both internal and external governing affairs of the new state of Pakistan. Khan (2010) notes that the inclination of Pakistan’s armed forces towards the United States pushed Pakistani leaders to opt for a close US-Pakistan relationship in order to secure a strong external ally against the regional threats to her national security and territorial integrity. Other than that, the ruling establishment of Pakistan also anticipated that the economic and military needs of the country could, at its best, be served by the economically stable United States. However since then, the relations between Pakistan and US have been lopsided wherein US has been thoroughly utilising this relationship with a broader global agenda whereas the benefits for Pakistan from these relations have not been more than counterproductive military and economic concerns. The overall costs paid by Pakistan are way too higher than the geo-strategic and economic benefits derived from this unequal partnership.

During the initial years after Pakistan’s independence, Mahmud (1991) explains, the United States regarded Pakistan not only as a major player in the containment of communism but also envisaged Pakistan’s army as a stabilising force in the Middle East and even in the Southeast Asia. Khan (2010) concludes that whether it was the containment of communist advance in South Asia, the protection of the US interests in the oil-rich Middle East or very recently the US war against terrorism, the US has desperately needed Pakistan because the achievement of those objectives was not possible without Pakistan's support. The US victory over the USSR was owed to Pakistan’s (General Zia ul Haq) support during the last phase of the Cold War. Similarly, the current occupation of Afghanistan by US was facilitated by the military regime of General Musharraf that provided US with the intelligence and logistic support. Khan (2010) believes that due to these reasons, the United States has always
preferred military dictators over democratically elected governments in Pakistan. The possibilities and prospects of Pakistan’s democratisation were severely diminished in such circumstances. The impact of such exogenous factors not only helped military dictators like Ayub, Zia and Musharraf to protract their illegitimate regimes but also extended the sphere of Pakistani army’s role in governance of the country. The US-Pakistan linkage has therefore proven to be extremely devastating for Pakistan as US-backed military regimes have thwarted the process of constitutional development, politicised the army and have increased the role of army at the cost of building civilian and democratic institutions (Rizvi, 2000; Zaidi, n.d.).

The history of Pakistan’s linkages with US demonstrates that contrary to Levitsky and Way’s premise, the US as the most dominant Western political actor has been successful in achieving her geo-strategic objectives by manipulating the authoritarian regimes rather than effectively pressurising them for democratisation. It is argued that strategic and geopolitical objectives precedes everything else in US’s priority list and the case of Pakistan is a convincing example. The understanding of Pakistan’s vulnerability in terms of Western leverage and her counterproductive linkages is foundational in the assessment of her failed democratic institutions at the national and regional level political organisation. Pakistan has remained a British colony since the 1857 however, since her independence in 1947, she’s been primarily associated with US in terms of leverage and geopolitical linkages. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location and her well-organised army are the critical factors that shaped up the dynamics of US foreign policy for Pakistan vis-à-vis the Cold War and War on Terror. Therefore, the US foreign policy agenda has been remarkably different for Pakistan when compared to any other third world country. In essence, democratisation and good governance reforms have been the least important objectives of US foreign policy, if at all.

3.1.2 International Aid, Conditionalities and Structural Adjustment Programmes

In order to understand the dynamics of democratisation in competitive authoritarian regimes, it is also essential to take into account the convergence of economic development and political agendas of the international monetary and financial institutions that are dominated by the developed states of the world. The distinction between political and economic strategies is apparently becoming extinct i.e. economic interests are shaping up the political strategies to such an extent which
plausibly transcends the impact of other social and cultural considerations. A wide range of contemporary literature assesses the impact of development aid, the strings attached called conditionalities\(^{10}\) and structural adjustment programmes on the economic development, democratisation and institution building in aid recipient country. The following part of the chapter reviews the critique of international monetary and financial organisations’ policies and their respective outcomes in terms of their impact on development management and institutions of governance.

The World Bank (1992) reports that in developing countries, the poor development management is a result of weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal framework, weak financial accounting and auditing systems, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain and variable policy frameworks, and inefficient decision-making, which increases risks of corruption. In addition, pervasive patronage in governments has led to public investment choices being used to finance white elephants, usually by contracting excessive foreign debt. On one hand, the assessment of political, economic and administrative issues and practice in developing countries, by the leading bilateral multilateral aid/development agencies and financial/monetary organisations leaves little room for challenge in terms of the problem diagnosis. However, on the other hand, the coercive remedial course of action provided by such organisations e.g. IMF and the World Bank has proven to be highly devastating in countries where the Western leverage is high.

‘One size fits all’ (Stiglitz, 2002) road map to restructuring the economy and public sector that is highly preached by the Bank and IMF, of course with some insignificant variations, is all good in theory but in practice, it has apparently ended up in exacerbating the economic and political conditions of aid recipient countries, again of course with some exceptions. The strategies for the quest of political and economic power have changed in the wake of the new world order. While a direct military invasion remains an option for the dominant states, manipulating and capitalising on their economic power, either directly through bilateral relationships or indirectly via IFIs (International Financial Institutions), has become an apparently less austere yet a

\(^{10}\) The high conditionality lending refers to the process in which international monetary institutions offer loans on the promise of borrowing countries to pursue a specified set of economic, political and administrative policies (Sachs, 1989)
very effective instrument for retaining their influence in international political power arenas.

There is no doubt that the development aid from international agencies can potentially augment governance reforms, provided it is managed well. For instance, the effectiveness of the aid can be enhanced by offering technical assistance in electoral mechanisms; supporting the institutionalisation of sovereign and autonomous elected assemblies and councils; parallel reforms in judiciary and bureaucracy; and consolidation of the political and civil society. Nonetheless, the flow of international aid has been criticised with a variety of good reasons. According to the iconic neoclassical economist, Milton Friedman (1958), foreign aid is detrimental to the civil liberties and democracy, because the international aid is received by the governments of the recipient countries and therefore it increases the size and role of the public sector as compared to private sector. Knack (2004), argues that aid recipient governments tend to be accountable primarily to their foreign donors and not to the taxpayers whereas Grossman (1992) believes that foreign aid has the potential to encourage military authoritarianism and cause political instability because the receipt of aid is valued as a bounty and such perceptions in turn diminish the prospects of democratic governance. Due to the absence of genuine democratic institutions, Knack’s (2004) and Grossman’s (1992) arguments can be verified in case of Pakistan wherein the non-democratic and distant state has been more responsive to the demands of foreign donors at the expense of public accountability. Rather than blocking development aid to the autocratic governments of Pakistan, the international financial institutions have been funding them heavily in programmes of ‘good governance’.

It is argued that the priorities of international organisations in terms of allocation of development aid are determined by the economic and strategic objectives of the states that dominate and run these organisations for instance, Alesina and Dollar (2000) studied the patterns of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to the recipient countries and found considerable evidence that the allocation of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients countries. They also suggest that colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid. Secondly, while allocating
development aid, the international organisations overlook the political and administrative composition of the post-colonial states and other associated complexities. Therefore, it is more frequently observed that a ‘one size fits all’ packages of reforms (supply driven policy rather than a demand driven objective) are pushed forward. Besides that, development aid is also sanctioned without considering the fact that the strength and effectiveness of institutions of governance is totally dependant on a precondition - democracy - as Santiso (2001) argues that neither democracy nor good governance is sustainable without the other and therefore democratisation and good governance reforms need to be perceived and pursued together.

The case of Pakistan clearly indicates that allocation of development aid is driven by the political and strategic agendas of US and Western led financial agencies rather than the real developmental and institution building needs of the country. Pakistan received huge sums\textsuperscript{11} of development aid from US and other Western multilateral aid and development agencies despite the fact that the country remained under the control of autocrats mostly. The pursuit of good governance reforms becomes meaningless in authoritarian regimes instead it obstructs the development of political institutions and nurtures authoritarianism. In similar vein, the impact of conditionalities that are part and parcel of international aid, is also questionable. It is important to note that not all types of conditionalities are detrimental; certain conditions can be quite effective e.g. anti-corruption measures and improvements in tax collection system but at the same time, austere conditionalities like devaluation of currency, floating interest rate, reduction in public expenditures, downsizing the public sector, abolishment of subsidies and the imposition of new taxes only contribute to the economic polarisation and social exclusion of the marginalised groups of citizenry. Kapur and Webb (2000) argue that properly designed governance related conditionalities can potentially improve the effectiveness of aid however, if such conditionalities are imposed on a makeshift basis that only focus on the short-term foreign policy objectives of major shareholders of IFIs in which a high degree of discretion is involved in sanctions, the impact of the aid is not likely to be pro-poor.

\textsuperscript{11} Pakistan received $58 billion in foreign aid between 1950 and 1999 (Easterly, 2001)
Referring to the developing countries, the following examples will corroborate the idea that there is very insignificant association between the aid/conditionality and democratisation, if at all. According to a study by Crawford (2001), conditionality made a significant contribution to democratisation in only 2 out of 29 cases during the 1990s. Crawford studied 29 cases of politically motivated aid allocations between 1990 and 1996 and found that only in 13 cases, aid was sanctioned after the improvement of recipient countries’ ranking in the Freedom House indexes. Similarly, a study by Knack (2004) provides a multivariate analysis of the impact of aid on democratisation in a large sample of recipient countries over the period between 1975 and 2000. Using two different democracy indexes and two different measures of aid intensity, Knack finds no evidence that aid promotes democracy. His findings remained the same even when the analysis was confined to the post Cold War period i.e. between 1990 and 2000, despite the fact that reliance of the US and other donors on authoritarian regimes was considerably reduced.

Owing to the changing political economy circumstances worldwide, the scope of aid conditionalities also expanded beyond the economic spheres towards the political dimensions in the last decades of the 20th century. The World Bank's mandate, as laid down in its Articles of Agreement is to promote sustainable economic and social development. However, the memorandum of Bank’s general council also suggests that countries’ governance of public sector and economy may be relevant to the Bank's work if it is concerned with efficient management of a country's resources. Thus, there could well be a need for the Bank to encourage, for example, civil service reform, legal reform, and accountability for public funds and budget discipline (Shihata, 1991 cited in The World Bank, 1992). Legal reforms undoubtedly refer to the amendments in constitutions which should, by all means, remain the domain of a state’s sovereign legislative bodies and should reflect the voice and interests of the governed. However, IMF and World Bank’s ‘conditioned’ policies have drastically changed rules in use in international and domestic politics over the last few decades. Austere dictation in matters ranging from micromanagement of economy to the hegemonic control of third world regimes, by international multilateral and bilateral aid organisations is a blatant encroachment upon the sovereignty of dependant poor countries. Aid recipient country’s democratic credentials and capacity to govern is thus adversely affected with the sanction of aid that is politically motivated and
conditioned in line with the strategic and economic agendas of IFIs and the states that dominate them. The effectiveness of development aid and associated conditionalties can be enhanced if the aid is primarily conditioned with the most essential conditionality i.e. democracy. This will not only increase the costs of maintaining autocracies to a prohibitive level but will also spur the process and enhance the prospects of democratisation.

The limitations in the scope of this study does not allow space for detailed impact assessment of the foreign aid received by Pakistan from IFIs however, in a nutshell it is argued that Pakistan’s economic growth that is attributed to the development aid has had a significant impact on widening the economic and social inequality gap between the various income and social groups of Pakistani society. Evaluating the economic impact of foreign aid in Pakistan, Easterly (2001), concludes that Pakistan has had a considerable per capita growth between 1950 and 1999 and intensive involvement of international financial agencies and donors. Pakistani population includes well-educated and well-to-do elite groups however, considering the economic growth, Pakistan underperforms on most of the social and political indicators e.g. education, health, sanitation, fertility, gender equality, corruption, political instability, and democracy. Easterly (2001) refers to these outcomes of economic growth as ‘growth without development’ and concludes that the foreign aid has actually contributed to overall economic growth of the country but it has failed in promoting social and institutional development because of the elite domination, social polarisation and ethnic divisions. It is quite evident that despite the linkages to US and considerable amount of international aid received by Pakistan, the prospects for democratisation and establishment of other institutions of governance remained bleak.

The following part of the chapter highlights the critical association between democratisation and institutions of governance.

3.2 Democratisation and Institutions

The institutions of governance are foundational in determining the effectiveness of any democratic polity as their strength and role can either be positively enabling or at worst, containing the preconditions that are required for democratisation. O’Donnell (1993, 1999) argues that an effective state, which upholds the rule of law, is essential for protecting the basic (civil and political) rights that are central to democracy. On
the contrary, strong states can also enhance autocratic stability (Huntington, 1968; Skocpol, 1979). Whereas some of the states’ institutions keep a check on the overwhelming executive power and uphold a democratic rule of law, others involve in suppressing the opposing political forces and tend to maintain political hegemony. The autocrats of competitive authoritarian regimes have managed to survive in the countries where the autocratic governments had a firm hold of the state’s organisations that enabled them to suppress the opposition uprising (Levitsky and Way, 2010). The striking levels of weaknesses and instability of institutions of governance (e.g. judiciary, political society and civil society) and weak enforcement of formal institutions (e.g. state’s constitutions) also adds to the overwhelming power concentration in the dominant institutions of the state.

In weakly institutionalised governments, constitutions usually fail to constrain powerful actors for example where the constitutional courts, electoral commissions, and other formal checks on executive power are apparently independent, but are often intimidated, patronised, or neutralised in practice (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). Some of the strong establishment divisions like the executive or federal bureaucracy of the state not only patronise other the formal and informal institutions but also tend to overshadow the elected legislative bodies thereby establishing the supremacy of executive over the legislature. Levitsky and Way (2010) referring to such scenarios, believe that the political outcomes are frequently the products of de facto power relations, rather than formal rules.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan has a history of oscillating between the status of a total authoritarian state and competitive authoritarian regime. The constitution of 1973 was framed by the elected government of Z. A. Bhutto and it was passed unanimously by the leaders of all political parties in the national assembly. The 1973 Constitution had adopted a federal parliamentary system for the country with a bicameral legislature in which the president was only a symbolic head of the state whereas the de facto governing authority was vested in the elected government i.e. the national and provincial assemblies. Later, during the military regimes of Zia and Musharraf, many amendments were incorporated in the constitution, which changed the entire character of the constitution. Thereafter, the bicameral legislative system remained intact however, the notorious 8th amendment passed by the parliament in Zia’s authoritarian
regime in 1985 changed the status of Pakistan’s government from a parliamentary to semi-presidential form of government and allowed the President, a number of additional powers that included the constitutional authority to dissolve the elected assemblies. This controversial amendment was subsequently abused several times by the Presidents of Pakistan to maintain their hold over the elected parliaments.

The three military dictators did not only organise sham referendums to get themselves elected as presidents but also maintained their firm grip over the weak parliaments through arbitrary amendments in the constitution. The constitution was altered in attempts to mask the realities of autocracy under the garb of democracy to such an extent that the functional domains of army and the executive were almost indistinguishable. During their respective regimes, Ayub, Zia and Musharraf also held the office of the President of Pakistan while leading the army at the same time. A typical modus operandi of Pakistani military dictators includes taking over the elected government, dissolving the legislative assemblies, twisting and amending the constitution via executive orders, getting elected as a President via sham referendum, pressurising the supreme judiciary for indemnifying the military coup and other associated political manoeuvres, introducing local government reforms and using the powerful organisations of army and state to organise and manipulate the general elections so that the parliament that is run by the King’s party remains under total control. The civil and political liberties are typically done away with and regional dissents or other political uprising is then crushed using the law enforcement organisations of the state mainly the army, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies and police.

The issues related to democratisation and good governance are intermingled. The typical paradox i.e. ‘what leads to what’ or ‘what is a prerequisite for what’ remains open to various views, making the quest for long term solutions even more complex. Hyden et al. (2004) conclude from their empirical study that the failures in development and obstacles to democratisation stem from a failure to undertake the necessary steps in establishing a system of rules that legitimise political choices and political behaviour. Their conclusion provides a launching pad for the assessment of the core hurdles in the three major attempts of grass root democratisation in the form of decentralisation reforms tried in Pakistan since her independence in 1947. It has
been argued that democratisation and good governance are inter-dependent and therefore in the absence of autonomous democratic institutions, hopes for effective and efficient national and local governance are not more than sheer wishful thinking.

3.3 What Makes Governance – Good?

Research pertaining to multi-disciplinary academic subjects like decentralisation and governance needs to establish a foundation that is usually built by borrowing from approaches, theories, ideologies, models and concepts from a wide range of disciplines that help in explaining the categorically focused research themes. In order to tackle a common complaint, that governance is vaguely defined and the scope of application of governance is usually not specified in social sciences literature, Chhotray and Stoker (2009:3) broadly defines governance as the ‘practice of collective decision-making’. Before setting out for a cross-disciplinary tour of governance, they generally define governance as follows

‘Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there is a plurality of actors or organisations and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationships between these actors and organisation’

They elaborate on this definition by explaining a few terms used in this definition. Rules can be formal or informal (i.e. rules in use) and decision-making procedures in some institutional form may be stable over time but not necessarily unchanging and collective decisions involve issues of mutual influence and control. Decision-making can be strategic but it can also be contained in everyday implementation practice of system or organisation and finally ‘no formal control system can dictate’ the relationships and outcomes. This definition certainly leads to a premise that considering governance as formal and informal practice, the principles for governance certainly cannot be confined to some pre-demarcated normative and idealised set of rules.

In order to avoid normative naivety, this research does not attempt to establish parameters based on some context specific and confined lists of principles against
which the practice of governance and approaches to democratisation can be assessed and generalised. Nonetheless, this study inevitably takes into account, some of the plausibly dominant discourses, ideologies, theories and models (e.g. principles of reinventing government: steering rather than rowing) as referents for the explanation of issues in practice that are seen as the outcomes of prescribed models which are usually clubbed under the broader umbrella of good governance recipes. In order to develop a set of relatively reliable benchmarks for analysis of the case study, competing views from relevant theoretical debates are referred to throughout the literature review of this study.

According to UNDP (1997), governance is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. Similarly, Hyden et al. (2004) define governance as the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions. Hence, they demarcate the implications of governance as the mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their conflicts. Hyden et al. (2004) enumerate and define six institutional arenas of governance namely civil society (where citizens gather on a voluntary basis to promote specific issues), political society (where the political representation is defined, the political agenda is set, and the regulatory apparatus is outlined), executive (where policy decisions are made on programmatic basis and the regulatory apparatus is designed), bureaucracy (where policy is implemented and the regulatory apparatus enacted), economic society (where state-market relations are defined) and judiciary (where the rule of law is enforced). They identified principles for good governance as participation, decency, fairness, accountability, transparency and efficiency. On similar notes, Minogue et al. (1998) comprehend the modern governance as the relationship between state and its people, treated not only as consumers but also as citizens, with their rights protected, voices heard, values and preferences respected and efficient public service delivery ensured.

Pressure for democratisation, stress on good governance reforms and transformation to the free market economy were essential driving factors of the paradigm shift that occurred during the last decade of twentieth century. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) in
their groundbreaking book ‘Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector’ suggested the principles of reinventing the government which advocates for catalytic governments separating ‘steering’ (devising policy and regulation) functions from ‘rowing’ (service-delivery and compliance functions). They categorically stressed on the shifts to community-owned government - empowering rather than serving citizens - which would push the control of services out of the bureaucracy, into the community. They also urged for competitive government that required service providers to compete for their businesses, based on their performance and the offer of price. Among the other guidelines were target-oriented governments that would avoid regulating internally, eliminating many of their internal rules and fundamentally simplifying their administrative procedures such as budgeting, personnel management and procurement. The guidelines also require result-oriented governments to shift accountability from input mechanisms to outcomes; be customer/market oriented and enterprising; restructure the private sector to solve problems of service delivery rather than using administrative mechanisms such as regulation; and finally decentralise the government that would devolve the authority down through the political and administrative organisation.

The above-mentioned principles of reinventing the government sound quite reasonable with prima facie evidence but their application in post-colonial autocracies or countries with highly centralised governance structures, is never without pitfalls. It is emphatically argued that in the absence of contextual analysis of the embedded complexities and institutional decay in the developing countries, the ‘one size fits all’ programmes of good governance, on the contrary, deteriorate the existing institutional fabric of those states still further. The development of institutions of governance is a long-term evolutionary process and therefore a sudden shock of paradigm shift that is stipulated by the changing geopolitical circumstances worldwide, is very unlikely to be absorbed easily by the states that have a long history of inherent governance predicaments.

As explained in chapter 2, the chronology of governance practice in Pakistan reveals a very daunting scenario. The preliminary literature review of local governance issues in general and Pakistan’s local government reforms in particular exposed a range of complexities in the political, social and administrative realms. These underlying
issues and complications have made it improbable for the western models of good governance to effectively work in a post-colonial state like Pakistan where the persistent lack of institutional development has drastically impeded the progress of reforms. Governance is about formal and informal practice, which spreads across various institutional arenas. A comprehensive analysis of the approaches and outcomes of governance therefore need a reassessment based on revised parameters that go beyond the subtle normative discourse as idealised in many prescribed models and programmes.

3.4 Concluding Note
Based on documentary analysis, this chapter has highlighted the wider political economy perspectives for the understanding of a multitude of exogenous factors that collectively affected the national governance dispensation in Pakistan. Pakistan’s geographical location and the regional political circumstances immediately after her independence compelled her to establish collaborative relations with the US however, this lopsided linkage has proven to be extremely counterproductive for the process of democratisation and prospects of institution building in Pakistan. The authoritarian regimes continued to rule Pakistan under the auspices of US administration. Various US administrations exploited these asymmetrical relationships by taking advantage of Pakistani army’s alliance in controlling the oil rich middle East, containment of USSR advancement in South Asia and recently the global war on terror. Although the elections for legislative bodies have been sporadically conducted at national, provincial and regional level, the elected parliaments and local governments could never work autonomously in the omnipresence of a dominating army, executive and bureaucracy. The state has been stranded between complete autocracy and competitive authoritarianism. While the army, executive and federal bureaucracy thrived beyond the legitimate constitutional limits in terms of de facto governing powers and authority, a corresponding consequential impact deteriorated other critical institutions of governance like judiciary, political society, economic society and civil society.

Foreign aid has been sanctioned frequently to Pakistan by US, IMF, WB and other multilateral aid and development agencies but, by and large, the prime beneficiary of
this aid has been the Pakistani army. The continuous inflow of development aid has improved the economic growth rate but instead of having a trickle down impact on economic development of the masses of citizenry, foreign aid has contributed further to the polarisation of the economic society. For the autonomous and effective functioning of institutions of governance in a democratic polity, it is essential that the constitution ensure a balance of power between them. In Pakistan, the constitution has been twisted frequently to maintain the dominance of the executive over the democratically elected governments. With centralised authoritarianism spread across the whole political and administrative organisation of the country, the prospects for effective local governments are dim. Considering the severity and complications in the nature of governance problems of Pakistan, it would appear that the preconditions of good governance are almost non-existent. The remainder of this study does not directly focus on Pakistan’s failure to achieve good governance instead it converges on the politics and dynamics of local government reform in adverse circumstances. The negative impact of colonial legacies, geo-political external pressures and the inadequacies of development support suffice to explain Pakistan’s failure in governance reforms. The subsequent part of the study explains the particular nature and local features of that failure.
Section 2
Literature Review:
Decentralisation, Civil Bureaucracy and Clientelism
Chapter 4
Decentralisation – Issues and Perspectives

Various authors have referred to four major forms of decentralisation. They are de-concentration, delegation to semi autonomous or parastatal agencies, devolution of political power to local governments, and transfer of functions from public to non-governmental institutions. Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) defined these types of decentralisation as follows. Deconcentration is the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central government. It is the transfer of workload from central government to the field staff outside the national capital, without having assigned them the decision-making authority. Delegation of decision-making authority to semi-autonomous organisations, outside the government ministries, is also a form of decentralisation. In devolution, the central government gives up certain functions and creates new units of government, outside its direct control. Finally, the transfer of planning and administrative responsibility from government to voluntary, private, or non-governmental organisations is another type of decentralisation. Decentralisation purists consider devolution, the transfer of political authority to the sub-national governments that are accountable to the sub-national populations through a ballot box, as the only authentic form of decentralisation (Turner and Hulme, 1997).

Since this study focuses on the working relationship between the de-concentrated administrative machinery and devolved local governments, the terms ‘decentralisation’ and ‘devolution’ are used synonymously throughout this study because they refers to the ‘devolution of power’ reforms introduced and implemented in year 2001 in Pakistan that implicated a major restructuring of mentioned institutions of local governance.

This chapter is based on literature review of theories and perspectives on decentralisation. We find that decentralisation reforms are undermined by factors such as the lack of official capacity and managerial skills of local government representatives; weaknesses in political and civil society organisations; the lack of political activism; asymmetries and coordination issues in inter-governmental and inter-institutional relationships; limitations in fiscal decentralisation; and finally, corruption in localised governance. The discussion developed in this chapter will be used as an analytical framework for the analysis of evidence in the case study, which
will in turn explain how the aggregate impact of above-mentioned factors undermines the inter-institutional working relationships and, ultimately, the effectiveness of local government reforms.

4.1 Official Capacity and Managerial Skills Issues in Local Governance

One of the main reasons for inefficient performance of local government as pointed out by many theorists is the lack of capacity, capability and managerial skills of local government officials. Programmes for decentralising social service delivery and development functions to the local organisations need to be at par with capacities of the implementing and executing agencies. Central governments are often unable to support decentralisation experiments with competent personnel, efficient administration and other badly needed resources (Rondinelli, 1983). The lack of managerial and technical expertise at the local level thus eventually hinders efficient provision of the public services. The World Bank (2004a) suggests that the central government can provide training to the local government in top-down ways or it can create an enabling environment for training by using its finance and regulatory powers in order to help the sub-national governments define their needs thereby making the process demand-driven. The Bank suggests that training programmes can also be imparted by the local or national private sector. In addition, the central government can also allow and enable the local governments to learn by doing. However, since the establishment of local governments is always politically motivated - positively or otherwise - the nature of relationship between the central government and local governments may lead to different outcomes.

Local governments are likely to develop their managerial skills and learn by doing when the institution of local government is kept functional as an integral tier of government and local elections are held on regular basis. Managerial capabilities of local government incumbents are not likely to develop in circumstances wherein the local governments are functional only in sporadic phases. Getting recognition for local governments in the public eye through regular local elections means that local governments are seen as an integral part of the government to which citizens can resort to while tackling their civic problems. With the long-term institutionalisation,
the elected local government officials will not only identify their formal role and responsibilities in terms of social service delivery but will also have opportunities to enhance their management skills on a continuous basis. In contrast, if the elected local bodies are created on a makeshift basis and/or controlled by the higher levels of governments, they are not likely to allow the local incumbents to develop their political and professional skills to the required levels.

A new setup of local governments needs time to acclimatise in the existing structure of public sector management. Particularly in countries, where there has been a sudden transition from highly centralised and bureaucratic decision-making procedures to a localised and devolved government, issues related to managerial skills and technical capacity loom large. While working under the entrenched structures of bureaucratic civil administrations, the local government officials are not likely to feel confident in execution of policy or in meeting the demands from their electorates. In order to establish local governments as an institution, comprehensive training and skill development programmes on a regular basis are critically important. Local government representatives’ lack of proper training and managerial skills lead to an undermining of their decision-making capacities on one hand and their total dependence on civil bureaucrats on the other.

Other than the limitations of the managerial skills and professional training of local government incumbent, the ambiguities in terms of official capacity and equivocal policy - such as blurred job description - also incapacitates the local government representatives. In other words, they get assigned a responsibility without the due authority. Therefore, the lack of clear delineation of official role and formal official authority adversely affects the local tier of governments. In addition, for an efficient management of local fiscal affairs, the local government representatives are expected to be well-versed with budgeting and revenue collection skills. However, their non-technical background and lack of experience in this regard gives an undue advantage to the civil bureaucrats who eventually dominate the local councils that are responsible for fiscal management in a locality. Together, the lack of managerial skills and complications in official authorities not only destabilise the decentralised government but also jeopardise the working relationships between the officials of civil administration and local government incumbents.
Although the two phases of decentralisation reforms were experienced by the citizens of Pakistan in Ayub and Zia’s epoch, the ‘Devolution of Power Plan (2001) was quite different and was implemented very unexpectedly in Pakistan. This was yet another radical change in local governance dispensation of the country in which the federal and provincial bureaucracy felt threatened by the establishment of a new local government system. Many political and administrative changes were introduced in the reforms that were to curtail the influence of civil bureaucracy to a greater extent however, since the transition to devolved governments was so abrupt, the official capacity and management skills credentials of the newly elected local government representatives remained questionable right from the first day. The local governments were assigned responsibilities to deliver municipal and administrative services for which they were not technically and professionally trained. It is essential to note that the issue of local incumbents’ lack of administrative and managerial skills was not an unprecedented phenomenon. Considering the administrative and political setup of Pakistani public sector, the problem of management skills and official capacity of local incumbents has always been limiting their effectiveness in local governance.

4.2 Demographic Heterogeneity and Elite Capture

The reasons for strong secessionist tendencies in developing countries are multifaceted such as the extent of social heterogeneity, multi-ethnicity - and the most important of all - regional socio-economic disparities and inequalities. Separatist movements are usually encountered with repression in authoritarian regimes but the time-tested rational and political strategy to pacify such uprisings is to allow self-rule in peripheries because localisation helps reduce the resentment of the marginalised and deprived social groups. Smith (1985) argues that cultural variations, uneven economic development, ethnic diversity and persistent primordial loyalties often produce irresistible pressures for decentralisation, though the political pressure may emanate from movements demanding complete separation from the state: secession. Different ethnic groups are exclusive, competing with one another, and primarily interested in furthering the welfare of their own group members, as postulated by Olson (1982). Considering the implications of socio-political heterogeneity in social services management, La Porta et al. (1999) found that ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is negatively associated with the provision of public goods. Their
results indicate that in countries that are linguistically diverse, infant mortality rates and illiteracy are likely to be higher, and school attainment and infrastructure quality are likely to be poorer.

It is also critical to note that the social heterogeneity makes it more difficult for the citizens to organise the expression of their interest with the help of ballot box and therefore the political process to arrive at cooperative social and political solutions becomes elusive. Social and economic heterogeneity is an important factor that influences the nature of relationship between voters and government. In chapter 6, it will be explained why certain social groups are politically marginalised and how an effective local government system can potentially overcome this issue. Similarly, when resources are scarce, policy makers are invariably constrained in their approach towards meeting an extremely diversified nature of demands from a socially heterogeneous and economically polarised society. If the political power and development management is devolved to the fragmented localities, the probability of emergence of a collectivised momentous opposition to the central government gradually diminishes. In addition, regional economic disparities can also be reduced with political and fiscal decentralisation. The discussion of social heterogeneity is critically important in this study because the political, economic and civil society of Pakistan is highly heterogeneous. It is argued that an effective political and administrative decentralisation policy can significantly extend the central government’s outreach to the socially fragmented groups residing in geographically scattered regions of the country.

A good deal of public choice literature (Platteau, 2003; Bardhan, 2002; Abraham and Platteau, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2003) associates decentralisation programmes with elite capture. The literature propounds that elite capture increases the propensity for the local government to over-provide the public services to the local elites at the expense of the non-elites. Public choice theorists argue that local governments are prone to elite capture because the citizens and politicians have lopsided positions in terms of social power, economic resources, knowledge of political and administrative procedures and educational attainment. Others like Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that some degree of elite domination is inevitable for local development particularly in rural areas, where the elites are often characterised as leaders representing economic,
moral and political authority in their respective constituencies. However, the explanation of proneness of local government to elite capture is overly pessimistic because it ignores the potential of local political institutions to redress the issues of elite capture.

It is argued that a long-term comprehensive process of government’s decentralisation is one of the primary solutions to contain the elite capture. Elite capture is an ailment of political institution that needs to be treated and a vigilant treatment does not require the elimination of patient (institution), in fact, the institution needs consolidation for resisting and eliminating the ailment. The factors that are reckoned as responsible for elite capture of local resources are indeed the factors that undermine the progress of local governments. It is emphasised that an effective programme of decentralisation should, in principle, mitigate the issues that perpetrate the elite capture of local government’s resources. The core purpose of delegating the political decision-making authorities to the citizens is to involve them in self-government and therefore the probability of elite capture should, in principle, be reduced by improvements in civic engagement with the help of exquisitely designed electoral processes. Although elite capture remains a threat to the effectiveness of local governments, their proneness to this threat can be reduced by containing the factors that lead to elite capture, not by limiting the role of the local government. In a nutshell, decentralisation of government enhances the value of citizens’ vote and improves civic engagement which in turn reduces the probability of elite capture.

4.3 The Apolitical and Not So Civil Societies
This part of the chapter explains why the role of political and civil society is critical for effective democratisation process not only at the central level but also the local level of government. ‘Political society’, as defined by Hyden et al. (2004) is the place where public demands get tackled by specific political institutions. The very nature and organisation of political society is central to the effectiveness and efficiency of democratic governance because the design of electoral systems and organisation of the political groups affect the way in which the aggregate political interests influence and augment the benevolent policy outcomes. Although the existence of political groups and the practice of elections are necessary conditions, they are certainly not
sufficient; a fair degree of polity’s sovereignty and an informed political society, *inter alia*, have an enabling impact on the process of democratisation. The right to vote, unconstrained political choices, freedom of information, a substantial degree of political activism and state’s positive role in consolidating local political institutions and encouraging the political participation are foundational requirements in this regard.

Civic engagement and political activism are positively associated with the development of the political society and therefore the decentralisation reforms are likely to be undermined in the absence of an effective political society. In regimes based on Islamic ideologies, fatalism also contributes to undermining an extremely essential prerequisite of a democratic polity i.e. political activism; fatalism thus allows the autocratic rulers a free hand in self-enriching policy pursuits (Gurgur and Shah, 2005). This type of impediment to political activism is significant even in democratically elected governments. Citizens’ fatalistic perceptions (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009) about the will of God, destiny, and divine accountability prevent them from meaningful engagement in politics. Public scrutiny thus diminishes. ‘What is destined to happen will happen anyways’ or ‘my single vote won’t matter anyways’ is the type of fatalistic perception and civic attitude which serves as a formidable barrier to effective political activism. The reasons for indifference towards the political and civic engagement may be varied but their impact on political society in general is enormous. The outcomes of participatory democracy depends on multiple factors such as the transformation of the political culture and the existence of a civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), the proliferation of autonomous civil society organisations and the capacity of those organisations to represent the plurality and diversity of civil society’s interests (Dahl, 1982; Putnam, 1992), and the existence of the institutionalised mechanisms that make participatory democracy viable for example referendums and freedom of assembly (Macpherson, 1977).

All modes of democracy, i.e. representative democracy, direct democracy and advocacy or deliberative democracy (Dalton et al., 2004) endow citizens with a right to vote. In order to be able to make effective use of their vote, citizens need a choice and the more choice they have, the better the progress of democratic government becomes. However, it is not only the practice of elections that suffices; the right to
vote needs to be accompanied with a thorough freedom of choice. If the voter is constrained with limited information, political, social and financial pressures, the very process of democratic practices becomes meaningless or even more predatory. A detailed analysis of the extent to which the social, economic and political constraints of voters restrain their political freedom is included in chapter 6.

Citizenry in Pakistan is socially and heterogeneous and economically polarised which adds to the difficulties in policy development that is based on foundations of democratic principles. The colonial rule has left strong and a relatively organised army and civil administrative system that continues to control the institutions of governance in the post-colonial Pakistan. These institutions were significantly helpful for administering the subcontinent during the British rule but after the partition in 1947, their continued entrenchment in the governance arenas have proved to be an anathema to the modern principles of democracy and good governance. On the other hand, political institutions - often symbolic though - have been suppressed and seldom allowed any space to nurture. Hence, Pakistan’s political institutions have regularly served as subservient entities for instance the local governments have always worked under the total guardianship of federal and provincial bureaucracies. The limitations in the development of a sound political society have severely contained the progress of local governments.

The role of civil society organisations is equally important in the governance structures. Especially at the local level, the civil society organisations can be very useful in building collaborative relationships between the local communities and local government bodies. The interaction of civil society organisations with local government in social development can have a synergic impact in the local governance as both of these formal and informal institutions collaborate closely with citizens and can potentially tailor the local policy and resource allocation to meet the demands of a local community in the most efficient manner. Starting from the grass root levels, civil society organisations like public safety committees, parents/teachers associations and local social welfare societies have the potential to become partners in boosting the performance of their local governments; after all civic engagement is the key to success. Similarly on a higher level, philanthropic organisations, charities, development organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community
groups, women's organisations, faith based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, business associations, and advocacy groups constitute regional and national civil society that augments the collective political organisation of the state.

The absence or precarious composition of civil society organisations undermines the effectiveness of local governments because it signifies negligible levels of civic engagement. Civil society shapes the ways in which citizens become aware of public issues that concerns them (Hyden et al., 2004). Just like the interdependence link between good governance and democracy (discussed in previous chapter), the association between civil society and political society is also very strong. The problems of civil society in Pakistan are not much different than her issues related to the political society where the task of aggregation of social demands to form a common set of social objectives is a hard task. One of the hurdles in this regard is of course the diversity of interests originating from socially and economically heterogeneous and polarised society of Pakistan. Secondly, the civil society could not easily nurture under the authoritarianism regimes.

In Pakistan, as Zaidi (n.d.) explains, the notion of civil society is restricted to NGOs (Non-Government Organisations) because they are seen to be working for change. He explains that some of advocacy NGOs that have ostensibly worked for democracy have been the active components of civil society. However, the same groups have also turned into defenders of the government on other occasions, particularly for the military regimes and have become partners in military governments. Therefore, their status of civil society organisation is highly dubious as he notes that prominent and well-respected members of Pakistan’s civil society became ministers in the Musharraf’s military government and justified their support for military government by arguing that a liberal and efficient non-elected government was preferable to an illiberal, inefficient and increasingly authoritarian democracy. With the exceptional cases of lawyers’ movement and the electronic media revolution during Musharraf’s regime, the vacuum, created due to the absence of genuine civil society groups in Pakistan, has been generally filled in by a plethora of foreign funded NGOs. It is very critical to note that national or international NGOs (aid and development) can supplement the development of other civil society organisations but such NGOs can
never be total surrogates for effective civil society organisations, let alone the public sector institutions.

By and large, the history of political instability in Pakistan has contributed towards the corrosion of civil society formation. Zaidi (n.d.) portrays the lack of cohesive capacity of Pakistani civil society and explains that the middle classes - that represent a majority of civil society groups - are primarily interested in securing their narrow economic interests and have been successful in partially capturing their stakes in state’s institutions. This is so because they feel that their personal and group’s interest articulation is more easily manageable through alliances and collusions with state’s institutions instead of involving in the cumbersome and uncertain procedures of political participation. The middle classes primarily constitute the civil society of Pakistan, which cut across various (and often contradictory) social and ideological divisions. Zaidi (n.d.) argues that unlike other countries where the rising urban middle classes have struggled for and have succeeded in collective social and political emancipation, Pakistan’s civil society groups have tended to become collaborators of authoritarian governments while pursuing their narrow objectives. A similar trend has trickled down to the local level civil society organisation in Pakistan where the civic engagement has dwindled gradually. Since the public sector governance has been the domain of civil administration for years, the middle class Pakistani citizens tend to seek easy and reliable solutions for their civic problems by establishing and exploiting their contacts in the state’s civil administration and other public sector departments rather than involving in the slightly tedious political mechanisms for the articulation of their civic demands through the localised political institutions.

4.4 Inter-institutional Relationships

In a modern democratic polity, decision-making powers need to be equitably rationed in all institutional arenas of governance i.e. political society, economic society, civil society, executive, judiciary and bureaucracy. Naturally, the coordination between these institutions is foundational for the development. In theory both, civil bureaucracy and local government are expected to work parallel with each other or to be more precise, complement the functioning of each other. Coordination, functional mechanisms, organisational hierarchy, jurisdictional demarcation, and apt delegation
of financial and administrative authority are thus enormously important elements to be examined in the investigation of inter-institutional relationships. Unlike deconcentration, in devolution form of decentralisation where political and financial authority is substantially devolved, inter-institutional compatibility becomes all the more essential. Smith (1988) argues that when decentralisation is proposed as an alternative to the centralised and bureaucratised structures of a contemporary government, it is vital to ask what political values are seen as threatened unless decentralisation is established to restore them. This is a strikingly valid argument. Bringing about a radical paradigm change, just for the sake of change, is hazardous and such blunders usually play havoc with existing institutional mechanisms. Smith (1988) explains that defining bureaucracy as the administrative arm of the state carries with it the assumptions about how the power of officials should be neutralised to ensure that administrative apparatuses remain the servants and not the masters of elected representatives.

Smith’s argument does not imply that the bureaucratic model of administration is somehow superior to a decentralised one rather it emphasises a meaningful and synergic co-existence of two institutions where the ultimate decision-making authority is vested within the institution of local government. In the assessment of inter-institutional relationships, the conflict of political interest is evidently found as a bone of contention. The de facto rationing of political power and administrative authority is affected by the underlying political motivations of the central government and her federating units that in turn determine the fate of state’s prime governing institutions. There are several ways to reduce the naturally arising friction between these state’s institutions. The effectiveness of inter-organisational relationship as enumerated by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), depends on clarity and consistency of policy objectives; appropriate allocation of functions among agencies based on their capacities and resources; degree to which planning, budgeting and implementation procedures are standardised; accuracy, consistency and quality of inter-organisational communications; degree of implementing agency’s control over funds; adequacy of budgetary allocations; timely availability of resources; revenue raising and expenditure authority at local level; support of national political leaders, local officials and elites; and administrative and technical support from the central bureaucracy.
The nature of relationship between various levels of government also affects the autonomous functioning of a decentralised government. When functional, legal and jurisdictional domains are blurred in practice, the rivalry between levels of government is foreseeable. Inter-governmental relationships are usually affected by colonial histories and hegemonic interventions, regime types, commitments to political, administrative and financial decentralisation, degree of economic development, international aid, informal social and political institutions, and ethnic diversities. Pursuit for the achievement and improvement of inter-governmental harmony is critically essential yet a very delicate task. The hardest task for the government is to devise policy objectives in such a way that institutions, besides playing their primary role within their own jurisdiction should also complement and monitor other institutions as watchdogs. Tendler (1997) argue that healthy antagonism between different levels of government and strong activism by central and regional governments improves performance of the public and other support agencies.

4.5 Common Issues in Fiscal Decentralisation
Subject of local finance cannot be isolated from politics (Smith, 1985). Any realm concerning public will certainly have a political dimension and therefore in the analysis of local government reforms, fiscal matters are too important to be overlooked. The accountability of local governments to local citizens is enhanced if the local governments have access to their own taxes with the rights to adjust existing tax rates and tax base. Huther and Shah (1998) using international cross section and time series data find that fiscal decentralisation is associated with enhanced quality of governance as indicated by citizens’ participation, political and bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved economic management and reduced corruption. Similarly, De Mello and Barenstein (2001), from their cross-country data conclude that tax decentralisation is positively associated with improved quality of governance. When tax powers are devolved properly, local governments can perform a range of functions with autonomy with the help of their own revenues. However, reliance on local tax resources needs careful consideration as they seldom meet the funding requirements of local governments. Revenue raising capacity building of local governments does not imply that local government needs to be entirely self-sufficient. The financial dependence link between centre and periphery is essential
nonetheless Rodden (2002) and Khemani (2004) argue that over-dependence on central transfers can also undermine the accountability of sub-national governments to the local electorate, and facilitate the shifting of blame for inefficiencies in service delivery to upper tiers of government. This in turn deteriorates public accountability and citizens’ trust in government.

Local governments will be less accountable if they can shift fiscal liabilities to the centre - what is often referred to as a ‘soft budget constraint’ (Litvack et al., 1998). So rather than facing the electorate for demands of taxes, local government will concentrate on pressurising the central government with demand for more grant income (Jones, 1978). The extent to which the design of intergovernmental transfers affects local accountability depends upon the nature of political relations between national and sub-national governments (Khemani, 2007). Indeed the control over finances by the central government can be used as political strategy to have a control over the local electorate. A formula based allocation of development funds is thus extremely important. Formula for such allocations can consider among other things, weightage assigned to factors like developmental status, developmental needs, availability of basic health, education and sanitation facilities, employment opportunities and geographical position of regions and degree of geographical concentration or dispersal of population in various regions.

Generating revenues by levying new taxes, raising the existing tax rates or even broadening the tax base however, is not a very desirable option for local politicians. Public demands services but is reluctant to pay for it. Since politicians’ future incumbency depends on votes from constituency, their willingness to generate revenue from local tax sources is always restrained. Appointed public officials on the other hand, do not have to face such dilemma since their tenure in office is secured. User fees have the added advantage of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local governments (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b) but user charges cannot be used to finance anti-poverty programs such as targeted public distribution of food, education or health services (Bardhan, 2002). Apart from that, in places where local administrations have a corrupt history, people are reluctant to pay user fees, be it even a meagre tokenistic amount. The delegation of authority for tax generation and public spending to the elected local government can enhance the public accountability
thereby revitalising public’s confidence in an accessible and efficient local government. On the contrary, if local governments are mostly dependant on the fiscal transfers from the central or regional government, efficiency in both revenue generation and public spending is more likely to be negatively affected. In principle, fiscal decentralisation upholds the involvement of the local taxpayers via their respective local councils in local public expenditure process that reduces the incidence of corruption and resource wastage. Hence, in theory, fiscal decentralisation not only improves the efficiency of spending the development and recurring public funds but also improves the revenue collection in the long run.

4.6 Localisation and Corruption
The answer to the question: ‘whether localisation increases or decreases the incidence of and opportunities for corruption’ is rather complicated. Depending on various contexts, associations between localisation and reduction of corruption shows contradictory and diverse outcomes. The assessment of the underlying factors fuelling the incidence of corruption in public sector is complex and so is the association between localisation and corruption. Decentralisation creates hundreds of new public authorities, each having powers to tax, spend and regulate, which makes them vulnerable to corruption (Shah, 2006). On the contrary though, Seabright (1996 cited in Shah, 2006) argues that accountability is always better at the local level, since the local citizens who are better informed about the governments’ performance can vote these governments out of office. Crook and Manor (2000) examined the process of political decentralisation in India (Karnataka state), Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and observed that in Karnataka, India, political decentralisation substantially reduced the amount of public funds diverted by powerful individuals. However, since citizens were not aware of these diversions, they concluded that corruption had increased.

Based upon the evidence from Karnataka, they conclude that political decentralisation reduces grand theft and increases petty corruption in the short-run nevertheless in the long run, both are likely to lessen. This example indicates that the local governments’ attainment of political maturity is positively associated with the reduction of incidence of grand corruption therefore the local governments’ ability to reduce the levels of
corruption in the long-run may well be relied upon. Similarly, based upon a review of political decentralisation process in Colombia, Fiszbein (1997) concludes that competition for the political office opened the door for responsible and innovative leadership that in turn became the driving force behind capacity building, improved service delivery and reduced corruption at the local level. Following the main line of argument in this chapter, it is argued that the long-term involvement political institutions and improvements in civic engagement may bring down the levels of corruption in public sector. In the rule-bound civil administration, it is extremely difficult for citizens to participate in the reduction of corruption. The local government representatives can be held accountable to the citizens and voted out of office for corruption whereas the appointed public officials cannot be voted out of office for the charges of corruption. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a) suggest that elite capture (a form of corruption) may be contained by improving literacy, civic education, monitoring by civil society organisations, media and support from the higher level of governments. The discussion exploring the impact of corruption and clientelism on voter-politician relationships, voting patterns and eventually on undermining the efficacy of local government reforms will be furthered in chapter 6.

4.7 Concluding Note

This chapter has reviewed the issues that hinder the efficacy of decentralised governments. To begin with, one of the core deficiencies was identified in the form of local representatives’ lack of managerial skills and insufficient delegation of official authority. This challenge can be overcome with regular training programmes facilitated by the central government. In addition, the local incumbents’ official capacity and managerial skills can be improved if the decentralised governments are formally institutionalised as a regular tier of government; local governments are kept functional over a period of time; and local elections are held on a regular basis. Sporadic and ad hoc implementation of reforms not only affects the skills and official capacity of incumbents but also lead to greater rifts between civil administration and decentralised government.

Decentralisation is not only a solution to the problems emanating from social heterogeneity and economic polarisation but it also gives political voice to the
regional political forces and therefore helps in pacification of secessionist uprising. Political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation policy serves as a safety net and helps in reintegrating the marginalised groups of the ethnically diverse and fragmented societies wherein the equitable provision of social services is quite complex. Although the elite capture of local resources is both possible and generally undesirable, with improvements in civic engagement and political activism, the excessive and corrupt elite domination can be resisted. It is therefore argued that civic engagement and political activism are positively associated with the development of a political society which is an integral part of state’s institutions. The indifference of citizens and lower levels of political activism impedes the long-term institutionalisation of all political institutions including the local governments.

Civil society organisations have an enormous potential to augment the performance of the governments. At the local levels, politics revolves around the local civic affairs and therefore civic engagement is highly dependent on the extent to which civil society organisations compliment the local governments. Principally, decentralisation is about consolidating the political institutions and political institutions can only be consolidated with civic engagement. Harmonious inter-organisational and inter-governmental working relationships are foundational for the institutions of governance on all levels of the state. Protected by the constitution, balanced rationing of political, administrative and fiscal powers in all institutions of governance for example appropriate allocation of functions and official authority, fiscal autonomy, timely availability of resources, support from the national and regional government, and technical support from bureaucracy helps in mitigating the inter-organisational coordination issues. The political maturity of local governments in the long run also decreases the probability of corruption. An apt policy of fiscal decentralisation is crucially important for enhancing the public accountability of the local governments. Contrarily, total reliance on grants from the higher levels of government, hinders the development of fiscal management skills and undermines the fiscal autonomy of the locally elected councils thereby threatening the equitable redistribution and attainment of economic efficiency.
Chapter 5
The Role of Civil Bureaucracy – Facilitative or Regressive?

A detailed historical account of exogenous and endogenous factors that have led to the entrenchment of Pakistan’s civil administration in the affairs of governance has been explained in the introductory chapters. Civil bureaucracy has been one of the dominant institutions in the governance arenas of Pakistan whereas the periodically implemented local government reforms have regularly been overshadowed under the patronising guardianship of civil administration for years. Based on secondary sources, this chapter will assess the organisational parameters of Pakistan’s civil administration system in comparison with the doctrine of classical Weberian theory of bureaucracy. Weberian theory propounds that under certain conditions, the institution of bureaucracy works effectively and efficiently in administering the public sector and delivering social services. It is however argued that despite the continued domination of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy, the performance of this institution has been far from satisfactory, mainly because Pakistan’s civil administration system was inherited as a legacy from the colonial British rule and as such, it never was a complete manifestation of classical theory of bureaucracy. After the independence, a vast range of functions still remained the responsibilities of Pakistan’s civilian bureaucracy nonetheless the apathy of state towards the much-needed corresponding reforms - professionalisation and organisational development - severely affected bureaucracy’s performance.

The literature review developed during the course of this research has revealed that decentralised elected governments in Pakistan have faced enormous difficulties in functional synchronisation and institutional co-existence with their counterparts - the dominant civil administration. One of the reasons for this incongruity is the continuation of colonial legacy of the executive institutions’ supremacy over the locally elected governments which has been explained in the introductory chapters however, in order to explore the nature and intensities of the inter-institutional tensions among the civil administration and local governments, it is also essential to review the inherent problems within Pakistan’s highly bureaucratic civil administration structure. Given that in a modern democratic polity, the civil administration is expected to work as a complementary institution alongside the local
governments, the understanding of political, administrative, and other associated innate problems of Pakistan’s civil administration is unequivocally critical in the assessment of local government reforms, as it will vigorously substantiate the empirical discussion of this study. In other words, this chapter will serve as a part of the prologue for chapter 8 of the case study, which undertakes the analysis of factors that are responsible for inter-institutional and inter-governmental tensions between levels of government and civil bureaucracy.

5.1 What is Bureaucracy and How Bureaucracies Work?

Contemporary public management theorists use the term bureaucracy synonymously with ‘public administration’ in contrast to the emerging concepts of ‘public management’. After the Second World War, the Western world’s (spearheaded by the US) relentless advocacy for upholding the free market economies and privatisation of public entities orientated policy makers around the world to indoctrinate the corporate sector’s managerial principles into public sector management. A shift was emphasised on moving away from ‘public administration’ (the traditional way of administering the public sector wherein the state owns and operates most of the public sector institutions that deliver the social services) towards the emerging paradigm of ‘Public Management’. The ‘New Public Management’ model of this paradigm prescribes privatisation of public entities and recommends the application of corporate, entrepreneurial and managerial principles and strategies to run the affairs of public sector institutions. Generally, the terms civil administration, public sector, and bureaucracy would denote significantly different phenomena in the study of any modern state’s politics. However, in case of Pakistan, the civil administration setup has been developed along the lines of colonial administrative system and despite many phases of privatisation of public entities in the post-independence era, there still exists a large yet highly inefficient public sector, which is apparently responsible for the delivery of a range of social services. Hence, the terms civil administration, public sector and civil bureaucracy are used interchangeably throughout this study - essentially referring to the state owned and state run public sector organisations.

As defined by Heywood (2007), bureaucracy (literally rule by officials) is, in everyday language, a derogatory term which means pointless administrative routine.
In social sciences however, the concept of bureaucracy is understood in a more specific and a relatively neutral sense. Bureaucracy refers to a rational mode of organisation that constitutes non-elected (appointed) officials and an administrative machinery of the government. Weber (1946 cited in Gerth and Mills, 1970) outlined the features of bureaucracy as professional administration structured by clearly defined division of labour, an impersonal authority structure, a hierarchy of offices, dependence on formal rules, employment based on merit, pursuit of career, and a distinct separation of members’ organisational and personal lives. According to Weber, rationalisation of collective activities is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency. For various reasons though, the Weberian idealisation of bureaucracy has been at odds with the principles and doctrines of present-day public sector management concepts and theories.

The following section briefly highlights the gist of general principles of Weberian bureaucracy and its critique which is mainly built around the premise that 1) the theory of bureaucracy is highly idealised and obsolete in a modern day state and 2) the threshold of conditions required in the theory of bureaucracy for the attainment of effectiveness and efficiency in public management is way too higher than what can be expected in a post-colonial state.

5.2 Weberian Theory of Bureaucracy and its Critique

1. Authority derives from law and from rules made according to the law.
2. Strict hierarchy means that legal rational authority and power are maintained organisationally, not by any individual but by the position s/he holds in hierarchy.
3. Organisation is something with an existence separate from the private lives of its employees; it is quite impersonal. Written documents are preserved, something that is essential as previous cases become precedents when similar
events occur. Only with the maintenance of files can the organisation be consistent in its application of rules.

4. Administration is a specialist occupation that deserves thorough training; it is not something that can be done by anyone.

5. Working for bureaucracy is full time occupation instead of a secondary activity.

6. Office management is an activity that can be learnt as it follows general rules

Many contemporary scholars have severely criticised Weber’s theory of bureaucracy by denying the possibilities of efficient outcomes from bureaucracies. There are some major practical limitations involved in the classical theory of bureaucracy e.g. its premise that organisation can be treated as something that is separate from the personal life of the bureaucrat and the immunity of legal rational authority of an organisation against politicisation. However, most of the contemporary critiques overlook the nuances between the practical limitations of the principles of classical theory of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic misconduct of the post-colonial third world counties. The assessment of organisational parameters of Pakistan’s civil administration will highlight this fine distinction. Theory and practice of bureaucracy is criticised by scholars from highly diversified ideological positions. Irrespective of context in which the theory is practiced, some of the critics have quite compelling arguments against the theory itself. For instance, it has been widely conceded that technical superiority of bureaucrats is a mere conjecture and therefore a more pragmatic theory of bureaucracy is required, that would emphasise on professionalisation of administration and on bureaucracy’s rule-bound character that needs ‘to be supplemented by recognition that human attitudes and behaviours are involved’ in administration (Kamenka, 1989:161). Therefore, the assumption that, organisations can be considered as entities that are separable from the private lives of organisations’ employees, needs to be rethought in a more pragmatic manner. On a similar note, Hyden (1983) believes that official commitment to non-bureaucratic ties (e.g. kinship, tribe, ethnicity, and religion) can override the rational features of bureaucratic models of public administration.

With the involvement of human values and social behaviours in the administration of an organisation, the legal rational authority vested in public office is also very
susceptible to be contaminated with politicisation. Public choice theorists also construe bureaucracy as highly inefficient. Dunleavy (1986) argues that people have sets of well-informed preferences, which they can perceive, rank, and compare and ensure that their preferences are logically consistent. They are maximisers i.e. they seek maximum benefits from least costs and they behave rationally. By nature, they are egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their behaviours - choosing how to act on basis of consequences for their personal or families’ welfare. Hughes (2003) explains that Weber’s theory primarily relies on bureaucracy being essentially disintegrated and motivated by higher ideas e.g. service to the state. However, from public choice theory’s perspective, this assumption of Weber’s theory is unreasonable; bureaucratic forms of governments try to maximise budgets in which their own personal utilities can be maximised. This represents a classical principal-agent problem where the principal and agent have competing individual and aggregate objectives and the principal cannot easily determine whether the agent’s actions comply with the principal’s objectives or whether they are self-interested misbehaviour (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).

Apart from the normative critique, the theory of bureaucracy is also confronted in terms of its practical outcomes. For instance, the Weberian model reckons that bureaucracy is ideal for efficiency however, Turner and Hulme (1997) criticise this notion specifically in the context of developing countries and believe that bureaucracy’s performance is hindered by red tape, poor communications, centralisation of decision-making, delays in operations and the distance of public servants from citizens which leads to poor functional capacity that eventually undermines efficiency. Generally, the criticism on bureaucracy revolves mainly around the argument that bureaucracies’ operating goal is system maintenance not developmental outcomes. Hughes (2003) referring to the practice of bureaucratic conduct in developing countries, is of the opinion that highly bureaucratic administrations breed time severs rather than innovators and therefore bureaucrats tend to avoid taking risks. Others like Behn (1998) and Gerth and Mills (1970) reckon that bureaucracy is susceptible to inertia, lack of entrepreneurial orientations, mediocrity and inefficiency and that secrecy, rigidity, hierarchy in bureaucracy leads to conflicts between bureaucracy and democratic institutions.
It is worth noting that the institution of bureaucracy, in principle, is responsible for the execution of the public policy that is devised by the political institutions. Besides, the institution of bureaucracy can also provide technical advice to the political institutions on policy-making nonetheless, adherence to the formal rules and procedures usually thwart bureaucracy’s capacity in terms of innovative policy-making and taking associated risks. In post-colonial authoritarian regimes, where civil-military bureaucracies have assumed the domain of political institutions, the practice of bureaucratic conduct does not follow the classical doctrines of bureaucracy. Instead contrary to the principles of classical Weberian theory, bureaucracies in the third world countries are legacies of colonial administrative structures which were not designed as one of the state’s institutions for good governance, in fact those structures served as the only institutions of governance. In the post-colonial era, these civil military bureaucracies have retained wider responsibilities, including those of political and judicial institutions, which is one of the reasons why these administrative setups remained incapable of efficiently delivering the social services. Resistance to change and path-dependency continued to be the innate features of bureaucracies; being the central stakeholder in the institutional power spoils, the civil bureaucracy is naturally disincentivised to reform itself. The collective rationality of the bureaucratic organisations disincentivise them to share the authoritative power and the ability to deliver targeted patronage.

In a nutshell, it is argued that post-colonial bureaucracies epitomise the poorest manifestation of classical theory of bureaucracy. In order to elaborate this point, the following part of the chapter explains the organisational limitations of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy with reference to the core principles from the theory of bureaucracy. The following review which is based on the secondary sources, will not only demonstrate how Pakistani bureaucracy’s organisation and behaviour deviates a great deal from the doctrine of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy but will also help in explaining (chapter 8) how the organisational behaviour of Pakistan’s bureaucracy has undermined the establishment and institutionalisation of local governments.
5.3 Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan: Parameters of Training, Recruitment and Professional Administration

Although the malpractices in the administrative structures of post-colonial regimes have been generally epitomised to criticise the theory of bureaucracy, there are some strikingly valid applicability limitations in the theory. The following part focuses on the major organisational deficiencies like the lack of training; deteriorating levels of civil servants’ professional skills; criteria for officials’ APT (Appointments, Promotions and Transfers); unmanageably large functional jurisdiction and domain of responsibilities; politicisation of bureaucracy; citizens’ accessibility; corruption and finally the lack of economic development. For the analysis of organisational quality of Pakistan’s civil administration system, the above-mentioned thematic factors have been purposively selected for discussion in this study because they are reckoned to have substantial impact on working relationships between the civil bureaucracy and locally elected governments.

The post-independence transformation of the historically purpose-built structure of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy has resulted in a multitude of systematic weaknesses. Therefore, the institutional frailties within Pakistan’s centralised form of governance structure are more ingrained and contextually complex as compared to the frequently contested normative issues associated with the Weberian theory of bureaucracy.

5.3.1 Training and Professional Parameters

The institution of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy lacks the most important requirement - professionalisation of administration. Induction to the senior administrative posts is based on generic competitive examination and other similar non-professional recruitment and appointment criteria. Public officials normally assume the responsibilities of a public sector department for which they are not properly trained and/or qualified and the lack of the required levels of professional qualifications, expertise, and trainings of civil servants mark the most striking level of the public sector’s problems. The Pakistani Civil Service System, composed of the Federal and the Provincial Civil Service Cadres, is a rank-based system, where generalists are preferred to specialists (Huque and Khawaja, 2007), and a lifetime employment is provided to its incumbents. A somewhat relevant issue is seniority, which is the
foremost criterion for promotion. Seniority as a primary formal criterion for promotion may minimise the probable discord among the civil servants, but seniority is not necessarily the best indicator of a person’s productivity and competence (Rosenbloom, 1986). By contrast, a system where promotions are based on merit is likely to enhance competence of the civil service by providing incentives for civil servants to improve their skills and do their jobs diligently and honestly (Azfar, 1999).

Husain (2007) describes Pakistani civil servants as poorly trained, sub-optimally utilised, badly motivated and ingrained with attitudes of indifference and inertia. The absence of reliable and continuous mechanisms for professional training of public officials has always been a major issue. In Pakistan, this shortcoming is not too pervasive in the higher echelons of public sector departments but at the subordinate levels, optimum levels of essential training is ironically considered as a perk. For instance, Huque and Khawaja (2007) found in their study of Pakistani bureaucracy that ‘seniority’ and ‘connections’ were two major criteria in civil servant’s selection for professional trainings. They found that training is considered as a benefit rather than a necessity for doing a job. Training sessions are conducted either internationally or in local capital cities, both of which are preferred holiday destinations for civil servants. Seniority as a criterion for professional training is also absurd in a sense that an official who is about to retire is more likely get training than any other official who is in his/her early or mid career level. By and large, the formal and informal practice of administration in the public sector organisations in Pakistan does not comply with the principle of theory of bureaucracy which reckons administration as a specialist occupation that needs thorough training and that administration cannot be done by non-professionals.

5.3.2 Recruitment Matters: Appointments, Promotions and Transfers

Pakistani civil service is highly politicised and the regime change is invariably followed by massive upheavals of civil servants’ politically motivated appointments, transfers (inter-departmental and spatial rotation) and promotions. Contrary to the classical theory of bureaucracy which upholds merit based employment, Pakistan’s bureaucracy works as one of the major cogwheels of political machine. The appointments, promotions and transfers of civil servants which are typically contingent upon incumbents’ political allegiances, seriously affect operational
effectiveness of civil servants thereby undermining their motivations to pursue professional careers. Cheema and Sayeed (2006) believe that excessive political interference reduces the time horizons of the bureaucrats, which eventually compels the bureaucrats to defect from collective arrangements and result in fragmentation of the state structure. In addition to that, short and uncertain tenure of civil servants fundamentally undermines their incentives to develop their expertise in specialised and professional career pathway.

This is so because the public officials are not only rotated geographically across different administrative units but also across various public sector departments that require varying qualification, skills and training. In the absence of coherent recruitment criteria and effective training programmes, the civil servants are more likely to form a large pool of redundant generalists instead of divisions/departments with professional employees that are qualified, recruited and constantly trained in accordance with the job requirements. This is how the officials’ pursuit of career as a professional career civil servant is put at stake and eventually they become time-servers instead. In such situations, civil servants are more likely to be hesitant in taking initiatives in the execution of major administrative tasks or leading their staff in instigating any development projects. Instead, the civil servants would rather be induced to serve their tenure at any administrative unit by involving in the routine official matters. Prospects of public accountability also diminish with the frequent and unnecessary rotation of employees across various public sector departments.

Keeping in view the historical institutional formation of Pakistan’s civil administration setup, Khan (2007) narrates that the British colonial administration used to deliver lavish patronage, usually in the form of land grants and targeted recruitment quotas in government service along with other perks to the loyal natives groups. The post-independence continuation of this practice in the public sector of Pakistan made it clear that the retention of authoritative powers, with almost nonexistent accountability mechanisms and ever-increasing official patronage were the sole motivations of Pakistani bureaucracy. Other than patronage delivery, politicians and bureaucrats in Pakistan also compete for manipulating powers in the affairs of APT of appointed public officials. Cheema and Sayeed (2006) mention that appointments and promotions are no longer based on well specified ‘rules’ but on the
ability of officials to sustain political protection. The problems associated with APT are overwhelmingly critical in case of Pakistan because the large size of public sector (which is already too bloated in proportion to the resources) provides enormous opportunities for patronage delivery in the form patronage employment. Kardar (2006) argues that all levels of governments are operated as employment bureaus rather than as efficient providers of public goods and services. This is one of the main themes that will be discussed with empirical evidence in the case study.

5.3.3 Wider Jurisdiction and Responsibilities

Kardar (2006) indicates that the public sector of Pakistan is over-extended and over-committed and is performing too many functions that are far beyond its competence level. Purview of Pakistani senior civil servants job responsibilities especially that of the elite district management group’s employees, is ironically large. This feature too finds its roots in the colonial administration era. A massive sphere of responsibilities of a Deputy Commissioner during the British Rule of the subcontinent was penned down by Hunter (1892: 513-514) as follows.

*Upon his energy and personal character depends ultimately the efficiency of our Indian government. His own special duties are too numerous and so various as to bewilder the outsider.*

*He is a fiscal officer, charged with the collection of revenue from the land and other sources; he also is a revenue and criminal judge, both of first instance and appeal. But his title by no means exhausts his multifarious duties. He does in his smaller local sphere all that the Home Secretary Superintendent in England, and a great deal more; for he is the representative of paternal and not of a constitutional government. Police, jails, education, municipalities, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local taxation, and the imperial revenues of his District are to him matters of daily concern. He is expected to make himself acquainted with every phase of the social life of the natives, and with each natural aspect of the country. He should be a lawyer, an accountant, a surveyor, and a ready writer of state papers. He ought also to possess no mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy, and engineering.*

Although it was for the colonial administration under the paternal British government, it is still hard to imagine that such a god-like viceregal officer/bureaucrat was capable
of overseeing the immensely vast administrative realms in accordance with the demands from the imperial government as mentioned by Hunter. Even in the Greek mythology, ancients Greeks used to worship various gods that they thought were ordained by the king of gods for utilising their special capacities and capabilities. For instance, they believed in various gods and goddesses who used to control their respective domains like the skies, seas, the dead in the underworld, wars, intelligence, arts and literature etc. It is, by all means, obvious that the type of official mentioned in Hunter’s description was a colonial administrator and certainly not a bureaucrat that is conceptualised in Weberian theory of bureaucracy however, the discussion is relevant over here because it was more or less this type of administrative machinery that was inherited by the newly born state of Pakistan. Pakistan’s bureaucracy along with the executive arm of the state retained the composition that included elites belonging to higher social and economic strata from a highly fragmented society. Although several sporadic phases of reforms have attempted to ameliorate the bureaucratic conduct and streamline the functional domain of the post-independence Pakistani civil administration structure, unfortunately the very character of the system kept on deteriorating with the time. Over a period of around six decades, due to expansion and departmentalisation of public sector, the functional jurisdiction of public servants has been reduced considerably nonetheless, the core weaknesses within the system remain uncured.

‘A certain degree of cohesion, staying power, organisational capacity to sustain continuity of policies, preserve the status quo and maintain a semblance of stability continue to be hallmarks of Pakistani bureaucracy’ (Shafqat, 1999: 997). Nonetheless, Shafqat’s institutional analysis also reveals that adherence to procedures, reluctance to take initiatives and general apathy towards citizens’ welfare are still the major problems of Pakistani bureaucracy. He points towards the iron curtains around the civil bureaucracy and mentions that currently the bureaucracy withholds information on areas of public concerns under the garb of secrecy which must be made available to citizens. As mentioned earlier, the principles of good governance in a democratic polity requires the institution of bureaucracy to enact the regulatory apparatus and implement the policy that is devised by the elected political institutions. Civil administration has to adhere to the procedures because that is how the institution of
bureaucracy essentially works. Principally, the bureaucracy needs to adhere to the procedures in order to implement the policy and should not intrude into the jurisdiction of other institutions like government or judiciary. In states where professional bureaucracies confine themselves to their constitutional jurisdiction, their adherence to the procedures and execution of policy can rarely be challenged. Contrarily, in case of Pakistan, since the civil administration has engulfed the domain of almost all other institutions of governance, citizens expect them to deliver social services of all kinds.

5.3.4 Politicisation of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracies inevitably exist and operate in almost all forms of legitimate or illegitimate governments, ranging from far right to far left. Civil bureaucracy is an indispensable institution of the state even in the countries that claim to have minimal involvement of the government in governance. A sound civil bureaucracy is always used as a help for peaceful transfer of power, notably during and after elections (Smith, 1985). Governments have to rely on state machinery for such transitions and for the execution and implementation of public policies. In theory, bureaucracy works only when it retains its legal rational authority and enjoys absolute separation from politics e.g. Woodrow Wilson (1941) argued that there should be a strict separation between politics and administration (or bureaucracy). According to him, administration lies outside the sphere of politics. Although politics set the tasks for administration, politics should not manipulate administration because public administration is actually the detailed and systematic execution of public law. In similar vein, Stillman (1991:107) argued that the dichotomy between politics and administration ‘justified the development of a distinct sphere for administrative development and discretion - often rather wide - free from the meddling and interference of politics. The dichotomy which became an important instrument for progressive reforms allowed room for a new criterion for public action, based on insertion of professionalisation, expertise and merits values into the active direction of governmental affairs.’

However, such dichotomy of politics and administration is an illogical proposition. In fact, this dichotomy can very reasonably be termed as ‘divorce of convenience’ between politics and administration because politics can by no means be separated
from the spheres of public administration. They are profoundly mingled together. Caiden (1982:82) very aptly argued that the two are effectively ‘fused with politicians performing administrative duties and administrators assuming political responsibilities’. The same stance was taken by Peters (1989). Interdependencies, in terms of administration, between politicians and civil servants make it almost impossible to avoid the mutual use and abuse of these two complementary institutions. Deconcentration of administrative hierarchy does not separate administration from politics. Smith (1985) emphasises this point by arguing that although there is organisational politics within any structure of administration, the bureaucrat is also a political figure within the community in which s/he serves.

In countries where the political institutions are functional and influential, it is quite common that the civil administration finds herself under an enormous pressure exerted by local political elites for twisting official procedures and protocols in favour of the local elites’ interests. The field officer or civil bureaucrat has to wield bureaucratic procedures as a protection against these stipulations. A formal stance of neutrality and instrumentality is necessary in the administrator’s dealings with politicians and leaders of powerful social classes, especially if the policies to be implemented go against the interests of dominant rural classes (Wood, 1977 cited in Smith, 1985). The maintenance of required levels of instrumentality and neutrality in civil servants’ working relationships with politicians becomes difficult especially in countries where institutions of the state compete with each other for acquiring political powers. Baxter et al. (2002) mentions that in some settings where a professionalised civil service is in place, ambitious politicians mount an effective assault on it, reversing its autonomy and turning it into a source of patronage. In case of Pakistan, the aggregate and individual interests of political institutions and civilian administration often leave them in an uneasy and antagonistic relationships. Particularly in cases where the purview and jurisdictional domains of public institutions is not demarcated precisely or when those demarcations are ignored in practice, public institutions are likely to develop hostile working relationships among themselves.
5.3.5 Access of Citizens to Bureaucrats

‘Pakistan is an ‘hourglass’ society – where state and public are mutually related through minimum of institutional links and people are generally disengaged from politics except for the occasional exercise of their right to vote. In Pakistan the bureaucracy typically operated as gatekeeper of distant state’ (Waseem, 2006:13). Access relationship between citizens and civil servants are of great concern in the study of local governance. Considering the peculiar nature of centrally appointed civil administration system in Pakistan, bureaucrats are quite reasonably accused of being quite distant from their ‘subjects’ and hence the bureaucrat-citizen relationship does not provide any substantial incentives for improved and tailored service provision. The rationale for devolved local government emphasises that centrally appointed public officials are not easily accessible to the public and are more likely to be indifferent towards their civic demands whereas locally elected officials (mostly native) would remain very close to their constituency and would be willing go an extra mile to make sure that their constituency is not neglected in the affairs of social service delivery. Smith (1988) believes that access relationship between the citizens and bureaucrats is worse because of the lack of independence of bureaucrats from political forces, their lack of understanding of citizens’ problems, lack of dissemination of information about entitlement and knowledge of bureaucratic process, and because bureaucrats steer their activities away from citizens.

Another important issue that Smith (1988) raises is that citizens’ relationship with bureaucracy depends upon the extent to which the claimant depends on bureaucratic allocations i.e. whether the citizen has an exit option in his/her affordable range for instance, access to open market (non-bureaucratic) allocation. Exit option refers to the financial capability of citizens to resort to the private market allocations for basic social services. Exit to the open market allocations may well be a desirable and quite possibly an available option for the poor masses but certainly not an affordable one. When market provisions, in such circumstances, cannot be relied upon in terms of meeting demands from vast majority of citizens, public provision of goods and services needs to be rationed via public sector institutions equitably. In Pakistan, where the income inequality is alarmingly higher and masses of population are unavoidably dependant upon the provision of public goods and services for their basic necessities like health, education and municipal services, rolling back of public
provision and expecting the private sector to abruptly fill in the a large vacuum is obviously not a rational proposition.

5.3.6 Corruption in Bureaucracy and the Lack of Economic Development
The tumour of corruption is an evil that remains pervasive in all institutions of governance, and not only in the civil bureaucracy. In fact, most forms of institutional corruption are omnipresent in almost all formal and informal institutions of governments and states of the world. Undoubtedly, owing to the weak institutional setups, the levels of corruption are alarmingly high in the third world states where the civil administration has proven to be one of the most vulnerable institutions in terms of proneness to incidence of corruption for many reasons. An elaborate theoretical base is laid in the next chapter which provides a framework for the assessment of various forms of corruption in institutions of local governance. Over here, corruption is referred to as the typical financial embezzlements, bribery, kickbacks and the abuse of public office and authority by the civil servants with specific reference to the execution of public works and delivery of non-excludable public goods and services. The centralised system ends up differentiating services to different categories of customers based on their willingness to pay bribes, resulting in non-uniform delivery patterns (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b).

While there is a broad agreement in literature of public administration about corruption being malfeasance that perpetuates economic, social and political inequalities, there also exists a substantial discourse asking ‘what’s wrong with corruption’. Put differently, one may argue that bribes stipulated in return for basic social services by the underpaid civil servants of a poor state may well serve as an informal alternative solution to the negative impact of free market externalities. Huntington (1968) advocates such an idea; he believes that for economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralised, dishonest bureaucracy is the society with a rigid, over-centralised, and honest bureaucracy. Similarly, Hutchcroft (1997) argues that from the perspective of an individual businessperson or citizen, corruption does indeed grease the wheels of a bureaucracy. Honest bureaucracies can be infuriatingly inflexible to those with a justifiable need to bend the rules, and dishonest bureaucracies highly responsive to those who have the means and/or connections to do so. The rigidity and inflexibility of bureaucracy as a system
for the public service provision, that assumes the procedures as ends in themselves, hinders the efficiency of such institutions.

Nonetheless, such arguments cannot be made as a basis for the justification of corruption in the public sector. In fact, these arguments undermine the possibilities of institutional rectifications of procedures that are prone to corruption. Bureaucracies’ corrupt behaviours have underlying reasons. Rather than allowing the bureaucracy enough leeway to act corruptly, it is essential to rethink and reform the organisational mechanisms that perpetrate and incentivise the corrupt behaviour. NPM model prescribes privatisation of public sector departments as a solution for the corruption and inefficiency. But in case of Pakistan, this may not be a viable strategy because 1) economic status of many citizens constrain their access to the privatised market provision of social services, 2) the state doesn’t have the capacity to regulate the privatised public sector and/or prevent a public monopoly from becoming a private monopoly and 3) corruption is very much likely to remain pervasive in public sector departments whose privatisation is extremely difficult for instance the law enforcement, municipal services, civil and national defence and other state regulatory authorities. While a gradual and vigilant process of privatisation may help, it certainly is not the only next available option for curbing the nuisance of corruption.

A very brief synopsis of some alarming statistics cited in Khan (2007) would be helpful in reflecting upon the prevalence of corruption in the large and inefficient public sector of Pakistan. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Pakistan’s 2006 CPI score of 2.2 placed her in the most corrupt quintile of 163 countries surveyed. This score was almost the same as the CPI score of 2.25 in 1995. Khan (2007) quoting from a report published in a Pakistani Newspaper, Dawn, describes that the extensive levels of corruption in the education department were indicated by the first Pakistani National Education Census conducted in 2006 which found that ‘12,737 educational institutions out of a total of 164,579 public sector schools in the country were ‘non-functional’, a euphemism for ‘ghost schools’¹². It is needless to say that such statistics only depict the tip of the iceberg

¹² The term ‘Ghost Schools’ refers to those public schools that exist only in the official records of the Education Department. Ironically, the building contractors are paid for the building and teachers
and reveal that the spread of corruption is more rooted than it apparently seems. The complexities involved with containment of corruption needs thorough diagnosis of factors that create an environment which is ripe for perpetrating the public officials’ tendencies for corruption. The menace of corruption is highly associated with another issue - the lack of economic development.

Susceptibility of administrative machinery to corruption and indifferent behaviour is ascribed to the fact that the large and superfluous public sector is usually underpaid. The World Bank (1997) states that in many countries, civil servants’ wages have eroded as a result of expanding public employment at lower skill levels and fiscal constraints on the total wage bill. The result has been a significant compression of the salary structure and highly uncompetitive pay for senior officials, making it difficult to recruit and retain capable staff. According to Jabra and Dwivedi (2004), the low salary structure for public employees in Lebanon has always had two serious results: first, competent employees receive more attractive salary offers from the private sector. Second, those who join and continue with civil service, have little motivations and are more incentivised to look for other sources of income (including bribery) to compensate for their low salaries. Brain drain, especially from the higher echelons of civil administration, is natural in such circumstances and the able civil servants prefer to switch over to either private sector or international organisations. In states where the private sector opportunities spurred by foreign investments offer attractive remuneration packages, the public sector job market face enormous levels of competitive pressures in attracting pool of capable incumbents. Generally, the budget constraints and external pressures to privatise and downsize public sector constrain governments to underpay the civil servants, leaving them susceptible to corruption and professional decay.

5.4 Conclusion
This chapter focused on some of the theoretical limitations of classical theory of bureaucracy. The chapter also included the literature review of Pakistani bureaucracy’s organisational composition and behaviour which reveals that the civil administrative structure as well as the practice is not in line with the principles regularly drawn salaries for teaching. Some of the school buildings are usually used by the local village influential for a variety of personal utilities.
indoctrinated in the classical theory of bureaucracy. These limitations are not only the hurdles in institutional development of civil bureaucracy itself but they also exacerbate the institutional relationships between civil bureaucracy and local governments.

The classical theory of bureaucracy assumes the public organisation as an entity that is separate from the personal lives of its employees and secondly, the principle of legal rational authority considers the civil bureaucracy as immune to the political interventions. It is argued that when civil bureaucracies take over the domain of other institutions including the political ones, the very character of the civil administration becomes politicised as is evident in the case of Pakistan. Also, where the political institutions are capacitated in terms of making policy decisions, the civil administrative institutions are routinely pressurised for manipulating and twisting their rule-bound operating procedures in accordance with the vested interests of politicians, making the politicisation of administration inevitable and the legal rational authority, a highly idealised principle. Civil bureaucracies have a constitutional role i.e. of implementing the public policy and of enacting the regulatory procedures. It can only work effectively when it doesn’t trespass its constitutional domain. Having assumed an overwhelming authority and functional domain, Pakistan’s civil administration has been working as more or less the only institution of local governance and that is why citizens condemn the administration’s failure because they perceive it as the only institution that is responsible for delivery of social services.

The organisational and institutionalist analysis of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy illustrate that it is a poor materialisation of the classical model of bureaucracy mainly because this system of administration was inherited from the epoch of colonial rule and as such the system was never a classical expression of the theory of bureaucracy in the first place. After the independence, Pakistan’s civil administration assumed a vast domain of responsibilities but her professional credentials kept on deteriorating; the state consolidated this institution in terms of power spoils but the organisational development was ignored altogether. The quality of training and specialisation of public officials in most of the public sector departments is poor. Consequently the employees make a large redundant pool of generalists instead of specialists. Their prospects for professionalisation are further hampered by the politically motivated
appointments, promotions and transfers which also adversely affect the pursuit of career opportunities. In Pakistan, such political manipulations have transformed the public sector departments into employment agencies that provide patronage employment.

Access relationships between bureaucrats and citizens are also far from satisfactory and since a majority of the population relies on public provision of social services, improvements in the access relationships are very crucial. Abrupt privatisation of public entities is not a viable remedy for containing the massive levels of corruption - at least not in the short term - because masses of poor citizens do not have the financial means to access privatised market allocations. Besides, the government and state institutions are already too corrupt and incapable to regulate the private sector and prevent a public monopoly from turning into a private monopoly. Corruption in public sector is also stimulated to greater extent by the lack of economic development. Evidence from the literature review suggests that the public officials’ propensity to corruption is triggered by the fact that they are underpaid. The lower wages offered to the civil servants eventually affect the professional quality of officials and organisations alike.

Civil bureaucracy being an instrumental and indispensable institution has to effectively coexist and function alongside other institutions of the state e.g. the local governments. The challenge is to make bureaucracy functionally compatible with those institutions therefore, the reforms in the civil administration are as important as the reforms in the political organisation of the government. The legacy of colonial mode of bureaucracy continues to be an anathema for the developments in local governance in the post independence Pakistan. In order to contain the overwhelming power concentration in the civil bureaucracy, a strategy of devolving the administrative and political authorities to the lower levels of public sector and government has been tried three times. However, it is learnt that such reforms, which on the face of it, were aimed at political and administrative development and which upheld the emulation of Western type of decentralisation, indeed ended up in intensifying the institutional rifts between local/regional governments and civil administration and eventually in undermining their public sector managerial capabilities.
Chapter 6
Political Clientelism

In order to assess the impact of clientelism in local governance of Pakistan, an analytical framework is developed in this chapter that will not only provide guidelines for the empirical data collection process but will also establish a theoretical base for the analysis of first-hand primary data. This chapter covers the dynamics of voter-politician relationships, the determinants of voting behaviours and the parameters of electoral mechanisms in local governance. The discussion begins with the distinguishing clientelism from other phenomena like corruption and pork barrel politics with specific reference to local governance. The impact of patronage employment and socio-economic fragmentation on the outcomes of pork barrel politics is evaluated in order to assess the dynamics of voting patterns. In addition, the chapter also includes a discourse based on arguments that run counter to the public choice explanation of clientelistic exchanges. The identification of these antithetical stances to public choice theory will reveal why various forms of clientelism in certain societies make the overnight paradigm shift to a new form of political organisation, extremely complex. Finally, for the impact assessment of issue in electoral mechanisms, two critical factors - holding of local government elections on non-party basis and the indirect elections of local government representatives - are also discussed.

6.1 Corruption, Clientelism and Pork Barrel Politics

The nomenclature of political phenomena carries with it certain meanings and assumptions that signify specific ideological and theoretical orientations. In order to setup an analytical framework for the assessment of any political phenomenon, the distinction of differing meanings is critical because it helps to clarify the involved intricacies that emanate from competing political perceptions. The term political clientelism is quite broadly used which makes it open to varying interpretations and is therefore often misconstrued in relation to other distinct phenomena. Clientelism is the delivery of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron (politician) uses is simply: did you (or will you) support me (Stokes, 2007)? Stoke’s definition of clientelism refers to a relationship between a voter and politician who enter into an informal contract of mutual exchange of vote in
return for personalised provision of public goods and services. Similarly, Klingemann et al. (1994) and Przeworsky et al. (1999) note that the clientelist linkages between the voter and politician facilitate a direct exchange whereby the voters trade in their votes in return for personalised material resources provided by the politicians; voters enter into such exchanges because they find it difficult to follow a cumbersome and time consuming process of aggregating their interests for policies that would benefit the wider electorate. Both of the above mentioned definitions imply that an individual voter can trade in his/her single vote in return for highly personalised favours however, it is argued (detailed in later part of the chapter) that an individual vote’s value is highly insignificant and hence cannot be used in a clientelistic exchange as a bargaining instrument in return for a highly personalised favour. Therefore, in the clientelistic exchanges, it is indeed the group of voters that can be instrumental and not a single vote per se.

The balance of bargaining power between voters’ groups and politicians in clientelistic relationships varies from case to case however clientelistic exchanges may lead to links that are based on subservience or lopsided friendships (Cain et al., 1987). Despite the evident possibilities of imbalance in bargaining powers (of voters and politicians alike) in patron-client relationships, the impact of clientelitic practice is less unfavourable than the impact of corruption. The terms clientelism and corruption are different as the two phenomena have some distinct features. Máiz and Requejo (n.d) distinguish between clientelism and corruption. They refer to Caciagli (1996), dalla Porta (1992) and Johnston (1986) who point out significant differences between corruption and clientelism as follows. The two phenomena differ in terms of resources employed (money versus votes), actors involved (civil servants versus voters and patron/broker), and presence of power (asymmetry versus equality, illegality versus legality and secret versus public). To rephrase, corruption involves money, civil servants, asymmetrical relationships in terms of power, is illegal and covert. On the other hand clientelism involves voters, patron/broker/politicians, equality (arguable in many cases) in patron-client relationships, is legal (if not fair) and overt. Keeping in view this distinction, the official misconduct of appointed public officials in civil bureaucracy is referred to as corruption in this study whereas the political institution of local government will be assessed in relation to the presence and intensity of clientelistic features.
The distinction between the clientelism and pork barrel politics provides further insights into the complex dynamics of voter-politician relationships. In analysing the economic costs of clientelist politics, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that hiring family relatives for administrative jobs should not diminish the quality of the public works, provided the relatives are qualified to do the jobs. With this argument, they point out towards a relatively less detrimental by-product of clientelistic relationship i.e. ‘pork barrel’ approach. Pork barrel refers to the publicly funded projects promoted by legislators to bring money and jobs to their own districts, as a political favour to local politicians or citizens. ‘Pork’ is not allocated on the basis of merit or need rather it is allocated on the basis of priorities of legislators in order to secure local support, making it legal yet unfair at times. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith’s argument prefer pork barrel approach over the highly individualised patron-client payoffs for the reason that more people have the opportunity of gaining from it. However, at the same time, they believe that more than poverty, it is the higher levels of income inequalities in societies that worsen the impact of pork barrel politics. This argument is analysed in detail in Section 6.3.1 of this chapter.

6.2 Patron - Client Model: Insights from Public Choice Theory

Public choice theory is based on the principles of rational choice assumption that forms the foundation of neo-classical economics. Hence, public choice theory is the political equivalent for the consumers’ rationality theory of economics. With the assumption that voters are economically rational, the public choice theory assumes that clientelistic exchanges involve patrons and individual voters. In addition, the principles of the public choice theory also emphasises that political markets are imperfect for several reasons. For instance, the assumption that political markets are perfectly competitive would imply that the poor classes of society should get more public goods and efficient redistribution as they are in majority in most of the cases but information asymmetries between the patrons and clients explain that this does not happen normally (Rolls, 2008). Illustrating this point, Keefer and Khemani (2005) argue that the failure in the political market - clientelistic exchange between voters and politicians - is the outcome of two key factors i.e. voters’ imperfect information and the lack of credibility of political agents. Keefer & Vlaicu (2008) believe that when citizens lack information about how politicians’ decisions influence their
welfare, they cannot punish politicians for performance failures nor reward them for success. Hence, the information asymmetries incentivise politicians to be more responsive to the informed citizens only. This argument denotes a situation in which the information asymmetries leave the voter in a vulnerable position in a lopsided relationship that is favourable to the politician. Downs (1957) suggests that voters remain ignorant and underprivileged in an information asymmetry situation because the individual cost of acquiring information is higher than the benefits derived from it.

The above-mentioned public choice arguments commensurate the politician-voter’s clientelistic relationships with parties involved in a business transactions. Powell (1970) argues that the two agents in clientelistic relations are unequal in status, wealth or influence and their relationship depends on reciprocity in exchange for goods and services. The points made in terms of information asymmetries are reasonable in a sense that the politician-voter relationships are not always symmetrical and voters are not always well-informed as compared to their respective politicians. For instance, Kitschelt (2000) opines that clientelism involves a reciprocal deal and voluntarism but also exploitation and domination because the low-income groups in a society discount future and rely on short-term and instant advantages. Therefore, clientelist exchanges tend to become more attractive for voters as compared to broader programmatic linkages that promise uncertain and distant rewards. Such situations provide the politicians with extra leverage that enables them to capitalise on voters’ limited information.

In general, these explanations fail to take into account the critical point that an individual vote cannot be traded in effectively in return for personalised favour and therefore the voter-politician relationship in clientelistic exchange needs to be perceived differently than a business transaction because unlike a business exchange, the clientelistic exchange involves group(s) of voters rather than an individual voter. Clientelism can instead be understood as a group phenomenon where groups of voters can come together to enhance their position in a clientelistic deal. The probability of information asymmetry also diminishes when group(s) of voters (not an uninformed individual) and are taken into consideration in clientelistic exchanges. It is believed that the magic of aggregation (discussed in the later part of the chapter) can
potentially level the information asymmetries and improve the position of voters’
groups in comparison with politicians.

Explaining, the second factor that aggravates political market imperfections, Keefer
and Vlaicu (2008) are of the opinion that the lack of credibility leads politicians to
prefer narrowly targeted policies over the broader public goods provision. Given that
the credibility of politicians depends on their personal characteristics and their
relationships with voters, decentralisation of government leads to the proliferation of
politicians and hence with a choice of candidates available, voters can pressurise them
to perform better (Keefer et al., 2005). There is however no evidence that mere
proliferation of political candidates would actually pressurise them to perform better.
Even with the proliferation of candidates, the politicians’ propensity towards pork
barrel approach is likely to remain the same because the lack of politicians’ credibility
not only depends on his/her personal characteristics and relations with voters but also
on the availability of resources that a politician can direct towards his/her electorate.
One of the major reasons that coerces political agents to target narrow provision of
goods and services is the scarcity of resources available to them for public spending.

Politicians are compelled to resort to pork barrel spending because they have limited
resources that can be spent on a fraction of electorate and not because they want to put
their credibility at stake by targeting the available resources to specific groups.
Besides that, it is important to note that the problem of credibility is two-sided i.e. just
like politicians have the propensity to renege on pre-electoral promises, the voter can
also breach the promise and instead can vote for any other candidate (Robinson and
Verdier, 2002). Keeping in view, the lack of voters’ credibility and limited availability
of resources, politicians would be more incentivised to target the public goods and
services to a narrow group of citizens. Pork barrel spending may not be a desirable
strategy for politicians but considering the financial restraints, this approach is the
most pragmatic option for them to establish or revamp their political credibility.

6.3 Socio-Political Groups in Clientelistic Exchanges

Political clientelism is not an individual’s problem, indeed it is a group phenomenon
(Lameronchand, 1972). Most of the political promises are made to the groups of voters
and when socio-economic groups are involved in clientelistic exchange, it transforms clientelistic politics into the pork barrel politics. Garcia-Guadilla and Perez (2002) gives the example of neighbourhood associations representing collective interests that use the political power of groups of voters as a collective entity legitimated by the process of decentralisation. The same may be true about groups composed of families, clans, sects, businesses and professional associations. In case of clientelistic relationships with the groups of voters, political competitors need to spend resources to ameliorate collective problems. Whether the group receives the benefit or not depends very little on the voting behaviour of any single member of that group (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008). Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that clientelism may have socially desirable by-products e.g. healthy competition among political groups. In many democratic systems, interest groupings based on occupation or social class form lobbies. In case of balance among these groups, pork barrel politics can benefit various sections of political and civil society and hence clientelism, according to them, is not just simply a zero-sum game over narrowly self-serving projects and programs.

They continue to argue that beneficial spillovers (positive externalities) of clientelism can help in absence of politicians’ monopoly in patronage, or as long as their voters have freedom to switch alliances. Besides that, groups vying for government favours inadvertently prevent socially harmful policies and/or promote beneficial public policies. These arguably positive dimensions of pork barrel politics apparently imply that pork barrel approach is one of the strategies that can incentivise the involvement of political actors in the political process but it is argued in the following section that the contextual realities associated with the social and political organisation of societies radically transform the impact of pork barrel politics. The following discussion addresses the question as to why despite the involvement of some of the socio-political groups, the system of pork barrel politics reinforces itself instead of involving more groups.

**6.3.1 Pork Barrel Politics and Socio-Economic Fragmentation**

Generally, the public accountability and equitable distribution of public goods under any form of clientelistic political setup is very hard to be institutionalised, both formally and informally. The clientelistic linkage distributes material benefits
exclusively to party stalwarts and other groups of voters who vote for the party that offers the benefits, eventually generating a particularistic type of accountability in which the voters demand individual favours or services from the politician, ignoring broader public policies’ criteria (Máiz and Requejo, n.d). Similarly, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that patron-client relationships are prone to misunderstanding and manipulation because no independent entity keeps an eye on them. This is rather a pessimistic opinion of Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith as it ignores their earlier statement which claims that clientelism can also promote healthy competition among the social groups of the society. It is argued that although patron-client relationships are prone to manipulation, the competition among social and political groups itself can serve as a deterrent to manipulation and is likely to keep a constant check on clientelistic exchanges. Nonetheless, the critical question i.e. whether or not pork barrel politics can promote competition needs further explanation.

The impact of socio-political groups’ involvement can be productive only when they are socially and politically engaged as competing actors in the political process. However, it is observed that although a multitude of socio-political groups exist in society, the low levels of their civic engagement and political activism maintain the status quo of pork barrel politics rather than promoting healthy competition among them. Consequently many segments of society continue to suffer as they are left out of the clientelistic deals altogether. Pork barrel approach reckoned as being socially desirable and generating positive externalities may well be justified owing to some specific success stories nonetheless, at large, the exclusion of numerous underprivileged groups from the social services delivery networks is part and parcel of the deal. Due to the social fragmentation and economic polarisation, narrow targeting of goods and services under clientelistic obligations exclude those groups that find it hard to collectivise and organise into aggregate entities that would help them articulate their interests and hence make their participation meaningful in the formulation of public policy. For several reasons, it is also not easy for the masses of citizenry in underdeveloped countries to be a part of the existing social and political pressure groups. The factors that undermine the civic and political engagement of the groups, also affect the way in which the strategies for pork barrel politics are informally designed and practiced. Other than the socio-political intricacies, the pork barrel approach is also positively associated with socio-economic complexities.
Manor (1999) opines that when disparities between the rich and poor and/or conflicts between social groups are deep-rooted, it is extremely difficult to make decentralisation work. The higher income inequalities are, the more difficult it is to prioritise public development projects. Social demands and developmental needs of various social groups in a society vary a great deal. Such dilemmas also make it difficult for politicians to prioritise the public policy options. ‘Rational’ politicians would thus go for the option that will secure them the higher payoffs in the form of votes, even if it not economically viable or socially desirable. This argument is well epitomised by Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) who focus on three categories of public goods which account for 73 percent of the activities of village governments in their sample from India - roads, irrigation, and schools. They find that the democratically elected village governments provide all three public goods, but the emphasis is on irrigation - the service that is most likely to benefit the rural elite. In villages with a high proportion of landless citizens, public investment had shifted from irrigation to road construction, suggesting that capture by elites can be tackled when the numerical strength of the poor increases. However, it happens in a manner that might not be the most efficient in terms of extending benefits to the poor. Roads built by village governments primarily benefit the poor, but largely by raising their short-term wages, as local road construction and improvement initiatives in India serve as employment enhancement programs for the landless poor. On the other hand, education that has the most profound and positive impact on poverty alleviation in the medium and long-term, seems least affected by the local democratisation programmes.

Mani and Mukand (2007) describe the ‘visibility effect’ wherein politicians will provide those public services which are visible and for which the politicians can take credit. Hasnain (2005) referring to this malfeasance in Pakistani politics, argues that the improvements in service delivery, such as ensuring better quality teaching, unlike the provision of government jobs or construction of school buildings, do not bear immediate fruit for politicians in terms securing a vote bank. Politicians make self-interested decisions to improve certain roads and sanitation services because such projects are more excludable yet highly noticeable goods and can be targeted easily in a specific area within their electorate. Contrarily, fewer efforts are made in order to improve healthcare and education services because in that case, the exclusion is harder and they require hard work and resources but above all, such improvement are
least noticeable and therefore the politician gets the least share of political mileage for it.

Positive externalities of pork barrel thus proffer little benefits and as such, from a broader perspective, pork barrel politics may be seen as generating negative long-term economic and political spillovers. In heterogeneous societies that are spread across different social and economic divisions, pork barrel criteria for public sector and development funds allocations intensify disparities among the marginalised groups rather than promoting positive competition between them. Fragmented and unstable political coalitions will result in each politician trying to maximise his short-term payoff even if this comes at the expense of long-term social gains (Hasnain, 2005; Cheema, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). This practice is unjust because the loopholes in political and institutional policy are sought and exploited. In other words, in the absence of wider civic and political engagement, pork barrel politics are legitimised by the process of elections and this legitimacy is accompanied with enormous costs incurred by the socially excluded groups as Keefer (2007) argues that clientelistic exchanges incentivise the under-provision of non-targeted goods (e.g. universal education) and over-provision of targeted goods (e.g. public sector jobs and public work projects).

6.3.2 Patronage Employment

In Pakistan, a large public sector offers better chances for patronage employment (Jalal, 1995) where votes make a good tradable commodity. An individual voter may not have a substantial bargaining power but voters are in a better position to capitalise on the synergy of their collective vote blocs i.e. where the vote banks become formations e.g. aggregated in groups like families, clans, tribes, ethnic groups, occupational groups and neighbourhood or business associations. Even in a large sized public sector like that of Pakistan’s, the offer of patronage employment mostly remains limited in comparison with its high demands and hence patronage employment is highly valued because it is not just granted as a one-off clientelistic payoff. Politicians’ instrumentality in the provision of employment adds to his/her credibility because one persons’ employment means a long-term personalised favour to a vote bloc or social group. It is obvious that patronage employments cannot be offered in return for individual votes. In fact, the very nature of patronage
employment offer makes it indivisible and valuable for voters’ groups therefore such
speciality offers are usually offered by politicians in return for a large number of
secured votes from socials groups. Other than considering vote blocs, politicians will
also prefer to manipulate public sector employment in favour of their cronies or party
workers so that the politicians can be instrumental not only in the elected institutions
but also in the public sector departments.

For politicians, patronage employment has one more advantage. Besides securing a
multitude of votes, patronage employment is safe and is revocable to a certain extent
post elections. Politicians also capitalise on the offer of patronage employment in
more than just one election. Thus, an offer of a job is a credible way of delivering
patronage to specific groups of voters. When political behaviour is observable, a job
has the additional advantage that it can be withdrawn as a punishment. Barbara
Geddes formulated a patron-client game as a version of prisoner’s dilemma, wherein
politicians will lose electoral support unless they provide public employment along
the partisan lines, and if the voters do not support the politician they lose their public
employment that was provided as a personal favour (Geddes, 1994). It is not only the
issue of appointments into the public sector that is critical for the impact assessment
of patronage employment on politicians’ credibility but also the affairs related to
promotions and transfers (geographical and inter-departmental) that matters in local
politics. In Pakistan’s bureaucratic public sector establishment, the APT matters are
significantly critical in shaping up the inter-institutional working relationships
because these matters are highly politicised.

6.4 Beyond the Pork Barrel Politics: Identities and Preferences

This part of the chapter highlights the rival explanatory approaches for the evaluation
of voting behaviour that go beyond public choice explanation. As pointed out by Van
Der Eijk and Franklin 2009), one of the factors that determines voting behaviour is the
membership of and loyalty to different social groups defined by differences in class,
religion, ethnicity and other similar features. If these social groups are critical in
social conflict and social organisation, and/or if the membership of such groups is an
important part of people’s consciousness, then such groups are referred to as social
cleavage groups and the dividing line between them is called as social cleavage (ibid).
Such groups have, in common with political parties, some distinctive political interests (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). A variety of groups, institutions, individuals (serving as opinion leaders) and their respective values and orientations are critical in moulding public opinion. For instance, Rehman (1997) explains that primordialist theory of ethnicity proposes that shared paternity, bio-kinship, commonality of descent, and blood relationships truly create deep extra-rational bonds or sentiments for language, religion or other aspects of identity. These extra-rational or sentimental motivations in turn determine certain aspects of multi-dimensional voting behaviour of voters as well as politicians’ response to those behaviours. In order to avoid overlooking the contextual complexities of the case, the analytical spheres for the investigation of patron-client relationships need to be stretched beyond the normative and empirical limitations of public choice explanations of rational voting behaviour.

As explained earlier, public choice theorists reckon that clientelism is a result of two market imperfections, one of which is information asymmetry. The magic of aggregation is a counter explanation to the public choice theory’s assumption of individual voter’s predicament of information asymmetry. Van Der Eijk and Franklin (2009) describe the puzzle of ignorant voters and the magic of aggregation. According to this concept, people are knowledgeable in patches. The electorate that generally lacks general knowledge is most competent in precisely those areas that matter most to them. Hence, no single individual voter needs to have knowledge on all subjects relevant to public policy because public opinion is a collective phenomenon not an individual phenomenon. When individual opinions are aggregated to constitute public opinion, different aspects of it can come from different individuals and therefore the aggregate public entity would be quite knowledgeable about most of the public policy aspects. This is the magic of aggregation which should, in principle, offset the information asymmetries between the patron and clients.

Caplan (2007) however is quite critical about the magic of aggregation and disapproves the public choice theory’s assumption of voters’ rationality as well. According to him, voters do not have rational beliefs, which they act upon rather they have ‘preferences over beliefs’. Voters’ beliefs (or knowledge) about economics (or rational choice) are systematically mistaken which worsen the outcomes of democracy and that is why the public choice assumptions cannot be reconciled with
the fruitfulness of democracy. In other words, the magic of aggregation works only if voters do not make systematic errors but according to Caplan, voters’ knowledge of economics or rational choice are riddled with systematic errors that lead to preferential bias. For instance, most of the voters are oblivious to the mechanism in which the ‘invisible hand’ in a free market economy harmonises private greed and public interest. Similarly, voters equate prosperity not with production but with employment. Such systematic errors show that voters are irrational because they believe in what they want to believe i.e. they have mistaken preferences because they are unable to judge the available information rationally.

While comparing the consumer behaviour (economics) with voters’ behaviour (politics), Caplan argues that, emotions and ideologies – and not just the facts or the processing of information – fundamentally affects human judgment and political behaviour. Human emotions and extra-rational ideologies override people’s rationality because they ignore unwanted information on subjects, which they do not care about. Caplan’s critical stance is quite rigid in a sense it does not accommodate perspectives like the logic of aggregation and groups’ rationality. His antithetical stance against the potential of aggregated public opinion proposes that democracies end up in choosing bad public policies. Contrarily, the main line of argument developed in this study suggests quite the opposite; it is argued that public policies are best devised and implemented under the elected democracies. However, Caplan’s proposition does provide us with another important perspective for the assessment of voting behaviour which illustrates that ideologies and emotions play a critical role in explaining a social and political behaviour. For instance, religion is one of the extra-rational ideological motivations that shape up voters’ preferences over rational beliefs. Since the social phenomena under investigation in this study are quite complex, we take into account a range of relevant explanatory perspectives to explain the complex political behaviour of voters.

According to Waseem (2006), Columbia school of thought focuses on sociological perspectives to understand the dynamics of electoral behaviour while Downisian theory is based on voters’ assessment of benefits in return for their votes. Nonetheless, we find no reason why these explanatory perceptions should be treated as mutually exclusive. Owing to the dynamics of human nature and groups’ aggregate constraints,
several competing or apparently contradictory motivating factors may have a collective impact on voters’ voting behaviour simultaneously that would mould and at times, alter voters’ electoral priorities. A pluralist approach undertaken in this research will take into account the economic rationality of socio-political groups, the logic of aggregation, voters’ emotions and ideologies, sociological perspectives and positive group identities, all of which are believed to be partly explaining the voting patterns at local elections held in Pakistan.

6.5 Parameters of Electoral Mechanisms

Two major issues have been raised by many analysts related to the electoral process of local government elections held in Pakistan in the year 2001 and 2005. They were the official exclusion of political parties from contesting the local elections and the indirect elections of Tehsil (town) and District Nazims (Mayor) and Naib Nazims (Deputy Mayor). In principle, for the attainment of a pluralist political society, it is essential that various political parties that represent different socio-political groups, participate in the local elections. The participation of political parties consolidates democratic practices by integrating elected bodies across the various tiers (Manor, 1999) and can potentially create and train a capable lot of leaders at local level who can then progress to the higher tiers of government. According to Manor (1997), the exclusion of political parties from contesting in local elections is not likely to be successful in the countries that allow for party competition at the higher levels of the government. The presence of political parties in local elections can be useful in settling conflicts between central and local governments (Gibson and Hanson, 1996) and promote the accountability of political parties (Gazaryan and Jeleniewski, 1996) because political parties’ involvement in the local elections serves as an acid test of their capabilities to deliver social services. Ribot (2004), however, contrarily argues that in case of exclusion of political parties, elections could be more competitive at the local level and could serve the interests of the poor in a better way.

As explained earlier, in Pakistan, the tradition of holding the general elections on non-party basis in 1985 set by military government, changed the entire disposition of politics and brought about a shift away from meaningful policy based politics. A drastic change was spurred with the exclusion of political parties from elections,
which consolidated individual political figures rather than strengthening the aggregate political organisation or political ideologies (Waseem, 2006). General Zia’s strategy to exclude political parties from the federal and provincial elections enabled the local politicians (elected earlier in the local government election of 1979) to contest and win the elections for the national and provincial assemblies in 1985. Since the conventional political parties were suppressed and the members of the national and provincial assemblies were elected on individual basis, sub-national identities were aroused making the political playing field conducive for pork barrel politics whereby politicians had no incentives to extend their services to their wider constituencies.

Therefore, by and large, the ban on political parties’ participation not only diminished the prospects for progressive and ideological politics but also further localised the pork barrel politics. According to the Local Government Plan (2000) in Pakistan, the local elections were to be contested on non-party basis. Although the mainstream political parties participated informally by supporting party workers to run for the local elections as independent candidates, ICG (2004) comments that by (formally) depoliticising governance, the military tried to reinforce loyalties along the lines of ‘biradaree’ (caste, tribe, sub-region) which has actually aggravated the social and political divisions in society. Other than the social fractionalisation, there are factors that make the parties’ context specific involvement in the local elections, further complicated. Political parties’ geographical concentration and outreach, the nature of social and ethnic groups that are represented by the parties, parties’ political orientation, and the degree of inter-party rivalry in specific areas determine whether the national or regional parties’ participation in the local government elections would be beneficial or disadvantageous. Keeping in view the inter-institutional and inter-governmental jurisdictional overlapping in terms of social service delivery and recruitment affairs of public officials, national or regional parties’ involvement in the local affairs can have an unpredictable impact. As discussed earlier, in Pakistan this matter becomes more complicated because legislators from all levels of government - ranging from the members of the national assembly to the local councillors - are involved in government sponsored development projects and basic social service delivery.
The electoral process in the local government plan (2000) was designed in such a way that Nazim and Naib Nazim at the town and district level were to be elected on indirect vote of electoral college that comprised of all the members of union councils elected directly in their respective towns and districts. Keefer et al. (2005) urge that the indirect election of mayors limit their incentives to provide public goods to broader constituency and hence they are likely to be less accountable and less responsive to the wider electorate. In similar vein, ICG (2004) reports that indirect elections for mayors allowed better chances for rigging as the District and Town Nazim were answerable to a narrow electoral college of union councillors. Mayors’ indirect election made it easier for them to buy votes from a few hundred Union Council members rather than earning a majority’s support from the whole electorate. However, the indirect elections also had underlying complications. Since the constituencies for different levels of government in Pakistan overlapped geographically, the direct elections of District and Town Nazim could potentially aggravate their working relationships with the upper tiers of government.

There are variations in population concentration and size of the districts and towns in the rural and urban areas of Pakistan. Since several constituency seats for the national and provincial assembly are usually included in one district’s area (in most of the large urban districts), the direct election of district Nazim could have undermined the political stature of member of a national or provincial assembly who is also directly elected with a popular vote. Contrary to that, in case of rural areas, one constituency of national or provincial assembly may include several constituencies of town administration. Here, the directly elected member of the national or provincial assembly may have an overwhelming political domination over the town Nazim who is indirectly elected. Therefore, the issue of indirect elections is also context specific and needs to be assessed keeping in view the complexities of jurisdictional overlaps - geographical and functional.

6.6 Conclusions

Public choice theorists consider clientelism as an individual problem but another way of looking at it is to focus on groups of voters that are involved in exchange for their votes - referred to as pork barrel politics. As theorised in the ‘magic of aggregation’,
voters’ groups are informed and knowledgeable as a collective entity and the probability of information asymmetries diminishes when groups of voters are taken into consideration in clientelistic exchanges. In pork barrel politics, the credibility of politicians not only depends on their personal characteristics and relations with voters but also on the availability of resources that politicians can direct towards their electorates. Politicians are compelled to resort to pork barrel spending because they have limited resources that can be spent on a fraction of electorate and not because they want to jeopardise their credibility by targeting the available resources to specific groups.

Some scholars opine that pork barrel approach can potentially promote positive competition among different social and political groups nonetheless there are practical limitations to this argument. Although a multitude of socio-political groups exist in society, the low levels of their civic engagement and political activism perpetuate pork barrel politics rather than promoting healthy competition among them. The limitations in resources also make it difficult for politicians to prioritise development projects. Due to the social fragmentation and economic polarisation, narrow targeting of public goods and services under the clientelist obligations exclude those groups that find it hard to organise themselves into aggregate entities that would help them enhance their numerical strength and eventually be able to participate effectively in the political process. It is therefore argued that pork barrel politics generate negative economic and political externalities in the long run.

More specifically in heterogeneous societies, that are spread across different social and economic divisions, pork barrel criteria for public sector and development funds allocations incentivise the under-provision of non-targeted goods for instance universal education and basic health and over-provision of targeted goods for instance patronage employment and targeted public work projects. The key to overcome the problems of social exclusion lies in the improvement of civil engagement and political activism in the political process. Lamerchand and Legg (1972) anticipate that as rural elements become conscious of their numerical strength, organise themselves politically, and articulate their demands through the institutional channels, gaps are likely to develop in the clientelistic system.
A range of different factors influences citizens’ voting behaviour. It has been argued that the rationality of a social group can be one of the factors that explains groups’ collective behaviour. In addition, loyalty to different social groups defined by their differences in class, religion, ethnicity, kinships, caste language, and other similar features also plays a critical role in determining the voting behaviour. Such primordial factors consolidate group identities that partly explain an important dimension of the voting behaviour of voters and politicians’ response to them. Similarly, Caplan’s critical idea of ‘preferences over beliefs’ provides another nuanced perspective for the assessment of voting behaviour, proposing that ideologies and emotions rather than the assumed rationality of voters, determine their electoral behaviour.

For the examination of electoral mechanisms’ impact on the overall performance of local governments, it is essential to take into account the inter-institutional and inter-governmental jurisdictional overlapping in terms of social service delivery and recruitment affairs of public officials. Although it is believed that political parties’ involvement in local elections secures the institution of local government nonetheless depending on the context, political parties’ involvement in the local affairs can have an unpredictable impact. Several contextual circumstances like political parties’ strength and outreach, the nature of social and ethnic groups that are represented by the parties, political ideology, position in the government and the degree of inter-party rivalry in specific areas determine whether political parties’ participation in the local government elections would be beneficial or disadvantageous in the local constituencies.

Similarly, the impact assessment of indirect elections for the local government representatives is also complicated because the constituencies for different levels of government overlap geographically. The direct election of local government representatives can have a positive impact on improving the politicians’ accountability and on reducing the probability of election rigging. However, given that the legislators from upper tiers of government are elected on direct vote and there is de facto inter-governmental and geographical overlapping in functional and electoral jurisdictions, the electoral policy of direct or indirect elections of mayors remains contentious and therefore needs a context-specific analysis.
Section 3
The Case Study of NWFP Province
Chapter 7

7.1 Introduction
This chapter serves two purposes. First, it provides a descriptive prelude and illustration of political, administrative and financial structure of devolution reforms in order to help the reader understand the analysis of first hand empirical data included in the following chapters. Secondly, the chapter also includes a case-specific literature review. Based on secondary yet empirical sources such as impact assessment studies conducted over the last decade, this chapter evaluates and uses the available research. The reason of incorporating the secondary sources of evidence in this chapter is to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’. In light of research conducted recently, the political, administrative and fiscal outcomes of reforms are reviewed in comparison with the pre devolution bureaucratic civil administration system of Pakistan. It is important to note that the brief analysis of local government reforms included in this chapter is based on nationwide studies and therefore it provides a generic overview of outcomes of political, administrative and financial restructuring.

The state and government of Pakistan is structured in accordance with the amended constitution of 1973 that was passed unanimously by the leaders of all political parties in the national assembly. According to the constitution, Pakistan is a federation of four provinces: Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province (renamed as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa in the year 2010), Punjab, and Sindh. In addition, there are Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Capital Territory that includes the capital city of Islamabad. These areas and territories are run under the administrative jurisdiction of the federal government and state’s bureaucracy. The Northern Areas used to be administered by the Federal Government however, by the end of year 2009, they were renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan, and were granted a province-like status, with an elected Chief Minister and a Governor appointed by the President. However, Gilgit-Baltistan still lacks a strong constitutional and institutional link with the rest of the four provinces of Pakistan. The Pakistani administered part of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region includes Azad Kashmir, which is a self-governing state under Pakistani government’s control however constitutionally Azad Kashmir is not a part of Pakistan.
The constitution of Pakistan is based on a federal parliamentary system with a president as head of the state and a popularly elected Prime Minister as the head of the government. The bicameral federal legislature or ‘Majlis-e-Shoora’ (council of advisors) of Pakistan consists of Senate (Upper House) and the National Assembly (Lower House). Seats in the federal legislature are allocated to each of the four provinces, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory based on population concentration. Senate, a permanent legislative body with equal representation from each of the four provinces, is composed of 100 seats and the Senators are indirectly elected by the members of Provincial Assemblies to serve a four years’ term. The President is elected for a term of five years by an Electoral College comprising of members of the Senate, National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. The President can be impeached or be removed from office for gross misconduct with a 2/3 majority of members of the Parliament. The National Assembly has 342 seats out of which, 60 seats are reserved for women and 10 seats are reserved for members representing the religious minorities. Members of the National Assembly are directly elected via popular vote and they serve a five years’ term. The Prime Minister who is the head of government is assisted by a federal cabinet whose members (ministers) are appointed by the president on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Each of the four provinces has a provincial assembly led by a Chief Minister who is the leader of the legislative assembly’s majority party or coalition. The provinces also have a Governor (appointed by the President) and a cabinet of Ministers that is headed by the Chief Minister and approved by the Governor. Like the national assembly, the members of the provincial assemblies are also elected via universal adult suffrage (18 years of age) and the provincial assemblies have reserved seats for religious minorities as well. FATA is governed directly by the President through the Governor of NWFP province. The judiciary includes the Supreme Court of Pakistan, provincial high courts, civil and criminal courts of justice like district courts and other special tribunals and boards. The President appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; other Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The President also appoints the Judges of the provincial high courts after consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as
the governor of the province and the Chief Justice of the high court to which the appointment is being made.

**Figure 1**
**Map of Pakistan**

Source
http://news.bbc.co.uk
7.2 The Local Government Reforms (2001)

General Pervez Musharraf toppled the politically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999 and the army took over the reins of the government in Pakistan. Being the army chief, General Pervez Musharraf proclaimed himself as the Chief Executive of Pakistan under the second PCO (Provisional Constitution Order) in the history of Pakistan on October 14, 1999. Later, he also took over the office of the
President of Pakistan on June 20, 2001. Paracha (2003) notes that instantly after the military take over, Musharraf announced a ‘seven point agenda’ that was intended for the national reconstruction and for redressing the institutional crisis of Pakistan. The seven point agenda included rebuilding national confidence and morale; strengthening the federation while reducing the inter-provincial disharmony; reviving and restoring investors’ (international) confidence; ensuring the law and order and dispensation of speedy justice; depoliticising the state’s institutions; devolving political power to the grass root level; and ensuring swift and wider accountability.

In the pursuit of this seven point agenda, NRB (National Reconstruction Bureau) was established that was headed by a retired army general. NRB was assigned with the responsibility to design the devolution of power plan for restructuring Pakistan’s political and administrative setup. According to the agenda, this devolution of power programme was aimed at politically empowering the citizens, decentralisation of administrative authority, decentralisation of professional functions, and distribution of financial resources to the provinces and the local governments. Consequently, local governments were formed at three levels (District, Tehsil and Union) through a Presidential ordinance - LGO (Local Government Ordinance) - promulgated by Musharraf in August 2001. A series of non-party elections were held in 2001 and 2005 for the representatives to be elected to the local government set up for a term of four years. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, 33% seats were reserved for female candidates at all three levels of local government. Similarly, seats were also reserved for peasants/workers and religious minorities at each level. In addition to this, both rural and urban areas were integrated administratively in order to abolish the centuries old rural-urban administrative division. In this system, the terms Mayor and Deputy Mayor were replaced by the Urdu language terms - Nazim and Naib-Nazim respectively.

7.2.1 Prominent Political and Administrative Changes
The lowest tier of local government was the Union Council (UC), which was also the smallest in size. The whole Union government comprised of a Union Nazim (Mayor), the Union Naib Nazim (Deputy Mayor) and the Union Administration, which included a maximum of three Union Secretaries (Appointed Officials). The Union Secretaries used to coordinate community development and social service delivery
under the supervision of the Union Nazim or the Union Naib Nazim. The total number of seats in a Union Council was 21, divided into twelve seats for Muslim General Councillors of which four seats were reserved for women; six seats were reserved for peasants/workers two of which were reserved for women; and finally one seat was reserved for religious minorities’ representatives. The remaining two seats were those of the UC Nazim and the Naib Nazim. The Union Nazims and Union Naib Nazims were the only officials in the local government setup who were directly elected by the citizens. They ran for their office on a joint ticket and, upon being elected, became the members of the Union Council. The Union Naib Nazims also became the ex-officio members of the Tehsil Council, while the Union Nazims become the ex-officio members of the District Council. The Union Nazims and Naib Nazims were to receive grants from the District and Tehsil development funds, which were allocated for different development projects within their respective Unions. They could directly monitor the allocation of funds for their Unions in the District and Tehsil budgets (Bukhari et al., 2006).

The Tehsil/Town Councils and the District Councils became the Electoral College for the election of Tehsil/Town Nazims and District Nazims respectively. The Nazims at these two levels of local government were not members of the councils, but rather representatives of the larger community. Therefore, the election of Town and District Nazim and Naib Nazim were designed to be held indirectly i.e. their electoral college consisted of all the elected members of Union Councils that were included their respective Town or District. The District, as the largest geographical and administrative unit, could include within its borders one or more Tehsils. Each TMA (Tehsil Municipal Administration) included a certain number of Unions formed by one or more village(s). Politically, the three tiers of local government were interrelated through the system of direct and indirect elections as described above. Figure 3 illustrates a hypothetical example of the electoral system in local government.

Tehsil/Town Council was the middle tier of the local government that comprised of Tehsil Nazim, Tehsil Naib Nazim, Tehsil Council and the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The Tehsil Council was an elected body comprising of Naib Union Nazims of all Union Councils in a Tehsil/Town. The number of general seats in the Tehsil council was equivalent to the number of Union Councils in each Tehsil.
33% seats were reserved for women, 5% for workers/peasants and 5% for religious minorities. The elected members (councillors) of all UCs (Union Councils) within a Tehsil/Town constituted the Electoral College for the election of candidates on the reserved seats. Both the Tehsil Nazim and the Naib Tehsil Nazim were also elected as joint candidates by the Union Councillors of the whole Tehsil. The Tehsil Nazim acted as the executive head of the Tehsil while Tehsil Naib Nazim acted as the convener of the Tehsil Council. Both were required to have an academic qualification of at least matriculation/secondary school certificate or equivalent. Municipal services such as water, sanitation and urban services were assigned to the Tehsil government. Figure 4 shows the hierarchy and functional domains of the elected and appointed public officials in a Tehsil Municipal Administration.

District/Zilla council was the highest and most important tier in the structure of local government, which comprised of the District Nazim, Naib Nazim, the District Council and the District Administration. The District Nazim was the head of District administration while the Naib Nazim acted as the speaker of the District Council. Both the District Nazim and the Naib Nazim were elected as joint candidates by the members (councillors) of all the UCs with in the entire District. Both of them were required to have a minimum qualification of at least matriculation/secondary school certificate or equivalent. The District Council consisted of the directly elected Nazims of all UCs with in the district. In addition to this, 33% seats were reserved for women and 5% seats each for the workers and peasants and minorities. Members of the UCs of the entire district also served as the Electoral College for the election of candidates on the above-mentioned reserved seats. Functions like budgeting and development planning, previously carried out by provincial secretariats, were now being performed at the District and Tehsil levels. The district government was responsible for carrying out services relating to social and human development such basic health care, education and social welfare. The organogram of District government can be viewed in figure 5.
Figure 3
An Illustrative Example of the Local Government Elections

| Assume a District with 60 Union Councils (UC), grouped in Three Tehsils of the same size i.e. (20 Union Councils in each Tehsil) |
| Direct Elections at Union Council |
| The electorate directly elects 21 Union Councillors out of which 19 are elected individually as general councillors, 1 UC Nazim and 1 UC Naib Nazim (both elected on a joint ticket). In this example, there are 1260 Union Councillors (20UCs X 21 Members X 3 Tehsils). |

| Tehsil Council (Indirect Elections) |
| By virtue of the above-mentioned direct UC election, each UC Naib Nazim also becomes a member of the Tehsil/Town Council as Tehsil Councillor. In addition to the 20 UC’s Naib Nazims, each of the three Tehsil Councils has a Tehsil Nazim, Tehsil Naib Nazim and 9 additional members i.e. 7 women councillors, 1 peasant/worker member and 1 religious minority’s member. The Tehsil Nazim, Tehsil Naib Nazim and additional nine members are elected by the 420 Union Councillors (20 UCs X 21 Union Councillors) |

| District Council (Indirect Elections) |
| Each UC Nazim also becomes a member of District Council ex-officio. In addition to 60 UC Nazims, the District Council also has a District Nazim, Naib Nazim and additional 26 members i.e. 20 women Councillors, 3 peasant/worker members and 3 religious minority members. The District Nazim, Naib Nazim and other 26 district councillors are elected by 1260 UC members. |

Source: Adapted from ADB, DfID and World Bank (2004)
Figure 4
Organogram of Tehsil Municipal Administration

Source: Adapted from the Official Website: www.nrb.gov.pk
National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan
Figure 5
Organogram of District Government

Source: Adapted from the ADB, DfID and World Bank (2004) and National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan
Cheema et al. (2005) describe the following political, administrative and accountability changes that were brought about in the governance structure with the implementation of local government reforms in 2001. Some of the public sector departments were not devolved to the district level instead they remained under the domain of provincial bureaucracy such as department of irrigation and the Police services. In addition, certain other functions within the departments were also retained under the purview of provincial bureaucracy for example higher education, teaching hospitals (Health department), agricultural research and development (Agriculture department), supervision of foreign funded projects (Planning and Development department) and regulation of medical standards (Health department). On the other hand however, a vast range of services were devolved from provincial to the District governments for instance the primary, secondary and technical education, primary health care and management of District and Tehsil hospitals (Health department), assessment and collection of land taxes, cesses and agricultural income tax (Revenue department), agricultural extension and farm water management (Agriculture department), planning and design of district roads and buildings (Communication & Works department). Similarly, other services that were previously administered by provincial public sector departments like the Local Government and Rural Development Department and the Housing, Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department were devolved to the Tehsil level of local government.

The provision of municipal services was assigned as a functional responsibility to the Tehsil Municipal Administration; services that were previously the domain of urban or rural local councils (non elected) were assigned to the Tehsil administration which included key municipal services such as water supply, sewerage, sanitation, drainage schemes and street lights. Cheema et al. (2005) however note that no services were devolved from the federal level to the newly established local governments instead, most of the provincial services were devolved to the district, Tehsil and Union Council levels. Before the devolution reforms, the provincial bureaucracy at the district level was accountable to their non-elected provincial secretariat whereas under the local government system, most of the appointed bureaucrats became (formally) accountable to the elected representatives of local governments. The most prominent example was that of the pre devolution Deputy Commissioner (DC), who used to report to the non-elected senior provincial bureaucracy, whereas in the post reform
period, the (DC equivalent) head of the district administration - District Coordination Officer (DCO) - was required to report to the elected District Nazim. In addition, unlike the pre-devolution functional domain of Executive Magistrate, the DCO under the new arrangement was no longer the District Magistrate or the District (revenue) Collector.13

7.2.2 Administrative Parameters of Reforms

As illustrated in figure 5, under the new system of local government, all the EDOs (Executive District Officers) of the devolved departments were to be supervised by the DCO while the DCO him/herself was required to report to the elected Nazim of the District. However Cheema et al. (2005) note that the authority of the Nazim over the DCO and Executive District Officers (EDO) remained limited in matters of public officials’ appointments, transfers and promotions, which continued to remain under the purview of the provincial secretariat. International Crises Group’s (ICG) Asia Report (2004) highlights some the administrative issues in post devolution period as follows. The Local Government Ordinance (LGO) designated the District Nazim as the head of the district government to be assisted by the DCO but many District Nazims were reported to have complained that their DCOs often ignored them in administrative matters as there was no provision in the local government plan to ensure their compliance with the local government’s directives. Section 20 of the Manual of Local Government (2001, 2005) made Nazims personally responsible for financial losses and unlawful expenditures however, several Nazims complained that this created ‘responsibility without authority’ and left them vulnerable14. The local government representatives believed that the devolution of administrative and fiscal powers to them was just nominal as most of de facto powers remained under the functional jurisdiction of the appointed civil bureaucrats. Poorly defined enforcement mechanisms were also identified by the report for example the TMA s were granted quasi-judicial powers such as the imposition of fines, however TMA employees found it almost impossible to enforce their writ without the enforcement powers such as the

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13 Pre devolution, the Deputy Commissioner’s sphere of authority indirectly included executive magistracy and revenue collection (via the Executive Magistrate who used to report to him/her) and the general administration and coordination directly. After the devolution reforms, the post of DC was replaced by DCO (District Coordination Officer) which only retained the general administration and coordination functions.

14 ICG countrywide interviews with Nazims, May-June 2003
support of police force. Such enforcement powers were previously exercised by the appointed Executive Magistrates who were backed up by the police.

The ICG (2004) report also spells out that the functional coordination had grown worse after the devolution reforms. There were no administrative linkages between the various levels of the newly established local government, and the local governments at each level used to operate in isolation. There was an exception of the political linkage between these levels of government as the UC members served as ex-officio Electoral College for the election of Tehsil and District councils. Not only the Nazim’s control over the DCO and EDOs was questionable, the mechanism for holding the District Nazims accountable for any misconduct was also dubious. For instance, the provincial Local Government Commission could initiate special audits and inspections of District governments but these were usually sporadic and were not a viable substitute for permanent and institutionalised accountability mechanisms at district level. Mostly, the accountability of District Nazim remained contingent upon the political relationships between District Nazim and the District Councils that were headed by the Naib Nazim.

Another major administrative change in the local government system was the administrative integration of rural and urban areas. Cheema et al. (2005) explained that during the pre-devolution period, both the urban and rural local governments used to be two distinct administrative entities where the provincial bureaucracy performed most of the public services delivery functions and therefore there were inequalities in service provisions in most of the rural and urban areas. The devolution reforms integrated both the rural and urban areas and abolished the centuries old rural-urban divide. This administrative change is crucially important for the equitable redistribution and allocation of resources among the rural and urban areas. Apparently, this administrative integration was a laudable objective however this strategy created some electoral and fiscal problems, which will be elaborated with primary evidence in the next chapters.

7.2.3 The Political Restructuring

The local government plan was executed through the presidential ordinance - LGO (Local government Ordinance) and the 17th constitutional amendment promulgated
by Musharraf, which provided protection to the local governments only for a period of six years beginning in 2001. Since the constitutional amendment was incorporated through the Presidential Ordinance and not via bill passed in the parliament, the local governments as the third tier of government enjoyed constitutional protection for only six years. During those six years, the elections for the second term of local governments were held in year 2005. Although Musharraf resigned from his Presidency in August 2008, the local governments elected during his regime continued to serve their term until December 2009. Thereafter, the system was abolished completely by the democratically elected (2008) government of Pakistan’s People’s Party. Cheema et al. (2005) compare this in contrast with India where the 73rd and the 74th constitutional amendments explicitly recognised local governments as the third tier of Indian government. The local government system could have survived in Pakistan even after the fall of Musharraf’s regime, had it been given a permanent constitutional protection earlier. However, as observed in case of the previous reforms, the makeshift system of local governance collapsed soon after the fall of military regime.

In the devolution reforms, since most of the public services were devolved from provinces to the newly elected local governments, the most prominent of the political issues emerged in the form of arch-rivalry between the provincial and local governments. Zaidi (2005) and Cheema et al. (2005) note that due to the conflict of political interests, provincial governments were not willing to accommodate and accept the local governments as the third tier of government. The political and administrative rifts between the provincial and local governments were multifaceted. Conflicts over the development funds allocations, matters of public officials’ APT and other similar issues resulted in an inevitable arch-rivalry between the local and provincial governments. Despite the rhetoric of power transfers from provinces to the local governments, provincial governments retained their predominant influence in many aspects over the local governments. For instance, Cheema et al. (2005) note that section 23 of LGO (2001) empowered the provincial government to remove the Nazim from his/her office through an external recall by securing a simple majority in the provincial assembly.
Keeping in view that the local governments were formed with the mandate in separate elections, the influence and overwhelming authority of the provincial governments over the local governments obscured the independence and autonomy of the local governments. A social audit of devolved social services delivery, conducted by UNDP (2010) reports that a very large number of District Nazims, interviewed for the study, believed that the district governments' relations with their provincial governments were tense whereas some of the Nazims said that the working relationships between them were good. According to the District Nazims, the relationships between the provincial governments and District governments deteriorated because of several reasons for instance, too much interference from the provincial government in the functional jurisdiction of local governments, poor coordination between province and district administrations, delays from provincial governments in the approval and execution of local development schemes, and financial difficulties imposed by provincial governments on the district administration.

ICG (2004:25) quotes a pro-military (PML-Q) MNA (Member of National Assembly) from the NWFP province: ‘If I tell my constituents that sanitation, water supply or police matters are now the responsibility of local governments, they turn around and say: we voted for you, not the Nazim’. With the transfer of social services responsibilities to the local governments in 2001, there was an additional competitive tier added to the inter-governmental patronage delivery network. Health, education and municipal services provision responsibilities overlapped among the local, provincial and federal government, and the civil administrations of respective departments. As explained earlier, due to the involvement of several levels of government representatives in the provision of similar social services, the tensions in inter-governmental relationships were intensified after the devolution reforms. When multiple tiers of government are involved in providing the same service, it becomes difficult for politicians to claim credit for their efforts (Hasnain, 2008) and citizens find it hard to hold the politician accountable for mismanagement and underperformance.

### 7.2.4 Limitations in Fiscal Decentralisation

In the local government reforms, some of fiscal functions and authorities were also devolved from provincial bureaucracy to the three tiers of local governments, which
included revenue generation through existing local taxes, imposition of new taxes and user fees, and public sector recurring and local developmental spending. The Local Government reforms envisaged formula based fiscal transfers to the districts through Provincial Finance Awards (Charlton et al., 2002). In addition, local governments were also allowed to levy local taxes and user fees from a specified list. For the promotion of trade and commerce, the import/export tax (Octroi) on the inter-district transportation of goods was abolished through the local government reforms. According to the plan, the local governments were not allowed to incur any debt to finance their expenditures. The plan encouraged the district and lower levels of government to generate their own resources in accordance with their capacity.

As explained in the previous chapters, the fiscal and administrative affairs in previous local government systems were dealt with by the civil bureaucracy. Hyder (1999) argues that the earlier local government reforms failed to establish an adequate fiscal transfer system as those local councils that were mostly dominated by the civil administration, were unable to perform even the limited expenditure functions assigned to them. The case of devolution reforms of 2001 was not much different. The PFC (Provincial Finance Commission) awards determined the non-discretionary inter-governmental fiscal transfer process from the provinces to the local government. The bulk of local government resources were mainly the fiscal transfers from provincially appointed Provincial Finance Commissions - up to 98% in some cases (ICG, 2004). The District governments had limited discretion over their budgetary resources. Hasnain (2008) maintains that the provincial allocable amount was transferred to the local government broadly under two separate block grants, one for recurrent expenditures, which constitutes approximately 88% of the allocable amount, and the remainder for development expenditures, with no de jure discretion to local governments to re-allocate across these two heads. In other words, fiscal decentralisation had just been paid lip service and local governments relied almost solely on higher tiers of government for their financial requirements and development expenditures. TMAs had been given some revenue raising authorities but with strings attached, which significantly contained their fiscal autonomy and obstructed their effectiveness and efficiency. TMAs’ revenue from own sources (e.g. the parking fee, cattle market fee, tax on transfer of immovable property etc.) were not allocated to any functional unit of TMA e.g. water fees were not earmarked for water services,
rather they would become a part of the overall TMA pool of revenues (Nayyar-Stone et al., 2006). Such pool arrangement provided no incentives for the local officials to improve the tax or user fee collection.

Apparently, the local governments had the appropriation authority over their fiscal receipts, which include revenues transferred to them from the province. However, through various administrative orders, the local governments were often directed to emulate the historic salary allocations as well as various appropriations to operational expenditures in accordance with the previous outlays (Cyan, 2007). Cheema et al. (2005) explain that certain budgetary heads of expenditures were retained at the provincial level for instance most of the employees in the administrative departments remained provincial employees therefore the District government could not create or reduce those posts or adjust their salary structure. Hence, a large fraction of the district budget was already fixed earlier. For education department, which spends around 90% of its non-development budget on salaries, this was a significant factor limiting the extent of decentralisation (ibid). Such constraints, among many others, compelled the spending patterns of local councils to be path dependant and as such local government representatives found it hard to improve their revenue raising and resource allocation capacities. Local councils’ involvement in fiscal decision-making was also insignificant and nominal. Cyan and Porter (2004) contend that the law prescribed the council’s role in budgeting but this function was led by the executive in such a way that marginalised the local council. For instance, Williamson et al. (2005) argue that in the allocation of ADP (Annual Development Plan) fund, the EDO of Finance and Planning Department dominated the budgeting authorities.

Other than the lack of fiscal autonomy, it is also the scarcity of development funds, which obstructs fiscal efficiency in local governance. For instance, ADP funds distributed among the Union Councils by the higher levels of government, mostly went into a large number of small projects because the district developmental budget when divided equally among Union Councils became too scant to be spent on any substantial project. Three main issues are worth considering over here. Firstly, local governments were highly dependant on the higher tiers of government for their fiscal arrangements; secondly, the traditional institutional procedures coerced the spending patterns of local councils to be path dependant; and thirdly, the design of fiscal
decentralisation left the TMA and Union Councils with inadequate funds that were seldom sufficient to be spent on any substantial development project.

7.3 Conclusions
Despite the massive rhetoric of devolution of the administrative, political and fiscal powers, the autonomy and authority of local government representatives remained limited largely. Civil bureaucracy, administered through the federal and provincial secretariats, continued to dominate the affairs of local governance and social services delivery. The restructured system of local governance could not ensure the delegation of due authority and powers to the local government representatives in accordance with their official responsibilities for instance the local government entities lacked the capacity to enforce their writ without the support of law enforcement agencies. The functional integration of elected local institutions into the predominantly established civil administration and other public sector departments did not prove to be an easy task as the civil bureaucracy was not willing for power sharing with an elected local institution. In addition, most of the social services delivery functions were devolved from the domain of provincial governments to the newly elected local governments and therefore a natural rivalry erupted between the two levels wherein the provincial governments were quite successful in retaining their dominance over the local government.

The fiscal policy of decentralisation programme was observed by policy analysts as ineffective as the provincial governments continued to retain their influence in resource allocation to the local governments. The mechanism of provincial finance award and the rules of funds allocation for recurring and development expenses allowed negligible fiscal autonomy to the local governments. Even within the limited fiscal autonomy granted to the local councils, it is argued that the appointed officials and bureaucrats rather than the elected members dominated the budgeting process. Besides that, scarcity of public funds and revenue generating resources also severely undermined the fiscal efficiency of the local governments. From the limited funds allocated to the local governments, approximately 80% is pre-allocated for recurring administrative expenses while the remaining 20% is usually too scant to be spent on any productive developmental project.
Chapter 8
Marriage of Inconvenience:
Clash of Interests in Inter-Institutional Relationships

This chapter explains the causes of the observed friction in working relationships between devolved public sector departments (Health, Education, Municipal Services and District Management Group) and local governments and between the various levels of government. It has been explained in chapter 4 that smooth inter-institutional working relationships are critical for the effective and efficient functioning of the government and administrative machinery. This chapter delves deep into the causes of inter-institutional tensions in working relationships and the associated complexities of local governance in post devolution reforms period. These complexities are multifaceted and intertwined however, the discussion will be focused upon the identification and explanation of factors that are imputed as perpetrating the asymmetries between the official responsibilities and legal authorities among the public sector institutions and various levels of government in Pakistan. The discussion in this chapter includes the analysis of factors from various institutional and organisational dimensions such as the issues of official capacity; legal authority and administrative skills; problems related to the appointments, promotions and transfers of public officials; rifts between the local governments and civil administration; the lack of inter-organisational coordination; and the impact of political parties’ involvement on the recruitment and fiscal matters of local governments and local administrations.

8.1 Recruitment and Skills Issues of Public Officials

Public sector management issues related to the recruitment process, skills, official capacity, legal authority, and competence of the public officials (both elected and appointed) are critical managerial concerns. Such managerial limitations need identification and appropriate redress wherever necessary because they not only affect the functioning and productivity of the public institutions but also have a profound impact on institutions’ working relationships with other partner institutions. The size of public sector in Pakistan is large which is apparently justified in a sense that it caters for the masses of population especially for those citizens who do not have the financial capability to resort to the private market allocations for their basic social
services requirements. In such circumstances, the identification of employees’ redundancy in public sector organisations, downsizing or privatising those public departments is the most undesirable of policy options for any elected government. Indeed, contrary to that, public sector departments are relied upon as employment bureaus by the federal and provincial governments for providing patronage employment and therefore the creation and allocation of patronage employment in the public sector becomes a very useful political strategy for the politicians in order to establish or revamp their political credibility and secure vote banks for themselves. With the politicisation of recruitment process in the public sector organisations, 1) the professional quality of public employees is put at stake because the recruitment is based on the criteria of patronage delivery rather than merit, 2) the equity and efficiency in provision of public goods deteriorates, and 3) inefficient, unskilled and redundant employees become a burgeoning burden on the public exchequer. The following example illustrates how the politicisation and mismanagement in the recruitment practices of public sector departments affect their efficiency and leads to redundancy and understaffing in different public departments at the same time.

In separate interviews, the EDOs from Finance and Planning Department of Peshawar and Mansehra related that in most of the districts, those employees who were on the verge on losing their jobs because of the departmental restructuring under the devolution reforms, were transferred into their Finance and Planning Department. Since those employees were hired previously for other departments, they were not trained and skilled enough for working in Finance and Planning Department. Therefore, despite the fact that in this case, the Finance and Planning department was sufficiently staffed, employees were not professionally trained and were therefore near useless. When the governments change, not only an excessive number of unnecessary employees (political appointees) are recruited into certain public sector departments, the federal and provincial ministers also intervene in the promotion and transfer matters of the existing public officials. Mergers and separations of public departments along with the ill-planned and ill-coordinated organisational and spatial rotation of public sector employees lead to superfluous staff in some departments whereas at the same time, other departments are either left understaffed, merged or abolished.
Such unprofessional conduct in the public sector recruitment process is the result of the politicisation of bureaucracy by the federal and provincial government and the incompetence of federal establishment division and provincial secretariats that are primarily responsible for the appointment, promotions and transfers of employees in all public departments. As discussed in chapter 5, the politicisation of civil bureaucracy is a critical factor that severely undermines the effectiveness of public sector organisations. Although the politicisation of bureaucracy is essentially a recruitment issue, the overlapping in terms formal and informal practice of institutions’ official authority and governments’ intervention in the matters related to the appointment, promotions and transfers of public employees in Pakistan is one of the core reasons that leads to the tensions between the various levels of government and civil administration. Therefore, the politics of appointments, postings and transfers of public employees is discussed in detail in section 8.3.5 of this chapter.

The Pakistani civil service system is composed of employees from federal and provincial civil service pool and the system is rank-based. A glimpse of the generalist nature of civil service was observed during the an interview where an office tenure record board displayed in a TMO’s (Town Municipal Officer) office in Town 3 of Peshawar revealed the fact that officials from highly diversified professional backgrounds - a retired captain from army and an engineer by qualification - had been working on this post in the past. Similarly, a senior bureaucrat working on the post of EDO (Finance) in Peshawar was appointed in this post through the provincial public service commission (Competitive Exams). His previous educational qualification was a postgraduate degree in English literature. He overtly admitted to have learnt the subject of finance during his initial years of job. Likewise, a District Officer (Revenue section) of Finance and Planning department in District Swabi said:

'I belong to PCS (Provincial Civil Service)$^{15}$ group .... Before this, I have been Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Political Agent and Executive Magistrate .... Post devolution I opted for this post (Revenue Department) .... Now I realise that I made a grave mistake because finance is a very rough and tough subject'.

$^{15}$ In all quotations from interviews, short annotations in brackets are not a part of the original quotes; they have been added for the purpose of clarification and reference to the context.
Due to the deterioration of formal practice and official conduct, the merit-based criteria of scale (official grades of appointed public officials) allocation were seldom practiced especially in the deployment of lower scale staff. We observed that the employees recruited in lower scales were actually deployed on the posts of higher scale. For instance, one of the employees recruited in scale 4 in Peshawar’s Town 3 was actually performing the duties on a technical post of scale 11. Owing to the lack of funds and recruitment restrictions from the parent provincial department, TMAs could not recruit sufficient staff in various scales in accordance with the requirements and that is why unlike the aforementioned Finance and Planning Department, most of the TMAs were understaffed. In order to compensate for the understaffing, we observed such makeshift arrangements wherein employees recruited in lower scales usually performed the duties of higher posts for which they were not qualified and trained. However, it is worth noting that the recruitment procedures for employees working in higher echelons of civil administration, especially those who are inducted through the federal and provincial public service commissions, were comparatively more professionalised in terms employees’ professional training and qualifications.

On the other hand, the elected incumbents of local government, wedded in a ‘marriage of inconvenience’ with their appointed counterparts revealed extreme levels of weaknesses not only in terms of their managerial skills but also in terms of the required official capacity and legal authority that was essential for performing the official duties assigned to them as per the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001. This is not surprising given the context of authoritarian rule in Pakistan. The elected representatives clearly lacked the political experience that is essential for performing the assigned democratic role. Besides, the new system of local governance failed to institutionalise comprehensive training programmes for the elected officials. The reforms were introduced and implemented haphazardly in year 2001; it was a sudden and drastic change that was unexpected for the public and candidates of local government alike and therefore it turned out to be a massive upheaval for the whole local governance setup. When the fresh, mostly inexperienced and untrained representatives started working with appointed public officials, their lack of experience and public management skills put them in an uneasy working relationship. From time to time sporadic training courses were arranged by international donor agencies, NGOs and national organisations like NCHD (National Commission for
Human Development) however such programmes could not provide sufficient orientation to the elected representatives to work in an entirely new system. Apart from the absence of a comprehensive training ground, the elected representatives also found it difficult to ‘learn by doing’. Although the system had a support from the central government, the elected representatives’ prospects for developing their political and managerial skills remained largely obstructed due to the administrative and political domination of bureaucracy and provincial governments. These inter-institutional and inter-governmental tensions are elaborated in section 8.3 of this chapter.

Well aware of the fact that generally the elected local government officials were not experienced, trained or skilled enough to perform the assigned jobs, a UC (Union Council) Nazim from Peshawar’s rural suburbs stated that

‘Political people (government representatives) ranging from Federal Finance Minister to the locally elected Nazims .... No one really knows the skills of (proper and efficient) budgeting ..... Old budget reports (of yester years) are reprinted (path dependence) and presented in provincial assembly and the local councils ..... Members are given the copy of the upcoming budget proposal (comprising of around three-four thick booklets) three days before the budget is presented in the assembly (as a bill) for approval .... How can someone read that in three days time. .... They (budget booklets) are never even opened by the members (of the assembly or local councils) .... We had a government of religious clerics (provincial government of MMA). They don’t even know the abc of English ... How could you expect them to read budget proposal when they don’t even have time to open such detailed books (budget proposals)’

We observed that in comparison with the appointed public officials, the managerial skills and experience of elected local government representatives were alarmingly low. Among other factors, elected officials’ lack of political experience and managerial skills in general administration and budgeting process adversely affected their performance. In addition, due to their professional deficiencies, the elected representatives of local governments mostly remained under the influence of their appointed counterparts. In matters ranging from the execution of developmental
projects to the routine administrative tasks, the *de facto* control was retained by the career civil servants. Hence, the central government not only failed to institutionalise a reliable and ongoing training programme for the newly elected incumbents of local government but it also fell short of providing them with an enabling environment wherein their political and managerial skills could be enhanced by a gradual and natural process of ‘learning by doing’.

8.2 Official Capacity and Legal Authority

The inadequacy of the official capacity and the legal authority of elected public officials also emerged as a contentious aspect of the local government reforms. The reforms abolished the post of DC and distributed the pre devolution DC’s financial and coordination responsibilities and powers among the local governments, EDO (Finance and Planning Department) and DCO (District Coordination Officer). Unlike the pre devolution Executive District Magistrate\(^\text{16}\), the Town and District Nazims were not given the magisterial powers but were given the responsibilities to secure and maintain law and order situation in their respective areas. In devolution reforms, the abolition of the office of Executive Magistrate was a laudable step because before the devolution reforms, the Executive Magistracy system was a clear infringement upon the autonomous status of the judiciary. The executive and the judiciary were supposed to be kept separate in terms of functional jurisdiction as enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan\(^\text{17}\). Nevertheless, since the magisterial functions were assigned to the Tehsil and District Nazims without the provision of magisterial powers, Nazims were constrained in terms of *de facto* enforcement powers, which made them incapable of dealing with the law and order situation.

For instance, the District Nazim was assigned the responsibility and legal authority of imposing section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (that bans four or more people from gathering at the public places, carrying firearms in public, use of loud speakers

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\(^\text{16}\) The Executive District Magistrate used to have the judicial and magisterial powers and s/he used to report to the District’s DC (Deputy Commissioner).

\(^\text{17}\) Article 175 (3) of the Constitution of Pakistan enshrines that the Judiciary shall be separated progressively from the Executive within [*fourteen*]\(^*\) years from the commencing day.

\(^*\) Item 33 of the schedule to P.O. No. 14 of 1985, substituted the word (fourteen) in place of the word ‘five’, in clause (3) of Article 175, (with effect from March 2, 1985).
in public rallies, tinted windows on vehicles, wall chalking and graffiti) but Nazims could hardly ever practice this authority because of two main reasons. First, despite being legally authorised, s/he did not have the enforcement powers such as the direct control over the use of police force to impose section 144 to avoid any law and order situation that is threatening. Secondly, since Nazims were elected and political office bearers, the protesters (mostly voters) who protest, in formations of processions, against any public sector department expect their local representatives to lead such rallies and processions rather than diffusing them. This dilemma usually put the local government representative in a critical position, mostly at odds with the officials of other public departments.

In an interview, the Naib Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar recounted that in the earlier magistracy system, it was quite common that the ruling members of provincial government would pressurise the Executive Magistrate via DC, in order to detain someone (for any legal reason or illegitimate political victimisation). Now with the abolishment of Executive Magistracy system, there was a clear separation of Executive arm of the state from the Judiciary. Earlier, the DC’s office was the hub of District’s financial, legal, administrative and magisterial powers and authorities and the DC and Executive Magistrate could sanction legal charges on citizens at their own whim. The Naib Nazim reiterated that in the post devolution decade, the political victimisation of opponents by provincial and federal government using district’s bureaucracy has been reduced considerably and this, according to him was a great political development.

Although the abolishment of DC and Executive Magistrate’s offices were highly lauded by the elected local representatives, most of the civil administrators and appointed public employees pointed towards the inadequacy of official capacity and legal authority of the local government representatives as the core reason for their performance failures. To most of the interviewees from public sectors departments (appointed), the transfer of district administrative functions to the locally elected representative, was a major blunder. A senior officer from Works and Services Department in Peshawar quotes:
‘Local Government cannot maintain a sound law and order situation the way army or law enforcement agencies do it …. Local Governments have been given the authority which they cannot exercise …. they (local representative) cannot initiate any punitive proceeding against a person belonging to his/her area because other than expectation of vote in future, s/he is a native, belonging to that very community and in case of any unpleasant event, things might lead to family feuds’.

On a similar note, a senior bureaucrat (Secretary of Local Governments Department) from Peshawar was of the opinion that local government officials at Tehsil level are not capable or trained enough for the functions (referring to the municipal development schemes) and projects assigned to them as per the devolution reform of 2001. According to him ‘they do not know as to what type of schemes are supposed to be initiated e.g. if they have a small amount of money to be spent on a development project, they will either compromise on the quality (of project) or just get rid of money (squander it)’. He continued

‘In a country like Pakistan, the writ of government can be established only with very effective civil administration … civil administration has to coexist with local government …. There is a need for an executive authority at every administrative level and our (recent) local government system has done away with it … without thinking as to how to fill the vacuum …. Local Government should have not been given these administrative responsibilities…. How can they do it? If there is a procession protesting against WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), how is he (Local Government representative) going to ask the police to baton charge the procession … rather he’ll lead that procession because he’s their political representative … Local government should only be involved in the provision of basic social and municipal services’

In the views of almost all the appointed public employees that were interviewed for this study, the local governments should not have been given the responsibilities of civil administration. The hallmark of the Pakistan’s pre devolution bureaucracy was her vice regal authority and official power, which was apparently endangered when the elected representatives were given some of the civil administration responsibilities
and most of the civil administrators were required to report to the elected representatives after the reforms. Senior bureaucrats and civil administrators believed that the elected representatives had neither the capability nor the official power or any political incentives to enforce the writ of the government, maintain law and order situations or perform the district management functions and therefore the local government representatives were significantly dependant on the civil bureaucracy. Most of the civil administrators opined that since the local governments were incapable for civil administration, their sphere of functions should only be limited to the municipal services. The issues emanating from the extended purview of local government’s function are discussed further in section 8.3.2 of this chapter.

8.3 Complexities of Inter-institutional Relationships
The understanding of complexities encompassing a range of fundamental governance issues at almost all levels of government in the large public sector of Pakistan will elaborate the reasons as to why the local government system could never be institutionalised to deliver effectively. During the sporadic, precarious and mostly corrupt phases of civilian governments, the provincial and federal governments did not find local government setups as ‘useful’ as the relatively entrenched structures of civilian bureaucracy for the patronage delivery. It has been explained that the devolution reforms of 2001 were introduced, implemented and controlled by the authoritarian government at the centre in a political manoeuvre in order to establish a reliable supportive political base at the district level across the whole country. Nevertheless, with this structural change, the provincial governments received a heavy blow in the form of substantial reductions in their legal capacities to manipulate the affairs of districts in their respective provinces. Most of their domain was now to be shared by the local governments and this led to serious discords between the two levels of government. The civilian provincial governments have therefore been preoccupied with the notion that local governments have the potential to pose a threat as their political rivals.

8.3.1 Provincial-Local Tensions
Inter-institutional and inter-governmental jurisdictional overlapping, in terms of functions, revenue collection, geographical jurisdictional delineation, legal authority
particularly in matters of APT (Appointment, Promotions, and Transfers) constituted a broad cluster of the problems in local governance. First, the levels of government were, in many cases, functioning as rivals as explained by the Provincial Secretary of the Local Governments Department who was based in the provincial capital - Peshawar:

‘You cannot place local government in position where they are in adversarial relations with province e.g. take the very critical example of PFC (Provincial Finance Commission) which, on the face of it, has been introduced to ensure that there is a transparent mechanism of fiscal transfers to the local government but in real terms, it is an encroachment upon the mandate of the provincial assembly .... The funds that come to province is part of the provincial consolidated fund and the constitution (of Pakistan) prescribes that you cannot appropriate this fund without the concurrence of provincial assembly but the PFC divides that fund into two accounts (provincial retained fund and provincial allocable fund) before the budget is presented in the assembly.... This is an encroachment upon the jurisdictions of provincial assembly, which should not have happened ... Why should we place the local governments in adversarial relations with provinces? .... According to the Constitution, Districts are the creation of province but the provinces are not the creation of this country, in fact they (provinces) make the federation of this country’

According to the PFC award, the total funds received by a province are divided into two heads; the provincial allocable fund is separated earlier and is disbursed among the Districts by the Commission, which consists of members from the provincial government, senior provincial bureaucrats and local government representatives. The other portion - the provincial retained fund - is presented in the provincial assembly for approval as the provincial budget. In the above-mentioned quote, the respondent was of the opinion that the finance policy for the allocation of funds to the local governments without the involvement of provincial assembly was an infringement upon the autonomy of provincial legislature in the management of province’s fiscal affairs. This, according to him, was one of the reasons for provincial government’s resentment as the provincial government was marginalised from the budgetary process of the districts that were part of the province; in other words, the federal
government controlled the districts’ fiscal management through the Provincial Finance Commission. However, as mentioned in chapter 7, the involvement and \textit{de facto} autonomy of the local government representatives in the expenditure of funds received via the PFC, was very limited; a large chunk (more than 80%) of the funds received by the district governments were already allocated for salaries and administrative expenses. Before the devolution reforms, the total amount of provincial funds were to be presented in the form of a budget in provincial assembly for approval. Since there were no local governments then, the expenditure of public funds (both developmental and administrative) was solely done through the provincial administration and civil bureaucracy. Therefore, with the involvement of local governments in the fiscal affairs after the devolution reforms, the provincial bureaucracy and the provincial governments considered the local governments as rivals in the fiscal and administrative governance affairs. The provincial governments also feared the local governments for political reasons.

‘A Union Council Nazim is, on an average, a representative of around 30-35 thousand people …. That is why the new (provincial) government consider local government as rivals’, said one of the Union Council Nazim from a Swabi. It was explained in the previous chapter that the members of the Union Council were elected on a direct popular vote. In many cases, several villages are included in the one constituency of a Union Council. Although the functional and political sphere of a Union Nazim was limited and therefore different from that of an MPA (Member of Provincial Assembly), his/her election via direct popular vote was a daunting signal for the political future of candidate or member of the provincial assembly. In separate elections though, MPAs had to compete based on direct popular voting in a constituency that included several Union Councils. If a Union Council Nazim could secure a mandate from his/her constituency, s/he could run for the provincial assembly seat in the next election against the traditionally established elite candidates. That is why the members of provincial government considered the local governments as political rivals. Cyan & Porter (2004) also point out this issue in their study and explain that the local governments in Pakistan depend on administrative and financial support from provinces, yet they have to politically compete with them.
Tensions were observed between the provincial and local governments, particularly in those areas where the provincial and district governments were run by the opposing political parties. A very clear example of this was seen in District Swabi where, a UC Nazim explained that the provincial government were quite antagonistic towards their District’s government because of the District government’s rivalry with ruling provincial political parties. He explained that since the District government of Swabi had the support of central government, the DCO was under an enormous pressure from his District’s Nazim. This, according to him was an infringement upon the authority of DCO, which was not supposed to have happened as he thought that the District Nazim should not have been too much powerful under the auspices of federal government.

All the elected members at each levels of the government get the development funds that are to be disbursed with their discretion. The President, Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, Senators, MNA (Members of National Assembly), MPA (Members of Provincial Assembly), Nazims and representatives of the local governments’ councils get development funds in annual budgets for their respective constituencies. On this issue, District Nazim of Peshawar commented: ‘in our country MNA, MPA, Senator, District Nazim, Union Council Nazim, and Union Council members are all busy in making ‘sewerage system’ (referring to a stereotypical development project) so what’s the difference between all of them?’ The same interviewee - the Nazim of Peshawar - addressing the all NWFP Local Government Convention in Peshawar said:

‘The job of senators, MNAs and MPAs is to carry out legislation rather eyeing the development funds. Our (local governments’) task is to serve the people at the grass roots level.’

The inclusion of local governments in the disbursement of developmental funds was a major step taken in the devolution reforms and was lauded as a move towards better resource allocation. However, it is emphasised that the involvement of multiple levels of governments in the delivery of similar social services and the absence of an efficient and coherent redistributive mechanisms leads to sheer wastage of resources.

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18 District Nazim was supported by the ruling party in the federal centre- PML (Q) and President Musharraf whereas the provincial government of NWFP was formed by MMA in 2002 and then ANP in 2008 (both archrivals of PML (Q) and hence rivals of District government of Swabi).
and targeted delivery of public services at the expense of under-provision of public goods and services to other areas.

Naturally, as a consequence, there are possibilities of duplication of similar projects at the same place especially in cases where an elected MPA and the District Nazim hail from the same constituency. The elected District Nazim of Peshawar in the second term of local governments (2005-2009) was elected as the Union Council Nazim of one of Peshawar’s UCs in the first term (2001-2005). Suggesting a solution for such maladministration, he explained:

‘You see these people sitting in my office? (Referring to almost 20 citizens waiting at Nazim’s Office in order to talk to him).…. They have come to me with their problems … Although it is not my responsibility (functional domain) but they have come to me because their issues have not been solved at their respective UC (Union Council) level where they should have been actually solved …. Union Nazim should be assigned with responsibility and authority …. All (development) funds that are distributed via the centre, province and district government should in fact be allocated via UC Nazim and (UC structure should be designed in such a way that) every public service issue should be resolved at UC level e.g. water supply, streets, electricity etc because a UC Nazim knows what is needed the most and s/he’s answerable to his constituency (directly)…. In that case, we (District Nazim, MNA and MPA) would be able to concentrate on rebuilding and reforming our institutions’

The Union council was the smallest yet the most important tier of the local government system. For the effective devolution of political, administrative and fiscal powers to the grass-root level, the Union Council level of government needed consolidation in terms of functional responsibilities and authority. The functional domain and fiscal autonomy of a UC Nazim was very limited and as compared to his/her political stature. In essence, UC Nazims were only involved in the identification and to certain extent the execution of a local development project. Apart from that, their role was mainly limited to the assistance of constituents in their petty affairs like the attestation of their domicile certificates and minor courts and police station affairs. According to the suggestion of the above-mentioned Nazim, all the development funds that were disbursed via the members of the national and provincial
assemblies were supposed to be granted to Union Council government for developmental projects in their respective areas. In addition, all the concerned de-concentrated public sector departments working in administrative area of the Union Councils, according to him, should have been brought under the direct control and supervision of the Union government. He believed that this strategy would have solved many problems e.g. the members of national and provincial assemblies would be able to concentrate on legislation making which is their core responsibility. The delegation of the administrative, political and fiscal authority to the Union Council level would also ensure equitable redistribution and effective developmental programmes in every region of the country. Since the Union Council constituency is smaller than that of provincial assembly and national assembly, a UC government is proximate to her electorate and therefore the local representatives are in a much better position to identify and address the municipal and developmental needs of the locality.

8.3.2 Local Governments and Civil Administration

Besides having serious rifts with the provincial governments, the local governments also had uneasy working relationships with their partner civil administration departments. To begin with, there were inherent flaws with in the design of local government’s structure that led to the ineffective integration of the two institutions. Policy analysts suggest that the weakening of the provincial bureaucracy’s overwhelming powers with the establishment of local governments was just nominally pursued because the provincial secretariats retained considerable administrative authority over Districts’ bureaucrats (Manning et al., 2003). The provincial governments and provincial bureaucracy used their powers to offset the authority of the Nazim. Under the local government system, most of the DCOs and EDOs continued to be a part of the federal and provincial civil service cadres and all the decisions regarding APT were taken by their provincial secretariats. The retention of authorities related to the public officials’ APT by the provincial bureaucracy created significant obstacles for the Districts’ politicians in their attempt to hold the provincial bureaucracy accountable (Cheema et al., 2005; Cheema & Sayeed, 2006). The local Government Ordinance of 2001 prescribed that the District Nazim can only request the transfer of the DCO and write the DCO’s ACR (Annual Confidential
Report)\textsuperscript{19} which was valid only if countersigned by the Chief Secretary (the senior most bureaucrat of a province) and Chief Minister of the provincial government. The provincial government’s consent for the transfer of DCO was therefore mandatory. Such accountability mechanisms brought the local governments under the control of provincial governments and provincial bureaucracy rather than making them accountable to their respective electorates.

In similar vein, the EDOs heading the devolved provincial public departments used to report to their respective provincial line departments and ministries before the devolution reform whereas in the post devolution restructured setup, they had to report to the District’s DCO and District Nazim. The Nazim could only request the provincial government to transfer these EDOs but the provincial governments retained the sole authority to appoint, promote or transfer them. ICG (2004) report elaborates that under the LGO (Local Government Ordinance), the DCO was the principal accounting officer of the District government however, s/he is responsible to the public accounts committee of the provincial assembly in the financial matters of the district, and not to the Nazim or the District council. Mostly, the EDOs neglected the instructions of District Nazims, as they were well aware of the fact that the District Nazim did not have any \textit{de facto} check and balance authority over them other than the minor exception of the annual confidential report. The District Nazim was also authorised to write the ACR of DPO (District Police Officer) however, as in the case of DCO, the ACR of District Police Officer was valid only when countersigned by the Chief Secretary of the Province and the Chief Minister. The provincial police departments were reformed via separate Police Order in 2002 and as such unlike other departments, the department of police was not devolved directly in the local government reforms. However, the District Nazim was authorised legally to inspect police stations to check any illegal detentions. Except for the districts where the police authorities had personally established a good working relationship with the District Nazims, the Districts’ police authorities were widely accused of running a parallel (local) government (ICG, 2004).

\textsuperscript{19} ACR (Annual Confidential Report) is a legacy of the colonial civil administration wherein superior officers write annual progress report of subordinate staff ensuring its utmost confidentiality. Ironically, the person whose ACR is written remains oblivious of the nature and content of report.
The local government representatives’ official capacity and legal authority of check and balance over the local police authorities was thus negligible. To highlight this issue, a TMO from Manshehra District commented:

‘A Nazim will think a hundred times before he would write the Annual Confidential Report of DPO (District Police Officer) or a DCO because tomorrow the Nazim might not be a Nazim anymore but DPO or DCO will still be DPO or DCO. So he (Nazim) might have to bear the brunt of these higher public officials in case if something goes wrong in their working (or personal) relationships … putting a DPO and DCO under (the apparent supervision of) District Nazim was not a very good idea.’

Prescribing a solution to the uneasy working relationships between civil administration and local governments, the District Nazim of Swabi urged that there should be a District Cadre of appointed officials who would work under the supervision of the local government at the District level. According to him, now the EDOs know that they are answerable to secretaries (senior bureaucrats based at provincial secretariats) and not to them (District Government). He continued that the DPO (District Police Officer) should also be made answerable to District Nazim and whatever responsibility is assigned to local governments, they should then be officially empowered to execute those responsibilities. He elaborated:

‘The extent to which the local government representatives have been authorised (for the functions assigned to them) through the local government ordinance depends mainly on their own political muscle and backing from provincial government otherwise the LGO (Local Government Ordinance) has not been institutionalised in such a way that would enable the local governments to be influential and hence effective (in local governance)’

Structural flaws in the reformed system were also evident with the fact that in local governments’ administrative tiers, there was no functional or administrative link between District, Town and Union Council. The public sector departments working with local governments also lacked linkages at District, Town and Union Council level. However, there was a political linkage between these tiers of local governments as UC members served as an electoral college for Town and District Councils. Nazim
of an urban Town in Peshawar suggested that there should have been an administrative linkage between these tiers however, this linkage should not incentivise manipulation i.e. the linkage should retain the autonomy of all these tiers of government and public departments.

In terms of the fiscal arrangements under the devolution reforms, the local government representatives of Town 3 in Peshawar complained that the provincial public departments (those which were not devolved under the devolution reforms) took over their revenue collection functions claiming that since such revenue generating businesses or households were in their (departments’) geographical jurisdiction therefore they were entitled to the revenue collection from that area. It was sheer infringement upon the legal functional domains of local government. It is worth noting that such incidences were observed in revenue generating functions only and not in service delivery. This means that in the case of revenue collection, the provincial or federal public departments take over the geographical area into their domain but when it comes to service delivery, the local government is held responsible. The Naib Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar district elaborated that their town was perhaps the only town in whole country where the revenue generating municipal services and other associated functions were taken over into their domain by CDMD (City Development and Municipal Department) as against the rules set in LGO (Local Government Ordinance) of 2001.

He explained that revenues from tax on Itwaar Bazaar (Sunday Markets), Melas (Shopping Fairs) and water supply were all included in the local government (TMA’s) purview as per LGO 2001. All other assets and revenue generating functions were given to the respective TMAs but one of the main commercial roads (referring to a busy commercial road) which is the highest revenue generator (tax generating businesses located on the road), was taken over by the administration of CDMD. The same was the case with Ring road that was the highest generator of BCA fee (Building Control Authority fee - an official fee for building approvals) and revenue generated via billboards. All these taxes and fees were collected by the non-devolved provincial department - CDMD and the local TMA was deprived of a substantial amount of revenue to which the TMA was legally entitled. The Naib Nazim of Town 3 further explained that CDMD was legally supposed to be looking after the mega...
projects like construction of townships or main roads and associated infrastructure; once built, CDMD should hand it over to the local government and town administrations. A somewhat similar issue was pointed out by a UC Nazim of Swabi district, who said, ‘the tax we pay to the federal government for the production and sales of tobacco from this UC is approximately Rs.21 Billion annually …. Now if this tax is redistributed in a more equitable manner, our UC and district will become a role model of development’.

In order to perform the responsibilities of civil administration, the District Nazims’ authority over the DCO, EDOs and DPO was quite limited and ineffective, as the local government system did not authorise, in effect, the office of District Nazim. However, in cases where the District government had the support of provincial or federal government, they had a firm control over the District’s bureaucracy, as it was evident in the case of Swabi. In order to overcome the official capacity and legal authority issue of the local government, the creation of District cadre of appointed public employees from the de-concentrated civil service departments could have strengthened the local governments’ political and administrative authority. In terms of revenue collection, the infringements on the local governments’ domain by the provincial and federal institutions also severely undermined the autonomy of the local governments.

8.3.3 Coordination Matters

This section highlights the nature of coordination problems between 1) the public and semi public departments, which remained under the administration of provincial and federal government after the devolution reforms, 2) the devolved public sector departments, and 3) the local governments. The EDO of Finance and Planning Department of Abbottabad exemplified two organisations that were not devolved in the reforms i.e. NHA (National Highway Authority) and WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority). According to him, NHA spent public funds on extending a road (3 feet) on both sides in their district but since there was no coordination with WAPDA, the electricity poles still remained fixed on the same place (so as such extending the road was a sheer wastage of resources as for the motor vehicles, the road’s width remained the same). In another interview, the Naib Nazim of Town 3 from Peshawar mentioned that
Our (TMA’s) coordination with PTCL (Telephone Department), Gas (Department), Water Supply and Sewerage Departments is very critical when we plan to build (or repair) a road or street in our town … Usually when we make a road and huge amount of money spent on it, it is then dug either by Telephone or Gas department (for maintenance and Development works).’

Apart from the fourteen public sector departments that were devolved in the local government reforms, there were several other public or semi-public departments that were not devolved however those departments worked in the geographical jurisdiction of the local governments e.g. the organisations mentioned in the quotations above i.e. PTCL (Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd), CDMD, WAPDA and NHA etc. Since such departments worked under the supervision of provincial or federal ministries, their lack of consideration and indifference towards official coordination for public works and projects that were undertaken by the local government/administration usually results in sheer wastage of public funds. Despite the fact that the functional domain of the non-devolved departments and that of district’s administration (local government & devolved departments) was different, the mechanisms for improving the official correspondence and inter-institutional coordination among them could reduce the wastage of public development funds especially in the geographical areas that overlapped between the jurisdictions of devolved and non-devolved departments.

Besides that, official administrative procedures in many public institutions still epitomise a typical system of postcolonial civil bureaucracy. The EDO (Health) from Abbottabad criticised the strings attached to his functional autonomy even in petty administration and micromanagement of his department. According to him,

‘Our procurement process is so bureaucratic …. Suppose in our BHU (Basic Health Unit) if there is a door lock that needs to be repaired …. I do not have the capacity to sanction money for that …. I will have to write (requisition) to C&W (Communications and Works) department for that (which will of course take ages before this requisition is sanctioned’.

The lack of coordination among the various tiers of local governments was also verified by a TMO from District Swabi who said that there is no coordination between
District Council, Town Municipal Administration, Union Council and the other public departments. According to him, sanitation was one of the basic functions that came under the purview of their TMA. Nonetheless, Public Health Department, District Government and C&W (Communication and Works Department) get involved (transgress) in sanitation works and none of the officials from these institutions bother to ask for an NOC (No Objection Certificate) or consult the TMA - the local administrative department which is legally responsible for this job. The lack of coordination in such planning and execution of projects eventually leads to a situation where none of the public departments can be held responsible for the mismanagement or inefficiency in service delivery. He narrated an incidence to explain his point: NRSP (National Rural Support Program) had allocated a sum of Rs.150 Million for District Swabi’s Development Plan, which was spent in such a way that the streets that were paved earlier and repaired by their TMA were dismantled and then rebuilt. Ironically, even the concerned staff of TMA was not informed. He (TMO) said, ‘there is absolutely no coordination among the public sector departments, however, Town Municipal Administration’s coordination with the representatives of local government is relatively better …. We have, at times, problems but we try to convince them (local government representatives) and we often resolve issues with them.’

The lack of coordination was not found as a major issue in the official interaction between the local governments and the respective devolved public departments. Indeed, such issues were more evident among other public sector departments. The root cause for the lack of coordination was the involvement of multiple levels of government and several public organisations working under the federal and provincial ministries in the delivery of similar social services. In order to make the most of development funds, the development programmes funded by the national organisations or international development agencies need to be implemented with the involvement of the concerned tier of government and associated public departments. In order to overcome the problems resulting from bureaucratic procedures and lack of coordination, the delegation of administrative and fiscal autonomy to the de-centralised civil departments can also reduce the levels of their inefficiency. Naturally, when the coordination among the public institutions is precarious, it is even more difficult for the local governments to effectively supervise them and improve the social service delivery.
8.3.4 Impact of Political Parties’ Involvement on Inter-institutional and Intergovernmental Relationships

As explained in chapter 6, the Local Government Ordinance of 2001 stipulated that the local election be held on a non-party basis i.e. political parties were legally not allowed to participate in the local elections. The rationale presented by the military regime for this specific rule was the proposed outreach of decision-making authority to the ‘grass root level’ of populace. Pakistani politics in general and political parties in particular have been dominated by elite feudal and industrial families and religious factions. Therefore, in order to integrate the deprived factions and marginalised communities into the mainstream local political spheres, this strategy was believed to be a panacea. However, as anticipated, the deep-rooted sway of the mainstream political parties did not allow such wishful thinking to materialise. National and regional political parties’ overt involvement in local governments’ elections was obvious. For instance, in the NWFP province, during the second term of local government, the District Nazim of Peshawar was backed up by the political party that had formed the government in the provincial assembly. In fact, it was the backing and robust electioneering support of that party that enabled the District Nazim of Peshawar to contest and ultimately win the election of District Nazim’s office.

Hence, during the early years of Peshawar District’s government, the provincial-district relationships went quite smoothly however later when another archrival political party - ANP (Awami National Party) - won the majority in the provincial assembly in March 2008, a natural rivalry erupted between these two competing levels of government. Consequently, in December 2009, the local government system was completely abolished in all four provinces of Pakistan including NWFP province and the whole setup was replaced by career civil servants appointed as ‘Administrators’ for municipal services and ‘Commissioners’ for administrative services. During those 22 months (between March 2008 and December 2009), the progress of District government remained unsatisfactory and the District Nazim of Peshawar accused the members of the provincial government of NWFP for transgression and unlawfully interfering in the legal jurisdictions of his District government. This, according to him, seriously affected their progress not only in routine administrative matters but also in the completion of the projects that had been initiated by their District government earlier. The general attitude of the provincial
government in NWFP province after the general elections in March 2008 towards the District governments was not accommodative. It were not only the district governments of Peshawar and Swabi who felt threatened by the government of ANP in the Province but similar apprehensions were clearly revealed by the District Nazim of Abbottabad and Naib Nazim of Mansehra in other interviews. Generally, ANP’s representation in the local governments across the province was very limited and was mainly confined to the UC and town levels. Therefore, the revival of decades old civil administration system for local governance was in the best interest of the provincial government in NWFP. It was therefore not surprising to see a large scale reshuffling in the provincial bureaucracy with the change in the provincial government.

Apart from the District governments, political party affiliations also had influence over the politics of lower tiers of local government. ‘When (Town) Nazim is from one political party and provincial government is formed by another party, they (provincial governments) try to influence the (Town) Nazim via TMO …. By law, Nazim’s approval is mandatory before TMO takes any major decision however in several cases, we (local government representatives) are bypassed’, said a Town Nazim from Peshawar District. In similar vein, the political parties’ involvement in the administrative and fiscal matters of UCs was also reported. For instance, a local councillor from a Union Council in Peshawar admitted that

‘If you have links and personal contacts in Town or District government then you can be influential at Union Council level and you can make progress [in terms of acquiring (or diverting) developmental funds]…. Things go well if the relationships between councillors and Nazim and Naib Nazim are smooth otherwise (public) works suffer e.g. in a Union Council where the Nazim is a ‘nationalist’ (belonging to the ruling political party, ANP) and Union Councillor is from Pakistan People’s Party, there are certainly some problems (delays in funds allocations). At Tehsil and District level, political parties do actively participate in local elections but, we, even at the Union Council level, have allegiances with some political party. I mean, a local politician may not be given party ticket (permission to run for election on behalf of a political party) or overt support but we do certainly have affiliation with (mainstream) political parties’
The affiliation of local government representatives with political parties create problems when competing political parties have varying degrees of representation at central, provincial and local level. The quest for development funds and manipulation powers in APT became the core reason for the clash of interests among them. The EDO (Health) from Abbottabad District mentioned that before the devolution reforms, there used to be an MNA and MPA only but now (after the reforms) in addition to that, District Nazims also interfere in their official matters. According to him, he was posted in Haripur District earlier where the three concerned political figures i.e. the provincial and federal ministers for health and District Nazim were from different political parties. This, according to him was a very a complicated situation for him to handle as he used to get pressurised (political interference) from all directions while he was trying to perform his official duties.

Political party affiliation was also observed to be associated with discrepancies in the local public expenditures. The District Officer (Revenue) from Finance and Planning Department from District Swabi, highlighting the obstacles explained that

*We normally have two types of budget allocation meetings - one is held by the DDC (District Development Committee) which is headed by the DCO … the other is BDC (Budget and Development Committee) which is headed by Zilla (District) Nazim … so we face contradictions in budgeting some times … when Nazim is backed up by provincial government, he’s more authoritative and prejudiced e.g. (in our district) he deprived some of the Union Councils (in development allocation) because they had affiliations with another political party despite the fact that political party affiliation should have nothing to do with the financial affairs of a District ….. Since our District Nazim had the political backing from the central government, he conspired to get the DCO transferred from the District {on a written complaint of Zilla (District) Nazim} …. However, in the general election held in 2008, the rival party (of District Nazim) - ANP- won the majority in the provincial assembly …. The DCO got himself reinstated (using his connections with provincial government) and was re-transferred to this District and needless to say that there is a grave rift between the two now’*
In an answer to the question regarding the impact of political parties’ involvement in local politics, a Tehsil Nazim from a rural town of Swabi District responded:

‘The last government of MMA (in NWFP province between 2002 and 2007)) used to make sure that the TMO they would send to work with me would have loyalties with the MMA government but as such I never had any problems in working with them (TMOs)….. I openly support ANP …. Now ANP is in government in the province but when it was MMA running the provincial government, the Chief Minister used to intervene directly in the affairs of my TMA …. So yes! there is always a political intervention from the provincial government’

It was observed quite frequently, during the discussions with local government representatives, that both the provincial governments of NWFP province formed by MMA and later by ANP were quite apprehensive and therefore antagonistic towards the local government system in general. There were, of course, some exceptions to that i.e. where these provincial governments were successful in getting their party members elected in local elections, despite the official ban on political parties’ involvement in local government. A significant example was seen in case of the District government of Peshawar, the provincial capital. As explained above, the elected District Nazim in 2005 local elections was systematically and overtly supported by the then government (MMA) and hence there was an excellent level of coherence observed between District and provincial government between 2005 and 2008. On the other hand, in districts where the rivalry between the provincial government and local government was high e.g. in District Swabi, the local bureaucracy was observed to be extremely pressurised from both rival governments. The involvement of mainstream political parties in local politics had an enormous impact on not only the public expenditure and APT matters of the local government but it also affected the voting patterns in the local elections. The impact of political party and religious affiliations of local candidate’s on voting behaviour of the citizens is discussed in the next chapter.

8.3.5 Appointment, Promotions, and Transfers
A brief explanation relating to the recruitment problems covering the APT of public officials has been presented in chapter 7 and section 8.1 of this chapter. However, the
complications emanating from the official affairs related to the APT are elaborated further in this section because they are considered as the most critical factors that influence the inter-institutional and intergovernmental working relationships. This section will explain how other than resource allocation, the crux of Pakistani politics revolves around the affairs of APT in public sector jobs. The involvement of several levels of government in APT matters has thoroughly politicised the public sector. The following explanation is an empirical critique of the normative discourse that propounds the possibility of separation of politics and administration in a post-colonial state like Pakistan. In Pakistan, where the alarmingly large socio-economic inequality gap is swelling still further, APT means a lot to the public officials for various reasons. Socio-cultural and economic limitations constrain civil servants to struggle for job designations that are geographically as proximate to their hometowns as possible. Urban dwellers prefer to stay in cities because their transfer to rural areas leaves them with limited access to civic facilities, which are relatively better in the cities. The most important of the all, civil servants’ children’s prospects of acquiring quality education in rural areas are usually very bleak. A female officer (Schools and Literacy Department) from Abbottabad District explained in an interview that if she complains about any grievance in a written form, she’ll then be harassed in other ways - most probably by having her transferred to a remote rural area (underdeveloped and deprived in terms of social amenities) and since she has domestic responsibilities and cultural constraints, she cannot afford to move out of her hometown. She will rather have to resign from her job if she is transferred to a rural area.

After the reforms, the local governments had to coexist with provincial government either coherently or in antagonism. The provincial governments were reported to have constantly attempted to transgress their jurisdictions by influencing or even bluntly transgressing their legal authority and powers in the affairs of APT. The Naib Nazim of Mansehra District believed:

‘Provincial governments do not let the District Governments to be influential and authoritative ... We try our level best not to create a situation that leads to jurisdictional overlap among our official authorities .... However, we are recently dealing with severe troubles due to the interventions from the Provincial Revenue Minister in some matters of APT despite the fact that he’s
Clash of interests over the APT affairs have been frequently observed between the local governments and local civil administration as well. For instance, District Officer (Revenue), from Finance and Planning department of a Swabi District narrated

‘We had advertised almost vacant 120 posts of class 4 employees in Elementary and Secondary Education Department … But the District Nazim has now called for an explanation from EDO (directly) for which he was not authorised legally … this is an encroachment upon the authority of EDO’.

This incidence was verified by the EDO (Education) himself in another interview. He elaborated that recently they had around 120 vacant posts of ‘chowkidar’ (Watchman) in the schools of District. They had advertised those posts but the District Nazim overruled their decision and cancelled that advertisement. The Nazim called for an explanation from the EDO (Education) as according to him, he was not consulted for the creation and advertisement of these posts. The EDO then had to approach the DCO in order to get the approval for advertising these posts. According to the EDO-Education, as a result of devolution reforms, their departments have become more re-centralised rather than decentralised e.g. he was of the opinion that earlier there used to be 4 officers equivalents to the post of an EDO and post devolution it is now one post of EDO. Since now they have many more functions to perform including APT, it has become more difficult for him to perform his duties. According to him, he was a competent authority for APT of employees working from scale 1 to 10 in his department but this authority was nominal only as the District government intervened in his administrative matters.

It is important to explain the context of the above-mentioned incident. Although the District Nazim was having rifts with provincial government, he was extremely influential because he had reliable connections with the central government and hence he was relatively in better position to exert pressure or even maintain a healthy level of check and balance over the local bureaucracy. Since the provincial government remains the EDOs employer, she holds APT powers over them. This is a highly
politicised arrangement to influence APT in the district. Senior district managers are deployed and in some cases employed by the provincial government and they are primarily bound to comply as per the provincial government’s instructions. Hassan (2002) explains that the provincial authorities tend to keep a tight control both on authority and resources of the local governments and the federal political authorities have the same approach towards the provinces.

While suggesting a solution for APT issues, the Naib Nazim of Town 2 in Peshawar District opined that the District governments should have a complete authority in the APT matters of public officials. According to him, the entire District’s staff should be hired within the premises of a district, they should work within that district and they should be retired there. They will then be truly answerable and accountable to the elected representatives of the District government i.e. only if all the officials of devolved departments of the District belong to such type of a District Cadre of civil servants. Whether the creation of District Cadre of civil servants will overcome the issues of APT of public officials is debatable. However, it is extremely important that the elected local government’s involvement and control in the APT of the officials working in the devolved departments needs to be improved. Although several public sector departments were devolved and brought under the apparent supervision of the local governments, the de facto authority and powers in terms of the appointed officials’ APT matters remained under the purview of provincial governments and provincial secretariat. Due to the provincial-local political rivalry, the APT matters of public officials became one of the core reasons for disputes between the two integrated institutions - civil administration and local governments - thereby hindering the progress of local governments.

8.3.6 Discontents in Fiscal Policy for Local Governments
As highlighted in chapter 7, the case specific literature review illustrates that the provincial governments retained their influence in financial resource allocation and the mechanism for PFC award allowed very limited fiscal autonomy to the local governments. This section of the chapter investigates the discontents of local government representatives in relation to the limitations of fiscal policy of local government reforms. In an interview, the District Officer (Revenue) in Finance and Planning Department from District Mansehra specified some of the discrepancies in
implementation of fiscal policy of devolution reforms. He argued that the government introduced local government reforms in year 2001 and the budget rules for local governments in 2003, and then fiscal transfer rules in 2004. According to him, all these amendments and reforms should have been implemented simultaneously because they (officials in the Revenue Department) did not have the budget rules between the year 2001 and 2003. The officials of devolved Revenue Section in Finance and Planning Department found it difficult to work under the new arrangement in the absence of revised job description and budget rules. Since the devolution plan was designed and implemented haphazardly, the transition from bureaucratic civil administration to the devolved local governments took a long time.

One of the legacies left by the colonial administration system was the separation of rural and urban areas for administrative purposes. Rural and urban areas were demarcated geographically and were administered by the different administrative units. A somewhat similar form of rural-urban administrative divisions remained in place in the post-independence Pakistan until the year 2001. With the implementation of local government reforms in 2001, the rural-urban administrative division was abolished and the municipal and administrative services were assigned to respective local government/local administrations. It was observed that this administrative integration of rural and urban areas had a mixed impact on the fiscal management efficiency of local governments. The Naib Nazim of an urban Town in Peshawar District explained that in the pre-devolution period, there used to be District Councils and Municipal Corporations for municipal services. The District Councils were responsible for municipal services in rural areas while Municipal Corporations used to look after the urban areas. The District Councils used to collect Zilla (District) tax while Octroi used to be collected by Municipal Corporations. One of the disadvantages, according to him, for the rural areas in this local government system (2001), was that the Zilla (District) tax was now equally divided in all Union Councils of a District except for 10%, which is left for District Council’s expenditures. In

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20 Octroi was a tax on goods that were imported into municipal limits for production or consumption. Before the abolishment of Octroi by the federal government in 1999/2000, it had been the biggest source of revenue for urban councils, contributing on average 50-60% of these councils’ income (Cheema et al. 2005). After the devolution reforms, the Octroi and Zilla (District) tax related transfers from the province (replaced by the revenue generated from the increase in General Sales Tax by 2.5%) go directly into the accounts of the Tehsil and Union Council administrations, respectively.
Peshawar, 42 out of 92 UCs are urban and 48 rural. Earlier, this District tax used to be distributed only in these 48 rural UCs while now it was divided among the rest of urban 42 as well. However, the Octroi is still divided among those 42 urban UCs only. This dispensation is disadvantageous for the rural areas in terms of redistribution policy. Similarly, a senior officer (Superintendent- License, Transport Terminal and Rent) from TMA Mansehra believed that in their TMA, villages generate relatively more taxes (tax on the ownerships transfer of immovable property) because the purchase and sale of land is higher in the rural areas of their TMA as compared to cities. He believed that contrary to the general notion that tax collected at the urban areas is spent in rural areas, it is indeed the rural areas that generate more taxes, which is then spent on urban areas.

On the other hand, however the case of some urban towns and their suburban rural areas was very different where the rural areas had a relative advantage in the fiscal redistribution. For instance, TMA of Town 3 in Peshawar comprised of 21 UCs. Most of these UCs were in rural areas and quite a few in the urban. The Nazims of those UCs were mostly elected from the rural constituencies. Given the discrepancies in tax collection mechanisms, most of the revenue generated in the form of user fee was collected from the developed urban UCs of that town and this revenue was then spent for meeting the recurring expenses of all 21 UCs included in Town 3. Tehsil Havailian in Abbottabad District, the largest revenue generator (from timber markets and cattle fairs) also faced similar predicaments. The revenue generated from Havailian’s urban UCS Were reported to be spent on all 21 UCs of Tehsil Havailian in Abbottabad. In the rural areas where the purchase and sale of land is frequent, the revenue generated from the tax on transfer of immovable property is higher and as such it is hard for the citizens to evade such taxes because the sale and purchase of immovable property needs registration in the TMA. Therefore, in some cases, rural areas generate more revenue than urban areas, depending on the varying frequency of sale of immovable property and composition of TMA i.e. whether the UCs in that TMA are mostly rural or urban. However, on the other hand, in the rural areas where the transfers of immovable property are not frequent, the overall tax generation in the TMA is low.
User fee collection is a quite complicated process in rural areas for various reasons. Basic municipal services are generally non-excludable and although these services are utilised by a majority of rural citizens, it is quite difficult for the administration to collect the user fee for services or exclude the free riders from the delivery of social services in the geographically scattered rural areas. Besides, rural citizens are mostly poor and cannot afford to pay user fee. It is also relatively easy to evade such charges because the tax collection and law enforcement agencies are understaffed and are incapable of easily reaching the geographically dispersed rural users of utilities. The Provincial Secretary of Local Government and Rural Development Department commented on the issue of user fee collection: ‘how do you expect a locally instituted local council service gentleman to impose a tax and get it approved from a council that is local ….how can they even afford it … this is local government’s limitation’.

In urban areas, according to the Nazim of Town 3, citizens find it relatively hard to evade local taxes and user fees. Urban citizens are financially well off and generally, they can afford to pay for the municipal services. Besides that, the local administrations like TMAs can easily access and manage the geographically concentrated urban users of public utilities. In case of default, the urban citizens can also be excluded from services e.g. water supply can be stopped to an individual household in cities whereas it is not possible to cut the communal water supply to a village where most of the consumers get the water supply through illegal connections. Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar elaborated that there are five urban Union Councils in his Town whereas all the rest are rural which are quite underdeveloped. There are 105 tube wells (for water supply) in the town 3. According to him, the TMA pays electricity bills for these tube wells, which amount to approx. Rs.5 Million every month, and this amount of money is generated by these five urban UCs mainly. He said that they do not have the capacity and sufficient staff to impose and collect water charges from their rural UCs; even their recurring expenses cannot be met with the revenue that is generated from all the UCs of the town. Provincial government provides them with limited resources above which the budget for their TMA is not approved.

Suggesting a solution for the free rider issue in rural areas, one of the Tehsil Nazims from District Swabi opined that
'In order to convince citizens to pay the user fee, we need to make them aware of all the benefits to which they’ll be entitled to. These rural communities are actively engaged in informal social services e.g. in a small village, people contribute generously and eventually collect huge amounts of money for construction of mosques and hujra\textsuperscript{21} but they are not willing to pay the water user fee'.
Limited funds from the Federal Centre via Provinces along with the limitations in revenue collection by the local governments leave them vulnerable and dependant on provincial and federal grants. As mentioned in chapter 7, when the already limited developmental funds are equally divided among all the UCs of a District, the amount that is eventually received by each UC diminishes and therefore the UC administration cannot initiate significant development projects with that money. A UC Nazim from rural outskirts of Peshawar narrated that their funds are too meagre to begin with. Their UC get approximately Rs.33000 (Equivalent of £242 approx.) monthly as a grant from the District budget. Out of this amount, almost half is spent in salaries and office maintenance expenses; what is left amounts to a figure of around Rs.100000-150000 (£730-1100 approx.) per annum for developmental projects. In addition, there are 12 members in that UC who seldom agree upon or approve a single development project for the whole UC and normally every member wants this money to be equally distributed which means every member of UC gets around Rs.12000 (equivalent of £88 approximately) as a developmental fund per annum. According to him, it was very difficult for them to make an effective use of such small amount. The support from and/or delegation of authority from the provincial and federal government was seen as an imperative for local governments in order to be able to deliver public services efficiently. The same is true for funds allocation. For reasons mentioned above, the tax levying/collection domain of local governments was very limited. However where the local representatives were influential, they could help divert the federal and provincial development funds into their areas through MNAs and MPAs of their respective constituencies.

8.4 Conclusions

Given the political circumstances, it was not surprising that the system for local government reforms was designed and implemented abruptly without taking into consideration the institutional realities of the pre devolution local governance setup. Elected into an entirely new system, the incumbents of local government were generally incapable in terms of experience in a political role and training that were essentially required for the assigned official responsibilities. The newly elected local
representatives were therefore ill-prepared for carrying out some of the major functions that used to be executed effectively by the civil bureaucrats earlier. The design of the reforms also failed in terms of sufficiently delegating official capacity and legal authority to the local government representatives. Since the institution of local governments was integrated with the devolved public sector departments at three levels, the unsatisfactory performance of the local government was also partly an outcome of the recruitment and professional limitations of the appointed public officials. Due to the politicisation of the public sector organisations, recruitment is based on the preferences for patronage delivery instead of merit, which is contrary to the doctrine of classical theory of bureaucracy. The ill-planned and pointless involvement of the District Nazim in the civil administration was observed as overburdening him/her with overwhelming responsibilities; most of the appointed civil servants rightly argued that the elected representatives neither had the capability (qualification, training and experience) nor the official capacity (and/or legal authority) or any political incentives to enforce the writ of the government, maintain law and order or perform other civil administrative functions like tax imposition or revenue collection. The new setup of local government therefore remained significantly dependant on the civil bureaucracy for performing most of the above-mentioned functions.

In all four districts, inter-institutional and inter-governmental jurisdictional overlapping and transgression was observed in terms of basic social services delivery, revenue collection, development fund allocations, geographical demarcation for administrative purposes, official capacity, and legal authority (particularly in matters of APT). Due to the involvement of local governments in the fiscal affairs, the provincial bureaucracy and the provincial government considered the new tier of local governments as a rival institution that was an additional stakeholder in their fiscal and administrative authority. The hegemony of the provincial governments was also threatened by the growing political stature of the local government representatives especially the directly elected UC Nazim. Consequently, the antagonism of provincial governments towards the local government severely impaired their performance because the local governments were dependant on the administrative and financial support from provinces whereas, at the same time, they had to compete (politically) with provinces in the same constituencies.
This chapter assessed the impact of mainstream political parties’ involvement on inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships. The relationships between the provincial and local governments were observed to be tenser in the districts where the District Nazim did not have any political affiliation with the governing political party of the province. In Peshawar, as long as the government of MMA was in power in NWFP, the District Nazim was quite influential. Later when ANP formed the provincial government, the same District government of Peshawar lost his political backing and provincial-local tensions intensified. Both the provincial governments of NWFP (between 2001 and 2009) had negligible representation across all tiers of elected local governments in Mansehra and Abbottabad. Therefore, the local-provincial political relationships in Abbottabad and Mansehra were not good either. The survival and progress of the local governments in Abbottabad and Mansehra was owed to the generic support of federal government for the devolved local governments across the whole country. On the other hand, in Swabi the scenario was slightly different. Despite the fact that both the provincial governments (MMA and ANP) were political archrivals of the District Nazim, privileged support from the federal government (due to political allegiances of District Nazim with the President and Prime Minister) highly invigorated the District government’s hold over the district administration.

In the two different cases of Swabi and Peshawar, the outcomes of political parties’ involvement were varied however; it was observed that the mainstream political parties were more incentivised to support their candidates for the District elections. The political parties also supported candidates in those Tehsils and UCs, which were located in the party’s traditional strongholds. Political parties competed more enthusiastically in the second term election (2005-2009) and most of them secured varying levels of representation in local governments. Across the four districts, competition for development funds and manipulative powers in APT matters were found to be the core reasons that fuelled the clash of interests among the provincial and local government. UC was the smallest yet proximate and therefore the most critical tier of the local governments. Nonetheless, UC administrations’ domain of administrative and fiscal responsibilities and authority was very limited. For the allocation of federal and provincial development grants, the UC administration needed to be prioritised. In order to reduce the involvement of multiple levels of government
in provision of similar social services, it is argued that the federal and provincial development funds for municipal services were supposed to be allocated to the UC administration via District governments on a priority basis. In addition, the role of MNAs and MPAs needs confinement to their core function i.e. legislation making and supervision of the public departments working under various ministries.

The nature of working relationships between the two integrated institutions (local governments and devolved public departments) also remained controversial. Provincial governments and provincial bureaucracy used their constitutional powers to contain the authority of the local representatives. Especially in civil administrative matters at the District and Tehsil level, the provincial bureaucracy via the Secretary of the Local Government Department, Chief Secretary of the Province, DCOs, EDOs and TMOs continued to influence most of the fiscal and administrative affairs. The sphere of District governments’ responsibilities was too vast going beyond the managerial capacity of the local representative. Their functional domain should have been limited to the major municipal services whereas the rest of the public services departments could have been well regulated and supervised by the respective federal and provincial ministries. In this way, the hotchpotch created by a multitude of public departments and levels of government providing similar public services, could have been avoided. Apart from limiting the role of local governments to the municipal services, the institution of local governments should have been sufficiently authorised in the recruitment and administrative matters of the appointed officials working in the devolved departments at each level of local government.

The coordination in public works projects between the local government and devolved public departments was relatively better. However, other non-devolved federal and provincial departments’ coordination with the local administrations was found to be almost nonexistent. Coordination among different public departments is likely to improve with limiting the local governments to municipal services, assigning the regulation responsibilities of other federal and provincial public departments to their respective ministries, and clear jurisdictional delineation of each institution’s geographical territory, official functions, fiscal authorities, and other administrative domains. It is extremely important that jurisdictions be streamlined not only among the levels of government but also among all public sector departments working at
federal, provincial and local levels. APT matters were the most critical factors that influenced the inter-institutional and inter-governmental working relationships. The provincial government constantly intervened in the jurisdiction of local government by influencing or even bluntly transgressing their legal authority and powers in the APT affairs of public officials.

The mechanism of PFC award was perceived in different ways depending on its varied outcomes in different cases. Nonetheless, generally the provincial governments felt that the federal government had tried to bypass the provincial governments from the fiscal management of the districts. The ten members PFC comprised of Provincial Finance Minister, three senior federal bureaucrats (provincial secretaries), three professional members from the private sector appointed by the provincial Governor, and three members from the elected local governments. It was obvious that the federal government retained the control over the financial management of the elected local governments across the whole country because the representation of provincial and local government in PFC was negligible. The limited funds allocated to the local governments mainly covered their recurring and administrative expenses and as such a very insignificant proportion from the PFC award was left for developmental projects. Although the distribution of the PFC award among the Towns and UCs of Districts was quite equitable in terms of policy and practice, the total amount of funds for local administrations was reported to be very insignificant.

The fiscal restructuring policy of the local government reforms had an adverse impact on the local administrations’ revenue generation capacities in general. The abolishment of rural-urban administrative division however, had a mixed impact on the revenue generation capacity of the local governments. In some rural Tehsils of Mansehra, more taxes were generated due to the high frequency of purchase and sale of immovable property (especially agricultural land). Contrary to that, in case of Town 3 of Peshawar and Tehsil Havailian of Abbottabad, the total amount of revenue generated was low mainly because of less frequent sale of immovable property and tax evasion (user fee of basic utilities and municipal services) in the rural UCs included in the Towns. Despite all limitations, it was evident that the devolution programme had brought the government somewhat closer to the citizens. Full-scale institutionalisation and permanent establishment of local government can therefore
serve as a solution to the problems of revenue collection from rural areas. In order to include the rural masses into the tax net and broaden the tax base, building of taxpayers’ trust in their local institutions is extremely essential. No major variation has been observed in findings from the analysis of factors and themes across the four districts except for the impact of governing political party’s involvement on the political relationships between the provincial and local governments.
Table 1
Inter-Institutional and Inter-governmental Relationships: Summary of the Interviews’ Findings

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<td><strong>Official Capacity and Legal Authority of Elected Officials</strong></td>
<td>- General lack of capability (qualifications, training and experience) and insufficient delegation of legal authority</td>
<td>- General lack of capability (qualifications, training and experience) and insufficient delegation of legal authority</td>
<td>- General lack of capability (qualifications, training and experience) and insufficient delegation of legal authority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- District Nazim’s personal political clout made him relatively more influential</td>
<td>-District Nazim’s personal political clout made him relatively more autonomous and influential</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Training and Skill levels of Appointed Officials</strong></td>
<td>- Relatively better in higher echelons but unsatisfactory in lower grades</td>
<td>- Generally unsatisfactory across the whole District’s bureaucracy</td>
<td>- Relatively better in higher echelons but unsatisfactory in lower grades</td>
<td>- Generally unsatisfactory across the whole District’s bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-institutional (Local government and Bureaucracy) working relationships</strong></td>
<td>- Mixed outcomes</td>
<td>- Tense relationships among the District government and District bureaucracy</td>
<td>- Generally satisfactory among the local governments and devolved public departments</td>
<td>- Generally satisfactory among the local governments and devolved public departments</td>
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<td>- With some exceptions, generally satisfactory relationships among the local governments and devolved public departments</td>
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<td><strong>Inter-governmental (Local, provincial and federal government) relationships</strong></td>
<td>- Support from the Provincial government for the District government consolidated their control over the devolved departments</td>
<td>- Support from the Federal government for the District government consolidated their control over the devolved departments</td>
<td>- Antagonistic relationships with provincial government but general support from the federal government</td>
<td>- Antagonistic relationships with provincial government but general support from the federal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional overlapping and transgression in administrative matters</td>
<td>- Extreme levels of jurisdictional overlapping and transgression among various levels of government, devolved departments and non-devolved departments</td>
<td>- Extreme levels of jurisdictional overlapping and transgression among district government, provincial government and local bureaucracy</td>
<td>- Relatively better coordination among the local government and local bureaucracy</td>
<td>- Relatively better coordination among the local government and local bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact of parties’ involvement on inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships</td>
<td>- Mainstream parties supported their candidates mainly on District and Town level</td>
<td>- Regional parties supported their candidates on District and Town level</td>
<td>- Parties’ involvement was relatively low</td>
<td>- Mainstream parties involvement observed on District and Town levels</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Support from the provincial government for the District Government consolidated their control over the devolved departments</td>
<td>- Support from the federal government for the District government consolidated their control over the devolved departments</td>
<td>- District Nazim’s own social and political capital consolidated his control over the devolved departments</td>
<td>- Candidates for local governments served as intermediary between provincial government and local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of rural-urban administrative integration</td>
<td>- Some urban UCs were affected negatively while rural UCs benefited</td>
<td>- Rural UCs were affected negatively</td>
<td>- Mixed impact on rural and urban UCs</td>
<td>- Rural UC’s were affected negatively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Impact of fiscal restructuring

- Despite the general lack of resources, the previously marginalised areas received funds for development
- Local government system filled in a political vacuum and the District government was instrumental in diverting federal funds to the previously deprived areas
- Despite the general lack of resources, redistribution was more evenly rationed
- Funds directed from federal budget and other national development programmes with the involvement of local governments

### Revenue generation by local government

- Major revenue raising functions were retained by the provincial and federal governments
- User fee collection was better in Urban UCs but almost negligible in rural areas
- Major revenue raising functions were retained by provincial and federal governments
- Tehsils’ income was better due to the frequency of sale of agricultural land
- User fee collection was almost negligible
- User fee collection was almost negligible
- Tehsils’ income was better due to the frequency of sale of agricultural land
- User fee collection was almost negligible
Chapter 9
Clientelism, Pork Barrel Politics and Political Behaviour in Local Governance

In order to extend the understanding of causes of local governments’ failure in Pakistan beyond the explanation of structural, organisational and administrative limitations, this chapter undertakes the examination of clientelism, pork barrel politics and factors that affect the political behaviour of social groups in local electorates. Other than the intrinsic institutional weaknesses, Pakistan’s local democratisation process is also severely hampered by the social and economic constraints that confine citizens’ freedom and impound their rationality when they exercise their right to vote. It is discussed as to how the social fragmentation and economic polarisation among the social groups affect the outcomes of pork barrel politics. Using primary evidence, this chapter identifies and explains the factors that affect voter-politician relationships vis-à-vis the political behaviour of electorates and politicians such as the socio-economic and political characteristics of politicians, political credibility of politicians, political party and religious affiliation of politicians and their capacity to deliver patronage employment. Other factors obstructing the performance of local governments for instance the lack of civic engagement, political indifference, and technical issues in electoral mechanisms are also included in the analysis. Some of the recent secondary empirical studies have also been referred to in order to supplement and enhance the main line of argument.

9.1 The Extent of Clientelism, Pork Barrel Politics and Corruption

The response of local government representatives to questions regarding the targeting of public services was mixed. Some admitted and justified their spending approaches whereas others totally denied any possibilities of highly personalised clientelistic service delivery in exchange for votes. Given the limited availability of development grants from provinces, constrained tax generating opportunities, and more personal and native affinities with their electorates, most of the local politicians generally agreed that pork barrel approaches were commonly practiced in local politics nonetheless, they believed that the design of the local government system did not allow the local representatives to capitalise on highly targeted service deliver especially at the Union Council and Town level. On the other hand, however, due to
the large size of electorates, the District, Provincial and National government representatives were accused of being relatively more incentivised to target services to some groups of voters. Consider the following views taken from interviews with the local government representatives.

The Nazim of a UC in District Swabi admitted to have given priority to his specific area within the wider electorate while initiating any development scheme because he thought that this was an opportunity for him to do something for his village. He was apprehensive about the future and feared that ‘when there’ll be no one elected from my village’s constituency in future, constituents won’t be able to influence politicians (from other villages) to initiate developmental schemes for my area.’ His reason was straightforward; since he was elected from this village, therefore, citizens’ expectations were higher and therefore he would prefer to initiate public projects in his own village on a priority basis as compared to other villages included in his UC. Similarly Naib Nazim of Peshawar’s urban town said that even in a smaller UC, it is natural that a local representative will prefer to target development project at his own village (from where he got elected). As discussed in chapter 6, these excerpts from interviews show that the system of local government did not lead to clientelistic relationships as hypothesised in a patron-client model by the public choice theorists. Instead, pork barrel approach was commonly observed because vote blocs were involved in the voter-politician relationships and since this type of targeting is not highly personalised, it is not as detrimental as corruption. But given the circumstances of the limitations in the development funds, wider constituencies and higher developmental needs, UC Nazims’ targeting of services towards their own village, in effect, deprived other villages from the sharing a stake in developmental funds.

Naib Nazim of Town 2 from Peshawar denied the possibility of clientelistic malpractices in service delivery and explained that the structure of the recent local government system allowed very scant chances for clientelistic behaviour especially at the Tehsil level where the TMAs were responsible for providing basic municipal services to all UCs included in their domain. His counter argument against the possibilities of clientelistic services was that all the local councils had members from each constituency so the chances of clientelistic service delivery were remote especially after the abolishment of rural-urban divide with the implementation of
reforms. The Naib Nazim mentioned that the system gave the members of the councils, a right to exercise their vote of no confidence against a Nazim in case of any grievances. He criticised higher levels of government for targeting the services delivery arguing that an MPA or MNA usually have a huge constituency which may even include several towns (in rural areas), in some cases. The turnout in the general elections is usually low and according to him, an MNA or MPA normally just have to ensure around 30% of popular vote from the whole electorate in order to get elected\textsuperscript{22} and that’s why, according to him, members of the national and provincial assemblies have more tendencies of relying on targeted service delivery as compared to a local government’s official. He explained that since the development funds received by the local representative are 1) inadequate, 2) pre-allocated equally among all the UCs and 3) due to enhanced public accountability and greater involvement of directly elected members of the UCs in all councils of local governments, the Nazims of the local councils had little chances to get involved in the clientelistic exchanges.

Although the members of the local councils had the right of no confidence reserved, having secured the support of majority of council members, the Nazim could still manipulate most of his/her powers to target municipal services to some specific Union Councils. In other words, in order to get the support of more members of the local councils, Tehsil Nazims’ would be incentivised to provide more efficient services to some UCs and less to others. As discussed in the previous chapter, although, the distribution of development funds was generally equitable, the UC Nazims had a comparative advantage over other members of the council so it was possible for them concentrate on their own village rather than going for a project that would benefit all the constituents. It will also be explained later in this chapter as to how the UC Nazims, in some cases, became influential by being intermediaries between the provincial government and their own local constituencies; the limited funds allocated to local governments may well have been distributed equitably however, the UC Nazims could use their influence to target the funds from other sources (like provincial funds) to their part of the constituency.

\textsuperscript{22} Many candidates compete for provincial and federal assembly membership therefore votes in the electorate are divided and the candidate ‘first passing the post’ wins the seat whereas the losing candidate’s votes are rendered irrelevant for the purpose of government formation. Although the winning MNA’s or MPA’s constituency is large, s/he can usually secure his/her seat even with a small proportion of the votes polled.
The District Nazim of Swabi believed that the tendency to rely on Pork Barrel approach is in human nature and is therefore, quite common across the whole world. According to him since he was an elected representative of around 0.6 million citizens in his District constituency, he distributes formula based development funds equally among all the 56 UCs of his District. Nevertheless, in case of other development funds that were to be spent with the sole discretion of District government or funds allocated from other sources like national or provincial development programmes, he admitted that the UCs where there is concentration of his voters, would certainly get major share, simply because they were supporters of ruling party, he said:

‘We do not ignore our UCs….of course some of them get preferences but at the same time we look after areas which are relatively more deprived and underdeveloped e.g. UC ‘Naranjay’ and ‘Purmalo’ had no electricity supply so far. It costs around Rs.3.5 Million – 4 Million for electricity supply scheme to village(s). None of the MNA and MPA in the past 60 years was bothered to spend money in that UC because the population of that UC is meagre and the vote bank insignificant however, I focused mainly on the deprived areas and we do this in expectation of expanding our vote bank and because we are concerned with the people of the area where we live’

This example signifies pork barrel as a relatively positive political approach. It shows that within the local government system, there is no possibility of highly personalised targeting of service delivery or individual clientelistic behaviour as purported by the public choice theorists. The response from District Nazim also verifies that there is lack of developmental funds available to the local governments and as mentioned in the previous chapters, the support from the provincial or federal government is extremely critical for the local representative to be influential in local politics. The electricity supply scheme mentioned in the quote was initiated with the help of federal government as the Prime Minister and President had good relationships with the District Nazim. The progress of developmental projects executed in District Swabi was remarkable. In addition, by targeting the services towards the previously marginalised groups of voters not only helped the local representatives build their political capital but also encouraged civic and political engagement of the citizens. The case of District Swabi’s government was exceptional as it showed the potential
strength of political institutions and the power of ballot box. Most of the underdeveloped areas had been deprived of electricity supply, but it was only possible after the introduction of local governments that the votes of the previously marginalised constituents became meaningful not only for themselves but also for the institution of local governments. However until the reforms were implemented, the MPAs representing those marginalised areas didn’t pay any significant attention to the constituents as they just needed a simple majority of votes from their traditional strongholds in a first pass the post system. Success stories like these promote positive competition among the groups of voters, which in turn improve the pre and post electoral civic engagement of citizens.

Contrary to the prevalence of pork barrel politics, scepticism was obvious in most respondents’ response about corruption in the local government system. Since matters related to corruption are sensitive in terms of investigation, interview questions examining the incidence and prevalence of corruption had to be tactfully asked. It was obvious that the elected representatives would deny any accusations of corruption. In order to circumvent this hurdle, questions related with outright corruption in local governments were asked in the context of institution and system. Instead of targeting the individuals, the interview questions focused on finding whether the formal system and informal mechanisms in local governance incentivised the elected incumbents for involving in corruption. Such element of euphemism in interview questions was quite useful for the exploration of factors beyond the surface. In addition, rival explanations and views from local governments’ counterparts - the civil bureaucracy - were also assessed. Most of the local government representatives were adamant in believing that the system of local government did not have any loopholes to allow outright corruption in the management of service delivery. However, one of the major accusations from the appointed public officials on the system of local government was that the local politicians contract out the public works contract to their relatives/friends and acquaintances in return for kickbacks.

When asked about such possibilities, the Naib Nazim of District Swabi argued that (as accused) even if contracts for public works are given by the local government representative to the individuals/firms that are in close contact with local politicians, what is wrong with it. He explained that public works projects are executed, in many
cases, and supervised always, by the public sector departments (e.g. C&W Department). Therefore, as far as there is vertical and horizontal check in place, the probability of corruption in the local government system was negligible. According to him, the system was reliable because the local governments served as a check on public departments and vice versa. Having denied the possibilities of corruption by the local politicians, the Naib Nazim of Swabi District lamented about the embedded menace of corruption as a lubricant in functioning of public sector administrative machinery. He referred to public officials compelling citizens to bribe them for petty works as trivial as issuing birth certificates. He explained that if we ask our constituents not to do so, they argue that public officials are very likely to delay official procedures and ultimately citizens would suffer therefore generally, the public is willing to grease the officials’ palms because they just want the things done.

Although corruption by the local government representatives was not reported in terms of their involvement in the execution of public works, one of the major forms of electoral corruption was categorically pointed out by a general councillor from urban UC in Peshawar. He commented on the issue of vote-buying among the local government representatives i.e. indirectly elected candidates for the posts of District and Tehsil Nazims buying votes from the members of their electoral college – the directly elected Union Councillors:

‘Usually a member (Union Councillor) sells his/her vote for a price ranging from around Rs.30000 – to Rs.50000 and now that people are more ‘intelligent’ (rational), they know the price of their vote …. There was woman member of our UC who admitted to have pocketed Rs.30000 from town Nazim and Rs.50000 from district Nazim in return for her vote…. She said that this helped her in getting her daughter married (for dowry) … Many councillors ran for UC membership elections just for the sake of selling their votes (this is specially the case with second term election) ……. These members are like animals sold for sacrifice (referring to the Muslims’ religious ritual)…. Their price depends on bargaining power and position of the buyer and seller’

The issue of UC members’ vote selling was associated with the indirect elections of the Tehsil and District Nazims, which will be discussed in later part of the chapter.
Since the local government system was implemented uniformly across the whole country, the possibilities for clientelism, pork barrel and corruption did not vary significantly across the four Districts studied for this research. The formula based transfers of administrative and developmental budget was equitably distributed between all the UCs of District and Tehsils. However, wherever there was an opportunity for the elected Nazims of UC, Tehsils and Districts, they tried to target the groups of voters in their own areas of political support. Most of the cases depicted pork barrel approaches however apart from the mentioned case of vote selling, no significant evidence was found across the four districts that would indicate massive levels of corruption by the local government representatives in the execution of public works. Substantial containment of corruption in the institution of local governments was owed to the representation of members of councils and the formula based fiscal transfer mechanisms. Largely, the evidence negates the public choice explanation of clientelism as an individual phenomenon however; the practice of pork barrel politics was evidently seen in all four districts.

9.2 Impact of Social Fragmentation and Economic Polarisation on the Outcomes of Pork Barrel Politics

It was discussed in chapter 6 that social fragmentation and economic polarisation impedes the development of an efficient civil and political society. Although pork barrel politics is not as detrimental as corruption, such approaches generate long-term negative spillovers especially in societies with higher social and economic fragmentation. The demographic composition of the capital city of Peshawar represented a greater degree of social fragmentation, which was one of the reasons why the case of Peshawar varied a lot when compared with District Swabi for example. In District Swabi, where the degree of social fragmentation was relatively lower, relationships of politicians with constituents were observed to be more cohesive and interactive. It was observed that in Peshawar (particularly after the administrative integration of rural and urban union councils in each town), disputes, inefficiencies and irregularities in allocation and expenditures of development funds became more evident. A general councillor from an urban town in Peshawar argued that UC Nazims finds it difficult to come to a consensus because most of the general Councillors are residents and representatives of (geographically and economically)
diverse villages and there is always a conflict of interest in their proposal for developmental schemes. Since the development budget is already too limited, when equally distributed among the UCs, it become even smaller and hence cannot be spent on meaningful projects.

Therefore, instead of developing a consensus on a collective programmatic development scheme for the whole UC e.g. an irrigation scheme that will have impact on all the villages included in that UC, it is more likely that the money is equally divided among the UCs and then spent on paving a street or two in each village. Naib Nazim of a town 3 in Peshawar district narrated his experience and said that there are 21 union councils in his town. In the year 2008, they had a wonderful opportunity of a mega project (proposed from the central annual development plan) for clean drinking water supply scheme in all 21 UCs. Town 3 was offered a proposal in which all the UCs were asked to pool in their development fund to the scheme but none of the members of town’s UCs was willing to leave and contribute his share of local development fund for this mega project. They were instead content to divide the money equally and get their due share. Consequently, the UCs did not get the contribution from proposed mega project.

Somewhat similar difficulties were reported by UC Nazim of Swabi district who added that members usually cannot agree for one large project because the suburban UCs of their District are geographically scattered and the developmental needs of the rural suburbs cannot be satisfied with a small amount of money. Contrarily, other UC members interviewed from rural Mansehra and Swabi presented a different picture, presumably because of the relatively lower degree of social fragmentation and polarisation. For instance, a Nazim from the UC in Swabi, believed that members do not find it difficult to prioritise any development scheme in their area because the requirements of citizens do not vary too much; there’s no huge difference in socio-economic status of citizens of this area. Most of them are poor and underprivileged rural dwellers and therefore a small project in their community usually suffices. In Mansehra too, a UC Nazim believed that it is relatively easy to build up a consensus in their UC in terms of identifying the most necessary development project. He said that they tried and had succeeded in spending the development fund on a meaningful
project without splitting the fund into smaller amounts. Endorsing his statement, he mentioned that their UC never initiated a project worth less than Rs.100000.

By comparing the degree of demographic heterogeneity of the districts, with some exceptions, it was clear that apart from the limitations of development funds, social fragmentation and economic polarisation of the society were one of the primary reasons that compelled the local politicians to rely on pork barrel spending. The evidence revealed that in Swabi and Mansehra, it was relatively easy to build a consensus among various villages for collectively spending the developmental funds whereas in Peshawar, due to the socio-economic fragmentation and administrative amalgamation of rural and urban areas, efficiency could not be achieved in terms of spending the development funds. By and large, the demographic heterogeneity was seen as positively contributing to the targeted delivery of social services. In order to overcome the long-term spillovers of pork barrel politics, 1) local governments needed sufficient funding and 2) effort were required from higher levels of government to encourage the involvement of demographically diverse social groups in local self-governance. Complexities associated with civic engagement and political activism of the marginalised social groups is discussed in section 9.4 of this chapter.

9.3 Factors Affecting Voter-Politician Relationships and their Political Behaviour

9.3.1 Socio-Economic and Political Factors

Characteristics like ethnicity, kinship, social class, financial status, rural/urban dwelling, educational attainment, income levels, landowning and occupation of voters and local politicians were discussed in detail with interviewees in order to have their perceptions about the extent to which these features accounted for, in determination of politician-voter’s pre and post election relationships and the voting behaviour. UC Nazim in Swabi district accounted that due to lack of education (lack of civic awareness), electoral candidates try to convince people to vote for them in unusual ways; they remind them of their personal relations with voters based on kinship, lineage, castes, and occupation etc. Voters, on the other hand consider their personal and targeted benefits while choosing a candidate before casting their votes. However, the UC Nazim stated that there’s a gradual positive change observed in voters’
perceptions and approach; earlier voters would just consider their personal gains while voting but now, besides that consideration, they also reckon the possibility and probability of satisfaction of their collective developmental needs (programmatic policy). Among other attributes, educational attainment of candidate and their family background were also mentioned as positively contributing to shaping up the voting behaviour of voters. The UC Nazim explained that if a candidate belongs to a well off family, s/he would be less prone to corruption as compared to a person who is not from a well to do family.

The case study of Mansehra was included in a recent comprehensive study conducted by Khan et al. (2007) that investigated the impact of devolution of power reforms in the context of entrenched power structures of Pakistani civil society. Analysing qualitatively and quantitatively, they found some orientating trends. They concluded that land ownership, caste, factionalism, and voters’ perception of service delivery were key determinants of local electoral behaviour in District Mansehra. Due to the upward economic and social mobility of citizens in the area, the predominant elites now had to share power with new entrants in political arenas. They elaborate that there used to be huge landowning discrepancies among three main ‘castes’ - Syeds, Swatis and Gujjars. Nevertheless, land ownership became less skewed because of the income enhancement that was stimulated with remittances by working male population who had migrated to large cities of Pakistan and abroad. There is a deep-rooted social and political rivalry between the three major castes residing in Mansehra. Almost all the mainstream political parties had their presence in Mansehra yet party based politics did not come across as an important factor in local government elections. Jumba\textsuperscript{23}, service delivery and castes were indeed identified as main determinants of voting behaviour.

Khan et al. (2007) observed a growing political maturity in a sense that no uni-caste panel of Nazim and Naib Nazim (elected on joint ticket) was seen in the four UCs, which were included in their study of Mansehra. So for example if Nazim was from

\textsuperscript{23} The term ‘jumba’ is used in Hazara region of NWFP province, which refers to the social faction that is formed based on ethnicity and/or occupation. Khan et al (2007) describe that an electoral alliance could take the form of jumba, which is the formation of a particular group or faction for a particular election. It is important to note that factions sometimes cut across various ethnic lines.
Syed caste, Naib Nazim would either be Swati or Gujjar or vice versa. Remittances brought prosperity to the landless tenant households and gave them more independence in terms of their voting preferences. Khan et al. (2007) propose that repeated elections politically empowered the rural population belonging to the non-dominant castes. With robust evidence, they suggest that service delivery also played important role in determining voting behaviour. Quantitatively, they establish that education, landownership, and being a village notable significantly enhanced the probability of becoming a candidate and winning elections. While qualitatively, service done for community and biradaree affiliation emerged as two main factors. The empirical evidence gathered for this research also corroborates the findings of study conducted by Khan et al. (2007).

In district Mansehra, the impact of the kinship and family lineage on determining the footings of candidates and voters in voter-politician relationships and voting behaviour were significantly evident. Nazim of a rural suburban UC in Abbottabad believed that the voter would look for moral character and the ‘Jumba’ affiliation. According to him, he did not have any political party affiliation and his voters valued his integrity as a village elder and notable. Describing the social and political psychology of his native citizens, he mentioned that voters also consider the financial status and ‘taloqat’ (social relations and interactions) of the candidate i.e. candidate’s participation in ‘ghamee/ shaade’ (communal social gatherings especially in weddings and funerals etc) and such social interactions of the candidate highly oblige voters. Most of interviewees had a strong conviction that social activism in a communal milieu is a major element in determining electoral success particularly at UC level where direct elections are held.

The UC Nazim from Abbottabad District further elaborated that a village notable accompanying and assisting citizens in their petty ‘thana kachahree’ (local police station and courts issues) also pays off positively in form of votes. Nonetheless, he himself avoided involvement and support in personal disputes of his constituents because he feared the loss of votes from one of these hostile groups. Accessibility of the masses of citizens, mainly poor, to the services of public sector departments has

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24 Biradaree literally means fraternity. In this study, it refers to the social group or community that has members having similar ethnicity and/or occupation.
deteriorated to such an extent that citizens frequently request their local councillors to accompany them even while seeking medical care in a public hospital. The UC Nazim also claimed to have helped his constituents financially; he explained that this type of assistance certainly helps in elections nonetheless, he would help the people of his constituency anyways i.e. in the capacity of being a village elder, and irrespective of any expectation for votes.

Optimistic about the fruitfulness of democracy at local level, Nazim of rural UC in district Mansehra stated

‘Undoubtedly, there has been a great impact of family lineage of both, the candidate and the voter on the voting patterns but I can assure you that this menace is diminishing already and if we have a few more elections (terms) of local government, this malpractice would be eradicated altogether. The local government system is creating awareness among people and now people are able to easily recognise candidates who will deliver in future, otherwise pre dominant political families and clans will continue to dominate the political spheres of our society; only effective local government system can eradicate these issues (factional domination).’

In the rural UCs of Peshawar, other than the social interactions of candidates, the size of candidate’s village was also cited as one of the criteria that is positively associated with the probability of success in local elections. The Nazim of a rural UC situated in outskirts of capital city of Peshawar believed that some times voters also reckon the size of candidate’s village i.e. the larger and more developed the candidate’s village, the more chances s/he has of being in a better position to compete any other candidate running for local elections. The candidate from a larger village running for a UC election is more likely to be influential and financially well off as compared to the candidates contesting from other smaller villages. Given the differences in population size of villages in a UC, large size of the candidate’s village/constituency also means that the candidate has more chances of winning the election even if s/he secures a smaller percentage of support as compared to another village with less number of registered voters. Among other attributes, the UC Nazim pointed out that a candidate’s financial, social and political muscle counts a lot in local elections;
citizens do not prefer to elect an extremely honest person because s/he is hardly capable of targeting services towards the his own constituency. The UC Nazim had no doubt that a local elected representatives direct all the legal and illegal spoils towards their own constituency; he believed that they may be representing a large area but their priority would certainly be their own constituency.

Collective developmental needs, expected personalised favours and candidate’s own political, financial and social stature were commonly perceived as determinants of voting behaviour among all UCs in the four districts studied whereas in some cases the size and development status of the candidate’s village was also reported as a prime determinant in this regard. In district Mansehra, voters’ allegiances with politicians were mainly based on kinship, lineage, castes, and occupation. Likewise in the suburban UCs of Abbottabad, ‘Jumba’ or ‘Biradaree’ (Social factions) affiliations and the candidate’s status as a village elder or notable was reckoned to have an impact on voting. However, due to the upward economic and social mobility in the region, the traditional elites were to share power with new entrants in the local politics and that is why service delivery also played important role in determining voting behaviour. It was anticipated that repeated local elections could reduce the impact of the family lineage on shaping up the voting patterns and instead the politicians would compete on the bases of efficient service delivery. Similarly, in Swabi, it was observed that besides the expectations of targeted and personalised favours, citizens in UCs also reckoned the expected satisfaction of their collective developmental needs. Since the elections for District and Tehsil Nazims and Naib Nazims were held indirectly, the determinants of political behaviour of Electoral College for District and Tehsil Nazims are discussed in the later part of this chapter.

9.3.2 Credibility of Local Politicians

Voting behaviour of voters is mainly dependant on the political and personal credibility of politicians. In terms of factors affecting the local politicians’ credibility, the case of local government in Swabi was quite different when compared to the rest of the three districts. The District Nazim of Swabi belonged to a very well off family and had won the local election as an independent candidate by defeating some of the conventional stalwarts of the predominant mainstream national and regional political parties. In an interview,
he overtly admitted to have developed very good terms with central
government (regime) of that time and that’s why according to him, he was
quite successful in influencing the Prime Minister and President of Pakistan to
visit his District and approve mega development projects like the supply of
natural gas and electricity to geographically scattered villages of his District.
As explained earlier, the District Nazim’s family (prominent political family of
the area) was at odds with the then provincial governments. Despite the
antagonism from the provincial government, the District Nazim had a very vast
support of his UC members; the development projects executed during his
terms were remarkable and this was verified by all three UC members who
were interviewed later.

A UC Nazim from Swabi District confirmed that credibility depends on the
candidate’s personal influence. He said that

‘Our district Nazim’s family is very influential and that’s why they arranged
President’s (2006) and Prime Minister’s (2007) official visits to our area
which has never happened before. During these visits, the President
(Musharraf) and PM approved and inaugurated the supply of gas pipeline to
the whole area and electricity provision schemes to the deprived areas.
Despite the fact that our district is geographically scattered, during this term
of local government, record development projects have been completed.’

It was quite evident that the credibility of the local politicians was primarily affected
by their financial status. The case of District Swabi was not different in terms of
limited development funds that were granted to the District via the PFC award
nonetheless, since the Nazim’s family was financially well off and the UC members
of the District were aware of the fact that Nazim’s political relations with the federal
government were cordial, they could count on him in the expectation of diversion of
other national development schemes to their respective areas. Therefore, despite the
general limitations of resources, the local government representatives could build their
political credibility based on their personal financial status and political capital that
was accumulated with the support from higher levels of government. In addition,
Nazarim’s control over the district’s bureaucracy, due to the support from federal
government, added value to his political influence. Subsequent interviews with three UC Nazims from Swabi also depicted that the Nazim’s political and social relations with most of UC members and constituents was exemplary.

In Peshawar, interviewees presented a slightly different picture. The Naib Nazim of a Town 3 explained that other than limited resources, political rivalry (between levels of government) and the civil administration’s bureaucratic procedures do not let the local government representatives work effectively which in turn deteriorates their post electoral credibility. Public departments’ officials expect ‘commissions’ (kickbacks) in every project that the local government intends to initiate. He explained that political opponents also try their level best to get them involved in meaningless litigations, legal proceedings and bureaucracies of trivial nature in order to let them down in front of their voters. According to him, they (appointed officials) just want to waste the time and energy of local government’s incumbent during their office tenure, which is one of many hurdles that deteriorate their post election credibility. Another Nazim of a rural UC from Peshawar opined that the main hindrance in building politicians credibility was acute shortage of resources available to them nevertheless, local representative’s own financial position also matters. Rationale for this, he described, was that if the candidate is not well off financially, s/he has to work for his own living and will eventually have less time for the community service. He continued that ‘citizens and voters have misconceptions about the local representatives’ financial jurisdictions …. they think as if local governments have billions of rupees to spend and that local government official can help them (citizens) out in anything as long as they want to help.’ Local politicians’ credibility was affected because citizens, unaware of the legal limitations of their local representatives, expected a lot in terms of personalised favours and development funding.

In district Mansehra, two UC Nazims agreed on the notion that pre and post electoral credibility of local politicians depended a great deal upon their capacity of being an intermediary between their constituencies on one hand, regional, national or international governments, and development agencies on the other hand. The credibility of local politicians depends on their capability of manipulating the development projects in form of either ‘pork barrel’ spending or even highly targeted
services. The UC Nazim of urban town in Mansehra argued that the UC Nazims are definitely critical in the identification and execution of development schemes. He related that there was UNDP funded sewerage and drainage scheme approved for their District. Since his UC comprised of area that was relatively a new residential development therefore he needed help on a priority basis from this scheme. Therefore, he met the director of the UNDP program and convinced him to visit his UC. The director agreed and they spent almost Rs.40 Million for making sewerage and drainage system, which was a great success. Another Nazim of rural UC from Mansehra claimed to have identified and influenced a substantially large project by Erra (Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority), a government agency that eventually spent Rs.40 Million (approximately) in his UC during the 2005’s earthquake rehabilitations.

In a question regarding the possibilities of any duplication of development projects, given the policy wherein a senator, MNA and MPA also get annual development funds, two UC Nazims from district Mansehra responded that

*It's true that MNA and MPA are also involved in development projects and there might be possibilities of duplication of projects however, it doesn't happen usually because the MNA and MPA competing for election from a particular constituency certainly has a local supporting UC Nazim or member so it is usually a 'give and take' type of relationship between the local government representative and MNA/MPA wherein the local government representative helps MNA or MPA in enhancing and mobilising his vote bank and in return, the MNA and MPA gets the development funds directed (targeted) towards that very local constituency.*

Similarly, the Naib Nazim of a Town in Peshawar expressed that ‘we try our best to get the funds of MNAs and MPAs diverted towards our town and UC, otherwise the local governments’ annual development fund, especially when equally divided among all UCs, is literally peanuts. The role of local politician as an effective intermediary builds up his/her political credibility. However, in case of political differences between an MPA/MNA and local government, naturally, the situation is far too adverse for the local representative. One of the prominent factors that were identified
by almost all local government representatives from all tiers of local government as having an enormous impact on establishing their pre and post electoral credibility was their social interaction and friendly behaviour with their electorates. In Swabi, a UC Nazim expressing his views said that

‘Voter is happy with ‘Gham-Khadee’ (social interaction in wedding and funeral ceremonies) and with us taking interest in their little (trivial personal) matters … all you need is to show your concern but when it comes to development works, they are more interested in their personal/targeted gains from the projects … a programmatic project that would benefit the whole village won’t be appreciated that much but a small personal favour would do a lot….Within the expectation of personalised favours, due to lack of education (lack of awareness of facts and official procedures and constraints), voters expect too much from us.’

There are various community mechanisms to establish credibility and voters can punish politicians through non-electoral structures (Rolls, 2008) e.g. the Hujra25 and Mosque. UC Nazimeen26 are usually invited to attend or convene a local Jirga27. Most of verdicts of such local informal judicial institutions are solved outside the judicial courts so voters also consider the capacity of candidate to support and speak for them in any Jirga. If a UC Nazim is a notable and influential person, people feel secured being protected against any excesses by police and therefore this also adds up to the pre and post electoral credibility of local electoral candidate. Town Nazim of Peshawar reiterated the importance of local politicians’ own influence. According to him,

‘it’s true that most of the times, the socially deprived areas remain on the bottom of the priority list (for services and development projects) either because they don’t form a considerable vote bank or because their local representatives are not influential enough in getting their voices heard in the decision-making process …. So vocal, pro-active, demanding and (socially)

25 In NWFP province, Hujra is a place and an institution. It is a communal place that is used by almost all villagers as a communal guesthouse. A village’s Hujra and Mosque are the two most essential places and institutions used for social interaction and communal dispute settlements usually headed by the village elders and notables.

26 Plural of Nazim (Mayor)

27 Jirga is an institution and a communal gathering wherein elders and parties to any dispute gather (usually at a Hujra) for dispute resolution that is informal yet very binding and effective. In most of the cases, verdict given by Jirga is more revered than a formal court’s decision.
influential candidates get the advantage in terms of credibility in local politics.

The only factor that was unanimously expressed as having a devastating impact on credibility of electoral candidate was the scarcity of available development funds for disbursement by the local incumbent. On top of that, the citizens’ expectations were overwhelming whereas the local incumbents were constrained not only in terms of financial resources but also in terms of their official capacity. It was learnt that the cordial social interactions significantly added to the political credibility of local politicians especially at the UC level where the direct contact between citizens and politicians was more frequent. The case of Swabi shows that the personal financial strength of the candidates and their social and political influence in the wider political circles provides them with opportunities to build political credibility. In the provincial capital Peshawar, the representation of mainstream political parties differed. Most of the local government representatives not only felt pressurised from the provincial government but also from the provincial bureaucracy. Therefore, the political credibility of local politicians remained overshadowed except for those incumbents who had the support from the provincial governments. In Mansehra, the local politicians mainly relied on establishing ‘give and take’ type of relationships with the members of the National and Provincial assembly. The ‘intermediary’ status of local politicians thus partly determined their political credibility.

9.3.3 Impact of Political Party Affiliations and Patronage Employment

The previous chapter elaborated the impact of political parties’ involvement on the inter-institutional and inter-governmental working relationships. This part of the chapter investigates the impact of political party and religious affiliation of politicians and their capacity of delivering patronage employment on the determining the political behaviour of the electorate. In Peshawar, the Naib Nazim of Town 3 argued that political party affiliation of politician on the UC level only matters in strongholds of national and regional political parties otherwise it is primarily the social interaction and social services provided by politicians that shape up voters’ political behaviour. Whereas due to the enthusiastic involvement of political parties especially in the second term’s local election, the political affiliations of politicians at the Town and District level had a great impact on influencing the outcomes. The Naib Nazim urged
that more than half of the APT matters (in the devolved departments) are decided and prioritised on the basis of political affiliation of the local politician and therefore the political affiliation of local candidates serves as a factor that contributes to their credibility.

In the UC elections, generally the involvement of political parties was relatively insignificant. A UC Nazim from District Mansehra believed that political ideology and hence the political party affiliation of the candidate is a matter of concern for those citizens whose basic standard of living is maintained but in case of citizens such as those in his UC (poor and underdeveloped), political party affiliation doesn’t really play a major role in determining their voting behaviour because they are tied in a constant struggle for their subsistence which makes them indifferent towards the political and civic engagement. Although the mainstream political parties tried to mobilise the voters in some constituencies using the UC Nazims as intermediaries, there were many UCs where the vote bank was trivial and as such, most of the political parties did not reckon it useful to get involved. The Union Nazim from Abbottabad and Tehsil Nazim of Havailian (Abbottabad District) denied any affiliation with the mainstream political parties. In fact, the UC Nazim of from Abbottabad District claimed that he had defeated candidates backed up by established political parties in his constituency.

The affiliation of candidates with political parties that are based on religious ideologies has been a critical factor in national and provincial politics, particularly in NWFP province of Pakistan. Disappointed with traditional political parties, masses of voters in NWFP heavily supported a coalition political party - MMA (coalition party formed by all the major parties that are based on Islamic ideology) - whose landslide victory in year 2002’s general election was an indicator of a political upheaval in the province. The coalition of MMA was formed just before the general elections of year 2002 therefore their involvement in local elections of 2001 was not manifested. However, in the second term local election held in 2005, the provincial government of MMA left no stone unturned in supporting their candidates to run for local elections. Swabi’s Nazim was of the opinion that religion has always been one of the major determinants of voting behaviour in their province but this is not the case anymore
particularly in District Swabi (referring to the total absence of MMA from the local political scene). He said:

‘This time (in local elections of 2005), people needed a change .... the appeal of religious political parties was useless .... Same is the case with ANP’s Pushtun’s ethnic ideology, which is vanishing now .... Now you can see that this is a paradigm shift .... In the last elections, all political parties were contesting against us but we won because we tried to change people’s mind .... We tried to fight against the conventional politics (with religious and ethnic ideologies) and we delivered social services.’

He affirmed:

‘Religious party affiliation of candidate cannot emotionally exploit voters’ decision any more .... Our people are now well aware ... you cannot convince them based on your religion any more.’

Although the affiliation of candidates with religious ideology based party did not bear any fruit, a religious person or a practitioner of religion was reckoned more credible as compared to other candidates who were relatively less religious in their public image. UC Nazim from Swabi explained that if a candidate were relatively more religious, people’s expectations of his integrity and honesty (in terms of spending the public money) would be certainly higher, thereby enhancing his credibility. In Mansehra, religious affiliations of candidates did not seem to affect the perceptions of voters at large where the element of political pragmatism in voters’ voting behaviour could evidently be interpreted from the response of interviewees. Khan et al. (2007: 130) quote that in Mansehra, some Gujjars who voted for Syeds said that they respected Mian Wali-Ur-Rehman as spiritual leader but stated that ‘he has not been able to do anything for himself, he doesn’t even own a house so what can he do for us? He is not a good public speaker either. He is a man of God, but if we vote for people like him, who will push our interest in assemblies?’

28 ANP (Awami National Party) formed government in NWFP in coalition with ruling party PPP in year 2008. Swabi’s district Nazim defeated ANP’s candidate in local election in year 2005 and therefore there was a natural rivalry between his district government and provincial government of ANP in the province.
Generally, there has been a strong and positive association between the delivery of patronage employment and electoral success but in the case of local politics; the impact of patronage employment on the voting behaviour of citizens has been inconsistent for several reasons. Except for the District Government, the representatives of the local governments at Tehsil and UC level were not authorised to influence the recruitment matters of public officials working in their constituencies. The District Nazim of Swabi was affirmative of catalytic significance of patronage employment in this regard and said, ‘you help one person from a family to get a job (in public sector), that family will be yours (voters and supporters) for life’. In Districts like Swabi and Peshawar, where the Nazim had the support from either the provincial government or Federal government, the district government could manipulate her authority to influence the APT matters and hence utilise patronage employment for establishing her political capital.

Nevertheless, the Tehsil and UC governments had negligible opportunities to deliver patronage employment. Most of the interviewees, from Town and UC level, therefore denied the possibility of patronage employment e.g. Tehsil Nazim of Havailian from Abbottabad District stated that the elected Nazims were not in a position to deliver patronage employment in their TMAs. According to him, for recruiting the TMA staff, there is an official committee that is responsible for matters concerned with recruitment affairs of the TMA. The committee comprises of elected members from TMA council and other appointed senior officials e.g. Town Nazim, TMO (Town Municipal Officer) and TOs (Town Officers). With the involvement of appointed public officials and members of the local council, the probability of Nazim influencing the recruitment matters diminishes. Similarly, at the UC level, local officials did not have the official capacity to deliver patronage employment because they were not authorised to get involved in the recruitment matters.

The overall scenario indicated that affiliation of candidate with any mainstream political party did not have an enormous impact on the UC level. There were some exceptions of course for instance, where the UC Nazims could be relied on for mobilising the popular support for the candidates of national and political assemblies, political party affiliation of the local candidate considerably affected the voting behaviour of citizens. The political credibility and social capital of UC Nazims
supported by political parties in such cases were greater because those UC Nazims had the capability of serving their electorates in the capacity of being an intermediary for their patrons from provincial or federal centres. On the other hand, active involvement of mainstream political parties was observed at Town and District level. Religious appeal of political parties for supporting their candidate did not affect voting behaviour of voters as it was evident in the case of Mansehra and Swabi. Although the District Nazim of Peshawar was supported by the coalition of religious parties, his success was primarily considered as an outcome of (alleged) vote-buying, campaign financing and electioneering rather than religious ideology. Generally, the design of the local government system prevented the local politicians from being able to deliver patronage employment however, by using their personal, political and social influence and/or being intermediary between their electorates and provincial and/or federal government’s member, the incumbents of the local governments could prove to be catalytic in manipulating the patronage employment.

9.4 Civic Engagement and Political Activism

The voter turnout in the UC elections in Pakistan was relatively higher than the turnover in general national and provincial elections, e.g. there was 48% turnout in the 2005 local government elections, as compared to a 42% turnout in the 2002 national assembly elections (Hasnain, 2008). Although the exact statistics of the difference between the rural and urban turnout in local elections are not available because of the abolishment of rural and urban divide however, primary evidence and observations revealed slightly higher degrees of the pre and post election civic engagement and political activism in rural areas as compared to the urban. The Nazim and Naib Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar (the town that comprises of rural and urban UCs) explained their point of view in this regard. According to them, in the urban areas, citizens are relatively better educated, employed, and they usually belong to the higher income groups; they are relatively busier in their personal or professional lives and as such there is very limited community interaction between them. Therefore, despite condensed population, urban towns in Peshawar do not make a very attractive vote bank. Contrary to that, in rural areas, owing to the joint family systems and communal and social cohesions, civic engagement and political activism is relatively better and it is relatively easier for the candidates to target the vote blocs of rural communities.
The Nazim and Naib Nazim believed that there is more of individualism in urban areas whereas in rural areas, community life is vibrant because the institutions like Hujra and Mosque are still existent and functional as community centres. They stated that they seek to promote community voluntarism by approaching people via mosques and Hujra and these communal institutions make the election campaigns easier for them in rural areas as compared to the urban. The distinction between socio-political composition of rural and urban constituencies was also verified by the UC Nazim of Swabi District who highlighted that the pre and post election civic engagement is different in rural and urban areas because the norms and community cultures of the two vary a great deal; materialistic (highly personalised) and pragmatic expectations of voters are more common in urban electorates as compared to the rural areas. The Naib Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar believed that citizens in the urban towns are better connected with the local bureaucracy and they can use their influence, contacts, and personal relations in public sector departments for the solution of their public problems. According to him, urban citizens do not really have to rely on local government representatives of their area and he will not be surprised to know that the majority of voters in the urban UCs of his town do not even know the name of their Town or UC Nazim and Naib Nazim.

In a response to the question, as to why there is lack of civic engagement and how could this be improved, Town Nazim of Havailian from Abbottabad argued that this is because of the overlapping of functions in various institutions. He opined that all the development and municipal functions should be assigned to the local administrations while MNAs and MPAs should concentrate on their legislation making. He continued that once the citizens are assured that the local governments and administrations are responsible and authorised for the development and municipal services, their civic engagement will be automatically improved. His argued that due to the drastic changes in the institutions of municipal service, citizens are confused as to which department is responsible for which service and to what extent. Due to the weaknesses of local administrations, citizens are sceptical about the capacity of organisations’ service delivery and that is why civic engagement remains low. Somewhat similarly, a UC Nazim from the rural outskirts of Peshawar thought that:
(the degree of) civic engagement is generally low because (the current) local governments did not deliver anything substantial and naturally when the local governments do not deliver, people get disappointed and their expectations dwindle and they do not feel like contacting their local representative for the solution of their issues .... When educated and noble people remain distant from local (political) affairs by either not voting or not contesting or not engaging in post election political affairs, a vacuum is created which is eventually filled in by the scum of society.... in such situations, candidates contesting for local government offices and the citizens who vote for them are mostly the people who pursue their own personal vested interests ..... Therefore the local politics revolve around collusions between politicians and voters and the cream of society remain indifferent'

As discussed throughout this study, the causes for the local governments’ inability to deliver efficient services to wider electorates were numerous. The above-mentioned UC Nazim referred to the failure of local governments in service delivery as one of the reasons why a majority of social groups were disenchanted and therefore politically inactive. It is obvious that when the expectations of the citizens are not met, they lose their confidence in the problem-solving capacity of the concerned institutions. Impoverished and marginalised groups are politically inactive because they are busy in a constant struggle for their basic subsistence and they can hardly afford to collectivise their political and civic interests. Their lack of political activism and civic engagement excludes them from receiving targeted social services. On the other hand, the UC Nazim also mentioned that the local governments failed to deliver because more capable, educated and relatively well off citizens tend to avoid engaging in local politics. It was explained in Chapter 4, that the social groups belonging to the middle class tend to seek easy and reliable solutions to their civic problems by establishing and exploiting their contacts in the public sector departments rather than involving in the collective solutions via political engagement. In other words, they look for individual solutions for their public problems.

Consider the case of District Swabi where many factors like the social services delivery, political and financial credibility of the Nazim, resource allocation and relatively lower levels of demographic heterogeneity in the area combined to build citizens’ trust in local government that consequently led to better political
mobilisation. It was also evident that with the greater involvement of citizens, the institutional capacity of the any level of government is also strengthened whereby the possibilities of pork barrel practices can be overcome a great deal. The District Nazim of Swabi claimed that in order to overcome the lack of civic engagement,

'We try our level best to get our constituents involved in decision-making and this is a very hard task because it is very difficult to reach citizens in a large (geographically scattered) electorate' however, we hear them through our circles of lower tiers of local government .... These local councillors and Nazimeen are our links to our voters and the broader constituency because they are well aware of most of the issues and demands of our electorate. E.g., we consulted our people while deciding whether to join one of the national political parties before the local elections. We got this idea that citizens in our constituency did not want us to join that party and instead they wanted us to remain independent and contest on non-party basis so we did as they suggested .... It will be counterproductive if we do not get the people involved in our decision-making .... We are doing everything for them and if they are not happy, we won’t get re-elected'

District Nazim’s claim of involving his UC Nazims in decision-making was verified and appreciated by another UC Nazim in his District however; he said that this may only be an exception in District Swabi and may not be the case in all other Districts of NWFP. Generally, citizens’ disenchantment and their consequent apathy towards social and political involvement were owed partly to the failures of local governments especially in demographically heterogeneous cities and partly due to the fact that the citizens expected too much from their local government representatives. Social services delivery has been under the domain of non-elected institutions for decades. After the implementation of local government reforms, there was a lot of overlapping in terms of functions of various public institutions; citizens largely remained confused about the official capacity of newly established local governments and that is why the civic engagement in local politics was low. The cause and effect dilemma between pork barrel spending and lack of civic engagement is hard to pin down. However, the evidence suggest that better resource allocation and efforts by the central and regional

29 The villages and Union Councils of District Swabi are geographically scattered. In big cities like Peshawar, the population is denser within the cities and in suburbs around it.
governments for political mobilisation and enhancement of civic engagement at the local levels can contain the negative spillovers of pork barrel politics that will not only restore citizens’ confidence in political institutions but will also promote positive competition among various segments of the civil and political society.

9.5 Political Mobilisation and Citizens’ Access

The exclusion of a common person belonging to the lower social strata (based on primordial factors like income, education, family background, ethnicity and occupation) has generally been obvious in Pakistani politics. However, it was learnt in this study that, much attributed to the way reforms were structurally designed, a considerable fraction of elected local representatives elected in 2001 and 2005 elections belonged to the previously marginalised social groups. The capture of local government seats, especially at District level by the traditional elites was also evident yet mostly at UC level and in some cases at Town level, non-elite candidates from native localities were successful in local elections. Almost each and every interviewee from local government accounted that pre devolution, it was extremely hard for the citizens of a locality to access their MNA or MPA for the redress of their grievances, ranging from petty issues like attestation on a domicile certificate to having their voice heard in an identification and approval of a development project in their local areas. Local government representatives proudly claimed to have been far more accessible to their citizens as compared to an MNA or MPA. It was also argued by some of the respondents that even if MNAs or MPAs wanted to be more responsive to their constituencies, it was not technically possible, given the size of an average constituency. With the argument of enhanced accessibility, the representatives of local governments also claimed to have shared and reduced the responsibilities’ burden of national and provincial assembly members.

Besides that, the reservation of quota seats in all local councils of local government for women, peasant/labour, and religious minorities was reckoned as a major achievement in attempts for upward social and political mobilisation of the groups that were previously marginalised from the political mainstream. Some wonderful cases were observed about people who moved up the social and political ladder because of the local government reforms. For instance, the District Nazim of
Peshawar (2005-2009) was elected as UC Nazim in the first local elections (2001-2005). A few months before the end of his tenure as a District Nazim, he relinquished his office to be legally able to run for the elections of Senate in year 2009 and he won the elections to become a Senator in year 2009. Similarly, the Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar stated that he belonged to a humble family and he did not have a landlord’s family background but he was elected as a UC Nazim. Thereafter, he competed against the well-established political elites and won the elections to become the Town Nazim. Numerous instances showed that the system encouraged people from all social backgrounds to emerge as local representatives. Similarly, the Nazim of a rural UC in Mansehra exemplified people who started politics at a community level and ended up as members of provincial and national assembly. He believed that the institution of local governments serves as a training nursery for politicians. According to him, even when he was not elected as a UC Nazim, being a native he used to get involved in local community’s social services. After being elected as Nazim, his services have been formalised by the system.

9.6 Technical Issues in Local Electoral Mechanisms

Officially, political parties were excluded from contesting in the local government elections held in year 2001 and 2005 and the election for Town and District Nazims and Naib Nazims were held indirectly. Unlike other issues discussed in this study, perceptions of the local government representatives varied a markedly about the technical issues in electoral mechanisms and their perceptions reflected the variety of their political and social backgrounds. Two major questions were discussed - 1) whether to hold the local elections with the inclusion or exclusion of political parties and 2) whether the elections for Town and District Nazim should be held directly via adult franchise or indirectly through the electoral college composed of all UC members. The nature of electoral mechanisms had different implications for local politicians depending upon their position in local government, their overt or covert affiliation with political parties, and their personal socio-political capital. Some argued that the direct voting for Town and District Nazim would have diminished the stature of UC members and therefore Town and District Nazims would then be least incentivised to redress the grievances of UC members and UC Nazims. The most
valid argument against holding direct elections for Town and District Nazims was related to the size of constituencies.

The Naib Nazim of District Mansehra argued that in his district, there are two MNA and six MPA constituencies. Therefore the constituency for District Nazim, if elected on direct vote, will be too vast and overwhelmingly difficult for him/her to manage. Direct voting for the District Nazim will give the Nazim, an overwhelming mandate and at the same time, undermine the political stature of MNA and MPA of his/her constituency. He referred to the case of Lahore, the capital District of Punjab province, where there are 22 national assembly constituencies and therefore the direct elections of Nazim would mean immense political power concentration in the office of the District Nazim. He also exemplified District Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan where according to him, despite the indirect election of District Nazim, no one knew the Chief Minister of the province but everyone knew Nazim of Karachi. Similarly, defending his indirect election, the District Nazim of Peshawar argued that ‘If I get directly elected then I’ll be more likely to ignore the local councillors and that’s not good because the Union Councillors are the representatives of local communities who are very well aware of the issues in their areas.’ Since the electoral college for the District Nazim included the directly elected members of all the UCs included in that District, it was quite likely that the UC members of the District Council would be ignored by the District Nazim had s/he been elected via direct popular vote. In other words, the direct voting of Town and District Nazim would adversely affect their accountability to the UC members and UC Nazims.

On the contrary, some of the respondents favoured the direct voting for Town and District Nazims. They argued that District and Town Nazim will always be accountable, irrespective of direct or indirect voting, to the directly elected Nazims and Naib Nazims of UCs because members of the council reserve the right of vote of no confidence against them. Therefore, in order to improve the accountability of Town and District Nazims, their elections should be held via direct popular vote. The respondents also believed that with direct voting for Town and District Nazims, the chances for buying the support of elected council members would also be reduced considerably. Given that, currently the office of District and Town Nazim does not enjoy the due authority required for it, direct vote would duly capacitate their offices.
It was also suggested that in order to avoid vote buying, direct voting should be conducted for UC, Tehsil and the District Nazims on the same day that will allow no time for the probable vote trade and other associated embezzlements.

Suggesting direct elections, Naib Nazim of Town 3 in Peshawar explained that now, when all UC members elect Nazims of Town and District, there is a natural formation of interest groups and lobbies. He mentioned that members of the council who voted for District or Town Nazim threaten them with vote of no confidence therefore Nazims, being prone to blackmailing, are bound to pay back and return the favour in the form of targeted services. Tehsil Nazim in District Abbottabad also proposed direct voting and explained that

‘Usually it is argued that if direct elections are held for Town and District Nazim, members of the council (Electoral College) would become powerless and politically redundant. This is a baseless argument because these members will still have their voices heard as no Nazim can get any bill approved without the consent of (majority of) council, which of course comprises of directly elected members’

All the UC Nazims and Naib Nazims are members of District and Town Councils respectively and each of them reserve the right of vote of no confidence. Nevertheless, those members who did not vote for the elected Nazims of Town and District, were excluded from the targeted service delivery because their limited numerical strength did not suffice for a decisive vote of no confidence motion. Therefore, despite being part of the local government, such members and Nazims remain mostly marginalised. Town and District Nazims are more likely to respond to the demands of those members who have voted them.

Many arguments for and against the direct elections were quite reasonably valid. With direct voting, Town and District Nazims would be more accountable to a wider citizenry and the probability of vote buying would automatically diminish because it will be very difficult to buy the votes of a large electorate as compared to buying votes from around 1200 UC members. However, direct voting of Town and District Nazims had some administrative and political implications. The most valid argument
against the direct voting was that the elected incumbent would be politically too strong which would possibly pose a threat to the political mandate of the members of National and Provincial assembly. Other than that, with direct elections, the Town and District Nazim would be politically detached from the members of their councils. Although the indirect election was one of the contentious issue and no common patterns were observed in respondents’ response, generally this policy did not have a substantial impact on the performance of local governments.

The discussion over holding elections on party or non-party basis also spawned various views. One notion was quite prominent among most of the responses i.e. even if government decides to hold elections on non-party basis (as in case of local government elections of 2001 and 2005), there will always be unsystematic influence and involvement of political parties in local elections. To many, any election without parties’ involvement (overt or covert) was not possible at all. In Swabi, a UC Nazim stressed on the need for involving political parties in local elections; according to him, this will enhance political skills and democratic sense of citizens and it will be a decisive test of the mainstream political parties at the same time. He continued that if political parties were encouraged to participate in local politics, it would build their credibility and capacity to deliver on provincial and federal level as well. To him, parties’ involvement democratises the local governance and therefore political parties should be encouraged to participate in all levels of local government. In Mansehra, where the rivalry between local and provincial government was more evident, District Naib Nazim argued that elections should be held on party basis so that the rifts between provincial and local government can be minimised. With this, he said, the administrative and development works will not suffer.

Nazim of a UC in Swabi however believed that on a UC level, election should be held on non-party basis because community involvement and interaction is more important than mainstream political parties’ involvement. The party, with which he had affiliations, was not very popular in his area but he enjoyed support of his local people in his personal capacity. According to him, at the UC level, affiliation of the candidate with any political party adversely influences the voting behaviour as sometimes citizens end up voting for a candidate against their conscience and preference i.e. when they vote for candidate that is supported by a political party instead of voting for
a more deserving candidate. The UC Nazim from Peshawar’s outskirts also argued in favour of non-party based elections by advocating that this will create a balance in the political situation where the national or provincial parties are hegemonic in nature; non-party based local elections would thus serve as level playing field.

Considering the political organisation of Pakistan, where political parties do actively contest in the provincial and federal elections, official ban on parties’ involvement in local elections would be a counterproductive policy for several reasons. Despite the official ban, the influence and involvement of parties in local elections was frequently observed anyways, which means that the official policy for preventing the political parties from contesting in the elections cannot be implemented. In addition, the unsystematic involvement of parties only added to the institutional tensions between the local and provincial governments. If encouraged to participate formally in the local elections, political parties are likely to have broad-based representation in their regional and local strongholds, which will eventually reduce the political, administrative and fiscal complexities in inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships. Political parties would be incentivised to extend their outreach to the grass root level that will spur positive competition among them to induce popular local politicians into the party. This will not only broaden the parties’ representation base but will also curtail parties’ intrinsic hegemonic power structures. Put simply, with involvement in the local politics, parties are likely to become more democratic intrinsically. Finally, parties’ involvement in institutionalised local politics will also serve as an authentic performance indicator of their capabilities.

9.7 Conclusions

The fiscal policy of the local government reforms restrained the possibilities of highly targeted and clientelistic service delivery. The evidence negates the public choice explanation of clientelism as propounded in the patron-client model because groups of voters are involved in clientelistic exchanges. However, numerous incidences indicating pork barrel politics were evidently observed in all of the four districts. With some exceptions of vote trade between the directly and indirectly elected representatives of the local governments in Peshawar, no significant evidence of massive corruption by the local representatives, in terms of executing the public
works, was found in any of the four districts. Apart from the limitations of development funds, social fragmentation and economic polarisation of the society were also seen as primary reasons that compelled the local politicians to resort to pork barrel spending. In the relatively less heterogeneous Districts like Swabi and Mansehra, the outcomes of pork barrel spending were less detrimental because it was relatively easy to build a consensus for public works among various social groups. Contrarily, in Peshawar, due to higher degrees of socio-economic fragmentation and administrative amalgamation of rural and urban areas, pork barrel politics marginalised several social groups from receiving social services. Demographic heterogeneity was observed as positively associated with pork barrel approaches.

The collective developmental needs of citizens, their expectations for personalised favours and candidate’s own political, financial and social stature were commonly perceived as determinants of the voting behaviour among all the UCs studied in the four districts. In some cases, the size and developmental status of the candidate’s village was also reported as a prime determinant. In district Mansehra and Abbottabad, voters’ allegiances with politicians were based on commonality of primordial factors for instance the Jumba or Biradaree affiliations. However, due to the upward economic and social mobility in the region, service delivery also played an important role in determining voting behaviour. Likewise, in Swabi, in addition to the expectations of targeted favours, citizens in UCs also considered their collective developmental needs. Cordial social interactions significantly added to the political credibility of local politicians especially at the UC level.

The political credibility of Swabi’s District Nazim was attributed to his financial status, exemplary service delivery, support from the federal government, his control over the district bureaucracy, and his social capital earned from the social interaction in his constituency. Contrary to that, the political credibility of local politicians in Peshawar remained overshadowed except for the District Nazim who had the support of the provincial government. In the UCs of Mansehra and Abbottabad, the affiliation of candidates with political parties did not affect their political credibility except for those who served as intermediaries between provincial government and their local constituencies. The religious appeal of political parties for supporting their candidate did not affect voting behaviour of voters. Due to the limited authority, the local
politicians at UC and Town level were incapable of delivering patronage employment except those intermediaries who could manipulate the APT matters of public officials with the help of their contacts with higher levels of government. At the District level, as learnt in the cases of Swabi and Peshawar, the capacity of Nazim in facilitating patronage employment was greater due to their support from the provincial and federal government. District governments of Peshawar and Swabi also had a relatively better control over their District’s bureaucracy as compared to the Abbottabad and Mansehra.

The failure of the local governments in service delivery was one of the reasons for the deteriorating civic engagement. Impoverished social groups are marginalised from wider social services delivery. These groups are politically inactive; they fail to collectivise their political and civic interests and that is why such groups do not constitute significant vote blocs. Similarly, the social groups belonging to the middle class prefer to stay away from political engagement because they rely on their contacts in the public sector departments rather than involving in the collective political solutions. The lack of civic engagement and political activism exacerbates the outcomes of pork barrel spending and local politics are taken over and dominated by some groups of voters and politicians. Despite these limitations, the local government reforms were highly commended for facilitating the political candidates from the previously marginalised social groups because historically, the local politics in Pakistan has been under the hegemonic control of traditional elites. The reforms were also highly lauded for improving access of citizens to their respective local representatives for assistance in their public and personal matters.

Although the proposal for direct voting of Town and District Nazims was criticised with some reasonable arguments, it was learnt that the overall impact of direct voting for Town and District Nazim would be quite useful. For instance, the directly elected Nazims of Town and Districts would be more accountable to their wider electorates and the probability of vote trading would diminish to a considerable extent. As far as the Town and District Nazim’s accountability to their councils’ members is concerned, they can be held accountable via vote of no confidence and other accountability mechanisms e.g. the requirement of consent of a majority of council members for the approval of bills. Despite the official ban, the influence and involvement of parties in
local elections was frequently observed. The unsystematic involvement of political parties exacerbated the institutional tensions between the local and provincial governments. It is argued that formal and systematic involvement of political parties in the local politics is likely to broaden their representation in strongholds that will eventually help in harmonising the inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships. Parties’ involvement at the grass root level broadens their representation as popular local politicians are attracted into the party and this serve as a performance indicator of their capabilities. The broad-based political representation in the party also offsets the hegemonic powers within the parties and makes them more democratic internally.
Table 2
Clientelism, Pork Barrel Politics and Political Behaviour: Summary of the Interviews’ Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent and practice of pork barrel approach</th>
<th>Peshawar</th>
<th>Swabi</th>
<th>Abbottabad</th>
<th>Mansehra</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Negligible at District and Town Level</td>
<td>- Common in UCs</td>
<td>- Negligible at District and Town Level</td>
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<td>- Common in UCs</td>
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<tr>
<th>Impact of social fragmentation and economic polarisation on the outcomes of pork barrel politics</th>
<th>Peshawar</th>
<th>Swabi</th>
<th>Abbottabad</th>
<th>Mansehra</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Due to greater social heterogeneity and economic polarisation, pork barrel spending aggravated the socio-economic and political disparities</td>
<td>- Lesser heterogeneity</td>
<td>- Previously marginalised groups were socially and politically reintegrated</td>
<td>- Due to moderate levels of heterogeneity and economic polarisation, pork barrel spending had a mixed impact on resource redistribution</td>
<td>- Lesser heterogeneity</td>
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<td>- Less heterogeneity</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors affecting voting behaviour and credibility of politicians</th>
<th>Peshawar</th>
<th>Swabi</th>
<th>Abbottabad</th>
<th>Mansehra</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Targeted service delivery in rural areas</td>
<td>- Targeted service delivery</td>
<td>- Targeted service delivery</td>
<td>- Targeted service delivery</td>
<td>- Targeted service delivery</td>
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<td>- Personalised favours</td>
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<td>- Candidates personal social, political and financial status</td>
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<td>- Candidates personal social, political and financial status</td>
<td>- Candidates personal social, political and financial status</td>
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<tr>
<td>- In UCs, the size and developmental status of candidate’s village</td>
<td>- Collective developmental needs</td>
<td>- Collective developmental needs</td>
<td>- Collective developmental needs</td>
<td>- Collective developmental needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Patronage employment at District level</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions at UC level – Jumba or Biradaree affiliation</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions at UC level – Jumba or Biradaree affiliation</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions at UC level – Jumba or Biradaree affiliation</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions at UC level – Jumba or Biradaree affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collective developmental needs in rural areas</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions – ‘Gham Khadee’</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions – ‘Gham Khadee’</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions – ‘Gham Khadee’</td>
<td>- Cordial social interactions – ‘Gham Khadee’</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Cordial social interactions at UC level</td>
<td>- Candidates’ political clout and social stature</td>
<td>- Candidates’ political clout and social stature</td>
<td>- Candidates’ political clout and social stature</td>
<td>- Candidates’ political clout and social stature</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Candidate’s affiliation with political party</td>
<td>- Candidate’s financial status and support from the federal and provincial government</td>
<td>- Candidate’s financial status and support from the federal and provincial government</td>
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<td>- Candidate’s financial status and support from the federal and provincial government</td>
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Factors affecting voting behaviour and credibility of politicians:

- Targeted service delivery in rural areas
- Personalised favours
- Candidates personal social, political and financial status
- In UCs, the size and developmental status of candidate’s village
- Collective developmental needs
- Cordial social interactions at UC level – Jumba or Biradaree affiliation
- Cordial social interactions – ‘Gham Khadee’
- Candidates’ political clout and social stature
- Candidate’s financial status and support from the federal and provincial government
- Primordial commonalities – castes, kinship and linguistic divisions
- Candidate’s ability to manipulate patronage employment and APT matters of public sector departments
- Candidate’s capability to help citizens in ‘Thana-Kachehree’
- Candidate’s ability to convene Jirgas in the rural areas

- Candidate’s control over the local bureaucracy
- Candidate’s ability to be influential in the provision of services from the non-devolved departments

- Candidates’ political clout as intermediary between higher levels of government and local communities
- Candidate’s social stature and the ability to convene Jirgas

| Impact of party affiliation and patronage employment on voting behaviour | Greater in District government because of Provincial government’s support | Greater in District government because of Federal government’s support and Nazim’s control over the local bureaucracy | Party affiliation was not a major determinant of voting behaviour
Lesser opportunities available for local government officials to provide patronage employment |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation was instrumental because the local government officials serve as intermediaries between members of provincial and federal government and local communities Which increases the likelihood of their manipulative powers in APT matters and patronage employment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Levels of civic engagement and political activism | Low levels of pre and post political engagement in urban UCs
More activism in rural UCs | Relatively higher across the whole district | Low levels of pre and post political engagement in urban UCs
More activism in rural UCs |
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<td>Relatively higher across the whole district</td>
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Chapter 10
Conclusions, Comparative Review and Policy Implications

The core objective of this study was to examine as to how the outcomes of devolution reforms were affected by the inter-institutional and inter-governmental working relationships. In order to address the main research question, the discussion in this study focused on the broader analysis of the factors that undermined the process and prospects of democratisation and hampered the institutionalisation of local government reforms. Factors like Pakistan’s history of authoritarianism, the dynamics of international political economy relations, the organisational character and behaviour of civil bureaucracy, political clientelism in the form of pork barrel politics, the nature of voter-politician relationships, voting behaviour, and local electoral mechanisms were assessed to explain the causes of local governments reforms’ failure.

This chapter begins with summarising the main argument developed in this study. In order to enhance the validity of the empirical findings, a brief comparative review is also included in the chapter that will cover 1) the impact of decentralisation reforms in other developing countries and 2) outcomes of decentralisation reforms in India in general and the state of Kerala in particular. Based on what is learnt from the case study and comparative analysis, some policy implications are discussed in the final part of the chapter.

10.1 Summary of the Argument

10.1.1 Authoritarianism and International Political Economy Perspectives

Pakistan became independent in chaotic political circumstances, which made worse the already embedded regional and local identity problems. An effective strategy for the delegation of political, administrative and fiscal authority to the regional levels could have proved to be a long-term solution to the centrifugal forces that threatened the national unity and territorial integration of the state. However, the authoritarian leaderships of the country opted for nurturing the civil-military bureaucracy for containing the regional political uprising and eventually Pakistan’s army and civil administration became the most powerful and domineering institutions of the country. Effective decentralisation reforms were crucial not only for the pacification of the secessionist uprising by accommodating the interests of regional socio-political actors but also for meeting the diversified social services needs of Pakistan’s society that is
geographically scattered and highly fragmented across the social, political and economical divisions. Nonetheless, the study evidently reveals that the rhetoric of decentralisation has only been abused as a justification for protracting incumbency of authoritarian regimes and for re-directing the stream of political power and administrative authority towards the centre. The three major sets of local government reforms were designed and implemented by the military dictators in such a manner that fragmented the regional political power bases into smaller and politically insignificant entities. Given the circumstances, the civil administration and public sector organisations under the central command of military establishments failed to meet the social services demands from a burgeoning population. Since the governing powers and authority of civil-military bureaucracy expanded beyond the legitimate constitutional limits, the institutionalisation of other critical institutions of governance like judiciary, political society, economic society and civil society was severely hampered by a corresponding consequential impact.

Eventually, the political and civil society of Pakistan became characterised with features like the absence of issue based politics, the use of executive power to suppress the political opposition, politicisation and corruption of bureaucracy, organisationally weak and dynastic political parties, politics based on ethnic ideologies rather than manifestoes, factionalism, and hegemony within the political parties. The political history of Pakistan is strongly associated with the international political economy circumstances. Constrained due to the geographical location and her position in the regional political circumstances immediately after the independence, Pakistan had to resort to alliance with the United States. The nature of Pakistan’s linkages with United States proved to be extremely counterproductive for the process of democratisation and prospects of institution-building. Various US administrations exploited the US-Pakistan’s asymmetrical relationships by taking advantage of Pakistani army’s alliance in pursuit of their imperialist policies in the Middle East, Cold War with USSR in Afghanistan and recently the War on Terror. Since, the authoritarian regimes continued to rule Pakistan under the auspices of US administrations, Pakistan remained stranded between the status of a complete autocracy and competitive authoritarianism since her independence till date. Pakistan has been one of the major recipients of foreign aid from US and other multilateral aid and development agencies but this aid has primarily been used to consolidate
Pakistani army. The continuous inflow of development aid has had a negative rather than positive impact on Pakistan’s economy and political institutions. Although the foreign aid improved Pakistan’s economic growth rate, its impact has hardly tricked down to the masses of citizenry and therefore it has indeed contributed to the economic polarisation and social fragmentation of the society.

10.1.2 Inter-Institutional and Inter-governmental Relationships

Inherited from the British Raj, Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy is a poor materialisation of the classical theory of bureaucracy. After the independence, Pakistan’s civil administration assumed a vast domain of responsibilities but her professional credentials kept on deteriorating; the state consolidated this institution in terms of power spoils but her organisational development was ignored altogether. The quality of training and specialisation of public officials in most of the public sector departments is poor. The politically motivated appointments, promotions, and transfers of the appointed public officials deteriorate their prospects for professionalisation and such political manipulations have transformed the public sector departments into employment agencies for the provision of patronage employment. The unsatisfactory performance of the local governments was also partly an outcome of the recruitment and capacity limitations of the appointed public officials, which reflects that parallel reforms are needed in civil bureaucracy as much as they are needed in local governments’ structure.

Local government reforms of 2001 were not given the required constitutional protection and that was one of the reasons why the system was brought to an end after the fall of military regime. Civil bureaucracy and other public sector departments that are administered by the federal and provincial secretariats continued to dominate the affairs of local governance and social services delivery. Since the civil bureaucracy was not willing for power sharing with an elected local institution, the functional integration of elected local institutions with the predominantly established civil administration did not fit in well and the working relationships between the elected and appointed local officials remained tense, leading to the deterioration of inter-institutional coordination. In addition, the involvement of multiple levels of government in the provision of similar social services not only jeopardised the social
service delivery process itself but also undermined the public accountability of politicians and eventually the citizens’ incentives for effective civic engagement.

Elected into an entirely new system, the incumbents of local government were generally incapable in terms of political experience and training that were essentially required for the assigned official responsibilities. The newly elected local representatives were therefore inept for carrying out some of the major functions that used to be performed effectively by the civil bureaucrats earlier. The design of the reforms also failed in terms of sufficiently delegating official capacity and legal authority to the local government representatives. The elected representatives neither had the capability (qualification, training and experience) nor the official capacity (and/or legal authority) nor any political incentives to enforce the writ of the government, maintain law and order or perform other civil administrative functions like tax imposition or revenue collection. Inter-institutional and inter-governmental jurisdictional overlapping and transgression was observed in terms of basic social services delivery, revenue collection, development fund allocations, geographical demarcation for administrative purposes, official capacity, and legal authority - particularly in the matters of APT.

Due to the involvement of local governments in the fiscal affairs of their constituencies, the provincial bureaucracy and the provincial government considered them as a rival institution that was becoming an additional stakeholder in their fiscal, political and administrative authority. In addition, the provincial governments also felt threatened by the expanding presence of local governments because most of the provincial functions were devolved to the three tiers of local government. The relationships between the provincial and local governments were observed to be tenser in the districts where the District government did not have any political affiliation with the governing political party of the province. Although parties’ involvement was officially banned, it was observed that the mainstream political parties were more incentivised to support their candidates for the District elections. The political parties also supported candidates in those Tehsils and UCs that were located in the party’s traditional strongholds. Generally, the competition for development funds and manipulative powers in APT matters were found to be the
core reasons that intensified the clash of interests among the provincial and local government and the civil bureaucracy.

The mechanisms of PFC award revealed that the federal government retained the control over the financial management of the elected local governments across the whole country because the representation of the local government in PFC was negligible. The limited funds allocated to local governments mainly covered their recurring and administrative expenses and as such a very insignificant proportion from the PFC award was allocated for developmental purposes. Although the distribution of the PFC award among the Towns and UCs of Districts was quite equitable in terms of both - policy and practice, the total amount of funds for local administrations was reported to be very insignificant. The abolishment of rural-urban administrative divide and difficulties faced by the local administrations in tax collection from the rural areas adversely affected their capacity of revenue generation. Ultimately, the fiscal transfers from the central government via the PFC remained the only major source of public funds available to the local administrations.

10.1.3 Pork Barrel Politics, Voter-Politician Relationships and Voting Behaviour

The contextual evidence gathered for the examination of clientelism in local governance negates the public choice explanation of clientelism as propounded in the patron-client model. It is argued that groups of voters are involved in clientelistic exchanges and individual voters cannot be influential in clientelistic bargains. The study however, unveils that politicians rely on pork barrel approaches. No significant evidence of massive corruption by the local representatives was found in any of the four districts except for the vote trading between the directly elected members of UC and the indirectly elected Nazims of Towns and Districts. Apart from the limitations of development funds, social fragmentation and economic polarisation of the society were seen as primary reasons that compelled the local politicians to resort to pork barrel spending. In other words, demographic heterogeneity was observed as positively associated with targeted delivery of social services. Collective developmental needs of citizens, their expectations for personalised favours and candidate’s own political, financial and social stature were commonly perceived as determinants of the voting behaviour. In some cases, the size and developmental status of the candidate’s village was also reported as a prime determinant. However,
the commonality of primordial factors for instance the Jumba or Biradaree affiliations were also reported as having an impact on voting patterns. In addition, cordial social interactions notably added to the socio-political credibility of local politicians especially at the UC level. Nonetheless, due to the enhanced civic awareness and political activism spurred by the upward economic and social mobility in some regions, voters also considered politicians’ ability to deliver efficient social services.

Generally, the political behaviour of voters was found to be multi-dimensional and was an outcome of many factors. Politicians’ political credibility was attributed to their financial status, service delivery, support from provincial or federal government, their control over the district bureaucracy, and their social capital earned from the social interaction in their constituency. The affiliation of local politicians with the mainstream political parties did not affect their political credibility except for those who served as intermediaries between provincial/federal government and their local constituencies. Traditionally in Pakistani politics, the capability to deliver patronage employment has been catalytic in shaping up the voters’ preferences. Nonetheless, due to the limited authority, the local politicians at UC and Town level were incapable of delivering patronage employment except for those intermediaries who could manipulate the APT matters of public officials using their personal political clout accumulated with the help of their alliances with higher levels of government. The capacity of District Nazims in facilitating patronage employment was relatively greater because the provincial and federal governments preferred to support their candidates at the District level.

Failure of the local governments in service delivery was one of the reasons for the apathy of citizens towards political and civic engagement. Impoverished social groups are marginalised from wider social services delivery because such groups are politically inactive; they are politically inactive because they fail to collectivise their political and civic interests and that is why such groups do not constitute significant vote blocs. Similarly, the social groups belonging to the middle classes prefer to stay away from political engagement because they rely on their contacts in the public sector departments rather than involving in the collective political solutions. Hence, the lack of civic engagement and political activism was found to be positively associated with pork barrel politics.
The evidence therefore suggests that enhanced resource allocation, institutionalisation of local governments and support from the central and regional governments can substantially reduce the negative spillovers of pork barrel politics that will not only restore citizens’ confidence in their local political institutions but will also promote positive competition among various segments of the civil and political society. The local government reforms were, on the other hand, highly commended for facilitating the social inclusion of citizens’ groups and political candidates belonging to the previously marginalised socio-economic and political strata in to the local political spheres. The reforms were also highly lauded for improving access of citizens to their respective local representatives for assistance in their public and personal matters. Put simply, despite all the hurdles and limitations faced by the newly elected local bodies, the programme had eventually started paying off in terms of bridging the gap between the local communities and the distant government.

10.2 Impact of Decentralisation Reforms in Developing Countries

Three major limitations were evident in the local governance reforms of Pakistan. The argument began with a critical analysis of the real objectives of Pakistan’s authoritarian regime that instigated the creation of local governments; it was explained that the core motivation of the regime was to seek political support from the local politicians. With a few exceptions, it was also observed that instead of getting support from the provincial governments, Pakistan’s local governments were threatened by the provincial governments. On the second front, the local governments largely remained under the influence and control of the civilian bureaucracy and their sphere of political and administrative authority was limited. Finally, various aspects of local governments’ fiscal limitations constrained their ability to perform the functions that were officially assigned to them. It is primarily these broader findings of the case study that are thematically compared with the outcomes of decentralisation policies and programmes from other developing countries. Although the case study of Pakistan’s democratisation in general and decentralisation in particular is peculiar in its own right, some evident similarities are observed when it is compared with other comparable developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Factors that led to the failure of Pakistan’s decentralisation reforms can be seen in various forms in developing countries around the globe. Although the contexts and intensity of the governance issues vary from region to region depending on the countries’ pre- and post-colonial histories however, it is argued that the core institutional problems faced by the decentralised entities remain more or less the same because most of these developing states had been governed by the central command of colonial governments. The colonial governments left the reins of the government with relatively stronger and well-organised civil-military administrations. After independence, the military regimes retained the control of their respective governments. Post-independence localisation policies by the authoritarian regime were doomed to fail because such programmes were designed and implemented in order to re-direct the stream of political power towards the centre. In Bangladesh and Nigeria for instance, local government systems were revived in order to create a local collaborative political base that would eventually serve as a political bulwark for the survival of central authoritarian regimes (Crook and Sverrisson 2001). Theories of political decentralisation purport that decentralisation reforms help establish local self-government that in turn enhances the economic wellbeing of the deprived social groups. From their study of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria and Mexico, Crook and Sverrisson (2001) conclude that the local governments are unlikely to meet the basic services needs of the socially marginalised groups unless there is genuine and strong support from the higher levels of government. This is in line with the case study of Pakistan, which reflects that the ideological commitment of central government and conducive inter-governmental working relationships are essential pre-requisites without which decentralisation reforms can hardly be effective.

The case study of Pakistan is also quite similar to other post-colonial states when compared in terms of the inter-institutional incongruities between the devolved governments and de-concentrated bureaucracy. Turner and Hulme (1997) review studies conducted by Hyden (1983), Wraith (1972) and Kasfir (1983) who argue that in Africa, the post-colonial decentralisation programmes were indeed a reversal of the controlled local democratisation process that had started during the last decades of the colonial rule. Africa’s newly independent central governments preferred to de-concentrate states’ bureaucracies rather than effectively delegating political powers to
the devolved governments. Eventually, the local governments that were established during the colonial rule in Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Zaire and Ghana were either abolished completely or deprived of their administrative and political powers by the post-colonial authoritarian regimes. The central governments retained the control of basic social services delivery e.g. health and education via the de-concentrated bureaucracies, leaving the local governments as empty institutional shells. Similarly, (Harris, 1983) finds in his study of Latin American countries that most of the governments are still over-centralised. In Brazil and Mexico, for instance, despite massive decentralisation programmes initiated in the 1950s, there is still predominance of central government agencies that operate at the local levels.

Unlike the case of Pakistan, those decentralisation policies which ensured enhanced fiscal transfers to the local levels of government showed remarkable progress. Faguet (2004) studied the abrupt transformation of local governance via decentralisation programmes (1994) in Bolivia and found that the fiscal policy of reforms facilitated a dramatic increase of fiscal transfers in favour of the previously deprived municipalities. Besides, the local governments were engaged in expenditures of the transferred funds that enabled the elected local bodies to change the expenditure patterns by prioritising the social sector over the production; the post-reform expenditures on education, urban development, water and sanitation amounted to 79% of all municipal investment. On the other hand however, post-reform changes in expenditure patterns of other developing countries reveal different implications. For instance, based on their study of decentralisation programmes in India and Mexico, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009) argue that the observed post-reform shifts towards greater current expenditures indicate that fiscal devolution has been negatively, rather than positively, associated with economic performance. Swelling public expenditures e.g. salaries and administrative expenses, according to them, may simply reflect that the local governments lack autonomy or sufficient funds from the centre. It was also observed in Pakistan’s case that despite an apparent devolution of fiscal responsibilities to the local governments, the federal governments withheld the de facto authority in public sector expenditures. Since more than 80% of the funds were pre-allocated for administrative and wage expenses, the autonomy of local bodies in the fiscal management of their constituencies was just nominal.
The pre and post-colonial histories and other socio-political and economic contexts of the mentioned developing countries vary a great deal and hence it is not possible to take into account their associated contextual complexities in detail for comparative analysis. Nonetheless, Pakistan shares a common inheritance with India in terms of colonial history, administrative machinery, well-organised army and demographic heterogeneity, if not political institutions. In order to elaborate Pakistan’s failure in adopting a successful decentralisation policy, the findings of this case study are compared with the outcomes of decentralisation reforms implemented in India. Pakistan’s case study shows that her colonial history, inheritance of administrative machinery, a well-organised army and demographic heterogeneity were among the main hurdles in the institutionalisation of local governments. The same features are assessed in terms of their impact on decentralisation programmes pursued in India. Keeping in view the contextual commonalities, the comparative analysis of the outcomes of their decentralisation programmes would contribute to the validity of findings in this research study. The following section describes and reviews local government reforms of India followed by the analysis of Kerala’s unique success story. A preamble for the following comparative review was included in chapter 2 where it was explained as to why the process of democratisation has been generally more successful in India than in Pakistan.

10.3 The Panchayati Raj (Local Government) in India

In India, the Panchayati Raj (Local Government) System was implemented through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1992. Oommen (2004) describes the key features of the Panchayati Raj as follows. The system assigned a key role to the Gram Sabha (the assembly of the citizens/voters) as a deliberative and decision-making body. An elected three-tier (Village, Block, and District) local government structure was to be established in all states (Provinces) of India. In order to include the previously excluded groups in local politics, seats were to be reserved in all Panchayats (local councils) for citizens belonging to the (perceived) lower castes i.e. SC (Scheduled Castes or Dalits) and ST (Scheduled Tribes) in proportion to their population. One third of the total seats were also reserved for women. Oommen (2004) explains that Gram (Village) Panchayats in several Indian states were not adequately strengthened financially and technically and as such, the local councils were not able
to deliver even the basic social services. As per the constitutional amendment, 29 categories of social services were to be assigned to the local governments e.g. street lighting, drinking water supply, sanitation and drainage and primary health care nonetheless, most of these services were still retained by the state departments.

Apart from that, most of the devolved social services overlap with the functions of the states (Provinces) resulting in the lack of clarity in terms of functional jurisdictions. Contrary to the objectives of decentralisation reforms, the task of planning and implementation of developmental schemes has been given to district governments instead of Village Panchayats in the state of Madhya Pradesh where the District Planning Committees, performing those functions, worked as subordinate agencies of the state government. Similarly, there were multiple channels of transferring resources to the local governments, which led to inefficient planning, duplication, corruption, and wastage of resources. The middle (Block) and higher (District) Panchayats were not given considerable powers to levy taxes. Some of the revenue raising responsibilities were assigned to Village Panchayats however, the nature of those taxes is not productive and Panchayats’ autonomy in tax imposition and collection is restricted.

Another study by Behar and Kumar (2002) examined the state of Madhya Pradesh in India and found that there was resistance and non-cooperation from the state’s bureaucracy, which in turn results in inadequate financial devolution, red tap and corruption. They also found that there was resistance from the socio-economic and political elite of rural Madhya Pradesh, who viewed the local councils as a serious threat to their socio-political hegemony. The local notables belonging to the upper castes were not happy with the inclusion of women and members from the lower castes into the positions of dominance via local government elections. Behar and Kumar (2002) mention that at the grassroots levels, the lack of information among common people about the local government system and their lack of political education hampered the effectiveness of the system. Despite all these shortcomings Behar and Kumar (2002) believe that the prospects of the Panchayati Raj are bright because the empowerment of women and scheduled castes along with the programmes for community involvement in decision-making are some of the feats that have been achieved by the Panchayati Raj.
The structural design of Indian Panchayati Raj is generally similar to that of Pakistan’s. The literature review depicts similarities in terms of inter-governmental and inter-organisational disharmony. Instead of effectively devolving the social services delivery functions to the local governments, most of the Indian states’ governments retained those functions. Similarly, the limitations of India’s local Panchayats in terms of fiscal autonomy and revenue generation capacity was no different than Pakistan. On the other hand, there were some positive similarities as well. It was reported that the local government reforms in Pakistan enhanced not only citizens’ participation in local governance but also encouraged political candidates from humble socio-economic backgrounds to emerge in local politics. Similarly, the inclusion of women and scheduled castes in to local politics was seen as a dramatic social and political transformation attributed to the Panchayati Raj system in India.

The most notable difference between the two cases was the element of seriousness that the Indian government demonstrated with the formalisation of Panchayati Raj system by irrevocably protecting it through the constitutional amendment. While in Pakistan, the system could not survive because it was not protected in the constitution. Although the framework and design of Panchayati Raj was enshrined in the Indian constitution, the responsibility and authority to implement the programme was solely assigned to the states’ governments while in Pakistan, the system remained under the influence of the federal government. Another difference worth noting is that unlike Pakistan, the leading political parties of Indian states participate actively (and officially) in the local elections. Therefore, the provincial-local rivalry is not viewed as the most threatening obstacle in the pursuit of decentralisation policies in Indian states. However, depending on the political organisation of each state, the outcomes of decentralisation policy diverge considerably. The case of Kerala is unique and exemplary for several reasons.

10.4 Decentralisation in the State of Kerala (India)
10.4.1 Success Story: An Overview
The case of Decentralisation reforms in the Indian state of Kerala has attracted a world-wide attention. The state has achieved universal primary education, near total literacy, and near gender equality in access to education (Mukundan and Bray (2004)
and therefore the Kerala model is reckoned as one of the most successful development programmes in the developing countries. Oommen (2004) accounts that the CPI (M) {Communist Party of India (Marxist)} led LDF (Leftist Democratic Front) Government came to power in May 1996 in the state of Kerala, which drastically transformed the relations between the local government and civil society by initiating a momentous campaign called the People’s Plan Campaign (PPC). LDF decided to devolve 35 - 40 % of the State development funds to the local bodies as compared to 2.35 % during the previous five years plan. People’s Plan was a massive political and fiscal policy paradigm shift and that is why Kerala’s decentralisation programme is often referred to as ‘big bang’ decentralisation. All the expenditure functions related to poverty alleviation, state-funded and centre-sponsored development schemes were transferred to the local governments especially the Village Panchayats whereas the state government’s role was mainly limited to monitoring and capacity building of the local councils. The way in which the state government supported the local institutions in Kerala was unprecedented in other states of India.

Explaining the inter-institutional relationships, Venugopal and Yilmaz (2009) describe that prior to the LDF led People’s Campaign, MLAs (Members of the State’s Legislative Assembly) had high degrees of discretionary powers in the administrative matters of their constituent districts. Post-reform, the MLAs do not hold any official positions in District Planning Committees or voting rights in the local affairs. Comparing Kerala with the neighbouring Indian state of Karnataka, Venugopal and Yilmaz (2009) find it quite different where Karnataka’s constitutional amendment bill of 2007 provides powers to the state’s bureaucrats and MLAs with regards to identifying beneficiaries for development programs thereby curtailing powers of the local governments in favour of MLAs and bureaucrats. Whilst in Kerala, generally the political interference from State governments has not undermined the progress of local governments.

State’s government being the employer of state’s bureaucracy, effectively supervises and manages the civil administrative machinery. Given that the state’s government enthusiastically supports and promotes the local governments, the relationships between the appointed and elected local institutions are also likely to be coherent. Venugopal and Yilmaz (2009) explain that there is a clear separation of power
between the legislative and executive arms of the local government in Kerala. Elected members of Village Panchayats enjoy a *de facto* authority to incur expenses and select private contractors for development schemes. In addition, Kerala’s Panchayats have supervisory and partial disciplinary control over the staff of the line public departments. Similarly, at the district level, there is clear demarcation of functions and authority between the appointed District Collector and the President (District Mayor) wherein the President is sufficiently authorised. The government of Kerala effectively managed to change the role of Collector (a senior bureaucrat) from implementation of development projects to coordination and facilitation of the local representatives. The World Bank (2000) observes that the case of Kerala, where the elected District’s President enjoys the authority over the District Collector, is unique given the traditional power and authority vested in the District bureaucracy.

In Kerala, the decentralisation programme’s most significant political achievement was the massive mobilisation of local communities in the local development affairs via the establishment of Gram Sabhas (Citizens’ Assemblies). It is believed that other than the paradigm shifts in fiscal policy, it was the civic engagement and grass-root participation of citizens in the developmental planning process that contributed to the success of Panchayati Raj in Kerala. Heller et al. (2007) explain that the extent to which the citizens’ assemblies participate in the budgetary and planning processes of the Village Panchayats, clearly indicates that citizens’ assemblies are not just consultative bodies, but are indeed linked to decision-making institutions in letter and spirit. They argue that the People’s Campaign for Decentralised Planning had an evident and positive impact on the social inclusion of the previously marginalised groups; the Scheduled Castes and women were able to have their voices heard in their local self-governance. People’ Campaign effectively created a much-needed political space in which more than 14,000 local representatives were elected. However, later the Congress - led UDF (United Democratic Front) government that came to power in Kerala in the year 2001, showed far less enthusiasm towards the local elected institutions than her predecessor government - LDF. Although the UDF government officially embraced the local governments and did not alter the legislative composition of the campaign, mass training programs and voluntary technical committees were abolished.
The empirical studies show that the UDF government was not too keen in the continuation of LDF’s momentous campaign and the progress of local governments was slightly hampered. It is however, argued that since the state’s political parties actively participate in the local elections as much as they participate in the state’s legislative assembly’s elections, the local government system was not severely affected by the change in the state’s government. This is in line with the argument that the support and involvement of mainstream political parties is extremely essential for local governments’ survival and progress. When the provincial government has representation at local level, it is not in the interest of the ruling or competing political party to ignore a highly significant vote bank at the local level that has already been mobilised. Once the local communities and previously marginalised groups are brought into political mainstream and given the taste of participatory development, the de-institutionalisation of democratic local institutions becomes a counterproductive strategy for the regional governments.

Cited in Oommen (2004), some of the prime features of fiscal decentralisation policy adopted by the LDF government during their first term (1996-2001) are recapitulated as follows. The transfer of more than one-third of state’s plan (development) funds to local governments as untied grant gave the local governments substantial fiscal autonomy. However, it was subject to the conditions that 40% of the allocated fund was to be spent on productive sectors, 10% for women-related projects and no more than 30% was to be spent on infrastructure. The village Panchayats which are directly linked with the Gram Sabhas (citizens’ assembly), were endowed with 70% of rural share of development fund whereas the upper tiers i.e. Block and District Panchayats receive 15% each. Kerala is the most fiscally decentralised state in India (World Bank, 2000; World Bank, 2004b) however, it is worth noting that the revenue generating authorities have not been effectively utilised mainly due the inability of the local public officials to enforce tax laws and their limited capacity to manage the revenue system (World Bank, 2004b). For instance, Oommen (2004) notes that even in Kerala, 60% of the potential in terms of revenue raising remains untapped.

Kerala’s decentralisation model was exemplary in many aspects nonetheless; several policy analysts identified some major critical issues in Kerala’s big bang decentralisation. The inter-institutional relationships between the appointed public
officials and local government representatives are questioned by Venugopal and Yilmaz (2009) who argue that the appointed public officials in the public departments work under the supervision of the elected local representatives during their office tenure but the state government continues to be their recruiter and employer. Therefore, the devolved public departments tend to function as institutions under the parent (state) department, which means that the state’s bureaucracy has retained a key role in the execution of state-sponsored development schemes. The accountability of state appointed public official working in the devolved departments is also questionable because the appointed officials are, in effect, answerable to both - the state and local governments. The comparison of inter-institutional relationships indicates that the behaviour of state’s bureaucracy and her working relationship with local governments is contingent upon the political behaviour and attitude of the state’s government towards the local government. Mainly due to the involvement and enthusiastic support of state’s government in local governance, the working relationships between the civilian bureaucracy and the local Panchayats in Kerala were far better as compared to other states. It was nonetheless evident that a sudden shift to an entirely new form of governance was not straightforward.

10.4.2 The Bottom Line – What is Different in Kerala?
Owing to the entrenchment of civil bureaucracy, Kerala’s problems in terms of inter-institutional working relationships are not very different than any post-colonial civil administrative system. What makes Kerala a relatively more successful model is the unprecedented support and effective community mobilisation campaign from the LDF’s government and the devolution of political and fiscal authorities in letter and spirit. It is obvious that Kerala’s Panchayati Raj system is far from perfect and the issues related to inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships are unlikely to be mitigated in a decade or two. Nevertheless, Kerala’s state government was successful in reversing her own involvement in the local affairs - a significant change that makes Kerala unique when compared with other Indian states and the case of Pakistan. LDF’s government was also successful in delineating the fiscal, administrative and political jurisdictions of state governments, local Panchayats and the local governments. Although the state-sponsored schemes were executed by the state-administered bureaucracy, the local councils’ fiscal authority and autonomy was largely unaffected wherein the citizens’ assemblies and other voluntary organisations,
linked to the Village Panchayats, were articulate in the selection of location and beneficiaries for development projects. It is also learnt that the bureaucracy transgresses out of her constitutional limits only at the behest of regional government and it goes without saying that when the political relationships between the regional and local government are harmonious and they share the same political and ideological commitment, bureaucracy is more likely to be accountable to these elected institutions.

Since political parties actively contest in the local elections, each political party has stakes in the local institutions and opportunities for expanding their political outreach to the grass root levels. It was observed that the UDF government was not too keen in the continuation of LDF’s localisation campaign nevertheless the survival of the system was not threatened by the change in the government. The participation and representation of major political parties was uniform and systematic across the board in Kerala whilst in NWFP, it was sporadic and unsystematic. In NWFP, the local governments made progress and held control of the local bureaucracy only in those areas where the local political incumbents had the support of higher levels of government. Although the civil society in Kerala is still polarised by clientelistic party affiliations where the caste and community interests are resurfacing and it is difficult for the civil society organisations to rise above these divisive interests (Tharakan, 2004), it is argued that the political divisions are not too detrimental for the local government system especially when a large political space has already been identified and consequently filled in at the grass root level. Due to the social inclusion of many new groups, the numerical strength of voters has increased, which is hard for any political party to ignore.

Comparison of Kerala’s fiscal policy with that of Pakistan’s indicates that the problems of local governments’ revenue generation are somewhat similar. On the other hand however, there are notable dissimilarities in the fiscal architecture of both cases. In Pakistan, more than 80% of the grants that the local governments receive, are already pre-allocated for salaries and administrative expenses whereas in Kerala, almost 40% of the grant is untied that is allocated via the local Panchayats for developmental expenses. Besides that, Kerala’s fiscal policy ensures that the lowest level of government i.e. the Village Panchayat (equivalent of UC in Pakistan) gets the
highest proportion of transferred funds from the state while the UCs in Pakistan get the least share of development funds from the Provincial Finance Commission. Moreover, the limited proportion that is allocated for development in Pakistan primarily goes to the highly visible infrastructure projects. Contrarily in Kerala, not more than 30% can be spent on infrastructure projects.

Venugopal and Yilmaz (2009) mention that in Kerala, apart from developmental and administrative grants, the local bodies also receive grants through other sponsored schemes wherein the local bodies act as (official) agents of the central and state governments. For such sponsored schemes, the sponsoring state department has the overall implementation responsibility, however local bodies decide the location of the project and select the beneficiaries. Such fiscal mechanisms reduce the probability of involvement of multiple levels of government and agencies in the delivery of similar social services. These mechanisms also minimise inefficient planning, duplication of projects, corruption, and wastage of resources. On the contrary, it was explained that the developmental schemes from central and provincial governments in Pakistan are selected directly by MNAs and MPAs and executed by the non-devolved public departments without any formal involvement of the respective local councils and administrations. This leads to the wastage of resources, lack of coordination and over-provision of services in some areas at the expense of under-provision in the other.

10.5 Some Policy Implications

The case study and comparative review has provided orientating insights to the extremely complex governance issues in general and the prospects of local democratisation in particular. It is learnt that despite several contextual commonalities in post-colonial governance structures, some of the comprehensive policies pursued to overcome the embedded complexities have actually yielded positive results. It can be clearly observed that the local governance problems are interrelated i.e. one factor affecting another. The same is the case with the solutions, which means that some of the major administrative, political and fiscal policy changes can possibly have a ripple effect on the interrelated issues. The following part of the study explains as to how the local governance reforms could have been designed and implemented in a better way.
10.5.1 Constitutional Protection and Political Considerations

The complex nature of governance issues discovered in this study indicates that the transition to a new form of governance is an evolutionary and gradual process, which will inevitably take substantial amount of time. To begin with, the process of local democratisation is conditioned upon the genuine will of the central government. Long-term institutionalisation of local government system is required that would include the formal establishment of the local institutions as regular tiers of government. The local governments need to be kept functional and protected legally via federal constitutional amendment and local elections need to be held on a regular basis. In order to rebuild the political organisation and restructure a pluralist political society, all national and regional political parties’ participation in the local elections is critically essential. Formal involvement of political parties is likely to contain the mayhem created by the inter-governmental and inter-institutional tensions.

It is anticipated that political parties’ participation will broaden their representation across various regions that will potentially reduce the inter-governmental rifts, which are spurred due to the unhealthy competition for acquiring development funds and quest for manipulative powers in APT matters. Repeated local elections and parties involvement will also help build the capacity of locally elected officials. If the jurisdictions are defined in policy and practice, direct elections at all levels will be beneficial because it will not only reduce the chances of vote trade between the directly elected UC members and indirectly elected Nazims of Town and Districts, but will also help in holding the elected members accountable to their respective electorates. The role of MNAs and MPAs needs confinement to their core function i.e. legislation making and supervision of the public departments working under the various ministries.

10.5.2 Administrative Concerns

The complementary role is of civil bureaucracy is of critical importance therefore parallel reforms in bureaucracy are also needed. Transparent and merit-based recruitment in all echelons of public sector departments along with the regional representation is the first step in public sector’s organisational restructuring. Performance based appointments, promotions and transfers in addition to the mandatory training programmes can revamp the professional quality of civil servants.
and minimise the recruitment and capacity issues of the organisation. It was observed that appointed public officials resort to corruption mainly because their wage rates are not competitive in comparison with the private market. One way of curbing the menace of corruption and attracting capable lot of employees into the public sector is to revise their remuneration package which is compatible with the ones offered by the private job market. A competitive scale of a basic wages and compensation in the form decent retirement benefits to all civil servants is likely to reduce not only the menace of corruption but will also have a substantial impact on improving the professional standards of the public sector.

In order to overcome the issues related to the politically motivated APT matters of civil servants, a separate cadre of regular employees need to be created at the District level. The provincial civil secretariat will remain the main employer of District employees yet their management particularly the post-recruitment APT matters need to be devolved to the District government where committees, having sufficient representation of elected officials and the executive officers of respective public departments, can manage the cadre’s staff. Most importantly, the prevention of formal and informal interference from the provincial government in the APT matters of District cadre is essential. Put simply, the APT matters of employees working in the devolved departments can be more productively managed by the District’s executive officers and Nazims, provided there is no involvement of members of provincial government. In this way the appointed public officials’ accountability to the public through their local government can be improved.

The sphere of District governments’ responsibilities was too vast that went far beyond the managerial capabilities of the local representatives. Their functional domain was unnecessarily expanded which could have been limited to the major municipal services whereas the non-devolved public services departments could have been well regulated and supervised by the respective federal and provincial ministries. In this way, the hotchpotch created by a multitude of public departments and levels of government providing similar public services, could have been avoided. Institutional coordination among different public departments is likely to improve with limiting the local governments to municipal services; assigning the regulation responsibilities of other federal and provincial public departments to their respective ministries; and
clear jurisdictional delineation of each institution’s geographical territory, official functions, fiscal authorities, and other administrative domains.

It is extremely important that jurisdictions be streamlined not only among the levels of government but also among all public sector departments working at federal, provincial and local levels. Most importantly, coordination is also extremely important between the local councils/administrations and the non-devolved government agencies working under the provincial and federal ministries. It was observed that the local councils and administrations are bypassed by the federal and provincial agencies when the state or province-financed projects are executed. Learning from the case of Kerala, it is argued that even if the financing and overall supervision responsibilities are retained by the federal or provincial ministries and their respective agencies, the identification of location and beneficiaries of development project should be formally done by the respective local councils. This will reduce the involvement of multiple levels of government and thereby minimise the chances of duplication of projects and wastage of public funds.

The UC being the smallest tier of local government included several villages in rural areas. Issues in electoral mechanisms and pork barrel politics were observed to be associated with uneven administrative divisions and demarcations of UCs. A village, which is socially and economically more homogeneous should have been the lowest administrative tier of local governments. Targeting of services to the UC Nazim’s village could have been controlled in this way. Other than that, each and every village would have had a fair degree of representation in Tehsil council not only through a UC/Village member but also through a UC/Village Nazim. One village’s political, financial and developmental domination within a UC could have been contained in this way. Inter-institutional coordination, primarily between the local government and local administration is highly contingent upon the relationships between provincial and local government. If the provincial governments support the local governments, appointed public officials are likely to be more accountable to the local government. The only way to reduce the overwhelming involvement of bureaucracy and reduce their corruption levels is to effectively involve citizens and make the local government institutions more accessible to them. Public accountability of bureaucracy
can only be enhanced via the consolidation of local governments, which in turn is contingent upon the involvement of citizens in local self-government.

The potentialities of local governments were evident in the case study, which revealed that despite all flaws, the system successfully re-integrated the previously marginalised groups of citizens into the political mainstream and provided unprecedented opportunities to the local politicians to emerge in the regional and national level political arenas. As observed in Kerala, one of the driving factors in social and political inclusion of communities was the creation of citizens’ assemblies and public committees. In a governance system that is based on bottom-up approach for decision-making, civic engagement is the key and local institutions without the citizens’ involvement are nothing but empty institutional shells. Formalisation of the already established and revered yet informal institutions like hujra and mosques can prove to be one of the most effective strategies for getting on board a wider representation of communities. When jurisdiction are defined and enforced, funds allocation enhanced, and local governments capacitated in terms of the required authority, the local representative will not have to serve as intermediaries between the higher levels of government and their constituencies. Instead, they will have their own political clout which they can rely upon for delivering social services whereas at the same time, they’ll also be more accountable to their electorates. Citizens will also be able to easily comprehend as to which institution is responsible for which service.

Finally, the technical limitations of electoral mechanisms also need to be reconsidered. The overall impact of direct voting for Town and District Nazim and Naib Nazims would be positive because direct voting is likely to hold them more accountable to their wider electorates that will eventually reduce the probability of vote trading to a considerable extent. It is essential to note that the direct voting of Town and District Nazim can be beneficial only when the domain of provincial and local governments is refined and defined. The unsystematic involvement of political parties exacerbated the institutional tensions between the local and provincial governments. A formal and systematic involvement of political parties in local politics is likely to broaden their representation that will eventually help in harmonising the inter-institutional and inter-governmental relationships. Parties’ involvement at the grass root level broadens their representation because popular local politicians are likely to be attracted into the
parties and this will serve as a performance indicator of their capabilities. The broad-based political representation in the parties will also offset the hegemonic powers within the party structures and will make them more democratic internally.

10.5.3 Fiscal Policy and Pork Barrel Politics

Fiscal policy of reforms is the most important and conclusive element as it is directly linked with the political and administrative implications. More untied grants from the higher levels of government and more autonomy for the local councils are required. Despite the fact that UC was the most critical tier of the local governments, UC administrations’ domain of administrative and fiscal authority was very limited. All development funds that are currently disbursed directly by the senators, MNAs and MPAs should in fact be directly allocated to the local governments. The lowest tier of local government needs to be given the highest proportion of transferred funds. Enhanced funds allocation to the lowest tier will also be beneficial for rationing of the public resources to the socially fragmented and economically polarised communities. A formula based expenditure pattern could ensure an equitable and rational distribution of development funds as observed in case of Kerala where the transferred funds for development were proportionately allocated for production sector, gender mainstreaming and infrastructure projects. Although the involvement of local bureaucracy is inevitable in the planning and execution process of development projects, more autonomy can be granted to the local representatives in terms of identification of the type of development project, location for the project and selection of private contractors for the execution of development projects.

Apart from the limited autonomy of the local bodies in fiscal management, one of the major issues identified in the case study was the difficulty in revenue generation in NWFP’s local councils and administrations. The reasons why rural citizens evaded local taxes were numerous. Poverty, disenchantment because of poor social services and lack of trust in local institutions restricted their willingness to pay user fees. With the institutionalisation of local government reforms, more revenue can be generated in the form of user fee. Communities’ trust can be only developed if they are included in the planning and execution processes. With making villages as the lowest tier of government and sufficient funds allocated to them, the issues of pork barrel politics can also be considerably reduced which will also boost civic engagement and will
eventually lead to better revenue generation. Citizens’ involvement can potentially change the expenditure patterns as well for instance, it is anticipated that there will be a shift from spending money on visible infrastructure projects towards more equitable and productive projects such as an irrigation scheme for the whole village or the establishment of a local cooperative society or a microfinance programme.

10.6 Recent Situation and Future Prospects

Recently, the prospects for local democratisation and decentralisation reforms are bleaker than ever in Pakistan where the socio-political scenario is more than daunting. Musharraf’s military regime was pushed to become the frontline non-NATO ally in the Global War on Terror in 2001. The country has been adversely affected as a result of the army’s involvement in the War on Terror that led to social, political and economic instability of unprecedented nature and intensity. Pakistan bore the brunt of internal insurgency as a backlash of America’s growing military presence in the region and CIA’s parallel intelligence network that is being expanded across the whole country. America’s aerial missiles strikes from unmanned aircrafts on the tribal belt of NWFP province, indiscriminately killing civilians including women and children, have triggered the anti-American sentiment to the highest levels in Pakistan. The retaliation from the militant groups that had started during Musharraf’s military regime continued to increase ever since. America has given Pakistan, approximately $18 Billion in aid since 9/11, a huge proportion of which was pre-allocated for military assistance. Whilst the ill-gotten wealth of the corrupt rulers continues to multiply, in fighting the proxy war for US, Pakistan has incurred colossal losses. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, Pakistan incurred approximately $68 Billion in economic losses since 2001 (Dawn, 2011). This is in addition to around 30,000 civilian casualties and 5000 army and law enforcement agencies’ personnel who died fighting the American War against Pakistani militant groups that were created, organised and funded by America against USSR during the last decade of twentieth century.

The rising insurgency has drained Pakistan economic resources like never before. The country’s total external debts in March 2011 have risen to a total of $59.5 billion (Express Tribune, 2011); this amount has nearly doubled during the last three years of Pakistan’s People Party (PPP)’s civilian government. Due to the war like situation, the
foreign investment has rolled back; the agriculture based economy continues to suffer due to the rising inflation; and the industrial sector is crippled due the country's worst ever energy (electricity crises). The major sources of Pakistan’s GDP are the remittances from overseas Pakistanis, aid from the US, and indirect taxes on general commodities and utilities of daily consumption. Pakistan’s most corrupt government that came into power in year 2008 (allegedly as a consequence of a deal brokered by CIA between Musharraf and PPP) has completely failed to even realise the dire political, economic and foreign affairs situation of the country. Recently, the Election Commission of Pakistan has made public that out of 80 million registered votes, 37 million were bogus while 35 million eligible votes were not even registered in the general elections held in 2008.

At the twilight of military rule by Musharraf in 2008, politics of Pakistan began to retransform in to the traditional cronyism. Totally apathetic to the burning governance issues, the leadership of the country has been busy in protecting their political alliances in the centre and provinces. Instead of building the civilian institutions, money is being squandered through a large, useless and corrupt government. Public funds are being targeted at the party voters via schemes like income support programmes while federal and provincial bureaucracies are being used as bureaus for patronage employment. Pakistan’s government and army’s dependence on US has increased to the record levels and it won’t be exaggeration to say that the country has become a nearly failed state where the prospects for genuine democratisation are bleak than ever before.

The local government set up was abolished at the end of year 2009 and the old system of civil administration has been in place since then. The appointed bureaucrats and administrators have taken over all the development, administrative and municipal services delivery functions. The civil service’s dwindling standard is affecting the lower income groups which is leading to further widening the social and economic inequalities between the haves and have nots. Amid rampant institutional corruption, there are governance crises in almost all institutional arenas. It goes without saying that ever since the law enforcement and other state agencies have become the main target of religious extremist groups, the previously unorganised rogue elements of the society have found a ripe environment to take the advantage of the turmoil. The fate
of Pakistan’s government and state institutions is totally dependant upon the political, social and economic stability. Pakistan’s internal unrest and the regional political circumstances indicate that the probability of genuine democratisation seems negligible and therefore the resurrection of the dormant local government system in the near future will not be anything less than a miracle.
Appendix 1:
Letter of Request for Interview

Subject: Appointment for Interview

Dear Sir/ Madam,

I am a PhD student conducting research at University of Southampton, UK since November 2007. My research focuses on the relationship between local governments and civil bureaucracy in NWFP province. In addition, I am investigating the nature of voter-politician relationships and determinants of voting behaviour in the context of local governments. In order to supplement my proposed thesis with empirical evidence, I intend to interview the representatives of local governments and appointed officials from public sector departments in NWFP. I’ll be grateful if you could spare some time (approximately 1 Hour) for an open ended / semi structured interview.

I deem necessary to mention here that the information gained during the interview shall be used for academic research purpose only and that the response from interviewees shall be reported anonymously. This interview will be recorded with an audio recording device for the purpose of interviewer’s convenience. University of Southampton follows a strict policy regarding ethical issues that might arise during any research project therefore the interviewee/respondent reserves the right to withdraw his/her consent from interview at any time. A brief outline of my proposed research, list of interview questions, and a letter of request/authorisation from my PhD supervisor have been attached with this letter. Your cooperation in this regard will be highly regarded. I look forward to hearing from you soon. Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours truly,

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Appendix 2
Interview Questions for Elected Officials of Local Government
(Phase 1: July – September 2008)

1. Please tell me something about your role and job description.

2. Are you familiar with your official role documented in the manual of local governments?

3. What are the issues related to the Appointments, Promotions and Transfers of public officials who work with you?

4. Please explain the revenue collection and funds allocation mechanism at District, Town, and UC level. Please highlight issues concerning the efficiency and transparency in this regard.

5. Is Public-Private partnership helpful at District, Town and UC level? For example, what are your views on contracting out revenue collection services to a private firm?

6. What are the major weaknesses with in the present local government system? Please highlight all the administrative, political and fiscal issues.

7. Please highlight issues/problems related to the managerial skills and qualifications of local government representatives.

8. How satisfied you are with the honorarium and other benefits that you receive?

9. Being a local representative, please comment on your career in politics.

10. How do you explain the coordination between various tiers of local government and public sector departments? Please explain its impact on local governance.

11. Please explain your political relationship with the members of the national and provincial assembly.

12. What are the types of tasks/official matters or situations in which you need to coordinate or consult with appointed public officials and how would you define your official interaction with them?

13. Do you have sufficient autonomy and authority to accomplish the tasks for which you are officially responsible? Please explain.

14. Please explain if there are any jurisdictional overlaps between the local government representatives and appointed public officials in terms of official responsibilities and authority.
15. What are the factors that adversely affect the working relationships between provincial governments, local governments and public sector departments and how can these relationships be improved?

16. Is the integration of rural and urban areas for administration in Devolution plan of 2001 fruitful? Please comment.

17. How reliable and effective is the mechanism of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation of local government representatives?

18. It is believed that a substantial amount of money is usually required for election campaigns. How can a common person afford to run for a seat in local government elections?

19. What indicators would you use that would signify the success or failure of Local government reforms?

20. Considering the changes in administration of District, Tehsil/Town and Union Council after the implementation of devolution plan, what is the overall impact of devolution plan on local governance? Please explain.

21. Do you suggest any changes in to the current local government system?
Appendix 3
Interview Questions for Appointed Officials of Public Sector Departments (Phase 1: July – September 2008)

1. What is your role in your organisation?

2. Do you have any written job description?

3. Please explain the changes in your job description, responsibilities, and authority after the devolution reforms in 2001.

4. How do you explain the issues related to the appointments, promotions, and transfers of employees working in your organisation – Please elaborate your own experience as well as the problems encountered by other officials who work with you?

5. Please highlight the problems related to the revenues collection and funds allocation mechanism in your organisation.

6. What are the major organisational (administrative and financial) weaknesses in your public sector department? Please explain in detail.

7. How do you define your official coordination with the newly elected local government representatives and the officials from other public sector departments?

8. Please highlight the problems related to the qualification, training, technical skills, and capability of appointed employees in your department.

9. How satisfied you are with your salary and other benefits? Please comment.

10. What are the types of tasks/official matters in which you have to coordinate or consult with the local government representatives and how would you define your official interaction with them?

11. Please elaborate your official relationships with the elected member of national and provincial assembly in your area. What is the nature and extent of political interference, if any, from the federal, provincial and local government?

12. Please comment on your job security.

13. Do you have sufficient autonomy and authority to accomplish the tasks for which you are responsible? Please explain in detail.

14. Do you think that the local government system has resulted in jurisdictional overlaps among the domains of elected representatives from local government and appointed public sector employees?
15. Considering the administrative and political changes after the implementation of devolution plan, how do you see the overall impact of devolution reforms on local governance? Please explain.

22. Is the integration of rural and urban areas for administration in Devolution plan of 2001 fruitful? Please comment.

16. Please comment on the formal and informal mechanisms for ensuring accountability of public sector appointed officials in your organisation.

17. Do you think that the menace of corruption is more pervasive in public sector departments (bureaucracy) as compared to the institution of local government?

18. Several public sector departments were devolved and were brought under the administration of District, Tehsil and UC government. Please comment on the impact of this institutional integration.

19. What indicators would you use to signify whether the local government reforms were a success or failure?

20. What changes in the local governance system, in your opinion, would ensure a harmonious and effective working relationship between the public sector departments and elected local governments?
Appendix 4
Interview Questions (Phase 2: December 2009)

1. Numerous public services delivery functions were devolved to the local governments in Devolution reforms. Please comment on the targeted service delivery and inequalities in service provision. Do politicians prefer to target social services? If yes, why?

2. How do social fragmentation and income inequalities among social groups affect politicians’ decision to prioritise social services delivery and developmental initiatives?

3. What are the prime determinants of voting behaviour in local elections?

4. Do voters consider personalised material benefits in return for votes? If yes, to what extent?

5. Is there any impact of politicians’ political party and religious affiliation on determining the voting behaviour?

6. Do voters consider educational attainment, income levels, land holding, family background and occupation of local government representatives?

7. What is the average cost of electioneering at the UC, District and Town level?

8. Please comment on the impact of patronage employment on voting behaviour and voter-politician relationships (before and after the elections).

9. Should the District and Tehsil Nazims be elected on a direct popular vote like the UC Nazims, UC members, MPAs, and MNAs? Please explain why or why not.

10. Should the political parties be officially and actively involved in running for local elections? Please explain your views.

11. What are the factors that adversely affect political activism and civic engagement in local governance? What can be done to overcome this issue?

12. What type of community and institutional oversight mechanisms can ensure more equitable and evenly distributed social services?

13. What affects the pre and post election credibility of local politicians and which type of changes in the institutional setup can help overcome the credibility constraints?
Appendix 5  
List of Interviewees (Phase 1: July – September 2008)

1. (Pilot Interview): Administrative Officer Town 3, Peshawar, Scale 16
2. (Pilot Interview) Naib Nazim (Convenor) Town 3, Peshawar
3. Nazim, Town 3, Peshawar (Working as Naib Nazim UC 36, Town 3 and Nazim Town 3 simultaneously)
4. District Naib Nazim, Mansehra
5. Town Officer, Town 3 Peshawar, Executive Engineer (Civil), Grade 18
6. Town Municipal Officer, Town 3, Peshawar
7. Chief Officer, Town 3, Peshawar
8. Union Council Nazim, Union Council Matta, Tehsil Shabqadar
9. Union Secretary, Union Council 36, University Town, Town 3, Peshawar
10. General Councillor / Member Union Council 36, Town 3, Peshawar
11. Union Secretary, Union Council 81, Town 3, Peshawar
12. Nazim Union Council Shaheen Town, Town 3, Peshawar
13. Secretary Local Government (Senior Bureaucrat), Local Government Secretariat, Peshawar
14. This interview is based on open discussion between interviewer and two Deputy Directors and one Assistant Director of the Services and Works Department, District Peshawar (Previously known as C&W Department)
15. Director Coordination, City District Peshawar
16. District Nazim Peshawar
17. EDO (Finance and Planning), District Abbottabad
18. District Officer (Female) (Schools and Literacy Department) Abbottabad
19. Deputy District Officer (Female Education) (Schools and Literacy Department) Abbottabad
20. Superintendent - LTR (License, Transport Terminal and Rent), Grade 17, TMA Mansehra
21. Assistant Tehsil Officer (Regulation), Grade11, TMA Mansehra
22. TMO Tehsil Mansehra

23. EDO (Health) Abbottabad

24. DCO Abbottabad

25. ACO (Assistant Coordinating Officer), Abbottabad

26. EDO (Finance and Planning) Peshawar (Did not allow recording)

27. All NWFP Local Government Convention was held at Nishtar Hall Peshawar on August 10, 2008. Around 1500 local government representatives that included elected Nazims, Naib Nazims and Councillors from almost all the UCs, Tehsils, and Districts of NWFP attended the event. I received a special invitation from District Nazim of Peshawar to attend this convention. The main purpose of this convention was to convey a message to the provincial government and show solidarity among the elected local government bodies against the possible abolition of local government system. I recorded all the speeches made by the representatives (mostly DistrictNazims) on that day. Although it was not a formal semi-structured interview, the speeches and my informal conversation with several local politicians provided me with invaluable information.

28. EDO (Elementary and Secondary Education), District Swabi

29. DO (Revenue), Finance and Planning Department, District Swabi

30. District Naib Nazim, District Swabi

31. TMO, Tehsil and District Swabi

32. UC Nazim Sara China, District Swabi

33. Tehsil Nazim, (Small) Lahore, District Swabi

34. EDO Education, Peshawar

35. Naib Nazim, Town 2, Peshawar District
Appendix 6
List of Interviewees (Phase 2: December 2009)

36. District Nazim, Swabi
37. UC Nazim, Chaknodia, District Swabi
37. UC Nazim Sara China, District Swabi
38. UC Nazim, Havailian Urban, District Abbottabad
39. Tehsil Nazim, Havailian, District Abbottabad
40. UC Nazim, UC City No. 3, Mansehra
41. UC Nazim, UC Tanda, District Mansehra
42. District Naib Nazim, Mansehra
43. District Nazim Peshawar
44. Town Naib Nazim (Convenor) Town 3, Peshawar
45. UC Nazim, Tarnab Farm, District Peshawar
Glossary of Non-English Words

**Biradaree:** Biradaree literally means fraternity. In this study, it refers to the social group or community that has members having similar ethnicity and/or occupation.

**Chowkidaar:** Watchman

**Gham Shadee or Gham Khadee:** Occasions of grief or happiness – participation in gham-shadee means attending communal social gatherings for instance weddings and funerals.

**Gram or Grahm:** Village (India)

**Gram Saba:** Assembly of the citizens/voters (India)

**Gram Panchayat:** Village Council (India)

**Hujra:** In NWFP province, Hujra refers to the communal place, which is used by almost all villagers as a communal guesthouse. Hujra and Mosque are the two most essential places and social institutions in villages. Social interactions and communal dispute settlements that are usually headed by the village elders and notables take place in Hujra.

**Islami Jamhoori Ittehad:** Islamic Democratic Alliance - Alliance of political parties formed against PPP’s government in 1988 in Pakistan.

**Itwaar Bazaar:** Sunday Market

**Jihad:** Muslims use the word ‘Jihad’ to describe three different kinds of struggle: 1) A believer's internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as well as possible, 2) The struggle to build a good Muslim society, and 3) a Holy war i.e. the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary (Source: www.bbc.co.uk)

**Jirga:** Jirga is an institution and a communal gathering wherein elders and parties to any dispute gather (usually at a Hujra) for dispute resolution that is informal yet very binding and effective. In most of the cases, verdict given by Jirga is more revered than a formal court’s decision.

**Jumba:** The term ‘jumba’ is used in Hazara region of NWFP province, which refers to the social faction that is formed based on ethnicity and/or occupation. Khan et al. (2007) describe that an electoral alliance could take the form of jumba, which is the formation of a particular group or faction for a particular election. It is important to note that factions sometimes cut across various ethnic lines.

**Mela:** Literally means carnival or festival however the term ‘mela’ in this study refers to a public event in the cities and villages where farm animals are sold.

**Mujlis-e-Shoora:** The bicameral federal legislature of Pakistan – The Council of Advisors.
Naib Nazim: Deputy Mayor

Nazim: Mayor

Nazimeen: Plural of Nazim

Panchayat: Informal local councils in Punjab Province (equivalent of Jirga in NWFP)

Panchayati Raj: Local government system in India

Taloqaat: Social interactions and relationships

Tehsil: Town

Tehsildar: Administrator of a Tehsil (Town)

Thana-Katchehree: Local police station and courts issues

Zamindar or Zamindari System: Zamindar literally means the land-owner in most of the Indian States - an aristocrat that owned a vast area of cultivable land and taxed the peasants who lived on it. Zamindars held enormous powers within their territories for instance, magisterial powers, influence in army recruitment, revenue collection and taxation (Source: www.wikipedia.org)

Zilla: District
References


